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ABSmACr 
'!be Role of the SUprEme 0Jurt in the <mstitutialal. System of the 
adted Arab Emirates - A <hIptratlve SbDy. 
Hadif Rashid Al~ 
'Ibis sttrly is CXXlCemed with demxlstratiB;J the importance of the 
Supreme Court in the CXXlStituticnal system of the Unite;i Arab 
Emirates, discovering its possible contributions to 
constituticnal developtelt am reccmnerxting measures to improve 
the effectiveness of the Court. 
A brief analysis of the modern history of the United Arab 
Emirates am an outline of the characteristics of this country 
and its society are provided. '!be CXXlStituticnal history of the 
country is given, with specific emphasis on the process of 
draftin;J the current CXXlStitution. 
The role of constitutional courts in federal systems, their 
ccntrihltiCl'lS to, and the theoretical basis for participation in 
the developnent and maintenance of, CXXlStituticnal systems is 
discussed. 
'Ibis sttrly includes a fairly detailOO analysis of the arguments 
abcA.lt the role of the U.S. Supreme Court am the lwerican FOOeral 
judiciary in practisiB;J judicial review, am the autb:Jrity of 
judicial interpretatiCl'lS of the CCI'lStitution. '!be West German 
experience in judicial review and its effects on fOOeralism is 
analysed. 
'!be CCI'lStituticnal system of the UnitOO Arab Emirates am the 
positial am canpetence of its Supreme Court is studioo. 'lbe 
legislative regulatial of the Supreme Court is evaluatErl. 
A detailed study is provided of the development of the 
jurispndenoe of the Court since its estabUslTnent. 
Firld.iD;Js am rec:allle1mtions aimed at ~ the ccntrihltion 
of the Supreme Court in the CCI'lSti tuticnal system of the Uni too 
Arab Emirates are provided. 
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'!be purpose of this study is to dem::nstrate the irrp:>rtance 
of the role of the Supreme Ccurt in the CXXlStitutional system of 
the United Arab Emirates CU.A.E.), to discuss its possible 
contributions to constitutional development and to suggest 
measures to improve its perfonnance. 
'1lle importance of the coort can be discovered through the 
study of the canpetence it is given am by analysing the way in 
which it discharges its duties. '1be importance of the cx:mpetence 
of the Supreme Ccurt in the calStitutiooal system of the U.A.E. 
is based primarily (Xl the power it is given to render birrling 
calStitutiooal interpretatioos, am also 00 the role it plays in 
resol v1nq diSIXltes alnJt the federal system. 
Because of their involvenent in calStitutiooal interpretat-
ioo am the importance of their cx:mpetence in determinirr:J the 
distribution of powers and the limits on the use of power, 
calStitutiooal cnlrts are often the subject of debate as to their 
proper roles am the legitimacy of their interpretations. In 
their applicatioo of legal rules coorts are by no means passive 
participants in the legal process. '1lle myth that coorts cnly 
interpret the law is supporte:l neither in theory nor in practice. 
Oxlstitutiooal interpretatioo involves wide use of discret-
ioo am clx>ioe for those e.rnpcwered to carry it rut. '1lle nature of 
constitutioos, the l~ge used in them and the fact that they 
are intE~rrled, generally, to last over lcn:J periods of time are 
some of the factors that make the interpretation of such 
Introduction 
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constitutions involve wide discretion. The framers of a 
constitution canJX)t foresee all p:>Ssible needs am situatioos in 
which a constitution will apply, so they provide texts that are 
general am allow for wide interpretive croice. 'lbeorists who 
call for literal interpretatioos of coostitutiooal texts canJX)t 
deny the general nature of the l.an:1uage used therein, and canJX)t 
argue that those who framed the constitutioo had the ability to 
predict all future applica.tioos. '!be ultimate result of the 
characteristics of l.an:1uage ani the ~ of a ooostitutioo is 
a large rooasure of interpretive discretioo for the constitutiooal 
jooges. 
'!be nature of constitutiooal interpretatioo and the croices 
available for jtrlges result in critical CCI'IIteIlts fran academics 
as well as fran those in power. <Ale basis for cri ticism of 
constitutiooal croice by judges relies 00 the traditiooal theory 
of law, that the law is "there" to be discovered, and that judges 
have 00 right to participate in the developnent of that law. 
Arx>ther cause for criticism is that constltutlooal croices by 
ju:iges can be considered uOOem::x::ratic in that it gives unelected 
or unaccountable persons the right to make choices that may 
oootradict dX>ices made by representative institutioos. 
In the face of challeD;Jes to the role of coostitutional 
coorts, these COlrt.s maintain the legitimacy of their dX>ices by 
dernalstrati.n; ju::licial ooherence in their decisioos. 'Ibis prcx:ess 
begins with reference 'to constitutional texts, but as their 
reliance exterrls beyarl the express words of ooostltutioos to 
include principles such as implied powers and measures like 
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hilancin;J the federal systems, rore refinement in their cooices 
and rationalisation of their principles is needed. 
Because of the p::>litical nature of coostitutions, the coorts 
in their interpretations are baJrrl to affect the political proc-
ess, but the important justification of the coorts deperrls on the 
rationalisatioo of their decisions in the light of OCt'lStitutional 
texts and their urrlerlyin;J values, and established jurisprudence. 
In federal systems coorts have been an essential part of 
rnaint:airlin:J and adjustiI¥J federal balance. '1bere is no single 
concept of federalism, even within a single state. '!be federal 
balance cannot be left to p::>litical organs without the risk of 
'nationalisatioo' l:7j the central governnent, or the disintegrat-
ion of the O:xlStitution by the acticn of the governnents of the 
states. It is of particular importance that the sOOrt tenn aims 
of a single state or the desires of central institutions do not 
thwart the general cx:mnitrnent to federalism. 
As federal experiences gather importance and cross national 
borders to new areas, and as solutions and adjustments within 
such systems are utilised in other countries, a canparative sb.rly 
of federal systems and their institutions beoanes rore important. 
Ju:licial review of legislaticn is adopted in many places, and the 
justifications and chall~s it faces are UlliIU, to several 
countries. 
'!be importance of canparative investigation into coostitut-
ional ju:licial review is to refute the myth that jlrlges simply 
apply the law, to sllc:M the role of oc:mts in umpir1n:J and maint-
Intrcduction 
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aining federal systems am to slx::M the necessity of justificaticn 
and coherence in the judicial interpretations of oonstitutions. 
Q::mparative investigation is not neant to slx::M that arguments 
which have succeeded in a particular jurisdictioo must succeed in 
another, but rather to demonstrate the core features of the 
process which must be present in any jurisdiction if the role of 
the oonstitutional court is to be discharged effectively. 
'!his study will examine the realities am possibilities of 
the role of the Supreme Court in the .developnent of the 
oonstitutional order in the U.A.E. '!be purpose of the stOOy is 
to enable those CCXlOeI'I'Ied with the oonstitution of the U.A.E. to 
understand the role of the Supreme Court in developing the 
oonstitutional order of the country, and to make suggesticns as 
to lx::M its functicns may be IOOre effectively discharged. 
'!be U.A.E. has its own characteristics, sane of which are 
unique to the country and sane which have been received fran 
other countries and fran earlier experiences. '!be country has a 
written oonstitutioo which came into force 00 2 December 1971: 
the day of in:iependenoe fron Britain. '!he oonstitution of the 
U.A.E. adopted the federal system, with the creatioo of a central 
government to which the emirates surrendered parts of their 
powers and sovereignties. '!be oonstitutioo of the U.A.E. is 
labelled "provisional". According to its provisions, the 
provisional oonstitutioo, interrled as a basis for st:rc'o3er unioo, 
was to be replaced by a new pennanent oonsti tutioo after five 
years. As will be seen, this replacenent has oot occurred. '!he 
distribJtioo of powers wi thin the oonsti tutional arrangements 
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contains no radical shift away fron the concentration of p::Mers 
with the heads of the anirates. 'lbe Suprere Ca.mcil in the Union, 
which is the central focus of legislative am executive p::Mer, is 
COlq::osed of the rulers of the respective emirates. 
The continued operation of the constitution beyond the 
initial five year perioo has maant that its provisions are to be 
applied to situations am for a duration beyorrl the intentions of 
its framers. Effective answers, solutions am decisioos were 
needed in the early years df the Federation am ccntirrue to be 
needed as the constitution continues in force. Due to the 
importance of the constitution and its necessity for the 
oontinued existence and developnent of the country, all problens 
created am questions raised about its operaticn need to be dealt 
with effectively. Effective interpretations of the coostituticn 
are needed, and answers where none are clear-cut, not just 
clause-bootrl interpretations of its provisions. As the country 
develops am bec:x:loes IIOI'e open to the world, in ccntrast to a 
rigid am closed society, the ~ies am challenges it faces 
grow, with the concomitant need to satisfy the demand for 
coostitutiooal answers. 
'lbe provisional CXll'1Stitution of the U.A.E. adopted jOOicial 
constitutiooal review. 'lbe task of constitutiooal review and 
interpretaticn was given to the Supreme Ccurt. In ad:lltion, the 
Supreme Ccurt has jurisdicticn in diSp.1tes between the nenber 
emirates am between them am the federal government. All of 
these matters are within the OCJ'll)etenoe of the Ccurt am, because 
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of the federal nature of the c:o.mtry, the Supreme CaJrt has an 
essential task to perfonn. It is important to study the possibil-
ities available, the discretion provided arx3 any obstacles to the 
Ccurt's full performance of its duty. Irrprovements cannot be 
made unless knc:Mledge arx3 appreciation are available as to the 
obstacles that exist am. the potential for such improvements. 
study of the formal am. informal factors affectirx;J the CaJrt am. 
of its past experience is needed for better urrlers~ arx3 
better prospects for improvements. 
Several of the institutiCXlS am. instruments utilised by the 
framers of the constitution are closely connected with, and 
largely attributed to, the U.S. constitutional system. The 
written constitution, federalism and judicial review of 
constitutionality are all attributed to the U.S. system. 
Examination of the cxntroversies arx3 possibilities in the U.S. 
Supreme Court's performance of its duties is helpful to the 
achievement of the ~ of this stlliy. 
West Germany has a more IOOdern cxnsti tuti<Xl ('!be Basic Law) 
than that of the U.S., arx3 has the three characteristics of: 
written constitution, federal system and judicial review of 
cxnstitutionality. stOOy of this system is also of help for this 
subject. '!be West Gennan system has an atHed benefit of beirx;J in 
a Civil Law CXlUIltry, which is more associated with the system 
adopted in the U.A.E. Examination of experiences of 
constitutional a:urts' experiences in federal systems is helpful 
in ~ JOOre light <Xl the solutiCXlS available to, arx3 ways of 
i.rnproviD:J the perfonnance of, the Supreme Cblrt of the U.A.E. 
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Following this introductien will be a study of the general 
history of the emirates, the nature of the society and the 
country as a whole. Developments in the twentieth century, 
leadin:J to the fonnaticn of the federal system will be analysed. 
The process of adopting the current constitution will be 
reported. All of this introductory information about the 
emirates will be dealt with in Part 1. 
Part 2 will deal with the role of supreme cnrrts in federal 
systems; the necessary interpretive roles of these ccurts; the 
experience of the U.S. in establishing the legitimacy of jOOicial 
review; the role of the West German constitutional court in 
mainta:inin;J federal balance; an:3 the effect of jooicial review of 
the ccmnerce power of the U.S. an:3 its general effect en the 
federal system. 
Part 3 will deal with the constitutional system of the 
U.A.E.; the actual positicn of the Supreme Coort in this system; 
am. the perfontanoe of the court since its establishment. A 
critical analysis of the powers, impediments am. possibilities of 
the Court's role will be provided. The development of the 
jurispru:ienoe of the court will be stuiied to show the ~ 
of the court's role am. its cx:nsistency in the discharging of its 
j urisdicticn. 
The conclusion will list findings and recommendations 
resulting fron this s~. 
PART~ 
0IAP.Im mE 
'!HE a:unRY« ITS IIIS'ltEY 1H> MJYE 'ltMARr5 mrIY 
The United Arab Emirates is composed of seven emirates, 
namely AbJ-Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajrnan, Um-Al-Qaiwain, Ras-Al-
Khaimah and Fajairah. Previously these emirates were autonarous 
polities. '!he geographical location and characteristics of the 
country are determinant factors in its past and present socio-
political, economic and strategic affairs. As part of the 
Arabian Peninsula it is part of the Arab world and the so-called 
Middle East area, and is inhabited by indigenous Arabs. The 
United Arab Emirates identifies itself as part of the Islamic 
world, having a totally Muslim irrligeno.ls population. 
The geographical and demographic characteristics of the 
country do not differ much from those of the neighbouring 
countries. '!he land is extrenely arid, with vast desert areas. 
'!he north eastern part of the country is well known for its Hajar 
l>b.mtains which rise fran the sea. '!hese IOC)U11tains ccntinue 
scuthward into neighbouring Qnan and are rugged, with difficult 
passes. '!hey separate eastern United Arab Emirates fran the rest 
of the country. Due to long separation fran the main part of the 
country, the mountain region and the eastern area are marked by 
the differences of popllation and ec:alallic status. 'Ihe mountains 
rrore than simply divide the country into two. '!hey act as a 
barrier for clouds caning fran the Irxiian Ocean, the effect of 
which is to precipitate rain on their peaks. Fran this watershed, 
the water runs downhill, providing the urxiergrourrl water which 
has for a long time supplied the necessary water for rrost of the 
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poIX.llation of the country. 
'!he western an:i south western part of United Arab Emirates 
is marked by an expanse of desert, an extension of the Empty 
Quarter, which is canprised of a vast ocean of sand arrl sand 
dunes with hardly any vegetation except in small isolated oases 
of Liwa villages. The coastline stretches about 430 miles along 
the Arabian Gulf and about 60 miles along the Gllf of <:inan. '!he 
main populated an:i ecoocmi.c centres are along the coast. 
'!he United Arab Emirates is located on the southern coast of 
the Arabian Gulf, bordering Saudi Arabia on the south an:i west 
an:i <:inan on the south east am north east. '!be total area of 
United Arab Emirates is approximately 32,000 square miles, made 
up as follows (1): 
Al:u-Dhabi 
Duba.i 
Sharjah 
Ras-Al-Khaimah 
fujairah 
Un Al--Qrlwain 
Ajman 
28,000 
1,500 
1,000 
650 
450 
300 
150 
The main cities are situated on natural coastal inlets 
all~ people in past and present times to harbour their ships 
am exploit marine resources for their living. Agriculturally, 
the land is poorly errlowed. '!be people of the camtry have 
traditionally deperxied for their living on the sea am on the 
vary sparse vegetation on the land. There were seasonal 
rrovements, between the sea am the hinter larrl. In sunmer, people 
terrled to roove to the coast in order to pearl am fish. In 
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winter the rainfall is sufficient to provide food for their 
carrels arrl goats. A proportion of the population lived in . the 
gocxl harbours to work in the local am the inter-port trade. 
other people were employed transporting seasonal crops arrl pearls 
between Iraq, Irrlia, Southern Iran, Qran arrl Fast Africa. 
In recent years the econanic position am financial strength 
of the anirates have been deeply affected by the discovery of oil 
in several of them, and the subsequent huge sums of money 
resulting fram the export of crude oil. 
'!he discovery of oil has had far reaching consequences on 
the society arrl its ea:xx::mic well-being. '!be material developnent 
of the emirates since 1965 has been revolutionary. Social, 
educatiooal, medical arrl other services have been generalSly 
provided for the citizens free of charge. 
'!be oil rocney has brought rocrlern technology arrl di versif ied 
skills. '!his has transfonned arrl rocrlernised the CCAlIltry, which 
is now excellently equipped. to provide canfortable living for its 
residents. '!be large influx of m:ney arrl the huge infrastructure 
proj ects arrl developnent plans have ccntributed in bringing to 
the CCAlIltry alien workers: technical, managerial arrl unskilled. 
'!he irrligeIlOJ.s populaticn form only about 18% or 20% of the total 
population resident in the country ( 2 ) 
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British &ltry to the Qll.f 
For a long time the coast of what is now the United Arab 
Thlirates was un::1er Qnani rule. Qnani danination spread fron the 
current Oman to include the Musandam Peninsula and the Gulf 
coast, as well as sane islands of the lower Gulf am parts of the 
Fastern coast, which now ccmprise part of Iran. Onani rule was 
challen:Jed by the Iranians and the Portuguese, as well as by the 
rising ~r of the Qawasim who managed to unite a munber of 
tribes am lead them to oust the Onanis fron the United Arab 
Emirates coast am fron all their positions in the Gulf. 
Although the Portuguese had a stake in the affairs of the 
lower Gulf in the 16th century before the rise of the Qawasim, 
they departed the area leaving few traces of their presence, 
except for sane forts. '!he Q:t.wasim took a position on Qishim 
Island and from there they managed seriously to affect the 
custans receipts of the British Fast IOOia Canpany fron Bandar 
Abbas by oontrolling the inter-port trade of the area (3). 
'!be first notable oontact between the British and the Arabs 
of the southern shores of the Q.llf (United Arab Emirates) was a 
military confrontation. The ruler of Ras-AI-Khaimah seized 
Basidu on Qishim Islam and established a trading centre there. 
'Ibis seriously affected the custans receipts which were being 
shared between the British am the Persians. In 1727, the Agent 
of the British East IOOia Canpany at Bandar Abbas led a naval 
expedition to Qishim Island and recovered the a::mpany I S share of 
dues fron the Q:t.simi representative on the islam (4 ). 
Bri tish trade with India grew in importance, and the trade 
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route needed to be safeguarded, using force where necessary to 
prevent any intrusion on their ships en route to and from India. 
Britain took resp::xlSibility for policing the southern shore of 
the Gulf against ccmpeting activities, by Europeans as well as 
Arabs (5). 
'!he activities of the British Fast India Canpany rerna.ined 
mainly commercial until the end of the seventeenth century. 
British political and military involvements increased steadily in 
the eighteenth century (6 ) 
O:ofn:ntaticn bet een the ():NasiJD aId the British East Irdia 
Britain saw the Gulf area as important for a variety of 
reasons. Firstly, it was both a source of Persian silk and offer-
ed a large market for the textiles produced in Surat in India. 
Secondly, the Gulf is close to Irrlia, and was therefore strat-
egically vital. In order to protect Irrlia from other European 
nations, and to safeguard British passage to Irrlia, Britain had 
to ensure that no other pc:Mer, foreign or local, could challenge 
them in the Gulf. Thirdly, the route from India and other 
eastern dominions, which were spice producing areas, passed 
through the Gulf to Basra in Salthern Iraq and from there to the 
Mediterranean, from where the spices were shipped to Britain and 
other European trade centres, was considerably shorter than the 
alternative route, used by Portugal and the Netherlands at that 
time, which passed arourrl the Cape of GoOO Hope. 
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'!he r:ivalry of econanic interests between the British and 
the Qiwasim, the Alliance be~ the British and the Imarn of 
Musqat who was the Qiwasirn's rival in the area, and the further 
alliance between the Qiwasirn and the Wahhabi state, all canbined 
to make the clash be~ the two sides inevitable. 
'!be first confrontations be~ the Qiwasim and the British 
were on Qishm Islam and at sea, rut these were insignificant. 
'!be first real war be~ the Q:lwasim and the British was in 
1809 when aramd 18 British warships attacked Ras-Al-Khaimah, the 
Qiwasim's main base, and destroyed all the ships in the harb::>ur, 
b.lrned the city and took whatever they could, returning to sea in 
spite of retaliation by the Saudi allies of the Qawasim. '!be 
British discovered after four years that what they had destroyed 
was only a small part of the Qiwasim navy, and that the Qiwasim 
had resumed their activities at sea by 1812 (7). In 1812 the Imam 
of Qnan with the assistance of the British, and with the help of 
the Bani-Yas tribes of Ab.l-rhabi, attacked Ras-Al-Khaimah to 
regain a position there, restore the situation and !=Ut an erx:l to 
Qiwasimi activity. '!be attempt failed and the Qiwasim prOVErl 
again that they were still strong enough to retain their 
iOOepeOOence and maintain the area under their rule ( 8 ). In 181 4 
the Imam of Qnan was finally successful, and imposed a truce on 
the ruler of Ras-Al-Khaimah by which this ruler relinquished his 
claim to Ras-AI-Khaimah and removed to Sharjah. One of his 
cousins became the new ruler of Ras-Al-Khaimah with the consent 
of the British representative. '!his step was aimErl at dividing 
the territory umer the a:>ntrol of the O:twasim in order to limit 
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their power. 
Through time am the weaken.in;J of Q:iwasimi daninion, new 
cities along the Gulf coast began to claim indeperrlence fran 
Q:iwasimi control. 
'!he Incepticn ani Deve1qment of t:b! TJ:eaty Relaticnship bet Bell 
Britain ani t:b! Emirates 
The Qawasim continued their maritime activities against 
those who they considered trade or political rivals, in 
particular the British, Indian subjects of the British government 
in IIrlia, am the Qnanis. The years fran 1808 to 1 81 8 witnessed 
the fall of the Saudi state at the hands of the Egyptians led by 
Ibrahim Pasha. The British in India were determined to take 
conclusive action to restore peace and stability for their trade 
in the Gulf. They sent Sir Wi11iam Keir with a considerable naval 
force arrl instructed him to destroy all piratical vessels arrl 
naval arrl military stores fourrl at Ras-Al-Khaimah. The British 
fleet stormed and occupied Ras-Al-Khaimah in December 1819 ( 9 ). 
Preliminary agreements were signed by the Sheikhs of Sharjah, wOO 
also signed on behalf of the Sheikhs of Ajman arrl Un-Al-Qiiwain, 
the Ruler of Ras-Al-Khaimah, and the Hinawi rulers of IXlbai arrl 
AOO-Dhabi (1 0) • 
The terms of these preliminary agreements were not always 
the same rut they aIOOUnted to assuring the surrerrler of vessels, 
fortified towers, guns arrl British Indian prisooers, while the 
rulers were assured of their rights to safe pearling and 
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This occasion marks the first identifiable incident in which 
the individuality of the emirates was recognised by an 
international power. 
The emirates already existed as irrlividual tribal confeder-
ations, rut this irrlividuality arrl irrleperrlence had exterrled only 
as far as domestic affairs were concerned. These emirates were 
increasingly treated as one political ccmnunity by the foreign 
powers entering the area. '!hat the British signed the agreE!llelt 
of 1820 with each ruler irrlividually, was an act with several 
levels of significance. One in particular concerns this study, 
that is it gave an extra dimensioo to the irrlividuality of the 
emirates, by rerogni.sing their irrleperrlence in the international 
sphere. '!be British could have signed the agreE!llelt with only 
one of the rulers, arrl rerogni.sed his authority over all the 
area. Such an act would have united the area even though 
mili tary force might have been necessary to enforce this unity. 
Why did the British choose to sign the agreE!llelt with each 
irrlividual ruler rather than rerogni.se only one daninant figure? 
'!bere were several reasons for this attitude. One factor was 
that the British were determined not to interfere in local 
domestic affairs. Another factor was that the British preferred 
to deal with several small (am. therefore weak) entities rather 
than with one canparatively strong entity. A third reasoo was 
that the domestic sphere was so cx::mplicated that the British 
foorrl themselves obliged to deal with several rulers rather than 
with ale alone. 
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An EYaluatial of the General 'l'I:eaty of 1820 
'!he name of this treaty is '!he General Treaty for Cessation 
of Plurrler am Piracy. '!his treaty was signed by the British 
Fast Irxiia Canpany with the Trucial states am Bahrain (12). 
'!he p.rrpose of signing this treaty was to preserve the trade 
of the Fast Irrlia Canpany am other British subjects against 
piracy or disruption. This treaty was not concerned with 
domestic matters, so it did not prevent the rulers from waging 
war against each other (1 3) • 
Article 4 of this treaty included a paragraph that the 
rulers: 
"urrlertook to be at peace with the British government am 
not to fight each other." 
But this part was viewed as exterrling further than the original 
pll"pOse of the treaty, so it was not enforced (14) 
'1be Ferpetual 'l'ruoe of 1853 
'!be British policy of nctl-interference in domestic matters 
and its lack of interest in inter-emirate disputes left the door 
open for conflicts am attacks by sea and on larrl between the 
emirates. 'lbere were several rea5alS why the British were not 
keen on preserving local security. '!hese incltrled the difficulty 
of carmunication, the sense of nationalism am the rejection of 
foreign interference in the local sphere. Another important 
reason was that the British were mostly concerned about the 
preservation of peace for their trade in the Irrlian Ocean am in 
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the Gulf which they considered not to be threatened. by local 
wars. 'Ihe frequency of conflicts between the emirates especially 
at sea disrupted the principal economic activity of the 
inhabitants, which was pearl fishing. In 1835 the British acting 
Political Resident suggested a maritima truce during the next 
pearl fishing season. So in August 1835 the rulers signed the 
suggested truce. 1be rulers bound themselves in this truce not to 
retaliate against any aggression if it happened in the pearling 
season, rut to re(X>rt the matter to the British naval authority. 
'Ihe non-retaliation truce was renewed annually to 1853, at which 
point the Political Resident consulted the rulers as to the 
(X>ssibility of signing a permanent peace at sea agreemmt (15) 
In this truce the rulers agreed to a complete cessation of 
hostilities at sea. 'Ihe rulers also agreed not to retaliate if 
they came urrler attack frcm another emirate at sea rut to infonn 
the British Resident atnJ.t the incident. 'Ihe i..m(X>rtance of this 
agreement is that whilst it was signed between the individual 
rulers am the Bri tish Representative, its prima obj ecti ve was to 
deal with relations between the emirates themselves to ensure 
peace at sea. So in this agreement we can see a major step 
towards normalising am pacifying relations between the emirates, 
who had for a long tima oonfronted each other at sea am on land. 
'lbe U::ii4jtehensive GgreBiEut of 1892 
During the 1870s and 18805 there were various activities of 
other states which the British ccnsidered to be an unacceptable 
Cllapter 1 - 19 -
challenge, and intervention in their danination of the emirates 
area. 'lbe French, Turks, Greeks and Persians all had sare contact 
with the emirates. In order -to ensure that other countries had 
no political or cc:mnercial contact with the emirates which might 
harm their interests, the British introduced and signed an 
agreement with the emirates allowing the British to control all 
the foreign political and cc:mnercial relations of the emirates. 
In this agreement, signed in 1892 with the individual 
rulers, the rulers agreed not to enter into any agreement or 
corresporrlence with any ~ other than Britain, not to ccnsent 
to the residence within their territories of any agent of another 
government and on no account cede, sell or otherwise give 
occupation of any part of their territories to anybody rut the 
British government. This agreement has been called the 
canprehensive agreement. In this agreement it is manifest that 
the emirates surrendered a great part of their iooepeOOence to 
the British government. 
'Ibis was the last of the imtx:>rtant treaties between the 
emirates and the British government. 
'DJe Leqal. status of the lSirates umer the British 'lmaty 
Relatials 
The British governnent treated the rulers of the emirates as 
heads of iooepen:lent states. On various occasions in the nine-
teenth century, these rulers professed sare kiOOs of allegiance 
to m::>re pcMerful governnents in the area. The governnents, such 
as the Wahhabis of Sau:li Arabia were interested in exterrling 
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their influence to the area. The fact that the British 
government decided to establish direct relations with the 
emirates shows that it did not consider that allegiance of the 
rulers to the other powers serioosly affected their imepemence. 
During the pericrl 1820-1892 the British treaties with the 
rulers were all in the nature of military alliances am friend-
ship. 'lhe British government exercised no legal jurisdiction 
over any part of the territories of the emirates (16). 
In the pericrl 1892-191 ~ treaties of protection am various 
other agreements were coo.cluded between the British government 
am the rulers of the emirates. '1bese agreements established 
closer relations between the British government am the emirates. 
Fran 1911 agreements concerning econanic matters am natural 
resources were signed, strengthening relations between the 
emirates am the British goverment further am creating a desire 
on the part of the British goverment to define Irore clearly the 
bourrl3.ries of the emirates. 
Fbsitial of the Emirates within the Br:itish Qmstit:utialal. 
fI: ewxk under the exclusive ajIeEiIEilt of 1892 
Under British Constitutional law, Protectorates differ from 
Colonies in that they do not constitute part of the British 
IXrninioos. In all British Protectorates foreign relations are 
controlled by the British Crown. Ibwever, the extent of power 
reserved by each protectorate internally is the basis on which 
British protectorates may be legally classified as: 
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(a) Cblcni.al Protectorates: In these protectorates the anount 
of pcMer exercised by the CrCMrl does not differ very inuch 
fran that exercised in the oolonies. In general the CrONIl 
reserves most powers of legislation and administration. 
However, in oontrast to the oolonies, these protectorates 
are regarded as foreign territories (17). Por.rlers of the 
Crown were acquired by virtue of agreements with tribal 
chiefs who agreed to place themselves under the sovereignty 
of the Qleen. '!he CrCMrl exercises jurisdiction in these 
protectorates over all subdects on the basis of the Foreign 
Jurisdiction Act, 1890. Legislation is enacted by Orders in 
Council, and an act of the CrCMrl in relation to a native 
in:lividual is regarded as an act of state which cannot be 
questioned in Ehglish ca.lrts (18). 
Cb) Prot:ect:ed states: In these states the British government 
has recognised the sovereignty of the local rulers, who have 
retained their independence at least with regard to the 
administration of their CMrl governments. With regard to the 
external affairs of those states, the ~rs reserved by the 
crown are based Cl'l treaty obligations. In practice the 
extent of pJWers exercised by the CrCMrl in these states 
varies from one state to another, according to the 
particular circumstances. '!bey are all, lx:Jwever, considered 
to be sovereign states and their rulers are granted 
inmunities fran jurisdiction in British courts. 
'!he difference between Protectorates and Protected states is that 
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in the Protectorate the British government assumes and exercises 
full sovereign authority, although without annexing the 
territory, while in the Protected State the sovereign authority 
belongs to the sovereign of the state, and the role of the 
British government is derived fron treaty agreements with the 
states (19). In relation to the Gulf states, the first official 
reference to them as ''British Protected States" was contained in 
'!he British Protectorates, Protected States and Protected Persons 
order in Council, 1949 (20) 
For the ~ses of this order the Gulf states, together 
with other states, were classified as "British Protected States". 
Urrler this classification and the treaty, the rulers of the Gulf 
states, and the states themselves remained, internally 
irrlepen::1.ent of British control. '!he governments of the Sheildrlans 
were headed by absolute rulers who reserved the power to make 
laws by proclamations and to administer, through representatives 
appointed by themselves, justice, police and various other 
functions of governnent. '!be British governnent exercised no 
power of legislatioo over any persons in the SheiJdrlans, other 
than those subject to the jurisdiction of British oourts (21) 
'!he Effects of British Treaties with the Eadrates 
British involvement with the emirates was fuelled by the 
search for greater stability and safety for its commercial 
interests in Irrlia. Raids 00 its cxmnercial fleet, and on ships 
CM1ed by its subjects, triggered the British attack. 00 Ras-Al-
Khaimah arrl the signim of the 1820 treaty. So the original 
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British interest was in the sea rather than on land. This goes 
sore way to explaining why the British were not interested in the 
domestic affairs of the emirates, and wished to avoid incurring 
unnecessary expense by intervening in domestic politics. 
British attitudes and policy had several consequences. By 
analysing British policy to, and its treaties with, the emirates 
we can note the following effects. 
1) 'J!)e IeCOgnitial by Britain that the rulers of the emirates 
are truly savereign with wtua it <DJ.ld have valid agreaiEllts 
uOOer intematialal law 
The emirates were canprised of numbers of people residing in 
certain areas alongside the Gulf, enjoying constant contact and 
relations with other groups of people living arourrl the scattered 
oases of the interior. Since the entry into the area of the 
British, the rulers have been recognised as irrleperrlent heads of 
tiny states subject to internatiooal law. The irrleperrlence and 
sovereignty of each emirate was placed in relation to the whole 
world and in relation to each other. Before the treaties, the 
influence of each emirate varied through time. Sharjah was 
unite1 with Ras-Al-Khaimah and included Ajrnan, Um-Al-Qaiwain and 
Fujairah, and was ruled by the Qawasim. Ab..l-Dhabi at one time 
exteojed fron the Peninsula of Qatar to the eastern part of the 
inlet of IXlbai. The 1820 treaty was the first written external 
recognition of the irrlividuality of each emirate. 'lbrough time, 
and chaD:Je in the balance of power in the domestic sphere, new 
emirates appeared (e.g. Fujairah) and other emirates disappeared 
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(e.g. Kalba), until the number of emirates stabilised. British 
recognition of new emirates was important for the bestov.ral of 
official credibility. British abstention fron recognising the 
existence of a new emirate delayed its appearance (as with the 
case of Fuj airah, which was not recognised by the British until 
the 1950s). 
The treaties with Britain were an important factor in 
recognising the sovereignty and the indi viduali ty of the 
emirates. 
2) '!he ~ of the coastal rulers as «\p:'5Ed to their 
cnmt.erpa.rts in.l.ard 
The British originally signed the treaties because of their 
need to safeguard their trade routes to India. Their dealings, 
therefore, were with the coastal rulers. Recognition by the 
British government of the sovereignty of the coastal rulers made 
these rulers the only ones recognised as politically sovereign in 
the eyes of the rest of the \VOrld. The international aoorgence of 
the coastal rulers was reflected internally by the need of the 
leaders of the interior to align themselves with, and be 
subordinate to, the coastal rulers. '!his was done in order to 
receive the support am achieve the stability they needed to 
establish permanent existence on larrls which had previously been 
in CU1I10ll use by all the turwlent people of the interior. 
The stability resulting fron the signing of treaties with 
Britain allowed pearling to flourish am the inter-port trade to 
increase. The increased wealth am enhanced ecooanic status of 
the people on the coast had enriched their rulers who taxed the 
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incx:ming pear ling ships and a:mnercial vessels. The enhanced 
economic status of the coastal rulers was a further incentive for 
inland leaders to subordinate themselves and their territories to 
the authority of the coastal rulers. 
The increasing strength of the coastal rulers helped to 
establish the present centres of political importance. The 
relative stability am security of the coastal cities, coupled 
with their econanic strength resulting fran the treaty, made 
these cities attractive to the inlarrl popllation, resulting in 
further concentration of people in the coastal cities. 
'!he anigration of people fran the hinterl.a..OO to the coastal 
cities had many consequences. Politically, it led to the increase 
in power of the rulers of these cities, am to a terrlency for the 
cities to become full city states. Profound changes in the 
ec:oncmic structure of the hinterlarrl took place. .Agricultural 
acti vi ties such as animal husbarrlry were abarrloned in faVCAlI" of 
those activities based on the sea, such as pearling, fishing and 
inter-IXlrt trade. '!his shift of eccn::mi.c importance in faVCAlI" of 
the coastal cities was later consolidated when oil revenues 
replacOO pearling revenues as the major soo.rce of incx:me. 
3) The improveaent in inter-eairate relations, and the 
fOlllBticn of the seven EIIlirates as me gJXJUp 
Inter-emirate relations went through several phases. The 
first phase was that prevailing prior to the involvement of the 
British. This phase was characterised by the division into 
oonflicting tribal alliances of the Qawasim am the Bani-Yas. 
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Later, the tribal alliances were restructured and a different 
pattern of conflict emerged. '!be restructuring occurred ~use 
of the alliances fornal during the Qnani civil war. '!be Qawasirn 
allied themselves with the Ghafiri, whereas the Bani-Yas 
supported the Henawi. The alliances, however, could not be 
naintained. So Bani-Yas suffered internal conflicts, one of which 
resulted in the establishment of the emirate of Dubai (22). The 
Q:iwasirn alliance suffered similar conflicts which resulted in 
their sphere of influence being divided into several new 
emirates. Inter-emirate relations were far fron frierrlly or 
stable. Rather, there were ronstant conflicts, o:mpetition over 
econanic resources am tribal disagreements. '!be signing of the 
1820 treaty with the British started a series of events which 
resul ted in the signing of a truce, the subj ect of which was to 
errl the acts of transgression between the emirates. The British 
were not prepared to play the role of perpetual roodiator between 
the emirates, so they did not naintain an adequate force to do 
this job. After signing the treaty with the British, the rulers 
felt that although there were no British naval ships in their 
area, they were capable of calling on the British military force 
in any major conflict. As this feeling strengthened, the 
incidence of war between the emirates declined. '!here were ti.nes 
when acts of aggression at sea began to increase, jeopardising 
the vital pearling in the Gulf. 'lb reduce cx:nflict. the treaties 
of 1835 am 1853 were intrcrluced. The 1853 treaty introduced new 
factors into inter-emirate relations: because the rulers agreed 
not to retaliate against any aggression suffered at the hands of 
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other emirates during the pearling season. The non-retaliation 
policy activated under the 1853 treaty eliminated a principal 
cause of inter-enirate wars arxi CCJnflicts. 
A later treaty added a new dimension to inter-emirate 
relations: the grouping of the emirates into one unit. '!his 
treaty of 1897 has been has been called "'!he agreement for the 
mutual surrender of fraudulently absc:::x:xning debtors". '!his agree-
ment provided for the establishnent of an Arbitration Camcil 
convened on behalf of the emirates' rulers. It was a Significant 
step towards rroulding the emirates into one political . structure 
an::} separating them fron the other Sheikhdans in the area (23). 
The grouping of the emirates into a single unit became 
increasingly evident. CAle reason was the c:x::xmon treatment by the 
British. Treaties were often signed by all the rulers, whilst the 
British interests were represented by one representative who was 
for a ccnsiderable time the native Resident Agent, situatal in 
Sharjah. 
-4) '!be abolitial of slavery 
'!he 1820 treaty callal upcn the rulers to prevent their 
subjects fron carrying off slaves fron anywhere arxi transporting 
them. '!his did not end slavery in the area, although the treaties 
helped to curtail the slave trade. Later in the twentieth 
century, the British representative began to issue certificates 
to slaves pronouncing them free. This ended slavery in the 
emirates. '!be abol1tioo of slavery precipitatal major changes in 
the social and ec:x:nanic status of the people of the emirates. 
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1. FOlitical ))eyel. ,""Alts 
The British expedition and attack against the Qiwasirn helped 
to disintegrate their state into several Sheikhdans which were 
subsequently recognised by the British. At the same time, the 
Bani-Yas state was left intact because it was an inland-based 
state with no maritime power, (and therefore causing no threat to 
British trade). This helped to shape the political geography of 
the area. 
The first signs of change were the appearance of two 
emirates, namely Ajman and Un-Al-Qiiwain. with local leaders who 
had previously fallen under the authority of the Qiwasirn. These 
leaders were now elevated to the status of iOOeperrlent rulers, 
with the power to sign treaties with the British. A further step 
in the disintegration of the Qawasirn state was the division of 
the Qawasirn themselves into two iooeperrlent Sheikhdans, Sharj ab 
and Ras-Al-I<haimah. In time, the town of Kalba on the eastern 
<X:last was also recognised as an iOOeperrlent Sheikhdan. 
The disintegraticn of the Qawasirn state continued into the 
twentieth century. Fujairah was rerognised as an iooeperrlent 
emirate in 1951, and there have been attempts by two other towns 
(Himriyah and Rams) to gain :Urleperrlence fran the Qawasirn. In 
1838 the Bani-Yas state, whidl continued to prosper, suffered an 
incident of disintegration. Same Bani-Yas families left to settle 
in IAlbai, oostin;J the governor who was awointed by the Al::u-Dhabi 
ruler. They established a new Sheikl'rlan with the Al-Bu-falasah 
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family as a ruling family. The present number of seven emirates 
dates fran the 1950s. 
The geographical size of each emirate is related to its 
history and developnent. For example, Abl-Dhabi is the largest 
because it is a land-based Sheikl'rlan, whereas the Qlwasim have 
two smaller emirates because, being a maritime state, it was 
attacked by the British, and eventually disintegrated into 
several emirates. 
The growth of Abl-Dhabi was enhanced by the strength of its 
ruler, Zayed bin Khalifa, who ruled for over sixty years (1855-
1909) • During the reign of Zayed bin Khalifa, the capital of 
Bani-Yas was transferred fran Liwa to Abl-Dhabi Island; pearling 
activities brought economic success to the emirate; and the 
daninance of AbJ-Dhabi was recxJgIli.sed over the Islands facing its 
territory as well as over the important Buraimi Oasis. The 
policies followed by Zayed proved successful in gaining the 
allegiance of several important tribes, through financial 
assistance as well as through marital relationships and well-
conducted diplomacy. The British were mostly interested in 
preserving peace at sea for the benefit of their trade and postal 
routes, their emerging strategic interests in the area in the 
form of air routes to India and telegraphic stations in the 
emirates. The British were c:x::ncerned to preserve the status quo 
and were against any change which might urrlermine the stability 
of the area. 'Ibis policy entailed activities to maintain the 
existing emirates and their ruling families, their defence 
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against any threat from inside or outside and defending the 
emirates fram the ambitions of each other. 
In their treaties with the emirates, the British undertook 
to protect them frcm foreign attacks, so they were save::l both 
fram the Saudi expansionist designs arrl frcm Iranian ambitions. 
Relatiooships anong the emirates in the nineteenth century 
were marked by continuing ani.IIDsity between the Bani.-Yas of Aru-
Dhabi and the Q:iwasim of Sharjah, arrl between each of them and 
IAlbai. 'Ibis latter was est.a..!Jlished when part of Bani.-Yas secede::l 
in 1838. 
'!he relationship between the smaller emirates, establishe::l 
in the former Q:isimi territory, and the remaining Qisimi state 
was one of continuing unrest. All the rulers of the emirates 
used the nanads of the interior as fighting men. 'Ib enlarge 
their territory, the rulers attsnpted to gain the loyalty of the 
residents. '!heir success in gaining the loyalty of the nanads 
was an assurance of their expaming and increasing power. Aru-
Dhabi was remarkably successful in its alliance with the nanads, 
arx:1. CXXltinued to expand and to gain strength. 
'lbere were, however, times when the rulers felt the need to 
co-operate in order to achieve their CXllilUl erns. 
One of the remarkable co-operative achievements was the 
signing of the Perpetual Peace Agreement in 1853. In 1905 the 
rulers of the emirates of that time (Aru-Dhabi, ~i, Sharjah, 
Um-Al-Qaiwain and Ajman) held a meeting to solve a dispute 
CCXlCerrrl.n:J sane roountain villages. 'Ibis was the first recorded 
meeting of all the Sheikhs in a Council (24) 
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'Ille British policy of general non-interference in dcnestic 
politics left the different relevant factions to interact as they 
chose. What concerns us here is that the rulers felt the need 
for joint action and co-operation. Co-operation among the 
emirates continued, am later developed into institutional I::xxlies 
with the permission am ~agem:mt of the British autrorities. 
'lhese experiences of joint actions am the later co-operative 
institutions had a decisive effect in ~aging the emirates to 
accept the Federation when it was time for the British to leave 
the area. 
British policy appeared to encourage co-operation between 
the emirates. At the same time, each emirate retained its indep-
eOOence. '!be British IX>licy of guaranteeing the iOOeperrlence of 
the emirates fron the ambitions of other emirates entailed the 
repeated threat to use force against any emirate which appeared 
to be challenging the iOOependence of another emirate (25). 
As a general rule, fighting decreased with the passage of 
time. Maritime fighting was virtually eliminated by the 
Perpetual Peace treaty. Fightin;;r on larxl decreased steadily, 
with SIX>radic exceptions. The emirates were gradually nnving fron 
an era of continuoos war am hostility into an era of mutual 
urrlerstarrling am co-operation. 
The absence of a law of prim::qen.iture in the emirates has 
been a cause for continUous tuInoil am unrest. In the event of 
the death of a ruler, rulership used to be harrled down to the 
nearest adult male, but this was not a general rule accepted by 
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all the ruling families am their members. Furthernore natural 
death was not the only way of errling one reign and beginning 
another. There were murders by brothers, nephews am cousins, am 
there were depositions am secessions. The challenge of power in 
the emirates was continuous. While the people of each emirate 
generally accepted the ruling family as their source of rulers, 
canpetition arrong the members of such families was generally 
endless. The murder of some rulers am the deposition of others 
was a feature of all the emirates except Dubai in which troubles 
aroc>ng the members of its ruling family were never allCMed to 
escalate to the level of changing the ruler. A reason- for this 
nay have been that Dubai is the trading centre of the area am 
the ruling family was aware that political unrest on the darestic 
scene might lose the emirate its privileged position. Two 
emirates experienced the greatest darestic tunroil. These were 
the two largest emirates, namely Sharjah am Al::u-Dhabi. 
The ccmpetition for the ruler's post used to begin after a 
keg reign by a strong Sheikh, so in Al::u-Dhabi the troubles began 
after the death of Zayed bin I<halifa (who ruled fron 1855 to 
191'(», am in Sharjah the najor tunroil occurred after the death 
of Sultan bin Sagr (who ruled fran 1803 to 1866) (26). 
It was UllIlCtl for the rulers to regard the threat fran their 
family members as more dangerous than the threat from other 
emirates or foreign powers, so there were incidents in which the 
rulers invited the British to defend them against ambitious 
family members, and in other incidents the rulers called on the 
co-operation of other emirates to end a danestic challenge by a 
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family member (27) 
Domestic chall~es to government played a significant role 
in inter-emirate relations. Two emirates could improve relations 
at a time when it was important for one or the other to have out-
side support to em. a danestic challenge to power. At other times 
new a.nirrosity could erupt arrl wars begin if the ruler arrl his 
closest family members considered that another emirate was 
assisting am providing refuge for one of their family members 
trying to wrest the rulership fron them. 
'!he final stage of gairliD;J power in an emirate involved 
official recognition of the new ruler by the British authorities. 
'!his was signified by the delivery to them of copies of all the 
previOJS treaties am agreements, am by having the ruler agree 
to abide by these treaties. 
'!he British, by their recognitioo of new rulers arrl new 
emirates, were the final arbiters in the settlement of danestic 
unrest by recognising the status of the new ruler, or the new 
emirate. 
2. lb:aulic Deyel., It of the Rld.rates aId its Effects 
Traditionally, the people wtx> resided in the emirate areas 
were either camel breeders or fishennen, with lx>th engaging in 
date palm plantations. The coastal people also used their boat 
l:uilding skills to bJild larger vessels to engage in inter-port 
trade between Iraq, Iran, Iooia am Eastern Africa. The desert 
people were mostly camel breeders am date palm grCMerS. '!bey 
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would drink camels' milk and eat dates as their daily diet. 
There was an interchange of goods between the coast and the 
interior, so the people of the interior would bring firewood am 
milk products to the coast am buy dried fish am sane imported 
products. '!he traditional way of life had implications for the 
inter-emirate relations. Arrong the reasons for friction arrong 
the emirates were: dis~tes over grazing areas, inter-tribal 
feuds, disputes over water resources and other kinds of 
ccmpeti tion over resources both en the coast am in the interior. 
'!his, then, was the pattern of life until the appearance of 
the British and their treaties with the rulers in the early 
nineteenth century. Treaties with the British authorities in 
Irrlia assured the rulers am their subj ects of access to Irrlian 
markets, am also gave an assurance of protection if they flew 
the appropriate flags on their ships. The ensuing period 
wi tnesse::l rapid growth in pearling, because of the assured access 
to Irrlian markets am the new markets for their pearls in Europe 
am the United States. 
Durin3 the era in which pearling flourished, new kirrls of 
inter-emirate disputes arose. Pearl diving needed to be 
financed. '!he m:>ney came fron local financiers as well as fron 
Indian nerchants living in the area. Q\e problem was that sane-
times (especially towards the end of this era) the pearling 
vessels were earning less than what was expected of them. 
Consequently their owners suffered loan repaynent difficulties, 
am sanetines abscx:>rrled to a neighl:a.lring emirate where they 
could start afresh. '!he flight of debtors cause::l dis~tes, am 
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sanetimes wars, between the emirates. In 1897, therefore, all 
the trucial Sheikhs signed an agreement for the surrerrler of 
fraudulent absc::orrlers (28). 'n1e dispJtes referred to in the 1897 
agreement were to be decided by a (X)UI1cil of the rulers. This was 
a positive step towards solving their disagreements by co-
operative efforts. 
'!be pearling era brought with it a new source of incane for 
the rulers and their families: taxing pea.rling vessels. 'n1e 
increased wealth of the ooastal rulers and their acquired ability 
to support inland nanads and tribes financially, brought than not 
only strength but also sometimes new sources of territorial 
conflict between the emirates and dispJtes over loyalty of the 
inland tribes. Taken as a whole, the pear1ing era was beneficial 
to the rulers. 
'!be rulers and their people had fourrl a significant source 
of incane. Overall, this terrled to stabilise the region because 
it was recognised that unrest and disturbance could ruin their 
pearling activities and endanger their econanic progress. 
~ the benefits of the pear1ing era, and the financial 
well-being it brought to the people of the emirates, was access 
to the outside world. In c:cntrast with the situation of the 
emirates prior to the pear1ing era, the people were able to 
travel to Irxlia to sell their pearls and to 00y goo:1s. '!be 
people also developed an interest in regional affairs. 
By 1930 the Gulf pearl trade was in decline. The 
intrcrluction of Japanese cultured pearls; the world recession; 
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and the new restrictions imposed by Irrlia on the importation of 
the Gulf pearls; all had a cumulative effect. 
The sOOden decline of the pearl trade had several social and 
political effects. Large numbers of people migrated to 
neighbouring countries looking for work. Once-wealthy pearl 
merchants accumulated debts to Irrlian financiers. Intervention by 
the British Political Resident attempted to ensure that the debts 
.....ere paid, but the rulers failed to pay their debts, because they 
were used to paying for their allies and inland tribes. 
Starvation became apparent in most of the emirates, and the 
people returned to their old ways of life. '!be emirate area and 
its people lost much of what they had gained in past decades and 
returned to being an isolated area with little attention paid to 
it by the outside world. 
One emirate was excepted fran the sudden return to poverty; 
this was nIDai. Its geographical position and the liberal trade 
policy adopted by its ruler encouraged commercial activity. 
Inter-p:>rt trade with the Iranian ooast throve. nIDai became the 
centre of commercial activity in the area, and a number of 
Persian traders emigrated to nIDai in order to continue their 
trade. '!be importance of nIDai was further ackn:::Mledged by the 
British transfer of their Political Residency fran Sharjah to 
Dubai. As a whole, however, the emirate area remained 
economically unimportant until the discovery of oil in 
neighbouring countries, and the prospects of oil discovery in the 
emirates area. 
Oil was first struck in cx:mnercial quantities in Abu-Dhabi 
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in the late 1950s am increased into the 1960s with oil i.ncane 
doubling am trebling bi-annually. The other anirates benefited 
from oil money even before production carried oil from their ter-
ritories. This was by the payrrent of rent of concession lams. 
'!he dawn of the oil era was, to an extent, a mixed blessing. 
One consequence was the rekindling of territorial disputes 
be~ the emirates, am the challen:Je by the inland tribes to 
the authority of the rulers to grant concession rights CNer their 
hane-lands. '!he British began to take a IOOre active interest in 
the darestic politics of the emirates. '!hey formed a new defence 
force, gave financial assistance to the emirates, and advised 
CNer concession agreements. Ehlployrrent prospects for the people 
rose, am m:rlern medical and educational (and other) services 
became available for the first time. 
The rulers of the oil producing emirates were acquiring 
unprecedented financial stren:jth. 'Ihese emirates .....ere AhJ-Dhabi 
and IAlbai, and later Sharjah and Ras-Al-Khairna.h. 
3. SaDe Aspects of !level., rt: in the Twentieth CBrt:ury 
(a) The number of emirates fluctuated from just two in the 
nineteenth century (the Qiwasim and the Ban!-Yas) to al:xlut nine, 
and stabilised at seven emirates in the 1950s. The seven 
emirates appeared as independent from each other and .....ere each 
recognised by Britain. 
(b) As the number of the anirates stabilised at seven, with IOOSt 
of the emirates having seceded from the original two, a new 
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problem arose of how to determine territorial bourrlaries between 
emirates. The problem of defining bourrlaries was canplicated by 
several factors: 
i the absence of clear conventional rules for defining 
territories; 
ii the fluctuation of tribal loyalty, which was the IOOst 
important sign of the distriOOtion of land anong the 
emirates; 
iii the discovery of oil dramatically increased the 
importance of land, and precipitated vigorous 
canpetition between the emirates to claim c:r.mership of 
territories which had for a 1cng time been neglected; 
iv the scarcity of water had sanetimes been the cause of 
disp.ltes about the c:r.mership of wells and other water 
sources; 
v the small original area of sane emirates coupled with 
their need for land to provide for residential and 
other services, led them to try to enlarge their areas 
by claiming ownership of territories lying between them 
and other emirates (29) and; 
vi the canp1ex intertwining of the emirate territories 
complicated the problems of defining the exact 
territorial boundaries. 
Territorial disputes have been a traditional feature of 
relations between the emirates. l<breover, territorial disp.ltes 
ccntinued, even after Federation. In ale instance, the conflicts 
led to ccnfrontation between two emirates with the resulting loss 
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of several lives. Fortunately nost of the territorial disputes 
have been settled gradually over the past few years. 
(c) '!he gain by the rulers of a new source of power, which was 
the IOCney received as royalty payments curl CXXlcession rentals 
fron the oil ccrnpanies. '!he IX>tency of oil to enhance the power 
of the rulers lay in the fact that, on the one haOO, ownership of 
the natural resources was vested in the government of each 
emirate, curl on the other haOO that the rulers were fiscally 
almost unrestricted. Fach local econany became deperrlent on the 
local government curl the will of the ruler to speOO the oil rconey 
on public services curl investment proj ects. Local governments, 
and particularly the rulers, were able to strengthen their 
p::>Sitions by providing rconey for tribal groups curl establishing 
new services. 'Ibis resulted in increasing the loyalty of the 
people to them. In direct ccntrast, the old system of financing 
the governments of the emirates was mainly fron taxes curl custans 
duties which meant that the rulers needed the c::x:H:lperatioo of the 
people to ensure their incanes. 
(d) In the middle of the twentieth century the emirates area 
began to open up to the rest of the Arab world fron whence 
teachers, doctors am ci vU servants came. Radio broadcasts 
received fron Egypt curl other Arab a:xmtries transforned Arab 
natiooalism, curl engemered resenbrent of the heavy presence of 
non-Arabs in the area, especially in the 1950s curl 1960s. 
(e) 'Ihe rapid educatiooal developnent in the area transferred 
the attentions curl c:x:xlCernS of the majority of people fron local 
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affairs to regional concerns. 
( f) '!be canpeti tion for power in the ruling families continued 
to weaken the rulers am their power in nost of the emirates. 
'!he rulers have generally terrled to have their family members 
share with them their political power am financial gains. '!he 
attention of rulers was nostly divided between the ccmpeting 
emirates am challenging members of their families. 
(g) The flow of oil money and the need to spend it on 
infrastructure am to proviqe services made it essential to bring 
in foreign workers. 
The money brought with it foreign companies and foreign 
investors. '!he result of the flCJlli of foreigners was that they 
became the majority - atcAlt 85% at CXle time. '!he large munber of 
foreigners in the country had several effects. As well as using 
the free health am other services, the foreigners brought with 
them a range of problems for emirate society, including an 
increase in the crime rate, am the introduction of drugs. 
(h) Cbnfirmation atcAlt the imepeOOence of the emirates am the 
new-found strength of the rulers served to make the emirate 
governments focal points in emirate political life. 'lb gather 
the tribal units am the ncmads, encooraging them to identify 
with one of the emirates became politically important. '!he oil 
m:ney streD;Jthened the appeal of affiliation with the emirates, 
especially those producing oil. Recognition of affiliation am 
the benefits derived fron their governments gradually ercrled 
tribal loyalties, which transferred to the emirates instead. 
With the appearance of the Federal G:wernnent am its role of 
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bestc::Ming nationality, am providing education, health services, 
rrost of the civil service am social services am allc:Ma.nCes~ it 
began to ccmnand loyalty. 
4. Islam am its Effects in the Hnirates 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the residential 
~tion of the anirates was alrrost hcm:lgeneously Surmi Muslim. 
'!be exceptions were a few Shi' a Muslims wOO had emigrated fran 
the Persian coast am India, am even smaller numbers of Hirrlu 
pearl merchants living in the area temp::>rarily. There were no 
signs of canpetition between a majority am a minority, am no 
differences ancng the irrligenous residents in their religious 
beliefs. The Stmn1 sect canprises four schools of opinion. All 
of these schcx:>ls agree on the religious beliefs an:l furrlaIoontal 
principles rut differ in sane of the interpretations of sane 
legal am behavioural duties contained in the original sources. 
&It the differences were minor am had no schismatic effect on 
the popllation, despite the presence of three of the four schools 
in the anirates. 
The overwhelming uniformity of belief, am the fact that 
Islam occupied a supreme position in the people's lives, unified 
the pop.llation, especially in the face of foreign intervention. 
Islam was am still is the basis for both public am private life 
of the people in the Q.llf area. 
Islam was considered the IOC>St important basis for c:x:::nstitut-
ional am legal rules in the emirates. Custanary law generally 
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played a major role in interpreting the general rules, filling 
the gaps, and adapting Islamic legal principles to the local 
society. There were few educated Judges and Religious Leaders 
employed by the rulers. Despite this fact the general rules app-
licable to the different matters of public and private life were 
usually knc::Mn by inheritance fran generation to generation with 
rocdification fran time to time. So, Islamic law was applicable, 
rut its rules were supplemented by custan and usage. The rulers 
were the final arbiters in their emirates, rut with the passage 
of time and the increased canplicatiCXlS of life, the rulers began 
to appoint Judges educated in Islamic Law. In the 1960s, Western 
laws \lllere introduced in Ulbai and Al:u-Dhabi with the emirates 
applYID:J their rules. Judges with Western legal education began 
to appear with the introduction of the new laws. The new laws 
were basically CXXlCemed with o:mnercial, traffic, tax, penal and 
emigration matters. Islamic law was to govern in all matters rot 
provided for in the new cedes. The British political agent was 
responsible for matters concerning foreigners and this was 
provided for by Orders in Council of 1 950, 1956 and 1959. 
5. Joint Actioos ani the IGd to Federat1cn 
The emirates \lllere on the road to greater co-operation and 
closer relatiCXlS with the passage of time. The <XJ1IOOl1 needs and 
characteristics of the emirates \lllere overwhelming and the British 
authorities encouraged them to co-ordinate activities and 
establish friendly relatialS towards each other. 
The first examples of joint action \lllere treaties for peace 
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at sea ani other kirrls of agreements, further the rulers felt 
the need to meet as a council to solve sare problems concerning 
tribal disputes. After the Sea:nl World War ani the beginning of 
the British policy of increased attention to the domestic affairs 
of the emirates, the British encouraged joint activities ani 
established projects to institutionalise the new increased c0-
operation between the anirates. 
British concern about the domestic affairs began with 
activities in two different spheres. The first was the provision 
ani organisation for the developoont of the service sector in the 
emirates starting with health and extending to agriculture, 
education, roads and other kinds of services. Development 
assistance was launched in 1939 with a dispensary in ~i, then 
developerl to be administered by the Developoont office. The 
sec:xxld of the British projects was the establishment of a IOCrlest 
military land force to protect peace under a variety of 
circumstances. This force was called the Trucial Qnan Levies, 
subsequently renamed the Trucial Qnan Soouts. The new force was 
needed to protect the oil explorations ani the airfield, ani to 
ensure peace between the emirates. The Trucial Qnan Soouts later 
fonned the core for the Union Defence Force after iOOeperrlence. 
To co-ordinate the developnent projects ani co-operative efforts, 
the British established a council of the rulers of the emirates. 
This council was calleq the Trucial states Cooncil (TSC). The 
TSC was established in 1952 with the British political agent as 
President and the rulers of the seven emirates as members of the 
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cnmcil. 'Ibis council was a venue for ~rdination and c0-
operation between the rulers. It had neither written dOCUItWents 
regulating its work nor any real pc:Mer to execute its decisions. 
fbwever the TSC remained for a pericd of a1:::out 20 years helpinJ 
to draw the emirates and their rulers together arrl to open the 
way for closer and rore frierrlly relations between them. 'lb 
organise its work, the TSC set up specialised carmittees and 
established the Developnent Furrl which administered the financial 
assistance received fran the different sa.rrces, channelling the 
assistance towards several vital services in the emirates. '!be 
TSC was helpful proof for the emirates that together they could 
achieve success and move forward to developments. More 
importantly, the rulers came to feel that their indeperrlence 
walld be preserved while the co-operative projects were provided. 
'!be rulers met in the TSC nearly twice annually, so it was a gocd 
chance to forget the age old tensions and begin to strengthen 
perSCXlal relations between each other. 
In the mid 1960s Olainnanship of the Council was transferred 
fran the Political Resident to one of the rulers elected by the 
Council for a specific pericd of time (30). '!be TSC had an 
important effect 00 the people of the emirates. It gave them a 
sense of unity by daoonstrating to them that their vital services 
of health, carmunication am agriculture were provided to each 
emirate by the one cnmcil. 'l'cM'ls saw the establisment of work-
shops and offices carrying the name of the TSC and its 
Developnent FUrrl. '!bese developnents helped to make the idea of 
inter-emirate co-operaticn acceptable and welcx:rne. Relations 
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changed fron aniJrosity between the emirates to frierrlship am c0-
operation. 
'!be idea of Federation between the seven emirates, Qatar am 
Bahrain was triggered by the armouncement by the British 
government on 16th January, 1968 of its intention to terminate 
its official treaty obligation with all of the emirates am to 
leave the area by the errl of 1971 (31) 
6. '!he DJbai h;Jree!iiiSlIl of 1968 am its Effects 
'!be annooncement by Britain of its intentions to leave the 
area, pranpted anxiety am fear of a future full of dangers am 
challenges. Politically, militarily am econanically the emirates 
had always had the security of Britain as representative, 
protector am keeper of the status quo. '!here were ambitions 
fron Iran am other forces in the area for rrore power. Could the 
small emirates face the world as independent States? This 
question, and hosts of others, prompted the rulers of the 
emirates ani the neighbouring cwntries to start discussions am 
speculations about the future of the area (32). 
'!he first concrete result of Unioo of the area, following 
the British announcement was a bilateral agreement between Aru-
Dhabi and Dubai. On 1 9 February 1968 Abu-Dhabi and Dubai 
a.nnamced that they had reached agreement on federation between 
them, stiIXllat1ng that the federatioo should be established un:ler 
one flag am be respoosible for foreign affairs, defence am 
internal security, medical and educational services, and 
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ci tizenship am migration (33) 
The rulers of Atu-Dhabi arrl ~i exterrled a pledge in their 
agree.rrent for the five other emirates of the coast of aran, am 
the two other emirates of Qitar arrl Bahrain, to consult on the 
issue of unifying their efforts to ensure a better future for the 
area (34). 
A week after the accord between Atu-Dhabi and n.IDai was 
annamced, all the rulers of the other seven emirates respcn:led 
positively to the invitation exterrled in that accord. A meeting 
of the nine rulers was a:nvened in n.IDai frcm 25 - 27 February 
1968 for ccnsultation on fonning a union of all nine emirates 
(35). An agree.rrent was reached to fom the "United Arab Emirates 
Federation" (which we will refer to as the ~i Agreement). 
Objectives of this federation, that were announced in the 
declaration, inclooed: stability in the region, CCf1IOC)ll defence, 
strengthening joint actions and co-operation for developrent and 
a better future for the people. '!be agreement determined federal 
authorities to be: 
1) A Supreme Cooncil canprising the rulers of the emirates to 
oversee the affairs of the federation and to be the supreme 
legislative am executive authority in the Union (36). 
2) An Executive Council was provided under the name the 
Federal Council. This cooncil was to assist the Supreme 
Council and act according to the p:>licies established by the 
rulers in their meetings as the Supreme Council. The 
decisions of this cooncil do not take effect unless approved 
by the Supreme Cooncil (37) 
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3) '!be Federal Supreme Court, which was detennined to be the 
highest judicial authority in the Union. '!be cx:rnp8Sition 
arrl canpetence of this court was to be defined by law (38). 
'!be agreement provided in Article 4, that the Supreme Council 
shall umertake responsibility for laying down a charter for the 
federation, which was to be ultimately called "'!be Provisional 
Constitution". 
'!be Dlbai agreement was drafted hastily urrler pressures of 
need, to stabilise feelings of anxiety within the emirates a.rrl to 
respond to threats from outside. There was a feeling among all 
the rulers that to fill the vacuum left by Britain, the bilateral 
agreement between Aru-Dhabi a.rrl DJbai presented an opportunity 
for the others to join a.rrl to satisfy the need of that time. As 
to the agreement itself, it was very brief (17 Articles in total) 
a.rrl was to prove unworkable a.rrl too vague in order to form a 
basis for a ccntinuing federation. 
All the decisions of the Supreme Council were to be taken 
unanimously (39) The decisions of the executive body (the 
Federal Cooncil) had to be awroved by the Supreme Council in 
order to be implemented. Ultimately all decisioos, legislation 
a.rrl orders of the federation created by the Dubai agreement had 
to be approved u.nani.m:xlsly by the rulers. '!his fact was to prove 
an obstacle to any effective operation for the Union. 
'!be agreement left .a host of important areas urrlecided: WOO 
was to finance the federation ? Had each emirate a right to 
maintain its own anned forces? HeM were the executive posts to 
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be distriwted? Resolving these an::l other questions was to 
prove very difficult, as through the passage of time canpetiticn 
for p:JWer arrl authority gathered m::menturn. 
The first test for the Dubai agreement proved to be a 
disappointment. In preparation for the first meeting of the 
Supreme Council, the advisors of the rulers of the emirates met 
in Ab..t-Dhabi on 18 an::l 1 9 May 1968 in order to agree on the 
minutes of the Supreme Council's meeting. There was a 
fundamental disagreement a1:xxlt the interpretation of the Dubai 
agreement a1:xJut whether to discuss details necessary to fonn a 
working union, or else take matters step by step, the first 
meeting of the Council focusing on the matter of the permanent 
charter. '!be representatives failed to reach agreement an::l the 
matter was transferred to the meeting on 25 May 1968 of the 
Supreme Council, which also failed to agree on the matters to be 
included on the ageroa of the first meeting. '!he meeting ended in 
failure anj reached agreement on no decisions at all (40). 
There were two different perceptions about the Dubai 
agreement, each perception held by a ntmlber of emirates. '!be 
first group saw the Dubai agreement as a preliminary agreement 
drawin;J general outlines, anj as such, not self-executing. In 
this groops' idea, the full operatioo of the federation could not 
be discussed until the permanent charter was drafted. '!he second 
groop were of the opinion that the agreement detennined that it 
was to cane into force on 30 March 1968 arrl as such, starting 
fron that date, it was a biooing agreement which was sup(X>5ed to 
be applied, and therefore the Supreme Council in its first 
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meeting, . should discuss the details of the formation and 
operation of the different federal authorities a.rrl draft its 
policies (41). 
As the first meeting failed, there was the possibility that 
the whole federatioo was eroangered, so neigl1l::o.rring c:::amtries 
intervened to help solve the problan a.rrl save the fooeratioo (42). 
en 6 a.rrl 7 July 1968 the Supreme Camcil Iret in Ab.l-Dhabi 
a.rrl agreed to start ~tting into operation their rubai agreement. 
It was apparent that full enthusiasm for the federation was 
missing. So instead of choosing a president for the Union for a 
term of coe year, the rulers agreed that in every meeting of the 
Supreme Camcil they would agree to clx:lose a president for the 
meeting, am there was a clear retreat fron the principle of 
choosiD; a president for the Union into choosing a president for 
the meeting. The clear cause for this retreat was the 
competition for power between the rulers, and this kind of 
canpetition am j ealoosy was continuing. As a consequence of the 
decisioos of the Supreme Cblmcil at this Ireeting, the Federal 
Council ( the executive body) was fonned. '!be federatioo lookoo 
real for sane tiIre, am the Federal Ca.mcil startoo cperatioo a.rrl 
formed several committees to discuss unification in several 
areas. 'l11e canpetition for power am the disagreements arout the 
distrirution of pooEr am the sharing of the ~t posts in 
the Federal Government, combined ultimately to bring the 
federation to failure. 
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7. [)evel, ""HIts of the Idea of the Cblstituticn 
'!be lA1bai agreement of 1968 was the basis for the federation 
of the nine emirates but, according to its provision, it was not 
enough to form a basis for a continuing federation. Article 4 of 
the Oubai agreement gave to the Supreme Council the 
responsibility for drafting a pennanent charter for Union. The 
matter of the permanent charter (which was to be called the 
Constitution and later still, the Provisional Constitution) was 
on the agerrla of all the meet.in;Js of the Suprare Council. 
1 ) '!be First stage 
In the first successful meetin:J of the Suprare Council, the 
first resolution of this meeting was Federal Resolution Number 1: 
"The public law expert, Or. Ahmed AI-Sanhouri should be 
contacted in order to be entrusted to umertake the mission 
of drafting the full and pennanent charter of the Union. 
The expert should complete his mission in a period not 
exceeding six nonths fran the time of reaching agreement 
with him. The expert has the right to seek help from 
assistants, provided that these assistants are approved by 
the cx:mnittee entrusted with carm.mi.cation with the expert". 
(43) 
The second resolution concerned appointment of members to 
oc:mrunicate with the ccnstitutiooal expert and to represent the 
emirates in the committee. Each of the nine emirates was 
represented by one person on this cx:mnittee. 
Dr. Al-Sanhoori began by appointin:J two assistants who WCAlld 
undertake some of the preparatory proceedings. One of the 
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assistant"s visited each of the emirates on an information 
gathering mission on which he travelled extensively throughout 
the emirates (44). 
Due to illness, Dr. Al-sanhouri was unable to complete his 
work of drafting the pennanent Cllarter for the Union, making it 
necessary for the Supreme Council to look for an alternative 
solution in order to get the charter drafted. 
2) '!be Secnd stage 
In its meeting fran 10 - 14 May 1 969, the Supreme Council 
agreed to form a committee of legal experts, nominated by 
irrlividual emirates, to draft a charter which \IIOlld be sul::mitted 
to constitutional experts in order to study it and provide 
recc::rt1OOIX3ations al::out it. '!be draft \IIOlld then be presented to 
the Supreme Camcil for adoptic:n. 
It is ooticeable that in this stage, the charter began to be 
called a "ProvisiCXlal Oxlstitution" (45). 
'!be cx:mnittee of legal experts was required to canplete its 
drafting of the Provisional Calstitution within two rronths of its 
fonnation. '!be cx:mnittee produced their draft of 126 articles 
within the time allocated. 
The constitutional expert appointed to review the draft 
produced by the ccmni ttee of legal experts was Dr. Wahid Ra' fat, 
wlx> was familiar with the needs am circumstances of the emirates 
due to his work as advisor to the governnent of Kuwait, am his 
previous visits accanpanyinq the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister during 
sane of the years that witnessed the birth of the federation. 
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The constitutional expert, Dr. Wahid Ra'fat, was supposed to 
receive, in addition to the draft constitution, the ideas arrl 
notices fron the emirates concerning this draft constitution. 
Dr. Ra'fat received only some remarks from Dubai and a full 
substitute draft fron Qltar (46). He met with the members of the 
c:cmni. ttee of legal experts arrl discussed with them the concerns 
of the emirates. 
Dr. Ra' fat cxnsidered it appropriate to draft a canplete 
revision, instead of merely ~ting on the version produced by 
the legal c:cmni.ttee. He cx:nterrled that he had to re-organise the 
constitutional draft arrl provide for the matters omitted by the 
c:cmni.ttee. '!be result was a new cxnstitutional draft of 164 
articles. 
This constitution contained the unanimity condition for 
taking decisions in the Supreme Cotmcil, so this impediment was 
not rem::wed ( 47) • The matter of the pennanent am temporary 
capitals of the Union was dealt with vaguely (48). The provisicn 
for the o::tilfOSiticn of the a::nsultative oouncil was cx:ntroversial 
in this draft and not in line with the agreed basis (49). 
The draft provided by Dr. Ra' fat cx:ntained his percepticn of 
the state of defence am the military forces within the emirates, 
that only the Federal GcNenTnent stnIld have the right to keep 
armed forces (50). 
The draft provided by Dr. Ra' fat ocntained ideas that needed 
negotiations am concessions to be agreed to, rut not a mere 
inclusion in a draft constitution. The draft as provided, 
therefore, needed more time am maj or changes to reach a form 
Olapter 1 
- 53 -
that was acceptable to the emirates. 
At the meeting of the Supreme Council in October 1969, a 
proj ect resolution was passed, to transfer the draft Provisional 
Constitution to a camdttee of experts to study it arrl present 
further reocmnerrlations. 
The rrere fact that the adoption of draft was not agreed on, 
reveals a disagreement about the content of the draft presented. 
Indeed, the council passed a projected resolution to form a 
consultative council canposed of equal nmnbers of representatives 
from each of the emirates, and other decisions which were 
incanpatihle with the draft constitution. 
'!be failure of the Supreme Camcils I meeting arrl the failure 
of its nenbers to sign the declaration ccntaining the decisions 
of this meeting, meant that the issue of the Provisional 
Calstitution was left without any effective decision to move it 
forward. 
3) 'Dle 'Jhinj stage 
At this stage, the future of the federation of the nine 
emirates appeared to be increasingly uncertain. The IX>ssibility 
of separation fran the other emirates of Bahrain arrl Qatar began 
to appear after the failure of the Supreme Council meeting in 
October 1969, and their failure to re-convene the council in 
November of the sarre year. 
The carmi ttee, proposed in the SUpreme Camcil meeting of 
October 1969, began its meetings despite the fact that the 
decision concern.in;J its fonnation had rot been fonnally signed, 
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since there had been unanim::>us agreement to its fonnation. 'nle 
work of the camdttee involved the two drafts: the one presented 
by the camd ttee of legal experts, an:l the other devised by Or. 
Ra 'fat. '!be result was a new draft of 153 articles (51). 
'lllree main areas proved difficult for the camdttee to agree 
atx:>ut, so the articles dealing with these were left blank am 
were referred to a meeting of the Suprem3 Council, which was 
suPfOsed to take place in August 1970, but was delayed until 
October 1970. These three areas were: 
1 • The Capital of the Union. 
2. voting in the Suprem3 Council, an:l 
3. Distribution of seats in the C::rurultative Council. 
Agreement on these matters was expected to be difficult due to 
canpetition between the emirates, am the difficulty of reaching 
agrE!E!l1elts due to the unanimity requiratent in the rumi Accord. 
The devel~ts which took place in 1970 am 1971 resulted 
in the declaration of Bahrain am O:itar of their indeperrlence as 
sovereign states. The federaticn of the seven emirates appeared 
a very strcng possibility. 
Six emirates announced their adherence to the Federaticn 
Agreement in December 1971, followed by the seventh in February 
1972. '!be signing of the Federation Agreement coincided with 
these emirates becaning fully indeperrlent political entities. 
The United Arab Emirates was declared a sovereign entity in 
December 1971,. one day after the British agreements with the 
emirates lapsed. 
The Constitution, which was originally drafted for the 
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Federation of the original nine emirates, was modified to fit the 
needs of the new government. '!be Coostitution of the United Arab 
Emirates was called a Provisional Coostitution, to be replaced by 
a Pennanent Ccnstitution after five years. 
The strong re-appearance of the TSC was central to the 
formation of the seven-member federation. During a regular 
meeting of the TSC, all the rulers, with the exception of the 
ruler of Ras-Al-Rhaimah, agreed to form a federation of their 
emirates with Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan of Abu-Dhabi as President 
for five years. Abu-Il'labi was chosen to be the temporary capital 
of the Union. 
voting in the Supreme Council was agreed to be by rrajority, 
with the condition that votes of Abu-Dhabi am Dubai were to be 
am::o:J the majority. Agreenent was reached to distribute Cabinet 
posts azocng the emirates. 
Corrlitions requested by sane of rulers were granted in order 
to assure the completion of the Federation. Among these 
c:x:n.titialS was one, presented by Dubai, that it kept control of 
its own customs regulation and duty collection, this being 
central to its ecala'IIY. The main reason for hesitation by Ras-Al-
Khaimah in joining the federation, was the rejection of its 
demams to be given rights on equal terms with Abu-Dhabi am 
Dubai, namely the same quota of members in the legislative 
camcil am veto IXJW'9rs -in the SUpreme O:x.mcil (52) 
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PART 'N) 
The federal system of government is associated with the 
American Constitution of 1787, am with constitutions which have 
been influenced by it. 
There is no all-embracing definition of federalism, as 
several authors in this field have each stressed different 
aspects of the federal system (1 ). 
For our ~, we can identify the federal system as: 
A system of goverrment in which there are two layers of 
goverrurent governj.ng the same people am the same larrl with 
a specific agreement of the division of power enabling each 
layer to have a sphere of power in which it is autonarous. 
With a written guarantee of autax::.my for both layers of 
government in their respective spheres. (2) 
'!be federal system of government ~sts with other forms 
of government in a world of constant change and shifting 
variables. The division of power in the federal system is 
usually eml:xxtied in a written ccnstitution. But the applicatioo 
of the ccnstitutional provisions which deal with the division of 
power (am other important areas) creates ccntroversy. It is in 
the applicatioo of federal CXXlStitutioo that the supreme c::ants 
am constitutional c::ants play a vital role. 
The most important feature of federal systems is the 
canbinatioo of unity and diversity. A single national IX'licy is 
created rut withoo.t hirrlering or jeopardising regional autonany. 
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It is argued that for the federal system to preserve its 
all-important division of power there should be an arbiter to 
decide the points of contrOVersy regarding divisions of p:Mer, 
and in roost federal systems this function is allocated to the 
highest Constitutional Court (3 ). 
Consti tutional Carts need to be impartial. In order that 
they are not influenced in their decision-making by federal or 
state authorities, Coostitutional Carts need to be protected in 
sane way. M::>reover, the Supreme Courts, through their revie"ll of 
the federal and state legislation, are supposed to allc:Jlji for the 
adj ustment of consti tutional nonns, reflecting developnent in 
various aspects of national life. '!be judges of the Supreme 
Courts have to be protected fran the reactions of either state or 
national authorities. '!be judges also have to be selected and 
appointed in a way which allows them to function without 
prejudice. 
'!be idea behiOO the divisicn of power is that aspects for 
which national tmifonnity is considered fmt:xlrtant are deemad the 
respalSibility of federal government. Matters which it has not 
been possible to add to the sphere of the federal government or 
that have been felt not to be important to unity are usually left 
to the state. 
ClKID;Jes in local, national and international life demarxi 
legislative resp::nses. M::>st federal constitutions, however, are 
difficult to amerrl. Constitutional Cblrts carry the OOrden of 
constitutional construction, liberalisin] and where desirable 
adding to the remit of federal government (4) 
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It is by no means acceptable to all commentators that 
Supreme Courts involve themselves in expanding the sphere of 
powers allocated to national goverrmmts, a subject which will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
Supreme Court judges are elected or appointed by different 
means in different federal systems, rut ncne of these means of 
appointing the judges is sufficient to ensure canplete neutrality 
(5) In the United States, the President naninates the judges 
am the Senate confinns the naninations, a prc:arlure which was 
designed to give those wtx> were t:l'n.lght to represent the states a 
say in the appoinbrent of the judges. Fran experience it is 
olNious that federal govenment daninates the choice of jooges 
because the Senate has becane less directly representative of the 
states. '!he act of appointing the Justices of the Supreme Court 
has acquired an enormous importance for Presidents in their 
attempts to leave a long-lasting imprint on the governmental 
matters of the country, not only in federal state relations rut 
also in other matters. '1lle issue now in the appointment of new 
jooges to the Supreme Court of the United states is not one of 
natiooal am state centrol rut is really cne of party p:>litics 
am p:>li tical ideas ( 6 ) • 
In West Germany half the j ooges of the Coostitutiooal O::mts 
are selected by the Burrlesrat am thus by the states, while the 
other half is chosen by a special electoral ccmni ttee of the 
Burrlestag .. (7). Again, j.n the West German O::nstitutional 0Jurt, 
p:>litical ideology has cane to figure in the Court's opinions 
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rrore than supposed national am state interests. So in the case 
of the European Defence Community controversy, the position 
adopted by each Senate of the Court was based on the daninant 
political ideology (8 ) 
Jlrlicial review in federal systems 
Judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation is 
designed to limit the power of legislative authorities to 
disregard the constitution am the limits am values it contains. 
'!be roots of the judicial review lie with the ancient notion that 
people have a right to disobey unjust laws (9). Jooicial review 
in the United States is based on the theory of the separation of 
powers. This is coupled with the American system of checks am 
balances. It is arguable that tlx>se who framed the United States 
constitution did in fact intend to give the judiciary the power 
to review the constitutionality of acts passed by Congress. In 
1 803 Justice Marshall, in his opinion in MaIb.lry v. Madiscn (1 0) , 
did not hesitate to anrxJUIlce the right of the courts to disregard 
tlx>se legislative acts which it considered to be contrary to the 
constitution. Judicial review became one of the bases of the 
United States constitutional system. '!he Supreme Ccmt, through 
its txJWer of judicial review, asserted its txJWer to have the 
final say about the interpretation of constitutional provisions. 
'!be Supreme Ccmt, through its right to refuse cases, increas-
ingly specialised in constitutional cases. As the constitution 
grew older, the importance of the role of the Court in 
interpreting its provisions increased. 
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Federal-State relations is one of the I'IOst ~rtant areas 
in which the Supreme Coort has cane to play a role. 
Article 1 of the United States Ccnstitution contains the 
powers of Congress. The States, however, have the power to 
legislate on the areas which are not delegated to Congress. '!bus 
a principle is announced clearly by Amendment X to the 
Constitution. '!he Supreme Coort has the pc:JWer to construe Article 
1 of the Constitution, thereby setting the limits it perceives 
constitutional provisions contain for cxngressional p::JWers. 
'!he interpretation by the United States Supreme Court of the 
Constitution am especially Article 1 have changed aeex>rding to 
the changing circwnstances of the federal goverrment, am have 
increasingly tended to favour the federal government. One 
~rtant area of federal-state relations in which the develop-
ment of the Court construction of the Cc:nstitution is obvioos, is 
that of carmerce clause cases, with which we shall deal later 
(11) 
Judicial review became pcp.Uar in different parts of the 
world after world War I. 
In Western EUrope the legislature was originally seen as the 
supreme source of law and there was resistance against any 
attempt by the Ccx.lrts to impose higher or constitutional stand-
ards on the legislative acts. But after such experiences as the 
Nazi regime in Gennany axn the Fascists in Italy, people began to 
consider the Judiciary as a neans of checking the legislature 
(12) 
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The majority of Commonwealth countries have embodied in 
their constitutions the institution of judicial review. M:>st of 
these Commonwealth countries were federal countries, so in 
addition to using judicial review as a means of protecting the 
basic ideas an] values, it was used to settle differences between 
the central and state governments over meanings of federal 
consti tutions ( 1 3 ) 
The most canprehensive statement of judicial review of the 
constitutionality of laws is that which is coo.tained in the Basic 
Law of West Germmy of 1949. '!he jurisdiction of the constitutio-
nal court of West Gennany involves: 
- '!he constitutional disp.ltes involving the highest organs 
of the federal government. 
- The abstract nonn control jurisdiction which involves the 
difference of opinion or doubts on the compatibility of 
federal or provincial laws with the constitution, or the 
canpatibility of provincial laws with federal law. This may 
be initiated by the federal government or a provincial 
government or one third of the members of the lower federal 
Iblse (Burxiestag). This does not require an actual case or 
controversy • 
- The challenge to the constitutionality of federal or 
provincial laws or compatibility of provincial law with 
federal law in an actual case before one of the federal or 
provincial courts. '!he courts sb:ul.d stay their proceedings 
in case of challeDJe of constitutionality or canpatibility 
with provincial laws and obtain a decision from the 
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Constitutional Court. 
- In:1ividual constitutiopal canplaints. 'lbese are c:x:mplaints 
brought directly to the constitutional court. People have 
the right to approach the Constitutional Court if they 
consider that their constitutional rights have been violated 
by pililic authorities, provided that they first exhaust the 
lesser legal remedies. 
- Federal-Provincial cx:nflicts. Involving rights a.rrl duties 
of each. 
- Unifonnity of the interpretatioo of the constituticn by 
the courts. Any court, if in doobt aOOut the starrling cons-
truction of the CcI1stituticn, should apply to the CcI1sti-
tutiooal Court for a biOOing constructicn. 
- Appeals about the electoral process. 
- Irnpeacl"m:mt of the federal President by either house of 
the federal legislative authority. 
- Rem:wal of federal j\.rlges, by way of an applicatioo fran 
the lower federal haJse. 
- To decide at the constitutionality of political parties. 
- To guarantee the self-government of the municipal 
governments within the Provinces (14). 
In Canada, the British North America Act of 1867 did not 
create any Canadian federal courts but left to the U.K. 
Parliament the pJWer to establish such courts. In 1875 Parliament 
passed the Supreme Court Act, which created a court of general 
appeal. No lower federal courts have ever been established. '!be 
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same system continues to operate urrler the Canadian Ccnstitution 
arrl the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedans of 1982. 
'!be Canadian oourts system is canprised of a single system, 
the lower oourts ternm Provincial arrl the highest court ternm 
Federal. The Federal Court has sane txJWer over the Provincial 
Courts. 
'!be Supreme Court has discretionary jurisdiction over the 
final judgement of the highest court of final resort in any 
province. '!be Supreme earrt: has appellate jurisdiction: 
i in all cases involving writs of habeas coI'plS or marrlanus; 
H over advisory opinions issued by the provincial coorts; 
Hi over inter-provincial and daninion-provincial questioos and 
in those cases where a provincial court considers that a 
particular question slx::Juld be subni tted to the Supreme Court 
(provided that it has the permissioo of the court of the 
highest resort in the province). 
The Canadian Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction 
except regard~ advisory opinioos. '!be Supreme Court has the 
duty to answer questioos fran certain authorities in the same way 
as it gives decisioos in regular appeals. '!he constitution gives 
the Governor-General, the Senate and the lDwer Ha.lse the right of 
direct questions to the Ccmt. 'Ille Supreme Court Act provides 
that such questions shalld be aboot: 
1 the interpretaticn of the British North America Acts; 
2 the Constltuticoality or interpretaticn of aIrI provincial or 
daninicn acts; 
3 the powers of the Canadian Parliament, of the provincial 
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legislatures, or of the respective governments; 
4 any other matters. 
The Court has rendered several important opinions regarding 
federal relations as a result of this advisory jurisdiction (15). 
In the area of constitutional interpretation, the Swiss 
federal system differs fran the federal systens of the United 
States, Canada, Australia and Commonwealth federations. In 
Switzerland, the federal legislature is the final interpreter of 
the federal constitution, subject to a referendum of the 
electorate. The Federal Trib.mal has the duty of maintaining the 
federal cx:>nstitutioo against the Cantonal Calstitutioos, and 
Cantonal Calstitutions against Cantonal laws. 
'!he adoption of a system of judicial review of the ccnsti tu-
tionality of legislatioo has been CXll'lI'leCted with the desire to 
limit legislature. The need to limit the legislatures has been a 
product of the belief in separatioo of powers and sanetimes a 
direct result of legislative abJse of pJWer. In camtries where 
the aruse of power has been connected with the judiciary, like 
France where before the French Revolution the judiciary was 
believed to have been abusing power, the judiciary is denied the 
general power of reviewing the calStitutionali ty of laws. 
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Factors affect:.iD} J\dicial Reri.ew 
(a) ~ am tenure of j~ 
Suprene or Constitutional Court judges in federal COWltries 
play two important roles. Federal constitution judges play a role 
similar to that played by constitutional judges in unitary 
states, that is, of interpreting the constitution. Like many 
unitary government constitutional judges, they have the ~r to 
review the constitutionality of laws and to over-rule those laws 
which they regard as contrary to the constitution. 
Constitutional judges in IlDSt federal systans also perform 
the important task of umpiring between national and state 
governments through their power to review the constitutionality 
of federal laws and the compatibility of state laws and 
constitutions with those of the national government. 
The recognition of the important roles entrusted to the 
federal constitutional judges have sanetimes, rut rot always, 
played decisive roles in designating the nethcrl of their at:POint-
nent in sane federal COW1tries. 
Identifying the nature of the judicial role effectively 
identifies the method used to at:POint constitutional jl.rlges in 
federal am unitary COW1tries. '1bere are two main opposing consi-
derations of the nature of the role of the judiciary in awlying 
constitutional jurisdiction. Traditionally those countries with 
strcng British influence, such as Irrlia am other COW1tries aff-
ected by the traditional Anglo-Saxon view of the jooicial role, 
terrled to look at the role of jooges in awlying am interpreting 
the constitution as being mainly a technical ale. 'lhese cnmtries 
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stressed the technical backgroun:j of judges. '!he theory l::ehind 
this attitude was that judges announce am apply existing law but 
they do rot participate in making laws. They failed to recognise 
that in applying am construing the constitution, judges make 
choices between IOOre than one {X>Ssible answer in IOOst of the 
constitutional cases they adjudicate, am that such choices are 
policy decisions. '!bey failed to provide sufficient protection 
against the political views or preferences of the judges. 
In these countries, constitutional judges were rrainly or 
usually a~inted by federal executives. The states are not 
usually given any say in the appointment of constitutional jooges 
even when these j ooges are going to decide cases involving issues 
of federal-state relations am distribution of power between 
states and the federal government. 
Although there has been considerable development on the 
theory of the j trlicial role, the practice survives of neglecting 
the rights of the states to participation in the appointment of 
Supreme Court Justices. Obvious examples of the system of 
appointment of constitutional jooges by a federal executive are 
Irrlia am canada (16). 
Camtries on the other side of this theoretical divide take 
the view that jooges have an apparent effect on the laws and CCX1-
stitutional rules when they cane to construe the texts am apply 
the law. In other words, these countries, fron their appointment 
procedures and other measures, can be urrlerstocrl to believe that 
jooges de facto make law by their 'filling the gaps' in the legal 
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rules am. by construing the constitutional am other legal texts. 
Judges are understc:xXl by these countries to be making policy 
choices. 
The countries which recognise the fact of judicial law-
making take precautions to ensure the principle of separation of 
powers is allerted to, or else, thrcugh the careful choice of 
judges, preclude the arose of judicial power on the grourrls of 
political preference alone. 
Federal division of p:lWeI"s plays a part in the cOOice of 
judges in those countries which acknowledge judicial law-making. 
The states, through their presumed representatives in the 
legislature, are given a decisive say in the procedure of 
appointing judges. 
The most obvious examples of the assurance of state 
representative participation in the cOOice of judges are the 
United States and West German experiences. In the United States, 
the Senate, which was originally cx::tlifX)Sed of representatives of 
state legislatures, has the power to confirm or reject the 
naninatioo by the President for the membership of the Suprene 
Coort. In West Gennany, half of the nenbers of the Constitutional 
Cart are elected by the upper house of legislature which is 
cx:mposed of representatives of state legislatures, and the other 
half are elected by the lower house of legislature which is 
cx::tltp:JSed of popl1arly elected members (17). 
On the question of tenure, those CC'.\lIltries which believe 
that canplete independence is needed for the members of the Cons-
titutional Cart, appoint the judges for life so that the judges 
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will not worry about the renewal of their tenn or about their 
future careers being affected by the stances they take in their 
oonsti tutional decisions. The ITOSt notable of these eotmtries is 
the United States where sane judges have served the Suprene 
Court for over thirty years (1 8) • 
In sane ca.mtries emphasis on the representative electoral 
pr~sses, aOO their relation with the choice of judges, has 
caused the tenure of judges to be for a limited period. An 
obvious example of this category is the terrure of judges 00 the 
Constitutional Court of West Germany. Here, under the 1971 
ArneOOment to the Statute of the O:nstitutional Court, judges 
serve a non-renewable tenn of twelve years (19) 
'!be nature of CbJrt:s Systaa Participatial in J\d1c1al Review of 
Qmstitut:i.alality 
Reviewir¥J the canpatibility of laws with rigid oonstitut-
iCXlS, aOO jooicial participatioo in this process, are of grc:Min:J 
importance. ~r, the fonns of the judicial systE!l1S of review 
vary considerably. Differences in the judicial systems of 
CXXlStitutional review arise in the different legal systE!l1S. 
We can divide the judicial systems of CXXlStitutional review 
into two major groups. cne of these groups is decentralised aOO 
the other is centralised. 
'nle decentralised .system is identified with the American 
system of judicial review. This system gives the power of 
reviewi.n;J the canpatibility of legislatioo with the Coostitutioo 
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to all the judicial organs, and is followed mainly by other 
catm:x1 law comtries. 
The centralised system is identified with the European Civil 
Law legal systems. 'Ibis ki.OO of judicial review gives the p::IW& 
of reviewing the constitutionality of laws to a single judicial 
organ. The original archetype of this kirrl of judicial review was 
the system established by the Austrian Constitutioo of 1920 (20). 
The decentralised system is based (Xl several grounds. One of 
the justifications of decentralised judicial review is that which 
was mentioned by Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in 
Mart:my v. Madiscn. '!his was that judges are charged with the 
job of interpreting laws and whenever they find a law 
ccntradicting a higher law they have a duty to a~ly the latter 
and disregard the former. Because of the supremacy of the 
Constitutioo, it is said by adherents to decentralised judicial 
review, whenever a statutory provision contradicts a 
constitutional norm, the statutory provision should not be 
applie:1. Another groun:i for decentralised judicial review is the 
separatioo of powers. '!he base of both legislative arrl judicial 
pc:MeI' is ccnstitutiooal sti~tion, arrl the legislature sOOuld 
accept that the judiciary will not apply the statutes which 
exceed the legislative limits of p::IW&. 
The centralised system of judicial review rests on several 
bases ccn::::erne:3 with the legal beliefs arrl the legal systems of 
the states concerned. 
One of the reasoos for the c}x)ice of a centralised system of 
judicial review is the idea that the act of invalidating the laws 
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enacterl by the legislature is a political act not fit for the 
ordinary courts. '!his is a product of another way of looking at 
the principle of separation of pcMers. Ordinary courts should 
not be given the power to over-rule legislative acts because they 
should accept legislative acts as they are or refer them to 
specially ernpowererl courts capable of dealing with constituticnal 
construction. 
A further reason for centralised judicial review is the 
absence of the principle of stare decisis in Civil Law jurisdict-
ions. In ca.mtries with decentralised jOOicial review, where the 
system of COllieu law exists, the decisions of higher courts are 
birrlin:J on lower courts. '!he appeals which get to the highest 
cx:xJ.rts prcrluce decisions on the oonstitutionality of laws biniing 
on the entire j OOicial system of the camtry. For example, in 
the Uniterl States, law declared uncx:nstitutiooal by the Supreme 
Court remains on the books but becomes dead law (until in 
exceptiooal cases the SUpreme Cburt reverses its past decisien 
am declares the law oonstitutiooal). Since the principle of 
stare decisis is absent in civil law countries, the fact that any 
cx:urt can decide en the constitutiooality of legislatien cculd 
create ccntradiction am ccnfusien in the legal system of the 
camtry. For instance, a kind of tax could be nullified by one 
court while the same kind of tax could be found binding by 
another, were decentralised jOOicial review to operate along with 
the absence of the principle of stare decisis. 
Another reason for the centralised process of judicial 
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review is that, in civil law CO\ll1tries, the Supreme Courts are 
unable to give constitutional questions sufficient consideration 
if these questions come to them as a result of the regular 
appellate process. 'Ibis is because the High Courts in civil law 
countries cannot refuse to take cases which come to them on 
appeal fron lC70ller c:oo.rts. In the Unitoo States, the Supreme 
Carrt can refuse to take cases, which has resultoo in it being 
alm::>st entirely specialised in oonstitutional jurisdiction. In 
civil law camtries, were the High Courts given constitutional 
jurisdictioo alcn;J with their civil am criminal jurisdiction, 
they wcul.d be sul:merged beneath civil am criminal appeals, am 
constitutional jurisdiction WOJ..ld occupy ooly part of their time 
am ccnsideratioo. 'Ibis practical lack of anphasis wcul.d not be 
cc:mnensurate with its importance. 'Ihus civil law countries have 
established special calrts or institutions, the main task of 
which is to construe the constitution and review the 
constitutionality of legislation (21). 
Federal camtries have either a centralised or decentralised 
system of judicial review, acoording to the legal system present. 
'!be archetype of fooeral states with a decentralised system is 
the United states, while an example of a fooeral system with a 
centralised judicial review of constitutionality is West Germany. 
SwitzerlaOO does not give the federal courts ~r to review 
the cx:rnpatibility of fooeral laws with the federal constitution. 
However it gives the federal courts the power to disregard 
cantooal laws which are found not to be canpatible with either 
federal laws or the federal constitutioo. 'Ibis ~ is taken 
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fran the principle of the superiority of the federal constitution 
a.rrl federal legislation over .those of the individual cantcns. 
Ordinary courts in civil law countries do not participate in 
the process of reviewing the constitutionality of laws. '!be 
ordinary courts have the right in IlDSt ci vi! law countries to 
stop the proceedings of any case before them am. refer the matter 
to the appropriate ccnstitutiooal court, if they suspect the 
CXJnpatibl1ity of the applicable law with the constituticn. 
In this way, ordinary courts play an important role in the 
process of judicial review, by bringing the question of 
constitutiooality to the special coorts, while able to apply the 
law without referring to the Constitutiooal Courts. 
Ded s1CXH1Bki DJ ~. PS e s: Civil law am ,cx'..:nl , law approaches to 
ool.l.eqiality of Jtd;Jes 
'!be approach to the collegiaUty of judges 00 Oxlstitutional 
Carrts varies fran country to country, rut there are two general 
lines taken by civil law and 0CJI'I'0C)[l law countries. 
The traditional civil law system of decision-making 
processes in the Supreme Courts is that of collegial 
reslD1Sibility of all the jtrlges for the opinioo of the cx:mt. 
'!he jtrlges, as far as outside observers are concerned, act as a 
united group. The Courts issue one opinion in each case 
reflect1r¥:1 the unity of the co.rrt. 'Ibis system originally did 
oot allow for dissentin;J or concurring opinicns to be anoounced 
wi th the Ca.trt' s opinioo. 
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'!be other systen of decision~g processes in Suprene 
Courts was the plural systen. '!be plural system is connected 
with a:::mron law countries. '!be Suprene Court of the United States 
is the obITioos exan;>le of the use of the plural systen of opinion 
writing by a court. 'Ibis systen recognises the right of each 
individual j u1ge to prornmce his own opinion about the cases 
presented to the courts whenever he coosiders it appropriate to 
dissent or ooocur with the opinion of the majority of the court. 
Fach of these two sys~ has its own justificatioos am 
phil~cal bases. '!be collegial systen favt:m's the unity of 
the Court in relation to all outside individuals and 
institutioos. '!his systen is also justified because it ensures 
the clarity am steadiness of the developnent of legal nonns 
without the confusion that can be caused by differences in 
CXlllStitutiCXlal or statute ooostruct1cn bebleen judges. 
'!be plural system favt:m's the enridInent of the legal envir-
onment by allowing competing opinions to be voiced. The 
prornmcement of opinicns by individual j ooges, either agree~ 
or disagreeing with the court's decision, along with the 
justificatioos, can result in the proper developnent of law by 
offering the participants concerned a range of opinions and 
justificatioos (22). 
'!be American SuprBne <h1rt is the archetypal plural systen 
in federal countries. Several (hiiiUliJJOalth federal countries ad-
opt the plural systen of decision~ in their Suprane Q)urts, 
Irrlia being ooe example, which also has a CUiiiU, law systan. 
Canada has adopted an extreme version of the plural systen. 
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Each judge can write his o.m decision, therefore there is no real 
"majority opinion". '!he judges on the Canadian Supreme Court 
vote "Yes" or ''No'' on the issues presented to the Ca.rrt but each 
either goes on to write his or her o.m reaSC4'lS or else concurs 
with another judge. It is difficult therefore to analyse the 
decisions of the Supreme Court in Canada (23). 
West Germany was an example of the use of the oollegial 
decisioo-itlaking process, alcng with other EUropean ca.mtries, 
until the influence of the American experience prompted the 
judges to stress the right of voicing their differences. Now the 
jooges of the West German ConstitutiCllal Carrt have the right to 
p.lblish their dissentin;J opinirns alooc:; with the opinioo of the 
majority of the Cburt (24). 
'l'he case/ooalLOI/eCsy requirement am advisar:y qrlnims 
'!here is more than one way in which CcIlstitutional Courts 
can be brcught to decide calStitutional questirns. '!he major and 
traditional route for bringing constitutional questions to 
Constitutional Courts is in a case or controversy which is 
canpatible with the jOOicial role of the Cburts. In this way the 
Oourt is asked to interpret the calStitution or apply its terms 
in relation to a case involving a factual situation with real 
cx:ntemmg parties. 
The other way of .bringing constitutional questions to 
Constitutional Courts is by putting questions to the Courts 
requiring advisory opinions. The Courts are presented with 
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questions which are hY{X)thetical with no conterrling parties. 
'Ibis way is exceptional today. The advisory opinion jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Courts is incompatible with the traditional 
function of the Judiciary which is to decide issues in real 
controversies and cases (25). 
The only Supreme Coo.rt in the major federal countries with 
the pcMer to rerrler an advisory opinioo is the Canadian Supreme 
Court. This jurisdiction of the Canadian Supreme Court has 
prova:i to be very important in relatioo to federal questions. It 
is reported that sore of the important questioos of federalism 
have been decided by the Canadian SuprE!lIe Cburt throogh its power 
to rerrler advisory opinions (26). 
The West GentIan CX>IlSti tutiooal cn.ut had the power to rerrler 
advisory opinions urrler Article 95 of its statute, but this power 
was alx>lished in 1956 after dramatic experiences of the Court in 
relation to political questions. The Calstitutiooal Court was 
accused of be<xIning too political rather than concentrating on 
its proper judicial functioo (27). 
In several coontries, the quest for CX>IlStitutiooal opinions 
has prompted individuals rather than public authorities to 
CCI'lfront the SuprE!lIe Cburts with questioos regarding the CX>IlSti-
tutiooality of legislatioo. The United States has witnessed 
actions brought by irrlividuals chall~ing the cx:ru;titutiooality 
of legislation. These actioos have often been rej ected for lack 
of sufficient interest. The raising of CX>IlStitutiooal cases is 
hampered by many obstacles. Apart fran the question of stan:Ung, 
CX>IlStitutiooal cases are often costly am therefore beyarl the 
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means of I1DSt pEq)le. 
In Canada where the Suprane Court has the po.>er to rerrler 
advisory opinions, this power is regulated by the Court's 
Statute. '!he law requires the Court to answer every question put 
to it on reference fran the Governor~al or fran the Senate 
or IDwer House, and to pronounce judgement in such instances in 
precisely the same way as if it were a regular appeal in a 
regular case involvir¥] regular litigants. '!be law defines the 
ki.rrls of cases that can be referred to the Court for advisory 
opinion. Such cases should fit into one of the following 
categories: 
'!he loterpretaticn of the British North America Act ('!be 
Canadian Constitution). 
2 The constitutionality or interpretation of Dominion or 
Provincial Legislation. 
3 'lbe po.'ers of the Canadian Parliament, of the Provincial 
legislature, or of the Executive Governments thereof. 
4 Any other matters (28) 
Giving power to the Supreme Court to render advisory 
opinicns led to criticism of the Courts for involving themselves 
in political questions rather than legal CXleS. In the cnly case 
where a federal SUprane Court in a maj or federal country was 
given the pc:M9I" to rerrler advisory opinions it has proven to be 
very important in relation to federalism. It is reported that 
most of the important decisions of the Court about federal 
questions are the results of its po.'er to give advisory opinions. 
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Qmclusial 
AltlDugh there are wide -differences between federal systems, 
am the organisation am powers of constitutional courts in these 
systems vary, these c:ourts have a special significance in m::>St 
federal systems. 
Among the most important factors contributing to this 
significance are the interpretation of federal constitutioos am 
the resolution of differences OIler the distrihltion of ~s. 
As societies am their respective federal systems continue 
to develop, further opportunities arise for constitutional c:ourts 
to interpret constitutions and to resolve differences a1:xut their 
rrean1ngs. 
Constitutional courts play an important role in the 
developtelt of federal constitutioos, am in adapting them to 
changir¥] requirements. 
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One important task of nost of the supreme or constitutional 
carrts is to review the constitutionality of laws. O:xlstitutional 
texts can never be canprehensive arrl self~lanatory of all the 
problans that the carrts may encoonter. 
Constitutional texts have open ended clauses arrl words with 
broad arrl vague meanirgs. Ccru;ti tutional carrts are presented 
with cases in which, therefore, specific meanings have to be 
allotted to general constituticm.l provisiCX1S. In interpretirg 
constitutional provisiCX1S,. carrts have to deal with the entire 
range of subjects covered by a constitution, and these 
interpretations will substantively affect the different subjects. 
'!he rrost important subject with which a constitutioo may 
deal is the protectioo of furrlamental rights, rut they also deal 
with the distribution and organisation of power in the 
government. Federalism is a subject which is regulated by the 
constitutialS of the federal States. 
'!be oonstituticm.l interpretatiCX1S of the CalStituticm.l 
carrts are usually final interpretatioos binding 00 all the other 
governmental branches. In sane constitutioos, the power of the 
constitutional courts to render final constitutional inter-
pretatioos is based 00 explicit delegation by the constitutioo; 
in other constitutiCX1S this power is claimed by the carrts as a 
necessary requirement of their functioo of applying the law. 
In both cases, whether or not there exist clear provisiCXlS 
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empowering the CCAlIts with the right of final constitutional 
interpretation, arguments exist alx:lut the extent am Limits of 
the p:::Mer of judicial review. Shoold the courts make IX'licy 
choices or should they leave them to the elected branches of 
governm:mt (1 ). 
In the constitution of the United States there is no 
explicit provision empowering the jtrliciary with the final inter-
pretation of the constitution. cm.ef Justice Marshall a.nIlO\.n'lCed 
this right of the CCAlIt in Marl:!.lry v. Madison in 1803 (2 ). 
'!he whole matter of judicial review has provoked discussion 
am ccntroversy on the proper role for the Supreme court in the 
American constitutional am IX'litical system. 'llle United States 
experience in judicial review is worthy of examination because it 
was the first camtry in which judicial review, in its present 
definition, was recognised am practised • 
.11XUMa1 review am jmicial activism in the thited states 
The controversy regarding the role of the Supreme Court 
involves several areas, all of which are subject to the 
constitutioo. One such area is that of federal-state relations. A 
secx:nj is that of in:ti vidual rights. In the fonner, the court 
denies one level of government a certain power, because in its 
opinioo such power belcn;s to a higher level of government. In 
the secxxrl, as a result .of its constitutiCllal interpretatioo, the 
court denies a governmental institutioo a certain pa.oer because 
this power does not belcng to any government or institutioo, the 
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right in question being guaranteed by the constituticn. 
The debate about judicial review by constitutional writers 
and commentators in recent"years has evolved around several 
ideas. 
One argument concerns whether the judiciary srould be active 
in its constitutional interpretaticn or whether it should be 
restraine1. '!be active judiciary is that which secorrl-guesses the 
legislature's value choices am on the result nullifies those 
legislative acts with which it disagrees. The restrained 
judiciary is one which subnits to the ultimate sovereignty of the 
legislature over society' s substantive value choices. The 
argurent of the partisans of j ooicial restraint ccntinues over 
how the judiciary should be restrained. Shoold it be left to 
restrain itself or should the restraining come from other 
branches of the government? Are the exist~ constitutional am 
legislative arrangerrents ena.tgh to restrain the jooiciary or is 
there a need to introduce new legislation or constitutional 
amerdnel1ts to curb the ability of the judiciary to interfere with 
legislative choices? (3) 
There is another argument in constitutional theory between 
two contending sides, the "interpretivists" and the "non-
interpretivists". '!be interpretivists argue that ju:iges deci~ 
constitutional issues should ccnfine thanselves to enforcing 
norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written 
constitution. '!be non-interpretivists argue that courts sha..lld go 
beyald that set of references am enforce nonns that cannot be 
discovered within the foor corners of the document. 
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It has been shown that interpretivism, at least in a clause 
bound fom, is not possible. '!here are many problems for which 
there are no ready solutions in the consti tutien because these 
situations have not been foreseen am there is a large number of 
open-ended constitutional provisions which need to be 
supplemented with value choices in order to be implemented (4). 
As there is no effective restraint by governmental 
institutions, then it is impracticable to argue for judicial 
self -restraint (5). 
But what are the bases for arguing against an active or ncn-
interpretivist judiciary? M:)st of the objections to the rxn-
interpretivist or active judiciary stem fron the allegatioo that 
this kind of judiciary encroaches on the province of the 
legislature because it will be substitut.in3 its value choices for 
that of the legislature. 'lbe ~ts of a ncn-interpretivist 
judiciary continue to argue that the active judiciary is anti-
deno::ratic, because the judges, especially federal judges, are 
not elected and have secure tenures; they continue to argue that 
this is against the democratic and majoritarian form of 
govemment established by the United States constitutioo. 
Althoogh few tcrlay deny the need for roore than clause-bc:u'xl 
constitutional interpretations, the opponent of the active 
judiciary calls for roore faithful adherence to the text of the 
constitution and rrcre restraint against legislative acts. 
We shall return later to the argument of whether or not a 
judiciary which makes value choices is against the American 
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system of government. NcM we shall discuss the developnent of the 
theories about the proper role of the judiciary in the American 
legal system. 
'Dle deYel. \ it of theartes dlallengiDJ the traditialal theory of 
law am the role of the j 1xJ1 d ary 
'!be traditional theory is that jooges cnly discxwer am 
apply the law am do not create law. It holds that the law is 
"there" waiting to be discoverErl am jtrlges have the duty to fi.Irl 
and apply it to specific fact situations where it properly 
applies. 
'!be traditional American theory of the jOOicial function is 
that the caJrts have a passive role in making the law. '!be caJrts 
do not extem protect1al to pIq)eIty am they do not put people 
in jail, it is rather the law which does these things operating 
through the coorts. '!be tradi tlonal theory goes further to hold 
that the extraordinary protections within which the courts 
operate were devisErl in order to guarantee that the responsible 
element in the process WI:Xlld always be, insofar as people could 
lmmanly arrange it, the law am not the caJrts. '!be coorts, this 
theory holds, were not protectErl in order that they might govern 
the camtry according to their wisdan, rut they were protected so 
that there WI:Xlld be no interference with the laws governing the 
natial (6). 'lhls theory about the jOOicial function has been the 
dan1nant theory for the greater part of American legal history. 
All the other theories which have cha.llengErl this theory did rot 
achieve the same wide acceptance (7) 
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Judicial review has been connected fron the begirming with 
the traditional theory of judicial fmction. Although judicial 
review was at the time of its annamcement a unique 1lmerican 
legal institution, 1lmerican writers tried to justify it urrler 
Blackstonian traditional theory of judicial function. Judicial 
review has been presented as no rrore than a particular appli-
catioo of a generaUy accepted idea of the judicial functicn. 
Judges urrlertaking review of the CXXlStitutionality of laws 
were calSidered as exercising "j u:lqement" not ''wiu''. In Chief 
Justice Marshall' s words: 
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is. '1b:>se wOO apply the rule 
to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and 
interpret the rule. If laws conflict with each other, the 
CaJrts must decide 00 the operaticn of each. (8) 
In the twentieth century the traditional theory of the 
judicial fmctioo has been attacked as an inadequate descripticn 
of what takes place in the decision of cases. 
The possibility and desirability of the rigid application of 
laws has been the subject of wide discussioo by 1lmerica.n legal 
theorists. 
The first major challenge to the traditiCl'lal theory of the 
judicial fmctioo came fron Oliver Wendel Holmes. Holmes argued 
that practical expedients, made necessary by the conflicts and 
needs of human society, were rrore important to the developnent of 
law than were any logica,l propositialS. ( 9) 
Holmes believed that the staOOard by which law sl'n11d be 
measured is its contemporary usefulness, not the fact that 
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saneone in the past has followed it. As Iblmes has t:Ut it, 
Everyone instinctively recognises that in these days the 
justification of a law for us cannot be fOlU1d in the fact 
that our fathers always have followed it. It must be fOlU1d 
in sane help which the law brings t:c:r.o1ard reaching a social 
end which the governing power of the ccmnuni ty has made up 
its mind that it wants. (10) 
Iblmes rejected the idea that the law had an existence of its arm 
apart fron the decisioos of the coorts. He argued that the law 
was a means am it was real because it affected the lives of men. 
To Holmes law was not an abstract problem of logic, but a 
practical question of social management. Jtrlges did not in fact 
settle cases by deductive reasc:nin;J, rather, they necessarily 
decided, consciously or unconsciously, what they felt to be 
socially desirable. 
Iblmes opposed the idea that law is a given insti tutioo by 
"nature" am that logic is a device both for the extensioo of 
legal principles am at the same time for limiting the discretioo 
of the jtrlge. Iblmes held that law nnves in a climate of opinioo 
made up of nmal am political beliefs, jtrlganent of policy am 
sanetiIres prejudices, all of which affect the jtrlge. 
Holmes, who became a Supreme Court Justice, took the 
position that much was to be gained from the acceptance and 
recogni tioo of the j trlicial rnaJd.n:J of law. Iblmes was of the 
opinioo that it is better to discuss this part of the judicial 
function am that jtrlges were actually legislating roore umer the 
traditialal theory than . they wculd have dale if they ['e(X)gnised 
this process am brcught it into the open. 
'!be essence of the arguIOOnts advanced by Iblmes was a plea 
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for judicial rrmeraticn and self restraint (11) 
1he beginning of the twentieth century marked an increase in 
opposition to the orthc:rlox t:heory of law and judicial function 
(12) 
One of the newer and nore important theories was sociologi-
cal jurisprudence, which was led by Roscoe Pound. Pound's 
arguments rely extensively on the judicial function in the 
prcx::ess of legal change. 
Legal devel~t, accx>rding to Pound's theory, is a series 
of adjust:Irents which are interactions between societal demarrls 
and the legal system which are made necessary by the functioo of 
law as a controlling and stabilising force in a society 
constantly terrling to change. 
The law is both a controlling force in society and a 
reflection of the conflicting needs and demands in society, 
accx>rding to Pound. Society, in his view, sl'lall.d be seen in tenns 
of the interests active within it. He shifts the emphasis fron 
in:tividuals to groups in society. 
Because society is in a constant state of change and 
developnent, the law is supposed to be c:xntirrually roodified to 
suit these changes and accommodate new situations. The 
legislature, situated as it is in the centre of the goveI'niD:; 
prcx::ess, cnll.d scarcely devote the required tine and attenticn to 
the desired developnent of the law. It was therefore necessary to 
leave these matters to ' other agencies of the goverrment (13). 
Pc:lunl's whole theory cx:mes to rest upoo the judicial functioo. 
'!be CCAJrts shalld be aware of developnents in society and sh::uld 
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assume their rightful task of bringing the law up to date. 
In studying law the sttrlent should not only know what the 
carrts decide, but equally the circumstances arrl COIXii tions to 
which these principles are to be applied. Law as an institution 
is the proouct of social demarrl am should be considered in tenns 
of its adequacy to the errl for which it exists. 
Pa.lrrl labelled the judge "the pragmatic social engineer" am 
argued that jtrlicial activity is rightly the creative element in 
the law. 
The emergence of sociological jurisprudence marks a 
formulation of a general trerrl in American legal thalght contrary 
to the traditional theory of law am the jtrlicial nmcticn. 
'1lle law is a social instituticn, a prmuct of the society it 
governs, subject to the same influences as other social 
institutions. '1lle developnent of the law was oot achieverl by the 
logical developnent of assumed principles, but rather throogh a 
series of adjustments. 
Judges have the duty and the right to undertake legal 
change. It is socially advantagealS for the judges to develop the 
law as they coosider necessary for the developnent of society. 
'!be degree to which j trlges walld rood1fy the law arrl develop 
its rules varies according to the different advocates of 
sociological jurisprudence. The difference is rather one of 
degree, because all the advocates of this theory consider it 
proper am necessary for judges to make law in their decisicn of 
cases. 
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'!he emphasis on the role of the j trliciary in the developnent 
of law is the important consideration for our present 
investigation. '!he effects of the sociological theory are very 
important because it has been adopted by a number of the Irost 
respected legal writers in the American legal system. 
Among the theories that have challenged the traditional 
theory is legal realism. '!his tenn has its origin in the Holmes 
dictum that law is "prophesies of what the courts will do in 
fact" • 
Legal realism, like sociological jurispnxience, developed as 
a protest against the ort:lx:rlax theory of law am the j trlicial 
functicn. Legal realism shares with SOCiological jurispnrlence 
the attempt to broaden the study of law with the aid of 
oorrowings fran the other social sciences. 
Legal realism inclu:ies several types of juristic thalght 
according to the type of science effectively used to be cormected 
with the study of law. Legal realism includes some social 
jurists, a group of psychological jurists, several statistical 
jurists am sane institutiooal jurists. 
<Ale of the lead.in:J legal realists was Jerane Frank, wtx> 
called the traditional theory of law "The basic Myth" (14) 
Jerare Frank wished to dispel variaJS pop.llar concepticns alx>ut 
law curl the Ju:iicial process. Frank wrote: 
"Modern civilisation demands a mind free of a father 
gorvernanoe ... \mtil we becaoe thoroughly cognizant of, curl 
cease to be ccntrolled by, the image of the father hi&:ien 
away in the autl'xlrity of law, we shall not reach that first 
step in the civilised administration of Justice,. the 
reoogniticn that man is not made for the law, rut that the 
law is trade by curl for men" (15). 
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'lb meet the needs of rrOOern civilisaticn, in Frank's opinicn, law 
IlDlSt adapt itself to roodern min:l. law must be pragmatic in 
serving the needs of man am society. 
Appearing in the years of the Great Depression, Jerome 
Frank's first book (Law and the Modern Mind) ( 1 6) had an 
effective role in clearing the way to a new set of cx:nceptions of 
government am law am to free peq>le fron the old authoritarian 
oonception of law (17). 
'!be result of the debate which took place starting at the 
turn of this century was the establistIrent of a wide acceptance 
of the existence of Ju:licial discreticn. What remained was to 
establish the degree am fields in which this discreticn sln.1ld 
be used am for what p.rrposes it sln.1ld be utilised. 
JwwUda1 review, e+1&. racy am the separatial of pcM!rS 
The most coounon argument against judicial review and 
activism is that it is undemocratic, leaving major policy 
decisicns to unelected ju1ges. '!be practice of judicial review, 
the critics argue, is ccntrary to the hnerican ocmnitment to 
dem:cracy arXl majoritarian rule (18). 
'!be critics of ju:licial review assume that, in the U.S. 
political system of popular representation, the exercise of 
powers which canoot fiIrl their justificaticn in the ultimate 
consent of those governed is difficult if not impossible to 
justify (19). Judicial review, then, is rejected according to 
this view. Jooges do not acquire their posi ticn through po{:Ular 
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election, arrl they are not accountable either to the people or to 
the elected officials who naninated arrl confinned them; rather, 
the justices of the Suprerre Ccurt are secure in their positions 
because of their life tenure arrl their salaries are guaranteed. 
Furthermore, judicial review of statutes is said to be 
urneoocratic because it allows the court to disregard Acts of 
Congress which have the sanctioo, even if iOOirectly, of the 
electorate. 
'!be argument that judicial review is against the daoocratic 
system has been raised frequently throughout American 
Cc:nstitutional history. One of the earliest to argue against 
judicial review was Thomas Jefferson, one of the political 
op[XXleIlts of John Marshall. He saw judicial review as violating 
the OCXlStitutionally man3ated theory of separatioo of powers arrl 
as representing a patent denial of the veritable popular will 
(20). Another of the early opponents of judicial review was 
Justice John B. Gi.l::tx:ns of the Suprerre Ccurt of Pennsylvania wID 
said that it was a "p:>Stulate in the theory of oor government ••• 
that the people are wise, v:irtucus, arrl cx::mpetent to manage their 
own affairs" (21). 
'!he critics of judicial review further argued that judicial 
review and judicial activism is against the principle of 
separation of powers. '!be separatioo of powers is a system of 
separate and co-equal powers and this makes it contrary to 
separation to subject the validity of the decisions of CX1e branch 
of the government as to the limits of its powers under the 
OCXlStitution to the joogement of another branch. 
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'!be critics of judicial review arrl jooicial activism argued 
that in striking down legislation the court is involved in law-
giviD;J, a task for which the courts have not been established. 
'!bey argue that co.lIts are not meant to be law givers. '!bey argue 
that courts, in striking down legislatioo, make policy choices; 
the ca.uts, they argue, replace the policy choices of the proper 
legislature with their own policy choices. 
In reply to the accusation that value choices by the 
judiciary are an encroaclInent 00 the legislative IXJWer arrl a 
violation of the principle of separation of powers, it is 
important to remember that separation of IXJWers is camected with 
the system of checks and balances and that the effective 
judiciary is the one which can check the other branches of 
governrtelt. By i.nvok.inJ its IXJWer to review legislative acts the 
jooiciary serves as a necessary arrl proper barrier against the 
excesses of the legislature. One of the ItDSt farocus advocates of 
judicial review is Justice Benjamin Cardozo, who served 00 the 
Supreme CDJrt. Cardozo says, in deferrling judicial review: 
By calSCioos or suboonscioos influence, the presence of this 
restrainin;J IXJWer aloof in the backgroond, rut ncoe the less 
always in reserve, terrls to stabilise arxl raticnalise the 
legislative judgement, to infuse it with the glow of 
principle, to hold the starx1ard aloft arxl visible for those 
who must run the race arrl keep the faith. (22) 
'lbere are several points of argument put to defem against the 
anti-majoritarian accusatioo which is pointed at judicial review 
arrl judicial actl vism. 
The U.5. Constitution (Article Ill) does provide for an 
indeperxlent judiCiary, by granting judges life tenure arrl fixed 
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salaries, am by making their renova.l very difficult, rut the 
appointment process is entirely political and capable of 
reflecting the change in the political consensus. 
'lbe political process affects the judiciary by several rooans 
other than the appointnelt process. Coosti tutional decisions can 
be overtu.rne1 by constitutional arnendirents which are entirely 
political and which have been used successfully on several 
occasions (23). 
'nle critics who argue- against judicial review because it 
lacks po(:U1.ar consent do in fact overstate the denocratic content 
of the legislative am executive branches because it is shown by 
several means and studies that representative democracy in 
practice diverges from the ideal notion. So even the 
denocratically elected branches may not accurately represent the 
po(:U1.ar will (24). 
Finally, is . judicial review the only departure from 
majoritarian rule in the American system of government? The 
answer is no, the Senate is a major example of departure fron 
majoritarian rule because all states have senators regardless of 
the size of their pC{'111atioos, no equality of representaticn is 
given by such a system which goes against cooceptioos of the 
representative denocracy. 
'nle authors of the Coostitutien did not believe in deIrocracy 
as a solutien to all ~ questioos am problems which wcW.d face 
the natien; one important area of rights, individual rights, has 
not been entrusted to the majoritarian will by the Coostitutioo 
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(25). '!he foonding fathers did not have canplete confidence in 
the fonn of dem::lcracy they were establishing, so they established 
the separation and division of poNers to check the 'NOrk of the 
political branches of goverI'lrlalt. To argue that any departure 
frcm textbook demxracy is improper is not a valid argument since 
the foonders of this fonn of demxracy recognised its needs for 
checks, and that its benefits are not absolute but relative (26) 
'l'he binding quality of the Supreme Court's coostitutional 
dec1s1cns 
'lbere is a group of critics of the Calrt who argue against 
the b:irrlir¥J quality of the Calrt' s CCl'lStitutional decisioos 00 
persons and institutioos other than those involved in the case, 
on which the decisioos are rendered (27). we shall include here 
sane of the arguments given by those who argue for the Hmi ted 
birrling effect of the Suprene Calrt's CCl'lStitutional decisicns. 
Attorney General Edwin Meese, in his address to a 'fulane 
University audience, tried to distin3uish between the O::ostitut-
ioo and oonstitutional law. He argues that the O::ostitutioo is 
the supreme law of the land and that CCl'lStitutional law, which is 
composed of supreme Court decisions, is binding only on the 
parties in the case and the executive branch for whatever 
enforcement is necessary. 
~ of the points put forward by Attorney General Meese to 
suRX>rt his positioo is ' that if we regard oonstitutiooal law in 
the same way as the O::ostitutioo it will be impossible for the 
Court to reverse its previous decisions and change its 
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interpretations. 
Attorney General Maese argues that constitutional interpret-
ation is not the rosiness of the Court only, rut also properly 
the rosiness of all branches of governroont. 
The advocates of the limited-binding quality of 
constitutional decisions point to several ways in which the 
constitutional structure contradicts the claim of the advocates 
of the final constitutional construction of the Court. '!bey point 
to some examples: Congress may vote down, on the grounds of 
una:xlStitutionality, a Bill which is similar to one .which has 
been declared constitutional by the SUpreme Court; the President 
may pardon men convicted of violating an Act which has been 
declared to be c:x:xrpatible with the Ccnstitution. 
'!be rejectioo of the birrling quality of the Supreme Court's 
constitutional decisioos will lead to chaos because each branch 
of government will claim its own final interpretation of the 
Ccnstitution: the O::llstitutioo will mean different things to the 
different branches. '!his will deprive the United states legal 
syst:an of an authoritative voice cnncerning the rnean:inJ of the 
Ccnstitution, thus making it impossible for the O::I'lstitutioo to 
operate effectively to guide primary behaviarr. Law is said to 
have b«> roles in society. It provides the gI'OU1'rl rules ~t 
to which legal ccnsequences are ascribed to an event that has 
already occurred. It also guides primary behaviarr so that people 
can organise their lives so their CCIlduct will fall within what 
the law allows (28). It will be destruct! ve of the guicliB3' value 
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of constitutional law if the different governmental organs speak 
with IOOre than one authoritative voice al::out its meaning. 
If the executive is pennitted to apply its own construction 
of the Constitution even if it contradicts the Court's 
construction, this will maan that those who have the reSCAJrces to 
challenge the constitutionality of legislative or executive acts 
will enjoy judicial protection while others will have to bear the 
negative effects of legislative or executive acts. 'lbe legal 
consequences of any event will becune a function of the reSCAJrces 
and capabilities of the affected parties, which will damage the 
equal protection of the laws in the country (29). 
Depriving the Supreme Court of the binding force of 
constitutional decisions on other branches and iIrli viduals will 
result in imbalance in the U.S. system of separate and CXJeqUal 
~s. Judicial review, which is the IXJWeI' of the judiciary to 
declare constitutionality, is the only judicial power that 
balances the ~ of other branches of goverrmmt. Judicial 
review balances the ~ of O:ngress to p3ss laws and to raise 
and speOO taxes, and the President's IXJWeI' to veto, enforce the 
laws and appoint government officials, including judges (30). 
Jld1daJ review and federa.l.iSla 
Judicial review, especially the non-interpretivist version, 
has been accused of en:langering the federal system. 
'lbese critics argue that the fact of recognising the ChJ.rt 
as the final interpreter of the national Calstitutioo is against 
federalism; they argue that the national Calstitution is by its 
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nature not merely the concern of central government rut also 
affects the states, am that the Supreme Court as an organ of 
central government will consequently ultimately favour the 
national government over the states. These critics use the 
extension of the Foorteenth 1vIe'rlment am the incoqoration of 
the Bill of Rights in its awlication to the states as an example 
of the deterioration of federalism because of judicial review am 
activism (31). 
Judicial review, which is carried out by an independent 
judiciary with sufficient isolation fron the political branches 
of government, is the best way to ensure the protection of 
federalism in cases of difference of interest between the bio 
levels of government. 
'!here is sufficient evidence that a majority of those who 
fraIred the Coostitutien interrled the Supreme Court to be the 
ultimate protector of federalism (32). 
Judicial review of calStitutiooal issues involving federal 
problems is a relief for the legislators from the task of 
resolvirxJ CXXlflicts between local power am national c::x:ncern - a 
task which might have been felt to call for a duty of insularity 
(33) 
Conflicts between localism and centralism, like other 
constitutional matters, are not merely resolved by judicial 
review. '!be President may veto a bill en oonsti tuticnal grOUI'rls, 
am, if not overridden by Ccn:Jress, will foreclose the CXJUrts 
fron receiving the question. By passing new legislatien in areas 
Olapter 3 
- 102 -
of carmerce Congress may change the effects of previous court 
decisions which were based on Ccmnerce Clause grounds. As the 
record of the Supreme Court has shown, the court has been 
particularly successful in firrling virrlication for co-operation 
in the federal system. In Leisy v. Hardin (34) the Court 
announced that in the case of difficulty in drawing the line 
between the interests of the two levels of government the line 
shculd be drawn to achieve oo-operation for the general good. 
Qyy:1nsicn 
My view is that ocmplete interpreti vism is not possible. '!be 
reascns for the i.mp:)ssibility of ocmplete interpretivism are 
numerous, for example, there are vague words in the Constitution 
which need to be given precise neanings am there are open-errled 
provisions in the Ccnstitution. What is "due process"? What is 
meant by "freerlan of speech"? '!bere are other examples requiring" 
precise meanings when being" applied to actual facts (35). 
The fact that the judiciary can make value choices in 
interpreting and applying the Calstitution is not ccntrary to the 
system of government established by the United States 
Constitution. '!be United states Constitution base1 its system of 
government on several principles, one of which is the system of 
checks am balances. 
'!be ?Jrpose of having separate and interdeperrlent govern-
mental branches that participate in the checks am balances is so 
that IlDre than one branch of government makes and executes the 
decision, in order for more discussion to take place into the 
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appropriateness of the decisions, thus preventing arbitrariness. 
'!he debate which has taken place in several occasions in 
American constitutional history about judicial activism and 
government by judiciary has been caused by the differences of 
opinion between the political branches of government anj the 
majority of the Supreme Calrt. 
'!be constituticn has separated the governmental powers am 
given the federal judges indepemence am secure tenure, am it 
was inevitable, from tne time of ratification of the 
constituticn, that the judges walld deal with the actual facts in 
their constitutiooal decisions am would make substantive value 
choices when needed. It is another matter whether or not they 
announce in express terms that they are !llakinJ value cix:>ices or 
not, what matters is that in reality they make these choices am 
properly so. 
'1bere are several ways to check the judiciary. Sane of these 
are more effective than others, rut the judiciary is not totally 
insulated from being checked. The courts have made and will 
cx:ntinue to make substantive value choices in dealing with the 
constitutional provisions which need to be supplemented by 
choices by the judiciary. The best approach in dealing with 
judicial interpretatioo of the constituticn is by recognising the 
fact that the judiciary makes value cix:>ices anj by using the 
different ways to chec::k am influence judicial opinion, not by 
tryin:J to limit or igoore the necessity of the judiciary to nake 
these choices. 
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~FOOR 
JtDICIAL REVI:Df AI«> ~ (]DICE IN '!BE mr.rm STATI!S 
In the United States the pcMer of the judiciary to review 
the constitutionality of legislation is widely accepted at the 
present time. '1bere is a debate going 00 IlCM between Arrerican 
constitutional scix>lars in this field which is mainly abcA.1t the 
basis on which to establish the right of the judiciary to strike 
do,.m legislation as l.n100nstitutional. Two major groups can be 
identified whose basis .of difference is abcA.1t whether the coort 
shaIld use a value cix>ice in str~ dO'olm legislation. In each 
group there are differences in the details. The first group 
denies the coort the right to use value cix>ices in reviewing the 
constitutionality of legislatioo. This group takes this positioo 
to avoid the alleged violation of denocracy in the court's value 
choices (1 ). '!be other group argues that there are value choices 
in the CCXlSti tution am that it is a fact that the coort shall 
am does make decisiCl1S based 00 substantive value choices am 
that the procedural tendency of sane cx:nsti tutional provisions is 
meant to adrleve a substantive result and that it is therefore 
inevitable that the court will consider these values in its 
decisiCl1S. 
Discussion in this chapter will cc:ncentrate 00 arguments 
about irrlividual rights. '!be main reascn for this fcx::us is the 
extent to which the matter has been debated in the U.S. in 
relatioo to irrlividual rights cases. Similar results can be 
achieved in the area of fErleral-state pc::MeI's. 
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We shall discuss the theory of the first group, which is the 
process based group, in order to prove that this approach does 
not ccnstitute a canplete am sufficient theoretical substitute 
for the value based approach. 
My view is that the constitution has value choices in it 
am it was framed not just to establish procedure rut to achieve 
a substantive aim. '!be court has the duty of identifying the 
fundamental values in the ccnsti tution am of considering the 
compatibility of legis~tion with these values in its decisions. 
I am not deferxiing the view that ccnsti tutional decisions should 
be l:nnrl absolutely by the decisions of loog~sed framers. If 
Arooricans wish no l~ to retain values in the a::nstitution, 
they can amend the a::nstitution to change them. In the meanti.ne 
the calIts have to a::nstrue the a::nstitutic:n to arrive at its 
nessage am values am to apply these values to decide ~ther or 
not legislatic:n is ccntrary to them. '!be values remain a::nstant 
rut nore debate am study of the oonstitutic:n will result in cla-
rifying them. 'n1e social am political circumstances in society 
will develop am the details of applying these values will thus 
chan:Je rut the calIt has the duty to apply them unless they are 
changed by a ccnsti tutional amerdnent. '!be court has the power to 
interpret the a::nstitution am to review the a::nstitutionality of 
legislation am it slx:Juld be l::xJurrl by the letter am the values 
of the a::nstitutic:n. '!be criticism that is directed at jtrlicial 
review as being \.l1'rlem:)cratic will not be avoided by denying the 
existence of the substantive ccntent of the a::nstitution. 
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Process l:Bsed theories of jOOicial review 
'!he problem with the process based approach is that it takes 
a reactionary-defensive line which in the end misleads its 
followers. The core problem is the allegation that judicial 
review (especially when it is based on value judgement) is 
urrlemxratic. '!he correct approach is to ask sane questions which 
can lead to a solution to this problem of reconciling dem.xracy 
with judicial review. '!he first question requiring an answer is: 
why is derrocracy important? Is it important for its own sake? -
or does its importance stem fron sane benefits accruing to the 
society in which it operates? 
The second question is whether democracy as an idea is 
perfect am can be applied witlnlt aIrI restraints or whether its 
benefits are relative deperrling on the society am whether it 
shculd be restrained in order to avoid hannful effects. 
Demxracy is important because it prevents tyranny , gives 
value to the human bein;J am provides an opp::>rtunity to have the 
consent of the governed in the choice of the way they are 
governed. Principally this choice is exercised by the electicn of 
those people who will take the legislative and executive 
decisions affecting the lives of the voters am the provisicn of 
a way of evaluating heM far these representatives fulfil their 
duties throogh re-electicn. So, to follCM this line means to 
value oot cnly demx:racy for its own sake, rut the fulfilment by 
darocracy of its pranise am objective. 'lhis is the begi.rlnio:} of 
the correct way of re<:xxlCiling deltocracy with jOOicial review. 
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Democracy, like so many other social or political ideas 
working in human society, is. relative am can be al::used. One of 
the al:uses is through the suppression of minorities, denying them 
their rights as citizens am human beings. Another defect of 
democracy is that a minority may daninate the majority through 
the ab.lse of the electoral process am so the majority am the 
mioority need to be protected frcm ab.lse am fron the misuse of 
the democratic idea. (2). 
My opinion respecting the recnnciliation of dem:x::racy with 
judicial review is based on the achievement of the benefits of 
derrocracy to society by applying the dem:x::ratic idea with the 
necessary restraints. The 'constitution provides several 
restraints, one of which is subjective, the others systematic. 
'nle subj ecti ve restraint operates by giving the values arOUl'rl 
which the political system will function. There are several 
systematic restraints. One is the separation of powers, the idea 
of checks am balances. Another is federalism. '!be whole system 
is based en the division am distril1Ition of powers in order to 
divide the decisian-making process so that the system will assure 
that no goverrnent institution will daninate am tyranny will 
thus be avoided. 
'!be best way to answer the accusatien of the umem:x::ratic 
nature of judicial review is not to take a defensive approach, 
rut to analyse the systen so that we can rerrove the points of 
objection and understand how democracy and judiCial review 
CX)eXist to bring a1::nlt the best results for society. 
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We shall begin by stating am. evaluating the leading theory 
in the process based groop, the process perfecting theory of John 
Hart Ely (3). 
'!be process perfecting theory of approach is ooe which the 
c::nJrt has been tempted to take in the face of criticism that it 
was exntradicting demxracy by nullifying the actions of the 
elected representatives of the people. 
'!be Supreme Co.lrt has often invoked a vision of heM politics 
shculd work. 'llle coo.rt jus~ifies its intervention as a proper 
action to remedy the ·harm resulting from the inconSistency 
between political reality am. the CCXlSti tutiooal. limits on the 
political process (4). 
'!be best knoIrm statenent by the court of this view is the 
Caroline Products footoote in the decision which was written by 
Justice Stcne (5). 
This approach depends on the idea that the role of the 
j trliciary is to guard against the misuse of the process provided 
by the CXXlStitution in order to give the political branches of 
the governnent the right to make value choices. In other words, 
the cwrt is a referee to make sure that the players abide by the 
rules in making choices for the people. 'Ibis approach denies that 
the cwrt should make value choices. 
The leading constitutional scholar who elaborated and 
deferrled this theory is John Hart Ely (6). Ely begins by stating 
the ccnt.roversy which exists between interpretivism and ncn-
interpretivism. Ely states that ncn-interpretivism is not p::p11ar 
because of the prime importance of deno::racy in the American 
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CXXlStitutional system. Ncn-interpretivism is clearly contrary to 
daoocracy because it gi Yes the j ooges, wOO are not elected, ' the 
power to overrule the choices of the electErl representatives, 
especially in ccnstitutiooal matters for which there is no easy 
way to resporrl to the court's decisicns. He then states that 
interpretivism is attracting support partly because of the 
failure of non-interpretivism to provide clear justificatioos for 
its existence. 
Ely next turns to interpretivism and criticises it on 
several grooms. His main CXXlCeI'Il is that even interpretivism 
camx>t ccnvince him that it CXlIIplies with the daoocratic theory 
which he has stated at the beginning of his argument as an 
essential basis of the American system of governnent and which is 
providErl for by the CXI1Stitutioo. '!be OCIlClusioo of this aI'g\J[OOnt 
is that neither interpretivism nor non-interpretivism is 
dem:x:ratic. 
Ely then offers the process perfecting theory of juiicial 
review as a substitute for these theories, and goes on to prove 
that it is a democratic theory. Ely objects to the judicial 
practice of searchiD:J for am arunmcin3' furrlamental values: he 
saw the court as interventionist in its value choices (7). 
Altlnlgh Ely does not accept the COlIt' s value choice in its 
decisicn~, he deferrls most of the activist reoord of the 
warren COlIt because it· was "process perfectin3'''; rrost of this 
reoord dealt with freErlan of speech, minority rights, voters' 
qualificatioos, criminal due process and other procedure based 
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fields (8). Fran Ely's acceptance of much of the Warren court's 
reoord, we begin to see that his theory is not one which limits 
canpletely the court's intervention or activism. Like many other 
theories it is rather a theory based on avoid~ the accusation 
that jtrlicial review is antidemx:ratic. 'Iba final result of this 
theory is to overrule the decisions of deoocratically elected 
branches of government and at the same time to see these 
decisions as a protection of denw:x:racy. 
In Ely's view the ccnstitutioo is 
"overwhelmingly coocerne:l, on the one hand, with proce:iural 
fairness in resolutioo of irxli vidual disp,ltes (process writ 
small), am 00 the other, with what might capaCiously be 
designated process writ large - with ensuring broad 
participation in the process and distributions of 
goverrment". ( 9 ) 
'!be court's duty, in Ely's view, is to supervise the process 
established by constitution. Examples of the court's role 
mentiooed by Ely are indicated by scxne of the chapters of his 
book: policing the process of representation, clearing the 
channels of p:>litical cl'liID3e am facilitatID;J the representation 
of minorities. 
Ely's picture of the ccnstitution am its various provisions 
is ccnstructed to arrive at the <Xl1Clusioo he wants. '1hl.s picture 
of the constitution, however, is not a complete one and if 
completed and pursued in more detail, will lead us to a 
<Xl1Clusion that Ely tried to avoid. 
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Substantive values in the o.:mstitutial am. the process-perfectiDJ 
theory 
There are several problems with the process-perfecting 
theory. '!be ['[k)St serious problem with this theory is that the 
substantive cx:mnitments of the constitution carmot be avoidej in 
the application of constitutiCX1al provisions to actual cases. 
Irrlee:1 saoo constitutiCX1al provisions have substantive content 
am others clearly call for injection with value choices. Even 
the procedural provisions of the constitution have to be based on 
value choices in their .application if they are to be appliej to 
prcxiuce a result consistent with the p.1I1X>Se for which they were 
draftej. Arocng the constitutiooal c:x:mnitments which are substant-
i ve in character are the First ArnerUIent' s guarantee of religious 
liberty and the prohibition of the establishment of religion, the 
protection of private property in several ways, am the abolition 
of slavery: all of these principles are evident fran several 
provisions of the constitution (1 0 ). 
In fact most of the constitution addresses matters of 
procedure. 'lbese procedural provisions have purposes beyarl their 
procedural CCI'ltent. '!be procedural cx:mnitments in the constitu-
tion are either adjuiicative (procedure due to irrlividuals wOO 
becane defendants in legal action) or representative (procedure 
which governs the election of representative persons or bodies). 
To urrlerstarxi the p.lrpose of the procedural prescription of 
the constitution, substantive values must be involved. In order 
to determine whether the process involved is adjooicative or 
representative, we must look at the values and rights these 
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procedural provisions are rreant to protect. In the applicaticn of 
these procedural provisions, the court has to look at the values 
these provisions are meant to protect and their relationship to 
the person or group involved and oonsider whether a person or 
group is denied a right or suffers the imposi ticn of a duty that 
the applicaticn of the o:xlStitutional provisicns will correct. 
In Iarloner v. Cl ty of Denver (11), the Suprare Ch.Irt decidErl 
that a hearing is required before assessroont for the cost of 
street i.rrprovenent is made of a property a..mer to satisfy the due 
process of law guaranteed by the U.S. Coostituticn in the 14th 
Ar!errlment. Urrler the process-based theory, there is no need for 
such a hearing because the officials who are respoosible for the 
assessroont of costs are elected, and therefore subject to the 
elective process, obviating the need to subject them to the 
adjudicative process which is interrled for nc:n-elected ju:Uciary. 
Trying to explain this rule by a process-based analysis will lead 
IlOI!7here unless the right protected by the process is tome in 
mind, and its protection is emphasised. The protection of 
private property is a substantive right and is central to 
explaining the rule established in this case. 
In Griswold v. Ccnnecticut (12), the SUpreme <::nlrt held that 
the statute involved was invalid as an unconstitutional invasicn 
of the right of privacy of married perscns. The <::nlrt cited 
several cases to prove . that the Foorth Ar!errlment implies the 
right to privacy (13). Certainly the Foorth AlnerXln'ent protects 
rights other than privacy, but proving this fact does not lead to 
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the conclusion that the Fourth Amendment is concerned with 
prcx::edure as a p.lI"pOSe for protectioo (14). 
Successive decisions have proved that there is a need to 
invoke rights of substance, such as the right to privacy, 
iOOi vidual digni ty am the protection of privacy, in deciding 
whether some superficially procedural provisions of the 
oonstitution warrant its interventioo (15). 
We cx:me OCM to cne of the functioos Ely has a.noounced to be 
among the duties of the ~udiciary in order to perfect the 
governmental prcx::ess, which is the protectioo of minorities. Fran 
the analysis of the jOOicial duty to protect minorities, it is 
o1:NialS that value cOOices are inevitable. 'lbe IOOSt important 
questioo in the protection of minorities is whan to protect. lbw 
can we determine which minorities deserve protectioo? 
The process perfecting theory suggests the use of 
irrmutability, discreteness am insularity (16). There are several 
characteristics am factors by which groups of people are identi-
fied: ooloor, religioo, natialality, gerrler, sexual orientation, 
legitimacy am wealth. But the questioo is heM to determine which 
minorities deserve protectioo? Or sb::W.d people belooging to, or 
identified with, such groups, be denied substantive rights 
because of certain feelings am attitOOes towards them? Are the 
determining factors tlx>se distir¥Juishing characteristics. 'Iba 
determi.nin;J factor in the identificatioo of a group deserving 
protectioo sl'nlld not be based 00 a suspect categorisatioo, which 
assumes that there is a flaw in the process, but rather the 
determinatioo that it is unjust that the group is denied the 
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opportunity fully to realise their humanity, arrl practise their 
furrlamental rights ( 1 7). To identify minorities which deserve 
j ooicial protection, a search for fumamental values must be 
invoked to discover whether or not certain groups of people are 
\.D1justly denied sane rights, or have imposed en than unwarranted 
duties. '!be search for the minorities deserving jooicial protect-
ion will involve an application of attitudes to fundamental 
values that the process perfecting theory tries to avoid (18). 
Aoother functioo that Ely has a.nrnmced to be aI'IOD3 the 
proper duties of the j l¥liciary in the CXXlSti tutiooal f ieId is 
"clearing the political channels", through speech am voting 
(19 ) 
'!be First 1vnerrlment protections of freedans of speech, 
press am the right of assembly are am:::D3' such rights that will 
if protected, keep the channels open for polt tical change am 
evaluatioo (20). In analysing this point, we begin by askirx] why 
politics slnlld be open to equal participaticn by all. 
Clearin:J political channels is obviously IXJt sufficient as 
an aim in itself, rut sho..1ld be CXXlSidered a means of achieving 
sane benefit to society. '!be importance of clearin:J political 
channels and guaranteeing the right to vote stem from a 
substantive view of human rights. '!be determination of whether 
the elective procedure warrants the interference of the <:nlrt in 
a particular case involves the determination of whether or not 
the rights protected have been denied. This will involve the 
jooiciary in the kirrl of fumamental value determination which 
the process perfecting theorists want to avoid (21) 
Olapter4 
- 118 -
'lhe j1.rliciary am the <Xlt'rE!Ctial of DBl.functicn in the political 
The whole idea of giving the determination of proper 
procedural functioning to the judiciary is contrary to the 
history of the American constituticn. Ely c:onterrls that: 
"Cbviously our elected representatives are the last perscru; 
we should trust with identification of legislative 
ma.lfuncticn". (22) 
Ely justifies giving the judiciary the role of correcting 
malfunction in the political process using the idea that an 
ootsider, the judiciary, sh::W.d detennine the aOOses- and not 
leave it to the political branches themselves (23) '!his is 
contrary to the whole structure of the American ccnstitution, 
which is based on involving many separate and indeperrlent parties 
in making decisions and executing them. The involvement of 
different parties and levels of government in the political 
process is intended to correct its malfunctions and prevent 
danination by any cne party which prcrluces the checking effect 
famous in the U.S. Constitutional system. There are many 
incidents in political history which show that the political 
process can successfully correct sate of its malfunctions (24). 
'n1ere are no ccnvincing reasons in Ely's arguments to give the 
judiciary the role of correcting malfunctions in the political 
process. 
'n1ere are provisicxis in the ccnstitution which specifically 
give power to correct the political process to the political 
branches. '!be cx:mnerce clause, for example, gives to Ccn1ress the 
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power to regulate interstate commerce in order, among other 
things, to protect the voteless out-of-state traders. There are 
sane proce1ural provisions which cannot be affected by any of the 
government's branches, incllldinJ the judiciary: one example is 
the duration of office of nenbers of Coogress. 
There is one other defect in Ely's theory: he supposes, 
correctly, that the political branches may overstep the limits of 
power prescribed by the constitution and may try to prevent 
others fron entering the decision naking process. 'Ibis is correct 
in that the political branches are human institutions susceptible 
to mistakes, rut what about judicial mistakes in determining the 
limits of CXXlStitutiooal procedure? Ely does not ad:lress the 
judicial role of process-perfecticn to correct malfunction in it. 
The process-perfecting theory of John Hart Ely is one 
irn{x:>rtant example of a host of theories which have one thing in 
CXllllCtl in that they try to avoid dealirg with the substantive 
c:x:ntent of j u:licial review in different ways (25). 
All of these theories fail to achieve a reasooable objective 
even if jlXiged by their own starrlards. As we have seen in the 
case of Ely, these theories do not provide beneficial dialogue 
for the developnent of the c:x:ntent of constitutional law. The 
best approach to ju:licial review of the constitutionality of 
legislation is to recx:lgIlise the substantive choices that the 
cn1Its have to make in their review arrl fron that point, to argue 
for the best cOOices that are oonsistent with the <XXlStitution 
am are good for the nation. The participation of constitutiooal 
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scholars with judges, trial lawyers am other concerned parties 
will no doubt benefit the developnent of constitutional law. '!be 
fact is that there are several provisions in the constitution 
which are open-errled. In applying the open-errled constitutional 
provisions the court has to inject meanings and choices of 
substantive values. '!be argument which does take place is about 
the proper source of the choice of the values to apply the 
constitution. Certainly the legislature does apply the 
constitution am its provisions to practical situations am in 
doing this it gives 'certain meanings to some open-ended 
constitutiCt'lal provisions. '!be executive does give meanings to 
sore open-errled constitutiCt'lal provisions. '!be legislature am 
executive soretiIres give meanings am interpret the constitution 
without expressly announcing that they are doing so. The 
judiciary, being in charge of dealing with the law, and 
constitutiCt'lal law is part of the law of the lan::I, does interpret 
the constitution. '!be Supreroo Ca.lrt was especially created by the 
constitution aIXl given certain powers by the constitution itself. 
'!be Supreroo Ca.lrt acts fron a st:rcl1q posi tien because of the 
express constitutional source of power it enjoys. '!be Supreroo 
Cl:xlrt has the pc7NI9I' to awly the constitutic.n, am it is accepted 
that it has the pc7NI9I' to review the acts of the legislature an:1 
the executive. With its irrlependence an:1 autoocmy, it acts as a 
check on the other branches of the goyeI'IIrent an:1 it deals with 
matters which soretimes appear, on the face of it, to be procedu-
ral aIXl sanetimes with nore cbTioosly substantive provisions. All 
of these provisions have substantive meanings and aims. The 
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Supre.ne Carrt: does, quite properly, deal with substantive value 
choices. '!be argument which insists on proclaiming the judicial 
role in the constitutional field to be about perfecting the 
process, avoids dealing with the substantive choices made by the 
Supreme Court, and deflects attention from an actual and 
necessary part of judicial review, regardless of the stated role 
of the <nIrt. 
'!be result of this will be to encourage the judiciary and 
especially the Supre.ne CoJrl. to make substantive clx>ices in the 
name of perfecting procedure, knowing that commentators and 
critics will focus on this part of the court's work without 
questicning its substantive clx>ices. 
A proper ooostituticna.l analysis, in my view, is cne which 
considers reality and the real extent of judicial review, 
acknowledges that in judicial review the courts deal with 
substantive clx>ices about ooostituticna.l provisicns, and tries to 
question the appropriateness of these choices and their 
oanpatibility with ooostituticna.l provisioos and values. '!be 
OCXlStitutioo does ccntain value clx>ices and there are values in 
the ooostitutioo which are not stated in words rut un::1erstood 
fron the oonstituticn. '!be jOOiciary has the power to review the 
cx::mpatibility of the legislative as well as the executive acts 
against the provisions and values of the oonstituticn. Discussicn 
of judicial review which admits value clx>ices am questioos them 
is a healthy analysis which can participate in the developnent 
am oorrectioo of ooosti tuticm.l law. 
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~ actials am fuolament:.al vallES 
In actions between the state (political branches) am the 
individual, the court should take into consideration the 
substantive values am ends that the coosti tuticoal provisions 
appear to protect. 
Between national government am the states, the CD.Jrt must 
look at the basic <XlUfXluent of the natioo, the irrlividual, am 
what he is meant to gain fron the system. O:Jes the encroachroont 
of one level of the government upcn the other disturb the balance 
IXlt forward in the constitutioo in order to prevent <:ne level of 
government from domination? One purpose of federalism is to 
protect the inli. vidual by a di visioo of powers, am this, coupled 
with the separation of powers, is meant to distribute 
govermental powers am::DJ several parts am layers of governnent, 
which in the errl serve to provide a balanced governnent in which 
decisions are debated and pass through different parts of 
government in order to allow correction and protection of 
individuals and groups of citizens. The basic issue in 
federalism cases is whether challeD3Erl actioo by <:ne governnent, 
state or federal, exceeds the scope of its constitutional 
autb::lri ty am thereby invades the autOOri ty of the other. <Ale 
kin::i of coostitutional case in which the a::JUIt frequently strikes 
down state actiCXlS on groorrls of federalism, is a:mnerce clause 
cases (26). 
'!be basis 00 which stri.Jdn;J down state legislatioo occurs 
ITDStly cx:noerns the interests of the natioo., am the material 
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well-being of the CXJUntry. 'nle constitutional provisions are 
indetenninate am the original intentions of its framers are hard 
to establish and controversial to invoke (27). Federalism 
involves imp:>sitien of limits en Wividual states as well as en 
the federatien. 'nle ultimate effect of such limits is to have a 
checking am limiting effect en the powers of both levels of 
goverrment. '!be oourts, especially the Supreme Co..trt, have wide 
discretion in the declaration of the limits of powers. The 
Supreme Cburt is boorrl by constitutional provisiCXlS which give it 
a wide rarge of choice in its decisiCXlS in cases involving issues 
of federalism (28). 
'!be doctrine of enumerated power that O:n;Jress has 
"all legislative powers herein granted", 
am the doctrine of 1nt:>lied power (29) that 
"Calgress shall have power ••• to make all laws which shall 
be necessary am proper for carryi.ng into executioo of the 
foregoing powers, and all other powers rested by this 
coostitutioo in the Goverment of the United States, or any 
Deparbnent or Office thereof" (30) 
make the Federal Govermlent a govemnent of limited powers. '!be 
limits of the legislative power of the Federal Govermlent are rot 
precisely defined am are subject to variatien am developing 
interpretatioo. '!he overall attittrle of the oourt' s decisions in 
the cxmnerce clause cases has been towards strengthening unity, 
enccuraging integratioo am suppressing the forces of localism 
(31 ), rut this does not . indicate that the restraining effects of 
the states in the operatioo of the Natiooal Governnent am the 
Federal system has diminishe3 (32). Federal legislatioo under the 
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commerce clause may be subject to close judicial scrutiny. 
Legislation passed urrler autOOrisation fran the ccmnerce clause, 
must be consistent with the Bill of Rights am other restrictions 
which protect not only individual interests but State interests 
as well (33). 
Using the process perfection theories may serve to justify 
active judicial involvement in several areas including 
fundamental rights b~ labelling the courts intervention as 
Process-Perfecting or Clearing-Political Olarmels, or other tenns 
that are used, but this theory does not lead to restraining the 
jOOiciary (34). 
There are substantive meanings and objectives of 
constitutiooal provisions, even those dealing with processes. 
Judicial interpretation of c:alStitutiooal provisions involves 
choices am results in checking other branches am levels of 
government. Sbilying the Courts I clx:>ices am discretion is better 
than igoorin;J them or avoiding dealin;J with them under any label 
or a~ch. 
'!be <DlI'ts, especially the Supreme Calrt, deal with various 
areas of the Constitution, and therefore have discretion to 
affect various rights am relationships. '!be application am 
interpretation of the Constitution involves rights of imi viduals 
towards governnent am rights of government autOOrities towards 
other governmental levels am branches. 
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Unlike the Unitej States Coostituticn, the Basic Law of West 
Gennany (the consti tutioo) gave the Coosti tutiCX'lal Court t:ffi 
power to detenn1ne the constituticnality of fe3.eral am Laemer 
(state) legislatioo in clear am explicit prO'Visicns (1). 
The Constitutional Court has the power (inter alia) to 
decide: 
in case of differences of op1n1on or doubt on the ••• 
cx:mpatibility of fejeral or larrl law with this Basic Law ••• 
at the request of the Federal Goverrunent, of a Land 
government, or of ale third of the 8.lOOestag nenbers. (2 ) 
00 canplaints of llIlCalSti tuticnali ty , which may be enterErl 
by any persoo who claims that one of his basic rights ••• 
has been violatej by plblic authority (3) 
in the case of difference of opinion on the rights and 
duties of the Fejeratioo am the Laemer... ( 4 ) 
on other disputes involving public law, between the 
FErleratioo an1 the Laerder, between different Laemer... (5) 
As a result of this clear constitutional stipulation, it is 
universally acceptej that the O:::Ilstitutic::nal Chlrt has the power 
to review the constitutiooality of fErleral am Land legislatioo. 
'lbere is, lx:Mever, 00 unifonn opinioo al:nJt the rules or scope of 
constitutiooal interpretatioo. 
Fran the early days of the Court opinioos were dividErl as . to 
wtEther or not the political effects of the Court's decisioos 
should be considered. In CXle of its early cases the seoc:nl senate 
of the O:nstitutiooal Court declared: 
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The decisions of the Constitutional Court relate to 
p?litical realities, and the Court must on no account 
disregard the political environment in which its decisions 
take effect. (6) 
In another of the Court's early decisions the second senate 
observed: 
The political consequences which may arise from the 
rejection of the applications as inadmissible cannot be 
allCMed to influence the Federal Calstituticnll Coort. It 
must decide acrording to the law alooe. (7 ) 
Nevertheless political am social ccnsiderations were always 
present am can be traced in different cases considered by the 
0::Iurt. 
One way of ~ political ccnsiderations into aCCXlUIlt was 
to use the passing of tinl:!, leaving the case peming either until 
it was resolved by other factors or until it became more 
appropriate for the 0JU.rt to take actioo. In the O::mnunist Party 
case, (8) the Court waited for five years until East-West 
relations cl1imJed am other political factors took effect, am 
then declared the Ccmram1st Party to be uncoosti tutiooal (9 ). 
Another way in which the a:mt took aCOJUIlt of the political 
implications of its decisions was by recognising that the 
justification for these decisions lay in the spirit of the 
Calstitutioo rather than falling within its written provisions. 
Reliance on the spirit of the O::nstitution sanetimes implied the 
violatioo of written constitutiooal provisions. In coofinning the 
constituticnality of the act ratifying the Saar Agreement of 
October 1954 the 0Jurt did not deny that the act violated sane 
constitutiooal provisions, rut argued that the oo.tcane of the 
treaty was the best result politically attainable arrl that the 
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Constitution IlUlSt oot prevent the bad fran giving way to the 
better just because the best was unattainable (10) 
'!he special nature of the West GeIIIBn legal am federal systems 
am their relatimship with the Cblstitutimal Q:mt 
'!be West GentIan legal system is a civil law systan. Un:ler 
this system the state is at the centre of law-m:lk.ing. Tradi-
ticoal GentIan jurispnrlence is a positivist jurispI'\rlence based 
en the idea that there is ooly ale "right" decision am that the 
task of the ccurt is to "disoover" it by a process of logical 
deductien (11). 
In the twentieth century the positivist view has been 
declining. Even in the heyday of positivism there was no 
agreement as to whether the criterion of judgement was the 
"objective" rrean:ing of a statute or the "subjective" will of the 
legislator. '!be Oxlstitutiooal 0Jurt has declare1 its preference 
for the cbjective statutory ccnstructicn (12). 
Even when j oogement is base1 en the obj ecti ve rrean:ing of 
statutes am ccnstitutiooal oonns, it is possible to ccnsider 
either what the '«JI'ds rooant at the tine when the law was framed 
or what they mean at the tine when it is be~ applie1. '!be 
present trend is to interpret laws on the basis of their meanir¥.J 
at the tine they are applied; this is another way of taking 
social, political and .economic developments into account in 
apply~ the law. 
Judges in West Germany arrl other civil law systems do oot 
Chapter 5 
- 131 -
view their decisl.' I"W\~ as b~ _..::I; nrr on them ' \,4.., -UU_"':7 In later cases or as 
binding on other judges. The interpretations of the 
Consti tutional Court are binding on all other courts and 
goverI1rTe1t authorities. Even the Court itself cannot easily avoid 
followinJ its previous precedents because of the way this will 
affect its relationship with other branches of government. 'n1e 
Court itself takes the view that self-restraint is a guard 
against any crisis in relaticns with other branches of goverment 
which might result in ra:Iucticn in or restrictioo of the role of 
the Ccnstitutional Court. 
Basic law declares West Germany to be a "daoocratic and 
social fa:Ieral state". Basic law established a party dem::lCracy, 
and the West German federal system is a centralised federal 
system in tenns of both its consti tutiooal arrangements and its 
practical operaticn. 
The fa:Ieraticn is divided into ten Iaender each of which has 
its own constitution. Most of the Laender were in no sense 
historical entities, rut rather, fortuitous creations of the 
western powers within their zones of occupaticn, and were partly 
interrled to prevent a stralg, unifia:I west German government fran 
repeating the experience of Hitler (13). 
The legislative powers allocated to the Iaender are meagre, 
because Basic Law allocates roost of the important leglslati ve 
powers to the federal government. '!he Iaender are ccrnpensated for 
their limita:I power of ' legislatioo in two ways. Firstly, the 
secx:rrl chamber of the Burrlestag is CXllip:)Sed of members of the 
state governments. '!be members for each LaIXl cast their votes (en 
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bloc). '!his institutionalises the influence of the goverrlIOOnts of 
the Laemer 00 national governroont. SecorxUy, the way federal 
legislation is executed balances the distribution of powers 
between the Laender and the federal government. The federal 
government does not have an administrative substructure in IroSt 
fields of its legislative powers, so it has to depend on the 
Laender administration to execute its legislation. This 
:inevitably gives the Laemer a cx:nsiderable degree of latitOOe in 
interpretin;J legislatioo (14). 
The fact that the West German federal system is a 
centralised ooe an:] that fOC)5t of the Laemer were only organised 
canparatively recently has caused the work of the <lxlstitutiooal 
Court to favour the Laerner an:] to guard the federal system, as 
was derocXlStrated in the Sooth West case (1 5) • In this case the 
Calstitutiooal Q)urt anoounced that there are certain funiamental 
principles which can be deduced fron Basic Law arrl. to which all 
other constitutional provisions are subordinated; one such 
principle is ferleralism. 
'lb! institut1ma1 110e(e re.m of the O:mstitutimal O:lurt 
In the Coostitutiooal Chlrt Act of 1951 the cnJrt is defined 
as "an autax:JralS COJIt of the federaticn iOOependent of all 
other CXXlStitutiooal organs" (16). Initially the Court was urrler 
the administrative superyision of the Ministry of Justice, a fact 
which anooyed the justices because it placed the iOOependence of 
the Q:lurt at risk. 
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The justices of the Constitutional Court realised the 
importance of preserving the independence of the court and 
started a ITOVe to correct the position of the C:lurt fran the very 
first nnnth of its existence. One of their rrost iIrp::lrtant demards 
was that the Court be accorded a status equal to other 
governrrental institutions an:i authorities such as the presidency, 
the Council of Ministers an:1 too b«> houses of the legislature. 
'!be justices argued that the position of the C:lurt at that time 
was contrary to Basic Law, which established the Court as a 
supreme constitutional organ and its justices as supreme 
guardians of Basic Iaw (17). 'lhe justices recxmnenjed that the 
O::rlstitutional Court should be given tu:igetary autooany and that 
it should be freed from any financial dependence upon the 
Ministry of Justice; that the Court slx:W.d be given total cxntrol 
CNer all internal administrative matters; am that the OJurt's 
justices slxuld be exempted fran all disciplinary regulations 
applicable to other j trlges. 
The justices achieved all their objectives for the 
irxieperxienoe of the <blrt. 'lhe 0Jurt 'fOIl has its am tu:lget, 
which is i.rrlepeIrlent of that of the Ministry of Justice. '!be 
justices of the Cburt have the same status as the highest state 
officials. 'lbe president of the oourt holds the same rank as the 
President of the Rep.1blic, the Cllancellor and the presidents of 
the b«> legislative lnJses (18). 
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Selecticn of JtDJes am Internal Organisaticn of the 
<mstitutimal. cmrt. 
Recognition of the political importance of Constitutional 
Courts is a decisive factor in detennining the marmer in which 
these courts are staffed. Where the significance of the role of 
these Ccnstitutional Ca.lrts is valued, marmers of appoint~ 
members are designed to give political groopings am legislative 
bodies a part in the appointing process (1 9) • 
Foll~ the American example, am perhaps stressing to a 
greater degree the role of the legislature am of the Iaerrler, 
the west German system of appointing members of the 
Constitutional Court is a significant factor for the 
consideraticn of the Court's importance. 
'!be Basic law provided that the Judges of the Calstltutiooal 
Court shall be elected by the two houses of the Federal 
legislature (20). <:ne half of the members of the court are 
elected by the Federal lower house (Bundestag), which is a 
(X)P.ll.arly elected bOOy, am the other half are elected by the 
upper ha.lse of the Federal legislature (Burrlesrat), wh::>se members 
are awointed by the governments of the Iaerrler (21). 
The Constitutional Court is composed of two separate 
chambers (Senates). Justices are specifically elected to either 
the first or the 5e(X)(rl Senate, and may not sit on the other 
panel. '!be first Senate is presided aver by the President of the 
Court and the second Senate is presided over by the Vice-
President of the Court. Both QUef Justices are indeperxient as 
far as ju1icial and administrative matters of their Senates are 
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concerl'lErl. Under the Coostitutional Carrt statute of 1951, the 
Bundestag elects its quota of judges through a specially 
organised carmittee representing a reflection of the stren;Jth of 
the different political parties in the lower legislative l'nlse 
(22). '!be Burxlesrat elects its quota of jooges directly. 
'!be effect of giving the 00 legislative houses the rights 
to elect members of the ~ Senates of the court, am dividing in 
half the seats they elect in the two houses, serves several 
p.rrposes. '!be first is to prevent danination of the cx::JUrt by any 
ooe party. '!be secood ~ is to provide a formula by which 
the court represents the influence of the strengths of the 
different parties in both Federal am Laemer levels. The third 
p.rrpose of the design of the system of staffing the cx::JUrt is to 
represent the interests of the Federal Government and the 
govermnents of the Laerrler, due to the courts I role in umpiring 
the Federal system and its power of Constitutional review. 
Another possible consequence of the system of staffing the 
O:nstitutiooal Court is to reduce the objections to the COJItsI 
substantive choices and moral judgements, on the basis of 
demx:ratic principles, due to the close coonectioo between the 
court and the legislative hcAlses, am the care taken to provide 
it with a system that reflects the voting pc:MeI"s at both the 
Federal am raerrler levels (23). 
Fach of the ~ Senates has the same number of judges. The 
Senates started with twelve j1.rlges each, which rreant that in 1951 
the O::IlStitutiooal Coort OCJl'PI'ised of twenty-four jooges. Now 
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the Constitutional Coort is canprised of only sixteen judges, 
eight judges in each Senate (24) Functionally the 
Constitutional Court operates as two separate courts. Each 
Senate has its own distinct jurisdictioo. 
In staffing the Constitutional Court, there are 
qualificatioos determined by the CXlUrts' statute emphasising the 
neej for a variety of experience and backgroorrls. To qualify to 
be elected to the Coosti tutiooal Coort the minimum age of the 
per5a1S is forty years, and they have to be eligible for election 
to the Bundestag and .possess the qualificatioos for jtdicial 
office. In additioo there is a special requirement that three 
seats out of the eight seats in each Senate are reserved for 
jtrlges who are already members of the highest Federal courts 
(25). The other judges elected to the Constitutional Court 
cxmprise a mixture of peq>le with experience in governnent career 
service, professional legal practice, academic life and direct 
p:>litical activity (26). 
'!be mixture of past experiences and the design of the system 
of electing the members of the CoostitutiCtlal. Court recognises 
the neerl for diversity of krrMledge and experience besides the 
nee1 for wider representatioo. All of these di versi ties equip 
the COJIt for harrlliDJ subjects that affect varioos aspects of 
the lives of irrlividuals am the operatioo of the Ccnstitutlooal 
system, in adlltion to the important advantage of providiIY:J wider 
exnfidence in the ability of the jtrlges and legitimacy of their 
substantive dx>ices in deci~ CXXlStituticna.l cases. 
AccordiDJ to the COOStituticnal coort Statute, as am:mdErl in 
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1971, Jooges are elected for a non-renewable tenn of twelve years 
with a marx1atory retirerrent age of sixty-eight years (27). 
The independence of the O:nstituticnal Court allCMS it to 
check the other branches of government without fear of 
intervention or pressure from the Ministry of Justice. This 
irrlependence is in acoordance with Basic Law, which gave the 
Court the p::IWeI' to c:::oostrue Basic Law in a way which is bWin;J 
00 the fErleral govemnent as well as the Iaerxier. The decisicns 
made by the Court have dem:nstrated that it is acting fron a 
stroog and i.n:lependent positicn, especially in dealing with the 
federal govemnent. 
'1his case came very early in the life of the Cl:nstitutiooal 
Court; the Court's statute was enacted in 1951 and this case 
dates fron the sane year. The Court decided that it 'IOll.d be 
beneficial to use this case to introduce itself to other branches 
of govemnent and to rarove arrj ambiguities about the place of 
the <h1It in the CXXlStitutiooal system. 
This case involves the federal government's attempt to 
redress the artificial division of the traditiooal territories 
of Baden and Wurtenberg into three new states by the Allies. The 
issue raised by this case was whether the federal goveI'IIOellt had 
the autmrity umer Basic raw to suspem elections and extend the 
term of a state legislature ~ the outoane of a popllar 
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referendum on the merger of the state in question with aoc>ther 
tat (28) . . 
se. Urrler Bas~c taw the federal government has the pcMeI' 
of territorial reorganisaticn of the taender, (29) rut the Court 
denied it the power to extern the life of the state parliaroont as 
lon} as the Ian1 exists am its legislation does not violate the 
requirements of Basic Law. '!he ca.tIt said that if the federal 
government interfered with such matters as when and how an 
elected Land parliament was dissolvOO, it would be violatin; the 
principle of federalism guarantee:3. by Basic taw. 
The Constitutional Court announced several important 
propositions in this case: 
(1) '!be federal O:xlstituticnal Coort is absolutely suprema in 
the interpretaticn of Basic taw. 
( 2) '!be Ca.1It' s functioo is to examine the legality or validity, 
not the wisdom, of public policy; the extent of the 
legislature's txJW& is a cx:nstitutiooal question on which 
the Coostituticnal 0Jurt reserves finality. 
(3) Constitutional provisions are to be interpreted not as 
iIrleperrlent rules st.andin;1 alooe rut within the context of 
Basic Law as a wtx>le. No cx:nsti tutiooal right, duty or power 
is absolute, rut is to be measured by cxmpeting rights arrl 
responsibilities urrler Basic Law. 
( 4 ) '!here are certain fun;3arrental principles such as dem:x::racy, 
federalism arrl the rule of law which can be deduced fran 
Basic Law as a wtx>le arrl to which all other cx:nstitutiooal 
provisions are subordinate. 
(5) Certain higher law principles constitute stamards against 
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which positive law and the actions of public officials are 
to be reviewOO (30). 
In ~l¥J 00 the principle of "federal canity" aI'UXlUrlCed 
by the Court in this case, the Ca.lrt said that as roombers of the 
federatioo the Laender are states with their own supreme state 
power, which although limited in its field of applicatioo is not 
derived fran the federal government rut rather recognised by it 
(31 ). In setting out the limits of the federatien' s IXJW& to 
organise new states, the Cburt signified clearly its intentien to 
guard the autonany of the Laender. 
'!be t<trth-Rh.ine Salaries CIse (1954) 
This case was brought by the federal government against 
legislatien by the !..ani of North-Rhine WestiXlalia, en the grouIXis 
that it violated the legislative framework of the federal 
goverrnent, which, urrler article 75 of Basic Law, has the power 
to enact fI'aIDEM)rk legislatioo. 
Basic Law gave the federal gove.mnent the power to enact 
framework legislatioo in certain fields; the purpose of this 
power is to ensure a certain degree of unifonuity throughout the 
Federal ~lic. '!be Basic Law did not define the nearll.n;J of the 
tenn "fI'aIDEM)rk", so it was a questicn for the Calrt to answer. 
Ckle area in which the ferleral governnent has the right to 
enact framework legislatioo is the "legal status of persoo.s in 
the pililic service of the Laerrler, Ccrrmunes or other oorporate 
bc:rlies un:ier public law" (32). In 1951 the federal governnent 
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enacted legislaticn which prohibited the laerrler fron fixing the 
salaries of their officials oore favourably than those of the 
oorresporrling federal officials. 
'!he Land government denie:i the CXXlSti tutiooali ty of this 
legislaticn, arguing that it did not leave free SCXJpe to the 
Iaender rut went into detail such as a::W.d only be justified by 
exclusive legislative authority. This, the Land argued, was 
contrary to the prrp:>se of the frarrework legislatioo, which is 
meant to allow the Laender the discretion to adapt their 
legislation to the special circumstances of their areas. 
'!he Ca.lrt struck dCMl the federal legislatioo as unconstitu-
tiooal, arrl said that the definiticn of frarrework power was a 
legal question to be decided by the Court. '!he Court differentia-
ted between framework legislatioo an1 ccncurrent legislatioo, 
saying that framework legislation must not be of the same 
intensity as ooncurrent legislatioo. '!he main distinction is that 
the federal governnent is given the right to occupy the area of 
legislatioo; Wltil this time an1 to this extent Land legislatioo 
is void, while fI"aI"De\li/Ork legislation presupposes Larrl legislatioo 
in the same area. Framework legislatioo shalld thus leave suff-
icient soope for Larrl legislation. In firrlin} invalid the federal 
framework regulations on civil servants' salaries, the Court 
stressed that, due to the principle of federal oanity, Iaerrler 
are not absolutely free to determine the salaries of their 
officials (33). This principle stems from the spirit of the 
federal constitution am means that whenever the effects of a 
Land's legislation extend beyond the area under that Land's 
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jurisdiction, the Lam must take accx:xmt the interests of the 
federal government and of other Laender. In determining the 
salaries of their officials the Laen1er slnlld bear in mirrl that 
the Federal Re~lic has a single overall financial structure. 
'!be Laender should take into consideration the general salary 
situation in the federal government and in the other Laender, so 
that the general financial structure is not shaken. Large 
variations in public sector salaries between different Laen1er 
and between Laender and federation may cause dissatisfaction 
within the civil service. 
'!be <h1rt ruled that a Larrl law can only be invalidated on 
the basis of violation of fe3eral canity in cases of obvioos 
misuse of legislative discretion. In this case the <h1rt fOOIrl 00 
obvious misuse of legislative discretion by North-Rhine 
Wesqmlia (34). 
'!be t:eleris:l.al case of 1961 
This case brought the Constitutional Court into direct 
conflict with the federal government on a matter of policy which 
the federal government considered vital (35) The federal 
government had decided in 1951 to create a 5eCXXld television 
channel in a&iition to the exist:ln:J channel which was run in 
collaboration between the Laen3er and sane private associations. 
'!be Laemer argued that the federal government did oot have the 
right to interfere in the regulation of television matters 
because these matters fell within their re<X)gl1ised canpetence 
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over cultural matters. Four Laender challenged the federal 
government's action before the Constitutional Court on the 
grotJIrls of infringement of the guarantee of "freedan of reIX>~ 
by broadcasting" cc:ntairm in Article 5 of the Basic Law, of the 
residual powers of the Laerrler under Article 30 am of the duty 
of fooeral ccmity (36). 
'!be fooeral goverrrnent' s case restoo en generic interpret-
ation of sane traditional areas of federal authority umer Basic 
law, because there was no explicit allocatien of autb::>rity over 
television. Among th& federal powers invoked to support the 
federal government's argument was its power over post and 
telegraphs (37) '!be CcAlrt ruled that while this power might 
extend to the regulation of arrangements for the technical 
aspects of television transmission, it could not cover the 
organisatien am mak.i.B] of prograrmes. '!be cx:ntent of televisien 
broadcasting, the Court decided, fell within the cultural 
sovereignty of the Laemer. '!be CcAlrt I s decisien made use of the 
principle of federal oanity at several points. It provided an 
example of the use of the doctrine of fooeral ccmity to modify 
the existiB;J freedan of discretioo, particularly in establishir¥3 
.. 
limits for ooth the fooeral governnent am the laerrler in the 
exercise of their powers. 
'!be CcAlrt was ccn::::erned to prevent the federal governnent I s 
power over broadcastin:J fran bein3' so far-reaching in its effects 
as to prejudice the organisatioo of broadcastin3' by the laen::ler. 
If existing broadcastin:J statioos were prevented fran cx:ntrollinJ 
their own transmissions, the court argued, this would be a 
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violation of the principle of federal a::rnity. 
'!be Court was criticised for its highly political arguments 
am the severity of its criticism of the federal goverrmant in a 
matter which was incidental to a fairly clear-cut question of 
legislative and administrative powers under Basic Law (38). 
There were many complaints that the Court had obscured the 
boundary between constitutional judgement and political 
criticism, especially in its detailed discussion of the manner in 
which the federal govermaent had dealt with the wtx>le issue of 
the new channel (39). 
The extent to which the doctrine of federal comity was 
developed by the Constitutional Court in several cases, 
especially the Televisioo Case, made it susceptible to alIoost 
unlimited extension to every aspect of political relations 
between the federal govermaent am the Laerrler. But in a later 
case the CalStitutiooal Court restrained its use of the doctrine 
of federal ocmity, especially for the protectioo of the rights of 
the Laerxier, anrn.mcing that the principle cx:nstitutes or limits 
rights or duties within an exist.i.rv:J relatioo.ship between the 
federal governnent am the Laerxier rut does oot indeperrlently 
establish a legal relatiooship between them (40). 
'lbe QmstibJt1 mal 
i.nterp:'etatial. 
'!be CalStitutiooal Court aIlI1O.1IlOed that lunan dignity is the 
"highest legal value" and the Basic Law in Article 1, which 
C1apter5 
- 144 -
proclaims the inviolability of human dignity, is beyond 
parliament's powers of amendment. The Constitutional Court 
annoonced that f1..lOOamental rights are pre-existent and birrlinJ 
upon both the fOlU1ders of the Oxlstitutioo and the legislature. 
'!be ConstitutiCXlal Court further aI'll'lO.lIlCOO that even though Basic 
Law authorises the legislature to derogate from fundamental 
rights in sane subjects, it is unacceptable to interpret the 
constitution in ways which would give the legislature a free ham 
to tamper with furrlamental rights, even in tmse subjects in 
which Basic law explicitly gives the legislature the right to 
derogate fran these rights (41). 
Federalism was one area in which stricter scrutiny is 
applied to political acts because of decentralisation and the 
limits it imposes in particular on the acts of federal political 
branches. In West Germany the federal system was created to 
protect against repetition of the Nazi experience. New states 
were created artificially by dividin;J the areas urrler Allied 
occupation. 
'!be Oxlstitutiooal Court has fornulated certain unwritten 
oc:nstitutiooal principles on the basis that these principles have 
their source in the guiding ideas which inspired the foorrlir¥.J 
fathers and informed the deliberations of the parliamentary 
council, rut were not expressly set out in arrJ specific ooostitu-
tiooal provision. 'lbese principles inch.rle federal cx:mity, the 
social state, am the principle of proportiooality, which is the 
equivalent of due process. The important principle of human 
dignity, which is based on Article 1, can be inclOOed with these 
Olapter5 
- 145 -
unwritten" principles to form higher constitutional principles to 
which constitutional arnerrlments should confonn (42). 
The use of unwritten constitutional principles and the 
primacy of individual dignity, all of which relate either 
directly or irrlirectly to the protectioo of the irrli vidual, have 
given individual rights a prime position in constitutional 
interpretation. '1bese oc::nstitutianal principles have affected 
constitutianal interpretatioo in a.rx>ther respect: because they 
are general and Il'OSt of them are not written, they allow the 
Court ample roan to manoeuvre am develop its decisioos. 
From its early days the Court signalled to the other 
branches of goverrunent that it wanted to be independent and 
active in perfonning its duty. In the first year the justices 
sought and eventually received imependenoe fron the Ministry of 
Justice in the Court's non-jOOicial affairs. '!be reasoo behirrl 
the justices' seeking the independence of the Court in 
administrative and financial natters was that they considered 
that these matters could jeopardise the independence of the 
O::mt, which is important if it is to play its role effectively. 
In its first major case the Coostitutional Court anrnmced 
that it was absolutely supreme in the interpretatioo of Basic law 
and that it was prepared to carry its responsibility 
!ndeperrlently. 
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'!he Court took a positive attittrle and played an active role 
within the latitude it possessed, using the power available to it 
in the ccntext of the legal system to develop and balance the 
coostitutional structure of the Federal Retm>lic. One example of 
the role of the Court in balancing the coostitutional structure 
and preserving the federal system is its protection of the 
Laerrler and the small area of legislaticn they centrol CXJTl[>3T ed 
to the federal government. 
In guarding the federal system the Court did oot CXXlfine 
itself to the letter .of Basic Law, but rather admitted the 
existence of basic unwritten principles such as federal cqnity 
and considered all other provisions of Basic Law to be 
subordinate to these principles. 
In its interpretaticn of Basic Law the O:nstituticnal Court 
takes different factors into consideration by adopting the 
rneanin;s of the CCI'lStituticnal provisicns current at the time 
when the provisicns are aRllied. 
'!be active role of the Court was cbvious oot cnly fron what 
it dx)se to do rut also fron what it chose oot to do. '!be Court 
used to leave sane cases pendin:J for a lcng time, so that the 
problems could be solved in different ways or the positicns in 
the case a:::W.d develop and bec:xxle clearer. 
The Court is an independent judicial institution and a 
powerful actor in the West Gennan coostitutional structure. '!be 
legal system and the nature of the coostituticnal structure in 
West Gennany have oot prevented the Oxlsti tuticnal Court fran 
carryinJ CAlt its duty. '!be Court has practised its CCXlStituticnal 
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adjudication while taking into consideration the different 
circumstances of the in::li vidual cases arxl their parties. 
'!be jurisdicticn provided by the Basic Law arxl the manner of 
staffing the court provided it with a wide discreticn arxl a ItOral 
justification to becane involved in ItOre than the applicaticn of 
positive legal rules. 
The Constitutional Court is the supreme guardian of the 
Constituticn, with the autlnrity of providing interpretatioos of 
the Constitution which are binding on all (43). The 
ConstitutiC1lal Cburt has a p:>litical significance due to its 
jurisdiction to interpret arxl resolve disputes al:n.1t the cootents 
of a p:>litical document, namely, the Ccnstitution (Basic Law). 
Therefore the Constitutional Court is, by its design and 
cx::mpetence, an important instituticn affecting the p:>litical arxl . 
CXlIlStitutiooal devel.opnents of the <XJUIltry. 
The Constitutional Court is involved in issues of a 
cootroversial nature, (as in the case of the Supreme Cburt of the 
U.5.), like the right to abortion arxl the right to life of unborn 
babies (44). '!be Ccnstitutional Cburt is not witlnlt rroral. arxl 
legitimate rights when involved in deciding such issues. 
In deciding such cases, the Cburt's ju:igauent will not satisfy 
the positiCllS of all people. '!be Cburt can reduce the criticism 
and any popular or political resentment by pointing to the 
Constitutiooal provisi~ of the Basic Law arxl sOOwing the coher-
ence of its interpretaticn of them, as well as adopting restraint 
in the dispositicn of sane of the issues before it (45). 
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'llle Ccnstituticnal Court is accordErl a major responsibility 
to ensure protection of rights given to governments and 
individuals by the Basic Law, anj to ensure the supremacy of that 
Basic Law. 'llle cnJIt's discretion in disposing of matters within 
its o::rnpetence is wide. 'llle success of the Ccnsti tuticnal Cburt 
in the past anj its role as protector of individual rights ani of 
Federal balance depeD:ied on mixed measures of self-restraint am 
decisive involvement in appropriate cases. 'llle success of the 
Constitutional Cburt is reflectErl in the grc:Ming OCXlfidence in it 
am in the increased oonstituticnal resp:nsibilities accorded to 
it by successive enactments (46). 
1 • 'nle Basic Law of west Gernany Article 93. 
2. Ibid., Article 93 (2). 
3. Ibid., Article 93 (4a). 
4. Ibid., Article 93 (3). 
5. Ibid., Article 93 (4). 
6. 'nle decisien c::oncerrrln;1 the 1951 electoral law of the Lam 
of Schleswig-Holstein. QJoted fron Blair, P .M. Fooeralism 
am Jtrlicial Review in west Gennany Oxford: '!be Claremcn 
Press, 1981, p36. 
7. 'nle decisien en the Qlropean Defence Camumity. Qloted fron 
Blair, q>. cit., pa6. 
8. ~, E. Supreme Calrts am JOOicial Law Making: 
COOstituticnal Tr1b.mals am COOstituticnal Review 
n:>rdrecht: Martinus Nijooff Publishers, 1986, p103. 
9. Ioc. cit. 
10. Blair, ope cit., p37, 
11. ~s, D.P. JOOicial Politics in west Gennany: A st:trly 
of the Federal Coostituticnal Q:mt Beverly Hills, 
California: Sage Publicaticns, 1976, p43. 
12. Blair, ope cit., p31. 
13. Katmers, ope cit., p56. 
14. Blair, q>. cit., pS. 
15. '!he Sooth west case, decided in 1951. 
16. ().loted fran Katmers, q>. cit., pS3. 
17. Ibid., pS4. 
18. Ibid., pS5. 
19. See cawelletti, M. JOOicial Review in the Q:ntemporary 
World IIrlianap::>lis,. IIrliana: '!he BciDs-Merrill Cb., 1971, 
p.55i see also McWhinney, q>. cit., R;>45-46. 
20. '!he Basic Law, Art. 94. 
21. '!he Basic Law, Art. 94 (1). 
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23. Johnson, Nevil, '!be Interdeperrlence of Law am Politics: 
Jooges am the Constitutioo in West Gennany 5 West European 
Politics, July 1982, p247. 
24. See~, ope cit., p34. 
25. ~, ope cit., p49. 
26. ~, E. JOOicial Restraint am the West Gennan 
Constitutional Court 75 Harv. L. Rev., 1961, p9. 
27. See Kcmners, ope cit. p.88 am ~, Constitutional 
Courts OPe cit., p54. 
28. ~, Ccnstitutiooal Courts ope cit., p234. 
29. '!be Basic Law, Article 118. 
30. Kcmners ope cit., p209. 
31. Blair ope cit., p151. 
32. Ibid., p85. 
33. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), 
am the latter case of Garcia v. San Antarlo Metropolitan 
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), for an analogous 
U.S. experience. 
34. Blair, ope cit., p166. 
35. ~, op.cit., p171. 
36. Blair, ope cit., p177. 
37. '!be Basic taw, Article 73 (7) • 
38. Blair, ope cit., p181. 
39. I.oc. cit. 
40. Territorial Organisatioo Case (1961), cited fran Blair, ope 
cit., p183. 
41. Kcmoors, ope cit., .p216. 
42. Ibid., p.210. 
43. Leil::ix>lz, Gerald, '!be West German Coostitutional Court, in 
~, E. am Pescatore, P. (ed.), Federalism am 
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Supreme Courts am the Integration of Legal Systems 
Bruxelles: Frlitions U.G.A.M 1973, p62. 
44. In the U.S., see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); In 
Gennany the issue was brought by sane members of the 
&lrrlestag am five LaeIrler. '!be decision was handed dCM1 in 
1 of Feb, 1975 - see Johnscn, Nevil, cp. cit., p.240. 
45. Jolmson, Nevil, cp. cit., p249. 
46. Q1e of such enacbnents is giving the Constitutiooal Court of 
Ccmpetence to hear direct ocnstitutiooal canplaints fran 
irrlividuals by the 1vneOOment of Article 92 in 1968. 
.JtDICIAL REVIEW CF mE CDI~ PCH!R CF <IIG<rSS JH) :iTS IMPACl' 
at '!BE FEIEW. SYSTl'Jt IN mE O.S. 
'!he Judiciary has an important role in deciding' the Hmi ts 
of the legislative ~s of the natiaaal government and of the 
states in the u.s. fErleral system. 
'Ihe general pattern in the developrent of the u.s. fErleral 
system has been 1:cMa.r4s increasing the Natiaaal goveI1'IneIlt ' s 
share of legislative~. 'Ihe <n.lrts have played two. different 
roles regarding the distril:xJ.tioo of legislative {X7w'eI': they have 
played a vi tal and maj or role in the praroticn am preservatioo 
of federalism by curbing state action incompatible with the 
integraticn of the natioo, and allowing for the expansicn of 
fErleral legislative authority. 'Ihe importance of both of these 
roles cannot be played d<::Mn. 'Ihe <n.lrts' role regarding curbing 
state actions incanpatible with the integration of the natiCXlal 
ecx:n:my has been a central ale. ~ protection of the 
expansioo of the natiaaal powers, the role of the judiciary has 
been sea:xrlary. 'lb say that in the performance of the sec::xxrl 
task the role of the jOOiciary is sea:xrlary does oot discnmt the 
i.rrp)rtanoe of such a role in the cantinu.in:} integraticn of the 
naticnal e:xxaay (1). 
In the face of the expansive power of Ca1gress arises the 
necessity of pItting certain limits to this power in order to 
preserve the fErleral system. '!he coostitution is pranised on the 
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existence of the states as irrlepement entities. 
What is the branch of government lTOSt suitable to prarote 
am support the integration of the nation am at the sane t:iIre 
ensurinJ the true existence of the individual states within the 
parameters providej by the CXXlSti tution? 'lbere are calls to 
entrust the Ccngress with this task. I shall argue that the best 
guardian of the fejeral system is the Jooiciary. 
My aim is to prove the positive role of the judiciary in 
praroting the growth of natiooal IXJWer, while preservinJ the 
fejeral system. 
'1be Qwnerce Paler 
'!he power of Ccngress "to regulate O:mnerce ••• ~ the 
several states" (2) has been one of the areas which witnessed a 
great expansioo aver the years. 
'!he cx:mnerce IXJWer has been used throughout the history of 
the U.S. federal system to strengthen the powers of the Natiooal 
governnent in many different fields. Fejeral Tatnlr statutes, 
even the Civil Rights statutes, am co.mtless others rest on 
cx:mnerce power. '!he urrlerly1D;J cxnstruction of the scope of the 
Qmnerce clause has been that Ccngress has the power to regulate 
the activities which it can show to be burdenin:.J, obstructing or 
affect1D;J inter-state a:mnerce (3 ). 
Originally the resolution of a:mnercial rivalries between 
states was am:ng the reasons behirrl call1D;J the 1787 CalVentioo. 
UD:ier the Articles of Calfederatioo there were different fonns of 
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a:::tmErcial rivalries annng the states, the enacbnent of tariff 
laws against other states being just one example of the trade 
restrictioos on interstate carmerce. '!he eliminaticn of these 
rivalries am the abol1 tioo of restrictive trade practices was 
one of the primary tasks of the Conventioo (4). 
'll1e sparse language of the Camerce clause was presumed by 
the frcurers to be adequate to allCM the resolution of carmercial 
rivalries between the states. Nevertheless, it soon became 
aRBI'ent that the clause had left several questions unanswered, 
so it was the duty of the judiciary to ad1ress these questioos 
am to resolve them, to serve the purposes of the Ccnstituticn to 
unify the states am abolish hannful trade practices. 
'!be need far 1 ntegratim of the aarket am the role of the 
&Jptaae CbJrt 
'!he oonstitutiooal regulaticn, in the oonstitutiooal text of 
1787, has not been .amen:3Erl since cc:rnin:J into force (5 ). 'Ibis 
fact itself shows the ~ of the role of the judiciary in 
the interpretation of the limits of both state and national 
powers regardiD;J ccmnerce, whidl has had the effect of allowiD;J 
the integration the national economy to an extent quite 
unforeseen in 1787. '!he role of the judiciary in provi~ for 
am protectin3' the expansicn of the natiooal eccn:my has becule 
necessary for several reasoos, primarily the desirability of 
natiooal ecxxx:m:ic integraticn brooght about by the develO(Xlent of 
the CXJUIltry IS eoonc:my fron being rural am decentralised towards 
greater integration am. sophisticaticn. Since the adopticn of the 
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constitution, the irxlustrial revolution took place am congress 
needoo to provide legislation to cupe with this, am to help 
expand it and distribute its benefits in the interests of the 
wlDle cnmtry (6 ). 
'!be first opportlmity for the Supreme Co.Jrt to deal with the 
questions left unansweroo by the O:mnerce clause was in 1824, in 
Gibbals v. 03den (7 ). 
Gil::tx:ns v. Men involva:i the validity of a New York statute 
that conferred a I'IICX'X)pOly to navigate the waters of the state by 
steamboat. '!be chall~ to the statute restoo, in part, upcn the 
grOllI'rls that it conflictoo with a federal statute licensing such 
interstate cx:mnerce, arrl was therefore an unautOOrisa:i state 
legislation. Chief Justice Marshall, who wrote the Court's 
decision, held that the New York's statute was void arrl took the 
opportunity to interpret federal ~ expansively. 
Marshall rej ected the claim which restricted ccmnerce to 
~chase arrl sale of goods. He assertoo that "O:mnerce" is a 
general term which describes the ocmnercial interoourse in all 
its branches. 
Marshall did not erxi his discussion of the scope of fooeral 
powers at this point, altlnJgh it was sufficient for the oold:in:J 
of the Calrt to establish that navigation was affectirxJ cx:mnerce 
am:ng the states sufficiently, in this case, to h:>ld the New York 
statute void. Marshall went on to establish that under the 
O:mnerce clause Cc:n;ress cculd legislate with respect to "all 
ocmnerce which calCenlS I'IOre states than one" (8 ) 'Ibis rreans 
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that any activity which "concerns" or affects interstate cx:xrrrerce 
would be within the power of Coogress to legislate. '!his also 
means that the power of Congress to legislate on interstate 
commerce would be absolute, plenary and subject only to the 
Constitution's affirmitive prohibitions on the exercise of 
federal authority (9). Accordir¥3 to Marshall, in his opinion 
Gibbons v. Ogden was to be understood as conforming to the 
general design of the Constitution. The design is that 
~essiCXlal power shccl.d extern to the nation generally, rut 
not to disp..ltes which are canpletely within a particular state, 
which do not affect other states and with which it is not 
necessary to interfere for the p.1rpose of executing sane general 
power of the NatiCXlaI governroont. 
Altlnlgh Gi.l:txns v. O:pen respected the theory of enumerated 
powers, it derlalStrated that this theory was canpatihle with a 
very broad view of ~essiCXlal authority. Gilixns v. open 
represents a landmark in the developnent of the O:nsti tutiCXlal 
law of the U.5., and gives a clear example of Marshall's view of 
Cl:n;JressiCXlal power. Not until Cl:n3ress used its legislative 
power with respect to Ccmnerce in the Inter-state O:mnerce Act of 
1887 etc., did the natiCXlal legislature take up the power it had 
umer the CcIlstitution. Before then the cases which reached the 
Supreme Coort were largely a:ncemed with the canpatihility of 
state legislation with the still dormant power of Cl:n;Jress under 
the O:mneroe Clause. 
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'!be Pre-New Deal J)r1s1oos (fn:m 1887 to 1937) 
During this pericrl the Supreme Court was repeatedly required 
to define the limits of Calgressiooal IXJW&. The Supreme Court 
departed from the empirical test for determining Congress's 
authority, which was suggested by M3rshall in Gi.l:tXJns v. 03den, 
and replaced it with a formal classification of economic 
acti vi ty • 'lhis test was restrictive of Cl::03ress' s pJWer am 
resulted in the invalidatioo of a nunber of Ccn3ressiooal acts. 
It distinguished "Ccmnerce" fran ''mining'' am "manufacturiD:J", 
am the result of this ··classificatioo was to deny CcoJress the 
pc:Mer to regulate the latter activities even if the prc:ducts of 
these activities WQlld subsequently enter the realm of inter-
state cxmnerce (10). 
In U.S. v. E.C. Knight Co. (11) the Supreme Court held that 
an a~sition of four sugar refineries which brooght 98% of the 
u.s. refinery capacity UIrler CXiliLUl centrol did not violate the 
Shennan Act. 'Ibis decisien was based en a na.rrc::M cooceptien of 
Ccngress's pc:Mer UIrler the Catmerce clause. The court maintained 
that cx:mnerce did not inclu:re manufacturing, agriculture or other 
productien activities. The court in its distinction between 
manufacture and commerce was trying to preserve the state's 
police power in order to protect the autcn:rny of states. The 
court did not succeed in establishing principles that were 
adequate to oonfine federal power. The interacticns between the 
different economic activities and the wider effects of the 
developnents in states upa1 interstate cx:mnerce was becx:miD3 
apparent with the passage of time. So, in SWift ani Co. v. u.s. 
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(12) the Supreme Court recognised the interconnectedness of 
markets aroco:J the states. In this case the Suprare Coort held 
that price fixing in livestock markets could be prohibited urrler 
the Sherman Act since the markets, although themselves each 
located in a single state, were part of interstate cxmnerce. 
'!be trerrl tCMaI'ds widening the reach of interstate ccmnerce 
continued and resulted in the ratification of important 
cxngressiCX1al exercises of the Ca'rlrerce p:JWer. 
In the Shreveport Rate Case (13) the SUprene Coort sus~ 
Q:ngress • s power to act "to regulate rates of intrastate railroads 
in canpeti tioo with interstate railroads. '!be court did not 
explain why it approved Congressional authority to regulate 
intrastate railroads which affected interstate cxmnerce while at 
the same time denying Congress power to regulate production 
activities which eventually affect interstate cxmnerce. Justice 
Hughes, wtx> wrote for the Coort in this case, gave reasoos which 
could be applied to other activities relating to interstate 
cxmnerce: in his words, " ••• all matters having such a close am 
substantial relatioo to interstate traffic ••• " would justify 
exterrliB; ~ess' s authority to them as a fair extentioo to 
ensure ..... the efficiency of interstate traffic". Why then could 
this oot be awlied to other activities affecting interstate 
cxmnerce? '1be answer to this questioo was oot provided by the 
court in this case. 
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'!be New Deal am Interstate Cbmprce 
'!be Supreme Court in the pre-New Deal era was reluctant to 
approve the expansion of Congress's cx:mnerce ~r. In sane cases 
the ca.rrt approved the ~ of O:ngress to regulate am prohibit 
the interstate transportation of gocrls cx:osidered to be hannful 
in certain ways. So, the transportatioo of lottery tickets in 
interstate cx:mnerce was held to be within O:ngress's power urrler 
the O:mnerce clause, in the lottery case in 1 903 (14). In this 
case the oourt refused to accept the argument that "to regulate 
does not include to prohibit". The court confinned that 
Congress's power over interstate commerce is plenary and is 
subject to no limitations except such as may be foorrl in the 
Constitutioo. Arl¥::n;J the subjects held to be within ~ess's 
power to prohibit fran being transported in interstate cx:mnerce 
were adulterated focrl am. ~ for i.rmoral ~s (15). But 
the ca.rrt refused to sustain the Federal Child I.al::a.Ir Law of 
1916, which prohibited the shipnent in interstate cx:mnerce of 
prcrlucts of enterprises employing urrler-age 1 atnJr, in Hanmer v. 
D:lgenhart (16). '!be ca.rrt insisted that the power to prohibit 
the shipnent of goods across state lines was limited to goods 
that were hannful in themselves. 
'!be insistence of the oourt 00 preserving the states' police 
txM& am the fonnal classificatioo of ecuonic activity were to 
be major obstacles to the acceptance of several New Deal 
programmes which were introduced to improve the economic 
development of the nation and to remove the obstacles which 
CXlIltrib.lted to the problems of that per1cd. 
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In the years of the Great Depression the courts were 
considered by many as an obstacle to national solutions to the 
eccn:mic problems. '1lle coort in several cases dennnstrated its 
insistence on using the formal classification and the 
"direct/irrlirect" test to ecxn::rnic activities and so excluded 
many from Congress's power by labelling them as having an 
"iOOirect" effect 00 interstate cxmnerce. 
In Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co. (17) the 
Supreme Coort held unconstitutiooal a statute that establishErl a 
c::anpllsory retirement arrl pensioo for all carriers subj ect to the 
Interstate CaImerce Act. '!be O:mt held that the scheme had no 
relatioo to the tusiness of interstate transportaticn, and that 
it was essentially related solely to the Social Welfare of the 
workers, therefore it was not in purpose or effect a regulaticn 
of CCIl'IlErce within the meaning of the Ccnstituticn. In another 
case, Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United states (18), the Supreme 
O:mt invalidated parts of the Natiooal IIrlustrial Recovery Act 
partly because the regulation of wages and hours in the Act had 
only an "indirect" effect upon coounerce and was, therefore, 
beyood the autlnrity of Oxlqress. 
In Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (19 ) , the Supreme Court 
invalidated the Bituminous a:al Ccnservaticn Act of 1935 in part 
because the Act regulated incidents of "production", and 
"productioo", the O:mt ruled, was a purely local activity beyood 
the {XJW&s of Ccngress to regulate urrler the CaImerce clause. 
'!he Supreme <h1rt invalidated several New Deal progrart'lOOS by 
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the use of its restrictive tests and thereby precipitated a 
political crisis. 'nle Court was considered to be an obstacle to 
the needed national solutions to the econani.c problems. 'nle 
Court's insistence on excluding a wide range of economic 
activities am 1 aOOJr regulaticn fran the ~ of Congress am 
reserving them to the states was considered to be a failure of 
the Court to urrlerstand the econani.c realities. 'nle states were 
impotent to deal with the problems of the economy and their 
regulation was useless because it usually resulted in canpetiticn 
~ the states for local advantage rather than the solutioo of 
the wider problems. 'nle effect of the Court's decisions resulted 
in public disfavour for it, partly because it was considered by 
many observers am CXllllelltators that the Court's limits on the 
power of Ccngress were not required by the Calstituticn bIt were 
merely of the Court's am opinicn (20). It was argued that had 
the Court used doctrines datir¥] back to Gil:tx:ns v. C9den it might 
have sustained Congressional authority in the New Deal 
legislatioo. 
In the face of the Supreme Court's refusal to sustain the 
New Deal progranme President Roosevelt m:JVed against the Court 
shortly after his second election in 1937. Roosevelt urged 
Congress to enact legislatioo which ~d peImit the increase of 
the justices of the Court, with the ultimate aim of allowin:J for 
the appointment of new justices who would conform to the 
Constitutiooal views of - the President and Cco:]ress. The "a::urt 
packing" was a serious challenge to the independence of the 
<h1rt. Eventually the Congress refused to adopt the suggested 
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legislation in the face of bitter an::1 widespread debate. But 
before the defeat of the Coort-packing legislation the Court 
retreatoo fran its position an::1 acceedoo to political pressure in 
its farrous decision in National Ialxur Relations Board v. Jones 
an::1 Laughlin steel Corp. (21) 
'DJe ~ of the OJmeroe Paler as ~ by Jales & 
1-3119"11 n am subsequent cases: 
In Jones & Laughlin the Court sustained Ccngress' s power to 
regulate l.a}x)ur relations at a manufacturing plant operatoo by an 
integratoo steel canpany. The Court held that latoJr relations 
in the canpany was within Ccngress' s power to regulate because 
any work stoppage at its plants ''wolld have a rrost serious effect 
en interstate cxmnerce" (22). 
The O:urt used l.aD;uage the effect of which was to broaden 
the reach of O:mgressicnal autix>rity an::1 signifiErl the abarrlcn-
ment of the classificatien tests which were used at sane earlier 
cases. 'lbe O:urt anrnmced the shift in its enqilasis fran the 
CXllSideratial of each ea::n:::mic activity separately in view of its 
nature and "direct" or "indirect" relation to interstate 
coounerce, to one in which the attention was paid to the 
cumulative effect al interstate ocmneroe. The Court anrnmced in 
Jones & Lauqhlin that "the power to regulate oc:mnerce is the 
power to enact all apprq>riate legislatial for its protectien an::1 
advancement". 'lbe O:urt further anrnmced that " ••• Altl'nlgh 
activities may be intrastate in character when separately 
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oonsidered, if they have such a close am substantial relation to 
interstate camerce that their central is essential or it is 
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and 
obstructioos, Cl::n3ress cann::>t be denied the ~ to exercise 
that oontrol" (23) 
'Ibis decision marks the recn;nition by the courts that the 
earlier test it used was irrelevant am signifiErl the return to 
O1i.ef Justice Marshall' s earlier view of Congressional ~ CNer 
interstate cx:mnerce. 'Ibis case marks the start of a new era in 
which Congress's pow~r was sustained on a wide range of 
activities am different fields, so lcn:J as it can prove they 
have an effect on the flow of interstate ocmnerce. 
In Wickard v. Filbum ( 24), the O:::urt sustained Congress's 
power to regulate activities which are not in themselves involved 
in interstate cx:mnerce at all, rut where the aggregate effect of 
the class of those activities was understood to influence 
interstate cx:mnerce. In Wickard the O:::urt held that Congress 
coold ocntrol fa.t'Ilers' production of wheat for hcme <XX'lSlm1ption 
because the cumulative effect of lore <XX'lSlm1ption of wheat by 
fanners might rea.scn:lbly be tho.lght to alter the supply-and-
de.mard relatiooships of the interstate CXllllolity market (25) 
'!be FCst-1937 dEds100s am to! Protective Principle 
In addition to extending Congress's power to regulate 
activities affectiD;J interstate curmerce, the post-1931 Supreme 
Court approved the imposition by Congress of protective 
conditions on the privilege of engaging in an activity that 
Cllapter6 
- 164 -
affects interstate a::rmerce. It is now established that Congress 
may im(x:>se any corrli tions on the use of ccmnerce privileges as 
Ion:; as the c:::omitions do rot violate iroeperrlent constitutional 
prohibitions (26). '!be limits which were imposed by the decision 
in Hanmer v. Dagenhart (27) 00 Ccngressiooal power have been 
renoved. Cile of the examples of the protective c:::omitions was the 
exclusioo fron interstate ccmnerce of gocXis prcrluced in plants 
whose employees' wages am OOurs did rot meet federal standards. 
SUch cx:n:ii tions were included in the Fair La1x>r Staroards Act of 
1938, which was affirne:1 by the Supreme Court in United states v. 
Darby (28). Congress, the Court said, could follow its own 
c:x:tlCeptioo of public policy in imposing restrictions to exclude 
fran interstate ccmnerce articles the use of which is ccnsidered 
by Qn;ress to re injurioos to public health, roorals or welfare. 
The power to exclude goads and activities from interstate 
commerce enabled Congress to expand its powers to achieve 
OOjectives which by their nature are rot ecxn::mic. 
In Heart of Atlanta tobtel v. United states (29) the Supre.m3 
Calrt unanirrolsly sustained the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
prohibited racial discriminatioo in any "Inn, Fbtel, fobtel or any 
other establishment which provides lodgin; to transient guests". 
Congress had ample evidence, the Court said, that racial 
discriminatioo in these establisl'lnents impeded interstate travel 
by blacks. 
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'1he Chmproe Power and the Limits Requind by the Federal System 
'!he expansion of the CaTrnerce power since 1937, and the 
inclusion of even non-econcmi.c acti vi ties and the achievenent of 
non-ecnnanic obj ectives through the CaTrnerce power, gives rise to 
the questioo of whether or not there are limits to this power. 
'!he use of the "protective principle" and the "necessary and 
proper" clause (30) resulted in the extension of Calgress's power 
to activities which are so peculiarly "lcx:al" that even their 
repeated performances cannot have substantial effect on the 
ecxxlCInY of rrore than CXle state (31). 
'!he Supreme Court has iOOicated that there are limits en the 
Catmerce power resultinJ fron the federal system of goverTlITEI1t. 
'lhese intimations are reinforced by the effort the Court makes, 
when sustaining legislatioo, to dem::nstrate that the ccn:iuct 
regulated has sane connectioo with interstate cxmnerce. '!here 
WOlld be no need to prove the existence of coonecticns between 
the conduct regulated and interstate commerce were there no 
limits to O:n:Jress' s ~ over these kin::is of activities. AM 
yet it is easy to prove the existence of camections between 
ecxnnic activities am interstate c::x::rrm=rce, the result is a 
plenary Ccngressiooal ~ over the natiooal ecxxlCI'I1Y. Calgress 
needs only to Wicate its express intentien to incltrle certain 
kirrls of ecx:xanic activities in its regulatien for the Court to 
sustain their inclusioo under Ccngress' s autOOrity. Only in the 
absence of express l.an;uage to include ecooanic activities urrler 
Qngress's regulatioo will the Supreme Court ooostrue a Qngress-
iooal Act not to inclOOe such activities if they are intrastate 
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activities. In UnitErl states v. Five Gambling Devices (32), the 
Suprerre Court rulErl that the Ccngressicnal statute should oot be 
CCIlStruErl to govern wholly intrastate activity when it is oot 
expressly included, because of the premised respect to the 
federal system (33). 
~ess' s autOOrity over ec::x:n::mic activities in the United 
States is effectively a plenary authority insofar as its 
intentioo to inclooe such activity is obvious am that it can 
prcwe the relevance of that activity to interstate ccmnerce. 
'lbere is, thalgh, the questioo of whether the sovereignty of 
states forms a limit to the power of Congress to regulate 
interstate ccmnerce. 
state ScJYereignty as a Lillit CD ClDjrees1cn a1 lUIer 
D:les the independence of the states as sovereign entities 
have a limitinJ effect 00 the natiooal cxmnerce power? Arrl wOO 
slxW.d declare the Hmi ts? '1bese am other relevant points will 
be the subject for our investigatioo in this sectioo. 
'lbe Cl:l'lstitutioo, clearly, pre~s the existence of the 
states as entities irrleperrlent of the natiooal goyernrrent. 'lbe 
Tenth Amerdlllent to the United States Calstitutioo, which provides 
that "the powers not delegated to the United States by 
oonstitutioo, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reservoo to 
the states respectively, or to the people" (34) was treated by 
early Judicial decisions to be a defence against federal 
overreach.iB3' ( 35 ) After 1937 the Supreme Coort rejected the 
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earlier construction of the Tenth Amendment and instead 
recognised it to be a truism, that the states retain powers not 
given to the federal government (36). 
The protectien of state sovereignty sb:lUl.d deperxi IlOVI en the 
presurood. irrleper:rlence of the states urrler the federal system 
created by the Coostitution. Ccngressional actien which treats 
the states in a manner contrary to their CXXlStitutional status 
should be void. In order to preserve Ccnstitutionally created 
federalism, what matters is mainly the preservation of states as 
sovereign entities which can practice their governmental 
authorities in their proper fields. 
In Marylarrl v. writz (37) the Suprene Ca.lrt, as a result of 
the p:)St-1937 interpretation of the Tenth ~t am of the 
federalism restraint in general, held to be a oonstitutionally 
authorised practice the application of the minimum wage and 
overtime pay requirements of the Fair Lal:Xlr stamards Act (FLSA) 
(38) to sane enployees of states am. municipalities. Eight years 
later in 1976 the SUprerre 0::Jurt, in Natiooal League of Cities v. 
Usery (39), the 0::Jurt overruled by a 5-4 vote writz am. struck 
down as UIlOCIlStituticnal a 1974 Ccngressiooal amemment to the 
FLSA which extended Federal minimum wage and maximum hour 
provisions to allrost all state am. municipal enployees. Nine 
years later the Suprerre <blrt overruled National League of Cities 
in Garcia v. San Antonio Met.rqx?litan Transit Authority (40) by a 
5-4 vote. 
'!be interestin;J thID:J alnlt National League of Cities was 
that it was the first decision in which the Court struck down 
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Ccngressional legislation urrler the cx:mnerce clause on federalism 
grOl.lffis since Carter v. Carter Coal canpany, four decades earlier 
(41). National League of Cities established a three-part test to 
determine whether a Congressional act infringed state 
sovereignty. '!be first part is that the challengErl law should be 
established to aim to regulate the "states as states". The 
seo:xrl part is that the chall~ law slnlld ad::kess matters 
which are "attributes of state sovereignty". 'lhe third part is 
that the challeD!Jed law shoold directly impair the ability of 
states "to structure integral cp:rrations in areas of traditional 
~tal functions" (42). 
'1hl.s three part test was designej to protect the sovereignty 
of states fron federal encroaclTnent. As the Suprema Ccurt said in 
National League of Cities, the challenged statute was well within 
the area of authorised O:nJressional power urrler the ccmnerce 
clause, except for the fact that it disregards the limits of 
federalism. 'lhe decision in National League of Cities was oot 
based on the Tenth AmeOOment argtnent, rut was rather based on 
the idea that there exist urrler the axlStitutional structure 
jOOicially enforceable limits on the federal power to protect the 
existence of states as sovereign entities with meaningful powers 
to provide for the p.1IIX)5eS of their imependent existence. It is 
questioonable, tlnlgh, whether the role of states as employers 
aIrl providers of services is an essential role for their exist-
ence as imepeIrlent sovereign entities in the federal system. 
'lbere is 00 satisfactory evidence to prove that the role of the 
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states to provide services is basic to their irrlepeOOence, as was 
the decision in National league of Cities meant to protect. 
'!bere are better areas to offer the states protection on the 
grOllI'rls of federalism, ~ which are the ability of the states 
to structure their sub1ivisions, anj their role as legislators 
(43) 
The three part test announced by the Court in National 
League of Cities proved to be a problematic one, as dE!tOJlStratErl 
by later decisions. '!be IOOaI1i.ng of "traditional" functions is 
ambigtnlSi does it IOOan "custatary" in a certain pericrl? What 
are the traditional functions which are beyond the reach of 
Q:n;Jress? This am other parts of the test presented the Court 
with difficult clx>ices on several occasions (44). Several cases 
in which the applicability of National League of Cities was a 
central issue, durir¥J the nine years until Garcia, were decided 
(45) In ocne of these cases did the Court eventually firxi an 
imnunity fran federal regulation. 
In Federal Energy Regulatory Camdssioo (FmC) v. Missippi 
(46), for example, the Supreme Court upheld the application of 
certain provisions of the Public Unity Regulatory Policies Act 
(PURPA) of 1978 to the states. ~ involved a claim by the state 
of Missippi that certain provisions of PURPA encroached upon its 
sovereignty. '!be Court in its 5-4 vote upheld the statute, rut 
noticeably did not depend for its decisioo on the three part 
test. The Court in ~ considered the ability of a state 
administrative body to make decisions and set policies 
1rrleperrlently of federal CXXltrol as an important cxn::Utioo for 
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the state to be able to pranulgate regulations of its own in the 
federal systan (47). The Coort, hcMever, upheld the federal law 
deperrliCXJ on the fiIrliCXJ that it did not canpel the states to 
adopt its proposals, therefore it did not impair their 
irrleperrlent sovereignty. The unhappiness of the Supreme Court 
wi th the three part test was made obI/ious in FERC by the fact 
that the Crurt avoided using it, am in other cases by using the 
test am sareOOw firrling the statute to be oonstitutiCl'lal (48). 
In Garcia the Supreme -Q:mt anrnmced that the grant.irx.; of 
inmlmity to "traditiooal governmental functions" of states am 
municipalities was unworkable and inconsistent with the 
"established principles of federalism" (49). Due to the 
problematic nature of the three part test of Natiooal League of 
Cities, especially of its third part, and to the lack of 
sufficient support in the SUpreme Court, it was inevitable that 
it woold be abandooed or chaD;Jed. Irxieed, the ccnversioo of 
Justice Blackrrun, who ccncurrerl in National League of Cities to 
join the dissenters of the Natiooal League of Cities, suggests 
the IOCI'IBlt at which the judicial struggle with the test of the 
National League of Cities ended. What was not totallly 
, 
predictable, however, was 00w far the coort woold go in its 
reversing of the Natiooal League of Cities. What happened was 
that the Supreme CooIt diseBJCiged itself fron the substantive 
julicial review of federalism. '!be Court, in Ga.rcia, went too far 
in abarrlcning the test of the NatiCl'lal League of Cities. The 
Supreme O:lurt adoptai in Garcia the political prcx:ess theory of 
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judicial review of federalism. Justice Blacknn.m, in his opinicn, 
said 
II ..-..-.....! _......:I 
we are ....... 'V.i.1~ that the furrlarrental limitation that the 
constitutional scheme imposes on the commerce clause to 
protect the • states as states I is merely CXle of process ••• " (50). 
Justice Blacknn.m went 00 to declare that it is for Ca1gress, not 
the Court, to measure the scope of the ccmnerce p:JWer arrl the 
countervailID::J weight of the Tenth Amendment. '!be interests of 
states, the Court announced, are protected by the structure of 
the government as a wh::>le • 
. 
other than the fundamental defects in the "political 
process" theory of jOOicial review in general which we dealt with 
in Chapter Four, there are inherent defects in the argument 
contained in the decisioo of Garcia atout the sufficiency of the 
political process to protect the rights of the states in the 
federal system. The fact that Congress is composed of 
individuals does not guarantee that it could be trusted to 
protect iIxli vidual rights. Likewise, the fact that O::n;ress is 
a::allp:sed of representatives of states does not guarantee that it 
could be trusted to protect the rights of states (51). 
The process of legislation is one of compromise, to 
in order to guarantee the passage 
of the proposed legislaticn. '!be interests of states have very 
little effect en the legislative process in Ca1gress. '!be states 
have lost several of the original means by which the original 
design of the constitution sought to ensure sufficient state 
representation. Among these lost state protections was the 
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composition of the Senate, which has been changed by the 
Seventeenth Amendment. There are several other iost state 
protection IOOasures in the original constitution design (52). 
Because of the deficiencies in the protection provided by 
political process of the states' rights, it is in the pcMer of 
the judiciary to interpret and apply the constitution, and 
because of its iOOeperrlence it can be trusted to anoounce the 
limits to the power of Calgress urrler the cx:mrerce pcMer am to 
protect states' sovereignty. 'lbe test established by the Supreme 
Ca.lrt in National League of Cities was an unfortunate ale am 
tried to establish the limits of coounerce power . by using 
inaFPI"opriate areas of state power. But the decision in Garcia 
is wr~ in its total jOOicial disengagement fron the substanti-ye 
jtrlicial review of federalism's limits on Calgressianal pcMer. 
OJmerce Cl an9f! L:iJlits en state Rfl9u1aticn am the Iklct:rine of 
other than the strong influence of the judicial 
interpretatioo of ccn;Jressiooal acts enacted urrler its cx:mrerce 
power stren;Jtheni.ng the Federal system am increasing the pcMer 
of the national government, the Conunerce Clause has been 
interpreted by the jOOiciary to be a limit on state regulation of 
ccmnerce even where there is no Calgressianal actioo urrler what 
came to be knc:Mn as the "donnant cx:mrerce pcMeI''' doctrine. 
Cbe of the earliest cases establishing the dormant cx::mnerce 
power doctrine is Gil:i:xxlS v. O:pen (53). In this case Olief 
Justice Marshall said, alx:ut the argument of donnant ccmnerce 
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clause, that it had "great force" (54). Within the basis of the 
donnant cx:mnerce is that one of the principle aims in calling for 
the Constitutional Convention was the abolition of the 
restrictive trade practices aroong the states. 
'llle importance of the dormant ccmnerce ~r doctrine is 
that it affects the wtx>le structure of the federal system, the 
relaticns between the federal government am the states, am 
arocng the states. 
In the early stages of the developnent of the doctrine of 
the dormant commerce clause there was an opposing doctrine 
suppJrted by Clrlef Justice Taney, Marshall • s successor. '!be 
opposing doctrine was that the ccmnerce clause left states free 
to regulate as they wished as lCRJ as their acticns did not 
cxnflict with validly enacted federal legislatioo (55). later, 
Taney retreated and joined the majority in supporting the 
doctrine of the donnant cxmnerce clause. 
An important developre1t of the doctrine of dannant ccmnerce 
clause was the decisioo in O:xlley v. Board of Wardens of the Port 
of PhiladelJirla (56). In his opinioo, Justice Olrtis attempted to 
recx:n::ile all precedir¥J opinioos. In O:xlley, the Supreme Calrt 
upheld the ~ of Pennsylvania to require ships in interstate 
am foreign cx:mnerce to en;Jage local pilots when enterin;J or 
leavin;J the p:>rt of Philadelphia. '!be doctrine developed in 
O::loley was that states. are free to regulate tlDse aspects of 
interstate and foreign commerce so local in character as to 
demand diverse treatment, while Congress can regulate those 
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apects that are so national that they demarrl a single, unifonn 
rule (57) '. '!be remaining irnpressioo on later ccmnerce clause 
jurispnrlence left by Cooley- is the recognition of the neej, in 
sore cases, to peru t local legislatioo while understanding the 
need for unifonnity in tOOse instances that are necessary for the 
tm.i.n;leded flow of interstate <::x:J'IIreI'ce. Followin:] Cooley, the 
test of whether to allow state regulation which is b.lrden.in3' 
interstate commerce was to classify the burdens either as 
"direct" or "irrlirect", allowing those that have an indirect 
effect and invalidating., state regulatioos which have a "direct" 
effect 00 interstate <::x:J'IIreI'ce (58) 
'!be cx:ntemp:lI'ary doctrine used by the Supreme COOrt is that 
the cx:nstitutioo established a naticnal interstate and foreign 
commerce free from excessive state interference. The Court 
sooght to clarify the prcx::ess by which it determines whether 
state regulation is unconstitutionally burdening interstate 
cx:mnerce. 'lbe test used by the SUpreme Court is k:rrJwn as the 
''balancing test", and is associated with the decisioo in Pike v. 
Bruce Clturch, !ne (59) Ac:ooI'dl.r¥3' to the balancing test, state 
regulation of interstate commerce will be upheld if the 
regulatioo is rationally related to legitimate state interest and 
that the b.1rden it imposes on interstate ccmnerce is outweighed 
by the state interest in enforcing that requ1atioo. 
Acoording to the advocates of the p:>litical process theory 
of jOOicial review, state laws b.1rdeninq interstate ccmnerce or 
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disadvantaging non-residents should be invalidated only to 
reinforce accomtability. Am this happens when the courts make 
void state laws which prOOaninantly rurden non-residents who are 
unable to vote in the state electioos. 'Ibere is an inference in 
the commerce clause that state and local law makers are 
especially susceptible to pressures which may lead them to 
disadvantage those who are oot c::alStituents of their political 
sub:li visioos. '!here is a Hmi too value in the deperrlence on 
political process as a jUiitificatioo for the doctrine of the 
dormant cxmnerce clause ~ '!he pali tical process theory makes the 
majoritarian denocracy by noting the predaninant ccnstituticnal 
value in every situaticn. Whilst the majority of the cases are 
raised by private parties to defend their interests, the main 
issue UIrler the cxmnerce clause is the allocation of p:JWeI' in the 
fejeral system between states and the naticnal government (60). 
Another alternative to the balancing test used by the 
Supreme Calrt in determi.n.iD3' the limits to state regulaticn of 
interstate conunerce is the "protectionist intent" test of 
Professor talald Regan (61). Regan argues that for the novement 
of goods cases, the correct rule which the court uses, even 
without expressly saying so, is the test to find purposeful 
protecticnism. If the protecticnist intent is fourrl to be of 
substantial effect for enacting the law, then the state 
regulation of interstate commerce is unconstitutional. The 
rotivatioo test is ~ fran the Foorteenth Arnerrlnent. '1he 
rotivatioo test, if awUErl, would result in the invalidaticn of 
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roore state regulation than the current test used by the court. 
The protectionist motive test would apply to partial 
discrimination in iIrp:>rt-exp::lrt am IIO\T9IlElt of gcx:rls cases, 
which are rarely struck dCMn urrler the balancing test. Contrary 
to the aUegatioo by Regan, the Ccmt sustained state regulation 
of interstate cxmnerce in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf creamery Co. 
(62), am Exxcn Cl:>rp. v. Govem::>r of Marylarrl (63), despite lower 
courts find.i.Dj the existence of protectionist rootivatioos. 'lbe 
C:Jurt does not am neerl not rely on the rootivation for state 
regulation of interstate commerce, because what matters is 
whether there is a protectiooist effect am whether interstate 
c::atrrerce is excessively burdened, not whether that protectionism 
was deliberate or not (64). There are limitations to the 
balancing test, one of which is the existence of sufficient 
representation in the regulatin:J state of the interests affected 
by the regulaticn. In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf creamery Co. (65) 
the Supreme <h1rt tqXleld a Minnesota statute banning the sale of 
milk products in plastic, nc:n-returnable cx:ntainers. '!be statute 
was o1:wiously for the benefit of the tnlp-r.«XXl industry, wtx:lse 
products would fill the void left by the ban on plastic 
containers, the pulp-wood industry being an important state 
industry. The Supreme Court's decision rested on several 
findings, one of which was that the burden imposed on the 
interstate rocwement of goods was relatively minor. '!he Supreme 
C:Jurt also foorrl that the ban on plastic cx:ntainers served a 
substantial state interest, which is the conservation of 
reswrces and the reducticn of solid waste. '!be Supreme 0Jurt 
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also foorrl, in this case, that the interests of out-of-state 
manufacturers of plastic containers was adequately represented by 
the few Minnesota finns that were adversely affected by the ban. 
Those overlapping interests and the existence of sufficient 
representation of the interests affected in the state provided, 
in the view of the Court, a powerful safeguard against 
legislative arose (66). 
'Dle adrl.ec\w!Elntd:ss of ja:Jiclal review reganliBj the ., 
From very early in the life of the federal system, the 
interpretation by the courts of the commerce clause and the 
commercial power of the national goverrunent took a clear 
directioo tcMards 5UptX)rting the integratioo of the naticnal 
eccn::my, and against allowing strict and narrow interpretatioos. 
Oxtrines, such as the donnant cxmrerce power develq;:led by the 
judiciary have helps] to curb state powers even where there was 
no clear federal legislation in the specific ma.tter. 'lbese ~s 
have helped to streDJthen the Unioo and to support an ec:xxlCJUic 
system capable of coping with development and overcoming 
irrp:rliments to its progress. A clear example of the stricter 
interpretations of the commerce power can be seen in 
umerst:amin:1 the implicatiCXlS of cases decided since 1887, am 
in particular duriD;J the pericrl of ea:ulfdc depressioo prior to 
1937 (67). '1lle clear role of jtrlicial review in the support of a 
strco;Jer Unioo am rore integrated ea:t1CI1tY is evident fran cases 
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decided after 1937 (68) 
Naticnal League of Cities was an exceptional case in which 
the court turned back to pre-New Deal ideas. It was an 
unfortunate decisioo wiUch was bourrl to be struck down. However, 
~ way in which Garcia over-ruled National League of Cities am 
a.nnoonca:l ~ disengagement of judicial review fran deternti.nir¥:J 
~ limits of power in the federal system was a decisioo with 
mixed fortunes. Whilst it was a welcx:ma decisioo in over-rulin:J 
Naticnal League of Cities arrl its three part test, which proved 
\lJ'lIIlOrkable in later cases, it went to extremes by announcing the 
adoption of the process-based idea of limitaticn to Congressicnal 
power. Surely the judiciary has, since early in the life of the 
federal system, played its part in supporting the federal system, 
am helpi..r¥j a tx>Sitive, prcrluctive am beneficial integratioo of 
the ec:xn::nty. To annoonce that detenninatioo of the limits of the 
power of Q:xlgress was to be left to the poU tical branches, was 
neither a beneficial statement, nor was it supported by the 
history or design of the OXlStitutioo. '!be role of the jOOiciary 
in its use of its pJWer of judicial review was a helpful am 
significant factor in shaping the existing federal system, am 
helping that system throoglntt its various stages of developnent. 
'!be Qmt has both shaped am follCMed the developnent of 
the natiooal market, its jlrlgenents sooetiloos creating eoa1atli.c 
opportunities, sometimes confirming independent economic 
achievements. In the American experience of federalism, the 
reservation of ecx:n::rnic irrlependence to the states has not been 
OCXlSidered to be a value of sufficient importance to obstruct the 
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integrati(Xl of the national market. It has not been regarded as 
an essential ingredient of the identity of states as discrete 
political units. 
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PARI' 'lBRFE 
amPlER SEVEN 
'DIE U.A.E. PRJVISIaW. cnerrlVlillOti, '!BE mDAL SiSTEM 
AIIJ 'DIE SB:PARATIC6 CF RMImS 
'1lle govermnents of the Emirates agree:i to establish the new 
Federal Goverru:oont as a union of their respective Ehlirates. In 
July 1971 they declared their intention and announced their 
Constitutioo. '!he new Constitution, which was to c::aIe into force 
on 2nd of December 1 971, was originally drafted for nine 
Elnirates, but eventually amerrled to suit the new federation. '!be 
number of the original Emirates was six, namely: Abu-Dhabi, 
Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Um-Al-Qaywayn and Fujairah. On 10th 
February 1972, seventh Emirate (Ras-al-Khaimah) joined the 
Federation. 
'1lle new Constitution was entitled "Provisional Cbnstitution" 
arrl by its provisions it was interrled to last for five years, 
during this period a new permanent Constitution was to be 
drafted. 
provisional Coostitutioo (lithe Calstitution" ) 
representoo the result of a cx:rnprcm:i.se between the opposing 
forces of localism arrl the need arrl desire for unity. '!he powers 
which were surrerrlere1 fron the Emirates to the Federal 
GcNenlmeIlt were CCXlSideroo to be the mininrum IX'Ssible. Even these 
were agreed CIlly urrler the pressure of tine and the proximity of 
the date of the British witlrlrawal. '1bere were clear signs that, 
for the Federation to survive arrl prosper, further ~s would 
have to be surrerrleroo to the Central Government, but this was 
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deferrej to the drafting of the pennanent Constitution (1) 
'!he Constitution definoo the new Central Government it 
createj as " ••• an irrlependent, sovereign, Fooeral State ••• " (2) 
1\roong the Federal characteristics of the Calsti tution is the 
distriOOtion of the legislative ~s which is contained in Part 
7 of the Calstitution. Article 120 listed the areas in which the 
Central Government has exclusive legislative, as well as 
executive, powers. Among the most important areas of power 
reserved for the Central Government are foreign affairs, defence 
am nationality. Article 121 contains the areas in which the 
Central Goverrutelt has legislative ~ while the Emirates have 
executive power. Article 122 declared that the residuary ~ 
are left to the Emirates. 
Fran the area of powers given to the Federal Government we 
can see clearly that it was envisaged as an entity representing 
the flnirates at the internatianal level; providing roost of the 
major services such as health a.nd education; unifying the 
Emirates at the local level; and showing the basic, driving 
forces which led to the formatioo of the Federal Government. '!be 
areas which are left for the Emirates show the existence of the 
localisiD;J forces, ClI'lOB3' which are the local ecxxxxnic interests, 
leavirxJ the important areas of mineral resources am custans 
regulaticn for the individual Flntrates. '!be fact that in the 
supreme body of the Federal Government, the rulers themselves, 
represent their Emirates, shows the strQ0:3 am prevailing ~ 
of the heads of the Emirates, even at the Central level. 
'!he Central Gov'erI'IIleI1t canprises five autOOrities listed in 
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Article 45, namaly: '1he Supr€!Ie Council of the Union, '!be 
President of the Union am his dePlty, 'nle Council of Ministers 
of the Union, '1he National Assembly of the Union, am the 
Judiciary of the Union. 
The Supr€!Ie Council is the highest authority in the oountry 
because of its CCIIIp:)Sition and ~s. 'nle nenbers of the 
Suprere Council are the rulers of the Emirates. It is vested 
with executive as well as legislative powers. Each Emirate has 
ale vote, the special majority required for passing substantive 
matters has to include Abu-Dhabi and Dubai (i.e. these two 
Emirates have veto ~s in these matters) while in procedural 
matters, simple majority is enoogh to pass a decisicn (3). 
'!he SuprE!IIE Council ratifies laws and decrees of the Union. 
Article 110 enables the SuprE!IIE Council to ratify a law which has 
been rejected or anerrled by the National Assembly. The Suprene 
Cbuncil a~ints the Prire Minister and sets the main policies 
for the country (4). 
'!be main p::IW&s vested in the Suprema Camcil are rot 
utilised to the fullest extent because of the relatively few 
occasi<XlS en which the Council meets (5). '!his is for several 
reasoos, annng which is the lack of provisicn in the Constitution 
itself for the frequency of the Council's meetings (6) 
'nle President of the Union has wide ra.Ir:Jing {XJWers, l:oth 
legislative and executive. The President cuD his deputy are 
elected fron aIOOI¥1 the seven rulers of the Emirates. 
'lbearetically any ooe of the seven rulers oould be elected as the 
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President or the Vice-President, rut in practice these two 
positions are certain to go to Atu-Dhabi and Dubai because of 
their importance arrl of their having veto pcMer in the Supr~ 
Council of the Union. The tenns of office for the President and 
Vice-President are five years with no restriction 00. their re-
electioo.. The President of the Union is the President of the 
Supr~ Council and represents the unity of the Emirates 00. 
local as well as international levels. 
'!he pcMers arrl position of the President are definErl in 
Articles 51 to 54 of the Constitution. Among the important 
powers of the President is his role as the Supr~ O::mnarrler of 
the Annerl Forces and Head of the Supreme Council for Defence (7). 
The President nominates the Prime Minister and appoints 
ministers, aml:assadors and other senior officials of the Federal 
Government with the exoeptioo. of the President an1 nenbers of the 
Supr~ Calrt (8 ). The President signs Union laws, decrees an1 
decisions which the Supreme Cameil has sancticned curl has the 
duty of supervising their implementation by the different 
ministries and divisions of the Federal Government (9 ) 'Ibe 
President signs and prCJlU.1lgates treaties after their passage by 
the Suprene OJuncil (1 0 ). 
'!be Council of Ministers is a part of the executive 
authority of the unioo urrler the supervisioo of the Supreme 
Council arrl the President (11). 'lbe main policies of the Federal 
Governrcent are set by the SUpreme Council and entrusted to the 
O::xmcil of Ministers to be implemented under the supervision of 
the President, who has the authority to question the cabinet as a 
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whole or iOOi vidual ministers about their duties 
jurisdictions ( 12) • 
'!he Prime Minister has been fron Dubai ever since the 
establishroont of the Federal Government. For several years, the 
Dep.rt:y ruler of rxIDai was the Prime Minister, then the ruler of 
Dubai, who is the Vice-President of the Union, took the position 
of Pri.Ioo Minister (13). The Prime Minister has two deputies, one 
fran !)iliai, the secorrl fran AOO-Il1abi. '!be seats in the Cabinet 
are distriWted anong the Flnirates. Abl-Dhabi am Dubai have 
reserved key ministries for themselves ever since the first 
Cabinet, whilst the other seats are given to the other Emirates 
in relation to their size and imp:>rtance (14). 
The National Assembly represents the legislative authority 
in the Cbnstitution, rut the analysis of its p:JWer reveals that 
this is limited to a large degree. The National Assembly, by its 
powers in the Constitution, is rrainly a consultative 1:xx1y in 
legislative matters (15). 
The National Assembly is currently ~ of 40 nenbers 
apportioned to the Emirates according to their size and 
import:anoe (16). 
The Constitution gives the Emirates the right to detenn1.ne 
the systems by which their representatives are selected for the 
National camcll (17). OJrrently all the Emirates appoint their 
representatives in the Council by decisions fran the rulers. '!his 
does not mean that the representatives always voice the opinions 
of their respective rulers (18). The Calstitution states that the 
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members in the Council represent the whole of the J?OI:Ulation of 
the Union (19). 'llie stage of developnent, especially on the 
educational level and the tribal base of the society, made it, to 
sore degree, difficult to adopt po~ election especially in 
the first few years of the Federation (20). The developnent of 
the SOCiety during the t~ since irrleperrlence, makes the causes 
for delaying the popular election of representatives no longer 
valid, rut it is yet to be seen how comrl.tted the Emirates and 
their rulers are to the dem:x::ratic representation of their people 
(21 ) 
The National Council plays a genuine, tlnlgh limited, role 
in checking and balancing the other l:xxlies of G:7veI'I'lIlWmt. '1be 
fact that there are representatives fran the Emirates, 
symlx>lising the roncern5 of the I;Xlblic, cannot be played down, 
and, canpared to the inmadiate neighbours of the U.A.E., is a 
step in the right direction (22). 
'1be Naticnal Assembly's role in the legislative process is 
that it discusses the prqx>sed bills and accepts them as they 
stam, rejects them totally, or anerrls them (23). The bills 
originate in the cameil of Ministers, and after passing through 
the National Assembly's discussions are referred to the Supreme 
Council which has the right either to accept the opinions of the 
National Assembly and pranulgates them with the amendments added 
or, in the case that the Supreme Council disagrees with the 
opinioos of the National Assembly, return the bills to the 
Assembly to review them for a sec:xxld time. The bill then returns 
to the SUpreme CWncil which has the ~ this time to disregard 
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amendments made by the National Assembly (24). 'lbe IXJWers of the 
National Assembly, then, are nore of a cx:nsultative nature 'than 
real legislative power, but it has a persuasive discussion am 
can delay proposed laws for sane considerable tine, so that the 
Supreme Camcil is tanpted not to disagree with the Assembly's 
opinion if it feels the need for a certain law to be prClIUllgated 
(25). Increased awareness by the people and the sU'p!;X)sed repres-
entation by the Assembly of ~lic opinion place a rooral oblig-
ation on the Supreme Cotmcil, either to accept the Assembly's 
opinions or to disregard them with proper explanatioo (26). 
'lbe National Assembly has the ~ to questioo the policies 
of the GoveITlllEI1t in the different fields by addressing questions 
to the Pri.rre Minister or the Ministers cxncerned (27). '!be Pri.rre 
Minister and the Ministers have a Ccnstitutional obligation to 
answer the questions addressed to them fran the National 
Assembly. '!be Assembly's txJWeI' is limited to discussion of the 
Government's policies and to the issuing of reccmnerrlations 
regarding these policies (28) '!his power str~ the 
Natiooal Assembly's pcM9I's, and tlnlgh not birrling, enables the 
Assembly to exert rooral pressure by checking the other branches 
of goveI'II'IeIlt. '!be National Assembly's checking IXJWeI' is 
directed 1lDStly at the Council of Ministers, rut it also applies 
to the Supreme Ca.mcil because it is the Supreme legislative as 
well as executive branch of the Government and is respc.llSible for 
sorting am supervising the Government's policies in the 
different fields. 
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It is evident that there is no division of legislative am 
executive p::JWers, am that the separate headings for these powers 
in the Constitution do not have sufficient content either 
theoretically or practically. '!be Supreme Council is the supreme 
executive as well as legislative 1:x:rly of the Q:wernment. Bills 
originate in the Council of Ministers and the legislative 
jurisdiction of the National Assembly is merely of a consultative 
nature. '!he fact that the rranbers of the Supreme Council are the 
rulers of their respective Emirates, where they have the final 
say in nearly all the legislative am executive powers, leads to 
urrlerliniD:J the fact that the najor legislative am -executive 
powers are concentrated with the seven rulers on the local am 
central levels of Government. 
Continuing our analysis of the concentration of powers in 
the Federal Gove.rnrIe1t, we can urrlerstarrl that the main executive 
aM legislative powers in the Federal Goverrm:mt are further 
concentrated into the harrls of the two major Einirates, namely 
AbJ.-Dhabi and Dubai. 'nlese two Emirates CXXltrol the resources on 
which the Federatioo survives, and they have the power of veto 
over substantive matters in the ~eme Ccxmcil. Major decisions 
in the Federal Governnent are left to the discretion of the two 
main Emirates to a large extent. The attitooes of the two main 
Emirates ooncernin9 Federal natters depeIXis 00 the relaticnship 
between these two Flnirates an:i whether or not the interests of 
their Emirates are involved. This was evident in the discussion, 
decisions an:i application of several major decisions CCIlCeITli.ng 
the developnent of the Federal Government. cne of the areas in 
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Which there was a disagreeroont which has hampered the developoont 
of the Federal G:Jvernment, is the contrih1tions of the Emirates 
in financing the Federal Buiget (29). Another area which 
represents the i.rntx:>rtance and effect of the relationship between 
the ~ main Emirates for the Federal Governrrent is the 
Unification of the Anned Forces (30). '!be framing am pra:m.llgation 
of the pennanent OJnstitution is another area which desoonstrated 
the real effect the M main Emirates can play in the developnent 
of the Federal Government (31). 
K:nowing all of these facts am urrlerstarrling the influences 
urrler which the Federal Goverment operates am develops, leads 
us to feel the need for an irrleperrlent arrl effective Judiciary to 
check arrl supervise the applicatioo of the Constitutioo arrl the 
proper developoont of the c:n.mtry according to the desires arrl 
aspirations of the writers of the Constitution am of the people. 
'!he Judiciary of the Union is dealt with in Cllapter 5 of the 
Constitution. The mere dedication of a separate chapter of the 
Constitution for the Judiciary reveals the existence of the 
feeling of the inp>rtance of the Judiciary arrl the necessity of 
its irrlependence fran the early stages of the Unioo. 
'!he Constitution provides for the establislmmt of a Union 
Supreme Court am Union Courts of first instance. Articles fran 
96 to 101 inclusive, deal with the jurisdiction and the 
o:xnpositioo of the SUpreme Court, which is given great importance 
mainly because of its O:lnstitutiooal Jurisdiction arrl its being 
the umpire of the Federal System. 
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'lbe Constitution gives the Finirates the option of 
transferring the jurisdiction of their local courts to the 
Federal Goverruoont. Four Finirates, thus far, have chosen to 
transfer the jurisdiction of their courts to the FErleral 
authorities, namely: Ahl-Dhabi, Sharjah, Ajman and Fujairah, 
whereas the other three Emirates retain their own local courts. 
'1lle provision of allCMing the anirates to join their courts and 
transfer their jurisdiction to the FErleral Judiciary was rrainly 
because of the temporary nature of the Constitution when it was 
drafted and ratified. · It \IIOUl.d be better now, after past 
experience, to unify the court systan in order to avoid the 
oonfusion which is created by the current situation and because 
of the success of the experience of those Emirates which have 
transferred their judicial jurisdiction to the Federal 
Judiciary, especially after the passage of two najor pieces of 
legislation on Civil Transactions and the criminal Law (32). 
Saying that the inclusioo of the judiciaries of sat¥:! Emirates in 
the FErleral Judiciary is a successful experience does not rooan 
that it did not experience any problems. Indeed the sudden 
transfer of the judiciaries of some Emirates created some 
conflicts between the rulers and the Federally-controlled 
Judiciary. However, the experience has generally been a 
successful one. r.k)re co-operation is needErl, especially between 
the Federal and Local Authorities, in order to convince the 
remaining Emirates to follow the same route. What is happening 
is that there is official and un-official co-operation to solve 
the problems that arise in the operation of the judiciaries of 
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those Emirates that have transferred their courts to the 
Federation. One area of co-operation is consultation between the 
Ministry of Justice and the rulers on the app::>inbnent to key 
positions in the judicial departrrents in those Emirates which 
have Federal lower courts. Overall the experience of the ~ 
Federal Courts is like that of most other services which were 
transferred to Federal control after a long time of local 
control, rut the passage of time arrl the clearer regulations am 
m:>re defined arrl urrlerstcx:rl" Coostitutional limitations are aIOODg 
the solutions for these problans (33). 
The Judiciary in the U.A.E. is canposed of Civil am Sharia 
Courts. The jurisdiction of the Sharia Courts varies fran one 
Emirate to another. Generally the Sharia Courts have 
jurisdiction in family law (Laws of ?ersonal Status) such as 
proof of marriage, divorce an1 inheritance for Muslims, am in a 
majority of the Fmirates, jurisdiction in matters concerning sate 
criminal offences such as theft, adultery arrl alcohol intake. 
Civil Ccurts have jurisdictioo in major areas like criminal law 
generally, cl viI an1 cx:mnercial transactions, l::lank.iD3, insurance 
and traffic matters. In those Emirates which have Federal Lower 
Calrts, Sharia Courts have two stages, arrl the Cassation is for 
the Supreme Court. '!be area of dividing jurisdiction between 
Civil and Sharia Courts is a confusing one and needs better 
regulation. 
Judges of Sharia oourts are required to, or preferred to 
have a degree in Law arrl Sharia (34) 
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'!'ne Federal Courts are of three stages, Courts of first 
instance, Appeal Courts, and Cassation which was given to the 
Supreme Court by a special law in 1978. '!be Federal Courts have 
general jurisdiction, because there are no specialised courts, so 
the Federal judiciary has jurisdiction in administrative am 
ccmnercial matters, in aCklition to the other areas in which it 
has jurisdiction, such as labour, traffic, criminal arrl civil 
rratters. 
'!be legal system in the U .A.E. is substantially affected by 
the Fl;Jyptian legal systan, which is, in turn, based on the French 
legal system. '!'ne legal system in the U.A.E., then, is IOCrlelled 
en the Civil raw System with its characteristics opposed to those 
of the Ccnm:n raw System. '!he principle of Res Judicata does not 
apply in the U.A.E., other than in exceptional cases where a 
j udici al ~inicn is binding, when it is applied by special legal 
stipulaticns (35). In sbxiying the legal system in the U .A.E. 
then, more attention should be given to the text of the 
Oxlsti tuticn and the COOes. '!be Q:mocn Law System did have sane 
effect in sane Emirates, for example ~ and Sharjah, rut its 
effect is declining an:i the treIrl is for the Civil raw System. 
'Ibis is the case in the whole area arourrl the U.A.E. as well. 
The majority of those who participated in drafting the 
Constitution and the Cedes in the U.A.E. were El:M>tians (36). '!he 
majority of the jOOiciary is of Egyptian natiCllality. 
The Emirates still have legislation on a variety of 
different matters. Whilst sane legislation has rrM been over-
ruled by new Federal legislation, in areas which have been 
Chipter7 
- 197 -
transferred to the Central Government, others are still 
applicable (37). 'lhe Einirates do not have written Constitutions. 
'!he Constitution was passed to serve as a basis for the fonnation 
of the Union and to have a duration of five years, according to 
Article 144. The whole idea was to agree on a Union which 
al t.ho.lgh not up to the aspirations of ccmplete unity (which was 
and still is the dream of many people in the area) was 
nevertheless enoogh to present the newly emerging country as one 
state to the outside world, and to provide services which were 
greatly needed by the popl1ation. '!he argument at the time of 
the fonnation of the Union, was that the passage of time wculd 
help in welding the people of the Emirates am their Governments, 
to strengthen their unity (38). 
'Ihe Provisional Ccnstitution was neant to be an instrument 
for unity and for a closer relationship, rut what was not ob'Jtous 
at that time was that this instrument itself wculd have a life of 
its am, wculd starrlardise relationships and create a balance of 
rights and duties which would itself need sane force of need or 
urgency to change. It was easy to argue, at the time of the 
formation of the Union, that in future the atmosphere for a 
stronger Union would occur in the five-year duration of the 
Constitution. Experience has proved otherwise. Indeed it is not 
peculiar for the Federal Systan of the U.A.E. to prove hard to 
cllanJe, and oot unique for the Oxlstitution of the U.A.E. to 
aCXJUire a life of its own. 'lhat is also the experience of Federal 
Systans elseWhere, as \1iell as for Federal O:nsti tutions to change 
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fran being instnunent f . 
. s 0 accalilo3at~on for varying interests, 
into a barrier for stronger unity (39). 
Acoording to Article 144 of the Constitution, six rocnths 
before the expiry of the five-year tenn of this Constitution, the 
Supreme Council shoold present a draft pennanent Constitution to 
be discussed by the National Assembly. What happened was that the 
Supreme OJuncil formed a ccmnittee of twenty-eight roombers with a 
<bnstitutional expert to draft the permanent Constitution. After 
several nv=etings, the draft penranent Constitution was presentoo 
to the Supreme Council. ' '!be general feature of this draft was 
that it noved clearly towards rtm'e participation by the people in 
the legislative process, clear solutions for the participation 
fron the Emirates in the Federal BlDget, unification of the Arrood 
Forces and most importantly, the strengthening of the Fooeral 
institutions and Federal President. '!be Supreme Camcil failoo 
to agree on this draft, for several reasons, analg these being 
the persisting canpetitian between the two larger Emirates and 
the view taken by Dlbai that this draft favoured AOO-Dhabi, and 
the resistance of several Ehdrates to surrerrlering ltDre powers to 
the Federal Government and to the peq>le generally (40). 
Instead of presenting the draft Pennanent Calsti tution to 
the National Assembly, the Suprene Cameil presented an anerrlttent 
of Article 144 of the <l:xlSti tation to exterrl the duration of the 
Constitution for a further five years. 'Ibis draft anerrlttent 
faced st:rcag objections fran members of the National Assembly and 
caused confrontations and disa:mfort fran several nenbers, but 
after all of this, and due to the understanding of the 
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distribution of pJWeI' in the country am to the division of the 
roombers of the National Council, especially those fron Abu-Dhabi 
and ~, on Flnirate lines, the Anendment was passed on 12th 
October, 1976. '!be whole process of exterrl.in;J the duration of 
the Constitution was the first real constitutional crisis in the 
U.A.E., and its results showed the difficulty of changing the 
Constitution arrl the difficulty of rennving the suspicions of the 
Emirates towards each other. There were many lessons to be 
learned from the experience of attempting to draft the new 
Constitution and the debacle aroond its fall. 'lbere was a Wild 
up towards the ern of the first tenn of the Constitution, which 
involved certain steps taken by those Emirates which have IOOre 
enthusiasm for a strong Union. For example Sharj ah surrerrlered 
its anny, broadcasting authority am judicial authority to the 
union curl arolished its flag. Other steps were taken by Abu-
Dhabi, which involved joining its judiciary with the Union. 
Fujairah also took sane steps towards stranger Unicn. Dubai, and 
to a lesser extent, Ras-Al-Khainah, proved to be be harder to 
ccnvince in joining these efforts (41). 
'!be secx:n3 term of the Constituticn began with a feeling of 
suspicion am::ng the Emirates am a sense of uneasiness aroong 
those who were ccmnittErl to stronger Unioo and aroong the 
populatioo generally (42). 
'!be build-up tcMards the errl of the secarl tenn of the 
Coasti tutioo wi tnessed strong noves designed to strengthen the 
unioo by means of persuasion curl pressure fran different 
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quarters. A joint !reeling was held by the Council of Ministers 
and the National Council, which resultoo in the issuing of a 
lengthy neoorarrlum calling for, inter alia, a Pennanent 
Constitution, dercocracy am a stronger union (43). There was an 
opposing mem::>rarrlurn presentOO by I:Ubai, arrl a second crisis which 
warranterl the intervention of the Foreign Minister of Kuwait to 
bring the owosing factions closer am preserve the Ferleration 
(44) The rt-.. __ 'I f Mini' t 
• \..UW1I,.;1 0 S ers was changerl, and those who were 
leading the tide for stronger Union were removed. More 
importantly, the ruler .of ~i became the new Prime Minister, 
and it was apparent that what prevailoo after this crisis were 
the de.marrls of I:Ubai. All of this loo to the extension of the 
Constitution for a further pericrl of five years, fran December 
1981 to December 1986. It was renewed again in 1986 until 
December 1991. It is I'lCM apparent fran the experience that the 
renewal of the Constitution has becaue a usual occurrence, with 
hardly any official opposition, and it is expected to stay like 
this for a <XlIlSiderable pericrl in the future (45). 
So the O::nstttuticn which was labellerl "Provisional" and was 
given five years to survive, has proverl to be difficult, if not 
impossible, to replace, arrl has becane effectively a permanent 
Consti tution am shoold be treaterl as a pennanent one. The fact 
that this Constitution was designed and agreed to be a 
provisiaal one, an experimental Ccnstitution in a sense, means 
that by their design its provisions require major changes in 
order to serve as a basis for steady and organised grCMth and 
( 46 ) . 1 change 
developrent for the future of the oountry • Partl.a s 
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and arnerrlrnents have to be made and sane of these have already 
been made, especially to Wlify the Arna:l Forces. other changes 
have to be made by the cus~ of implenenting the Constitutional 
tenns am carrying on the organisation of the Federal System am 
the QJvernmental organisation in practice. 
All of this canbined, will not be enough for the adaptation 
of the Constitution to the development of the country. Some 
changes may create their CMIl problems and may generate challenges 
( 47 ). All of this leads to the urrlerstarrling and apprec:iation of 
-
tre role which can be played by that instituticn which is given 
the responsibility to interpret the Ccnstitution arrl deteonine 
the validity of IDeal a.rxl Federal Laws urrler its tenns. 'Ibis 
institution is the Suprere Court of the Unioo (48). 
Constitutional allen::llllents originate in the Supreme Cameil 
and are presented to the National Cameil to be debated, with a 
higher than usual majority being required to pass its dec:isiCllS. 
'!ben the matter goes back to the Suprere Cooncilto be passed. 
The opiniOns of the National Council are not binding on the 
SUpreme Cooncil, 50 even if the National Council insisted on its 
opinions a secc,nj tine, the Suprere Cooncil can still disregard 
them (49). 'lberefore, the burden of responsibility for a.nen:ling 
the Ch'lstitution lies mainly with the SUprere Council, arrl with 
lx>th Abu-Illabi and rubai having a veto power over this decision, 
it has proved to be very difficult to pass the ~ts (50). 
It is apparent that the Federal System is suitable for the 
Emirates as the union of these Emirates has survived several 
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internal crises am dis[:Utes. 1vbreover, the Union has proved to 
be a step forward in the solution of old problems and for 
furtherance of future ambitions. '!here were several probl9fiL<5 for 
which the Federation offered successful solutions. AlIong these 
problans were the border diS[:Utes, rrost of which have been solved 
now with the remairrler being in the process of being solved (51). 
The Federation has been the medium for solution of other 
problems, including CCAlps in the Emirates, of which Sharjah has 
suffered two unsuccessful ones since 1971. The first 
unsuccessful coup in Sharj ab happenal in January 1972, six weeks 
after the birth of the Federation. In this attempt the previoos 
ruler, a member of the ruling family, with an anned group forced 
his way into the palace of the ruler demarrling to be recognized 
as the sole legitimate ruler. In a joint actioo the a.I'm3d forces 
of the federal government and of Aru-Dhabi managed to bring the 
situatioo urrler control. '!he coup failed arrl the attackers were 
held prisoners. Altlx:lugh as a result of the confrontation the 
ruler of Sharjah, Sheik Khalid Al~simi, was killed, the effect 
of the federal govenment I s role in suppressing the attack arrl 
prevent:in;J chanJe of ruler by force gave the Federatioo strength 
arrl praninence in all the Country (52). 
'!he secaxi att~ to seize power in Sharjah by force 
happened in June 1987, when the Cc:nm3.rrler of the Flniri Guard arrl 
brother of the ruler, Shaikh Al:rlul Aziz, used his posi tioo in the 
Qlard to seize control of the emiri palace arrl government head 
quarters am demanded to be reoognized as the legitimate ruler. 
Again the federal government played an important role in 
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resolving the dispute arrl preventing forcible change of ruler. 
'!he fe::ieral goverrnnent, its Supreme Council in particular, used 
peaceful negotiations to put the attempted coup to an em (53). 
'Ihrough the period of trouble the Suprene Council remained in 
session am did not ern its meetings until the problem was over. 
'!be SuprE!!re Council refused to Cow to the pressure am insisted 
on its position not to recognize use of force as a legitimate way 
of transferring power. 'nlose who were occupyiD:J the palace am 
gOVenEent offices were forced to negotiate am accept the return 
of the ruler Sheikh Sultan Al-Qassimi to the emirate. 
The Federal System has proved through time that it is 
destined to stay rut, contrary to the aspirations of many, it has 
proved to be too difficult to chaD:je it into a canplete Unitary 
System. 
AIooD:J the characteristics of the Federal System which are 
clearly OCservable in the U.A.E. Constitution are the following: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
'!be Coostltuticn is clearly a written one, stating the 
division of ~s between the Emirates am the Central 
Government. 
'!be C'txlstitution is a rigid one, mean.io:J that it requires 
special procedures to amerrl it, which are rrore difficult 
than those needed to pass ordinary laws. 
'!be a:nstitutiCXl inclooes divisicn of powers between the 
Emirates and the Central Governments, especially the 
legislative powers. 
Both the Emirates and the Central GoverIInent have direct 
powers over the citizens. 
'!he Constitutioo cannot be arrerrled by e;e Federal 
Authorities alooe, instead the Emirates have a Vl.tal role to 
play in these proc:ajures• 
Foreign affairs are mainly the province of the Central 
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7. 
8. 
9. 
Governrtalt. 
~re is an authority which has a sufficient ~t of 
inde~ which is entrusted with solving the 
CbnstJ.tutlona1 problems between the Emirates am the Central 
Governrtalt, which also has the pcMer of the birrling 
interpretation of the Constitution. 
'l1lere are provisions in the Coostltution ensuring the 
supremacy of the Constitution am the Federal Laws issued 
accordingly, over those of the Emirates (54). 
'!be member Emirates do not have the right to secede fron the 
Unicn. 
Generally, a major weakness of the Federal System in the 
U.A.E. is that the Central Government does not have sufficient 
.' 
inleperrient financial resoorces am it has to depend on the 
oont:ribltion fron the Emirates, especially Abu-Dhabi am D..lbai, 
for its needs (55). '!he Emirates control the two najor saJrces 
of i.ncx::Ire which are mineral resources (especially oil) am 
custans. 
The second major weakness in the Federal System of the 
U.A.E. is one of design. '!be Supreme COlmcil which is the nain 
body of the Central Government having control over all main 
subj ects arrl p:>licies is cx:nifX>Sed of the rulers of the Emirates. 
'lbe Supreme CruncH by its design has major contradictions. It 
is su~ to be the guardian of the Federation, the heart of 
the Central GovernrneIlt. Yet at the san¥:! t.i.re the nenbers of this 
Council are the rulers of the Emirates protecting am praooting 
the interests of their respective Emirates. Experience has 
proved that the bias towards the individual Emirates is strong 
arrl the suprel'OO COOncil functions better or worse according to 
whether the relatiooshiP between AbJ-Dhabi am ~ is gocrl or 
Clapter 7 
- 205 -
~, am to whether or not there are clashes of interest between 
these two Emirates. Moreover, there is no provision in the 
Cbnsti tution to regulate the frequency of meetings of the Suprare 
Council, so ITOnths am even years pass without any meeting of the 
Suprare Council taking place, which means delay in discussing 
important issues. Consequently, great harm can befall the 
devel~t of the Federation. 
Federalism is not a static fonnal design of Government rut, 
rather, a continuing process (56). The development of the 
Federal System depends on the application of the Federal 
Constitution, on the co-operation between the Central Governnent 
on one harrl, am the member states on the other, a.rrl on the 
relationships between the member states. As far as the 
realisation of the need for the Federation, that is quite clear 
in the U.A.E. en both formal am popllar levels. It is left to 
the member Emirates to ro-operate with the Federal Government, to 
provide all the help they can am to respect the decisions of the 
Federal institutions when they are issued according to the 
Constitution arrl laws which are all prcrlucts of agreE:!lreI1ts anong 
the Emirates. 
It is obvious that a lot IOOre good faith arrl co-operation 
are required fran the Emirates in the future to strengthen the 
Federal experience, especially when co-operation is spoken of arrl 
done not on the local level rut on the regional level now after 
. ti n... .... ~~ 1 (57) 
establislment of the Gulf Q:H:Jpera on v.JW,...... • 
'!be Constituticn of the U.A.E. is the first written 
Constituticn for the Emirates. '!be inllvidual Emirates were, arrl 
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still are, governaj by tradi tional reg:i.nl3s based on tribal 
alliances. Adherence to the letter of the Constitution requires 
tine arrl patience for the i.rxlividual Emirates and their 
respective Governnv:mts to get used to it. '!be rulers of the 
Emirates used to enjoy an absolute ~ in their Emirates, so 
for them to get used to the limits which the Federal System 
intrcrluced is a difficult arrl a gradual process. '!be 
institutions responsible for enforcing and supervising functions 
of the Federal System are faced with all of the problems prcrluced 
by the environment in which the Federal System arrl its 
institutions are to work. 
Unpiring the Federal System, interpret1D;J the Federal 
Constitution, arrl resolving the disputes which arise fron its 
applicatioo, are tasks belongirYJ to the Federal Supreme <hlrt. 
Understarrling the nature of the Federal System in the U .A.E. and 
the envirOf'l[OOIlt in which it is working, makes us appreciate the 
difficult and important task entrusted to this court. 
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forces ••• to join the defensive machinery of the Union ••• to 
defarl ••• the Union against any external aggressioo.". In 
1976 the constitutioo was amerrled and Article 142 cancelled, 
so cnly the federal .government now can have anned forces. 
'!his is at least in theory, since the unificatioo. of the 
anned forces was aOO still is not ccmpletely successful in 
practice. '!here has been disagreement between AOO.-Dhabi arrl 
IA1bai al:a1t the manner in which the unified forces are to be 
ccmnarrled. '!be ap[X)intment of ooe of the SCXlS of Sheikh 
zayed of AOO.-Dhabi as a::mnaxner in chief 00 6 February 1978 
was obj ected to by IA1bai; the scn of Sheikh Raj id of n.IDai 
is the Minister of Defence. '!his disagreernentcx:ntriblted 
to the cxnsti tutiooal crisis of 1979, which resulted (inter 
alia) in the rem:wal of the scn of Sheikh zayed fran his 
position. 
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31 During discussions on the framing of the pennanent 
constitution it was obvioos that there were two opp:>Sing 
sides. One side was lead by Abu-Dhabi, with same emirates, 
one of which was Sharjah. This side calls for the 
ratification of the draftpennanent constitution arrl 
strengthening the central government. The other side was 
lead by rubai, with other emirates, one of which was Ras-
Alkhaimah. This side was suspicious of the Ab.l-Dhabi side 
am called for the renewal of the provisional constitution 
for a further five years. See Al-Tabtabai, ope cit., p446. 
32 Aioong the main legislative acts is: 
law no. 5/85: Law of Civil Transactions. 
The experiences of the emirates which choose to transfer 
their judiciaries to the federal government have proved to 
be successful. '!here are certain characteristics of the 
cnmtry arrl its judicial am oonstitutional system which 
enoourage the unificatioo of the jooiciary: 
1 The emirates, through their representation in the 
highest authority in the federal go'VerIm3Ilt, that their 
interests will be assured. 
2 '1he current system gives the jurisdicticn to the local 
council on a territorial basis, and does not give 
jurisdictioo to the federal council when citizens of 
rore than cne emirate are involved, (as is the case in 
U.S. See U.S. Const. Article III this can result in 
biases arrl may cause reprisals, or at least suspicion 
in the judiciary. 
3 The area is small, the ll1OYeI1'eIlt between the emirates is 
constant, which may lead to conflict of jurisdiction 
between local councils in the different emirates. 
Because of the size of the emirates arrl that the small 
rrumber of litigations do not warrant establishment of 
dual systems of judiciary, the best solution is to 
unify the j trliciary on all levels. 
33 In the U.S. there are two parallel judiciaries. One is the 
federal judiciary, the other is the state judiciary. Both of 
these judiciaries begin with the level of first instance, 
ani em at the top with, respectively, the federal arrl 
state Supreme Courts. See Abraham, H. '1he Judicial Process: 
An Introductory Analysis of the CDurts of the United states, 
England am. Franoe (5th ed.) Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986, p142. 
In Canada all the first instance am appelate courts are 
provincial. Only the supreme court is federally 
administered, al~ the canstitution gives the federal 
government the right to set up primary constitutional 
courts. See Johnstone, R. The Effect of Judicial Review on 
Federal state Relatiansin Australia, Canada am the United 
states, Baton Rouge, Wuisiana: Wuisiana state University 
Press, 1969, p35. 
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In Gennany the situation is IOC>re like that of the U.S. in 
having a dual judicial system. See Article 92 of the Basic 
law. 
34 See Ballantyne, W. Ccmnercial Law in the Arab Middle East: 
'!be Gulf State Ia:rlon: Lloyds of I..cxrlon Press, 1986, p57. 
35 Ibid., p4. 
36 '!he final version of the U.A.E. Coostitution was draftOO by 
the E>;m>tian Jurist, Wahid Rafat. See Chapter Cbe of this 
thesis. 
37 Article 149 of the Prov. Const. gives the emirates the 
right to legislate in matters which are within the province 
of the federal legislative pcMer, 1.IDtil the federal 
government occupies. the field. 
Article 148 gives another exception to the distriOOtion 
of pcMer between the emirates arrl the federal government, 
this article provides: 
"All matters established by laws, regulations, decrees, 
orders arrl decisions in the variCKlS emirates of the union in 
effect ufXXl the o:ming into force of this CXXlStitution, 
shall oontinue to be applicable unless amerrled or replaced 
in accordance with the provisions of this constituticn ••• If • 
Taking into account the slow legislative process in the 
federal government, especially during the first few years, 
the application of Articles 148 arxi 1 49 had, arrl still 
have, considerable effect. 
38 Al-Tabtabai, '!he Federal System in the United Arab Emirates, 
ope cit., p67. 
39 See Livingstcn, W. Federalismarrl Constitutional Cllange, 
Oxford: '!be Clarerrlon Press, 1956, p7. 
40 Ibrahim, '!he Experience of the Federal National Council, ope 
cit., p128; arrl Al-Tabtabai, '!he Federal System in the 
United Arab Emirates, ope cit., p446. 
41 See Heard-Bey, ope cit., p394. 
42 Ibid., p395. 
43 See T.aryam, ope cit., pp239-248. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Altong the causes for the inability to adopt a new 
constitution are: 
a the uneasy relationship between the emirates 
(especially the governments of the emirates) which 
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makes agrearent on the new constitution difficult. 
b the lack of strong incentive to change the current 
situation. 
46 Examples of the unsuitability of the current constitution 
for beca:ning permanent one are nurrerous, as examples shcM: 
1 '!he organisation of federal arrl local judiciary. 
2 The federal hrlget. U.A.E. Cbnst. Article 127. '!he 
application of this have eru:xxmtered major 
difficulties. 
3 '!he pennanent capital of the union. U.A.E. Const. 
Article 9 which has not been carried out until l'lCM, 
which makes changing this provision necessary. 
47 For example the arnerrlnent of the constitution to unify the 
a..I'11'ed forces created confrontations arrl disagreements 
between sane emirates. See Al-Tabtabai, '!he Federal System 
in the United Arab Emirates ope cit., pp41 0-417; am Heard-
Bey, ope cit., pp3g.3-395. 
48 The experiences of other oountries, especially federal 
<X>Wltries, have proven that the constitutional CX)UIlcils can 
play useful parts in developinJ their constitutional systems 
arrl in supporting federalism. See McWhenby, E. Supreme 
Courts am Jtrlicial I.a.w-makinq: Constitutional Trib.mals arrl 
Cbnstitutional Review Ibrdrecht: Martinus Nij haff 
Publishers, 1986, pp165-184. 
49 U.A.E. Prov. Cbnst. Article 144. 
50 '!he Cbnsti tution Anerlnents, which have been passed. in the 
U.A.E., are in three areas: 
1 Amending Article 1 in 1972 by aMing a paragraph 
allowing the Supreme Co.mcil to allocate new seats in 
the event of admitting a f'Bfl nenber to the Union. 'Ibis 
was a solution to a problem presented by admitting the 
seventh emirate to the Union. 
2 Amending Article 138 am cancelling Article 142, to 
prohibit the nenber emirates fron raising and keepinJ 
a..I'11'ed forces. 'Ihls was dale in 1976 to satisfy the 
demarrl of unifying the a.rnej forces. 
3 Amending Article 144 three tines to extem the duration 
of the provisional CXXlStitution by five years each 
time. '!be dates of these arnerrlnents are 2nd December 
of: 1976, 1981 am 1986. 
51 '!he (Dubai - Sharja,h) border displte has been solved 
amicably, see Taryam, ope cit., p233. '!he (Ras-Alkhaimah -
Fujairah) border diSInte is currently the subject of a 
supreme court case, which has rot yet been decided. 
52 See Taryam, ope cit., pp' 91-192. 
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53 See Peterson, J .E. "'!he Future of Federalism in the United 
Arab Emirates" in: Sindlair Ill, H.R. and Peterson, J .H. 
(eds.) cross Currents in the Gulf: Arab, Regional and Global 
Interest, lDrrlon: Routledge, 1988, pp207. 
54 U.A.E. Prov. Const. Article 151. 
55 U.A.E. Prov. Const. Article 127. See Heard-Bey, ope cit., 
pp379-380. 
The policies of the U.A.E. and its developnent have been 
widely and greatly affected by the current arrangement for 
the provision of the Blriget. '!be Federation came on 
several occasions to crisis situations because of the blrlget 
problem. See Ibrahim, '!he Experience of the Federal Cameil 
OPe cit., pp261-301. 
56 For further information, see: Friedrich, Carl J. Tren:3.s of 
Federalism in 'lbeoI:y and Practice, lDrrlon: Pall Mall Press, 
1968; Elzar, o:miel, J. Exploring Federalism, Tusca Ia:>sa, 
Alabama: University of Al.abarra Press, 1987. 
57 'nle establishment of the G.C.C. was signed by agreement by 
the heads of the six nanber countries on 25 May 1981 in the 
city of Abu-Dhabi. 
<lIAPrlm EIQfl' 
'mE SUfk&ii3I <nRl' IN mE <nerl'lVI'Ittl AM> THE LAIIS CP THE an'lB) 
ARAB EMJ:RMES 
'!he importance of the Supreme Court stems fran its power of 
reviewing the constitutionality of laws, giving binding 
interpretation of the constitution am its position as an umpire 
of the federal system. 
'nle IOOdern principle of CCl'lStitutional judicial review, that 
is the su1x>rdination of ordinary laws to the higher law, was 
first effectively enunciated in the United States by John 
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison (1 ) One of the main reasons 
given as justifications for el'IlfOW&ing the judiciary to review 
the constitutionality of laws is that the Constitution is a 
higher law am that the cn.lrts have the duty of applying laws, so 
if an inferior law violates a higher one, the coorts have to 
apply the higher one. 'llle institutioo of judicial review serves 
to Umi t the power of the legislature am preserve and supervise 
the adherence to the Constitution. Judicial review of the 
constitutionality of laws has spread throughout the world (2 ). 
One of the cn.mtries that has adopted the institutioo of judicial 
review of the constitutionality of laws is the United Arab 
Emirates. 
Federal goverment has two tiers of authority, central am 
state. Both are governed by the same ccnstitutioo. '!be two levels 
of goverment in the federal system are supposed to be ex>-
ordinated curl iIxleperrlent in their respective spheres. '!he 
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federal ronsti tution is the basis on which the division of power 
is governed in the federal systan. Differences of opinion arrl 
occasional disputes between central arrl state governnents are 
boorrl to occur as a result of the application of the federal 
ronstitution. These differences of opinioo and disputes are to be 
resolved arrl decided by an iOO.epen1ent authority which is capable 
of rendering decisions on an unbiased basis. '!be preservatioo of 
the federal balance arrl the protection of the rights of the two 
levels of goverrunent in the federal systan has led the majority 
of federations to entrust the function of deciding federalism-
based disputes and differences of opinion to the juliciary (3). 
'!he constitution of the United Arab Emirates gave the task 
of interpreting the Constitutioo am resolving federalism-based 
disputes to the Suprem= 0::Jurt of the Union (4). 
In this chapter we shall discuss the establislnnent, 
CXlIifX)Sition am jurisdiction of the Court, am the guarantees 
provided by the Ccxlstitution arrl the laws to protect the 
indeperrlence of the Calrt. We shall analyse the powers of the 
Court and the significance of its jurisdiction for the 
consti tutional order and federal system of the United Arab 
Emirates. 'Iba canparative study shows us the imp:>rtance of the 
constitutional cn.Irts am the systans which are employed to give 
these cn.Irts the best chances of doing properly the job which is 
entrusted to them. 'Ibe canparative study also shows that there is 
much debate and CCXltroversy SUI"I'OOI'Xlin3 the aJI'lSti tutional courts 
in their attempts to invalidate legislation, accusations of 
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judicial legislation arrl of illegitimate judicial activism. All 
of the accusations of activism directed to the constitutional 
courts stem fron the allegation that these courts encroach on 
other departments' powers and by that undermine the same 
constitutional system they were neant to protect arrl guard (5 ). 
In the United Arab Emirates we have seen the way in which 
the Constitution functions, where power is concentrated arrl what 
kind of federal system operates in the country (6). In this 
chapter we shall try to urrlerstarrl arrl firrl out what are the 
possibilities that are .presented to the Supreme Court, how the 
Court can carry out its responsibilities in the consti tutional 
system without creating a crisis or causing permanent damage to 
the Court itself in relation to the other ircpJrtant government 
authorities either federal or local. Traditional theory 
concerning the judicial function, which prevailed until the turn 
of this century, held that the Courts only apply the law but do 
not participate in making legal rules. It was held that law 
making was the exclusive province of legislatures, whereas Calrts 
have a duty to implement the law as they fiOO it (7). '1hl.s theory 
is what legal realists call "'!be Basic Myth" (8). In the ccntext 
of Constitutional Law, the traditional view holds that the 
frarcers are the only source of O::nstitutiooal law, am that the 
Courts only apply this law. In the early years of this century, 
a great debate took place aimed at dispelling the basic myth (9). 
It is 'OCM generally acCepted that the traditional theory is a 
myth, not a reality, am few tcrlay believe in such a theory (10). 
To defend the traditional theory in the ordinary law is a 
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difficult if not impossible task. In the field of Constitutional 
law the task is even harder. Constitutions usually contain 
general rules and are meant to last for long periods. The 
Constitutional rules am provisions form a basis for ordinary 
legislation. Constitutional Courts interpret Constitutional 
provisions in the course of the different tasks entrusted to 
them. Ar!ong these tasks is the examination of the confonning of 
regular laws to a Constitution (11). 
In the case of the U .A.E., the nature of the Provisional 
Oonsti tution makes adherence to traditional theory un\\'Orkable. 
There are several reasons for this, among which are the 
prOV'isional, temporary nature of the Coostitution, am that its 
intended p.rrpose is to be an instrument leading to stronger unity 
(12 ) 
Another reascn, especially in the first few years of the 
federatioo, was the existence of a vast legislative volume which 
left a large number of Constitutional provisioos without details 
an:i without statutory regulatioo. '!he consequence of this has 
been the generation of applications to the Court for 
interpretation, am in sate cases the resolution of disputes 
about the rights of different authorities. These eventually', 
arrive at the Court for settlarent (13). 
'!be Supreae Court is entrusted with the task. of interpreting 
the Constitution either . as a direct interpretation, or else in a 
decision in a judicial review case ( 14). The Court has declared 
its role in the interpretation of the Qx1stitution to be passive, 
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which would accord with one of the ideas fron traditional theory: 
of simply rem:wing ambiguities fron the text arx:l applying the law's 
provision without any judicial law-makin:.J (15). '!he facts and the 
actual interpretations provide:i by the Court do not support this 
claim. The Supreme Court establishes Constitutional Principles 
arx:l in reality makes Constitutional law, arx:l this law which is 
made by the Court is birrling on all (16). 
'!be duty entrustej to the Supreme Court is an essential arrl 
important one arrl its task is delicate. '!he Court needs to 
W'rlerstarx:l the import.ance of its task arx:l the results which are 
attainable fron its attittrles. It needs to live up to the 
aspirations of the people am those who established the fejeral 
government arx:l draftej the Constitution. It neOOs to keep in miIrl 
that the Unitej Arab Emirates is a progressive country 00 the 
road of developnent, which is one unit in the face of the whole 
world, yet is still being introduced to the world. It is 
important that these aspirations arrl expectations are realised. 
'!be different governmental departments arx:l autOOrities bear their 
share of the burden of promoting developments and removing 
obstacles to the country t s progress. '!be Court bears its share, 
which makes an important contriOOtion to the whole develqment 
process. The Supreme Court deals with the Constitutioo, which 
prescribes the limits of ~ arx:l distriOOtes responsibilities. 
Whilst the Supreme Court is neErlej to play a positive role in the 
progress am developoorit of the constitutional system, at the 
same time those who can disrupt the functiCl'lS of the Court, am 
even question its existence, shalld be assurej of their pcMeI's 
Cllapter8 
- 219 -
am not provoked. Keeping the balance required of tQe Supreme 
Court is a difficult task. We want to study the Court am its 
power to see whether all of these enable the Court to keep the 
balance am to be a forward-looking Court. 
The Constitutioo deals with the Supreme Court in seven 
articles of the fifth chapter, which is devoted to the j trliciary. 
This chapter contains sixteen articles (17). It is obvioos fran 
the large Ill.mlber of articles devoted to the Supreme Court that 
the founders of the Constitution preferred a saoewhat detailed 
constitutional regulation of the Supreme Court instead of leaving 
this regulation to the legislature. '!be detailed constitutional 
regulation of the Court am the substance of this regulation 
reveals the su~ importance of the Supreme Court for the 
constitutional order am developtent of the United Arab Flnirates. 
Whether the practice of the Court during the past years of the 
life of the Court lived up to the initial expectations is a 
different matter which deserves special analysis to discover its 
causes am effects (18). 
'!be Constitution provides for the issuance of a law to 
regulate in nore detail the cullposition of the Court am its 
working procedures (19). 'Ibis law was enacted in 1973 (Union law 
number 10 for the year 1973). '!be name of this law is the law of 
the Federal Supreme Court. '!be enactment of this law marked the 
beginning of the life of the Supreme <burt. This law regulated 
the Supreme Court as a specialised OCXlStitutional cx:xJrt on the 
sane basic lines contained in the Calstitution. '!be year 1978 
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marked a major transformation in the life of the Supreme <burt. 
In this year the Supreme 0Jurt ceased to be only a specialised 
oonstitutional court when Union Law (17/1978) was passed urrler 
Paragraph (9) of Article 99 of the Constitution. Paragraph (9) 
of Article 99 makes the Supreme Court canpetent to embrace "Arrj 
other jurisdiction stipllated in this Constitution, or which may 
be assigned to it (the Supreme Court) by law". Law (17/1978) 
added to the Supreme Court cassation jurisdiction in all matters. 
PrO\Tided that the parties bringing a case for cassation to the 
Supreme Court follow the procedures correctly, the Court cannot 
refuse to hear the case. Law (10/1973) was anerxied in 1985 by 
law (14/1985) to accullllOrlate the increased volt.me of cases am 
prO\Tide certainty am simplify sare proce:fures. Law (17/1978) 
was amerrled in 1985 by law (3/1985). 
We shall discuss the Court's CXJlIfXISition, proce:fures am 
jurisdiction urrler the Constitutioo, law (10/1973) as anerxied by 
law (14/1985), am law (17/1978) as anerxied by law (3/1985). 
'!be 0 "4* 161 tial of the &JpLdiE ChJrt 
'nle Constitution prO\Tided that the Suprem:! O:lurt "... shall 
consist of a president am a number of judges not exceeding five 
in all ••• " (20). ~ law determined the number of judges of the 
Cburt to be a president an::l four judges (21). 'lllere is an option 
in the law to add an unlimited number of alternate judges, 
prO\Tided that not rore than one is sitting on the Constitutional 
panel, not roore than two are sitt1n.g' in the five~ panels 
which CCl'lSider matters included in the first seven paragraphs of 
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Article 33 of law (10/1973), and that none of them is allowed to 
preside on any panel (22). 
The qualifications for the appointment of those who are 
appointed to the Supreme Cburt stress technical experience in 
judicial affairs. 'll1e mambers of the Court should be nationals of 
the United Arab Emirates and hold a Uni versi ty degree in Sharia 
am law (23). '!be president am rrenbers of the Supra:oo Court are 
appointed by decree issued by the President after approval by the 
Council of Ministers and ratificaticn by the Supra:oo Council 
(24) 
'!he O::>nstitution and the law provide the president am the 
rranbers of the Court with guarantees that they will be secure in 
their positions. 'lbe president and rrenbers of the Court may not 
be rem:J\7ed except by death, resignation, expiration of tenn of 
contract or canpletion of tenn of secon:ment (for those who are 
appointed for fixed terms or are on secondment from other 
countries), reach.inJ retirement age, pennanent incapacity, or 
being appointed to other jobs with their approval (25) 
'!be <XI1Stitutiooal regulaticn of the appointnents to the 
<hIrt, am the guarantees gi veIl by its provisions to the members 
of the Coort, reflect the cooviction by those who framed arrl 
ratified the Constitution of the importance of the Court, 
especially due to its CXXlStitutiCXlal jurisdiction arrl its role in 
umpiring the federal system. But there are several problems 
stenming fran the regu1atioo by the Constitution and the law of 
the composition of the Supreme Court, all of which problems 
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contribute by different degrees to hampering the Court and 
depriving it of the integrity ani indeperrlence which is necessary 
for it to function in a proper way. 
The main guarantee for the roornbers of the Court is that they 
are secure in their p::>sitions, and they cannot be rerroved fran 
their positions except in very few exceptional cases, which do 
not reduce their iOClependence. All of this looks to be enough to 
allCM the Supreme Court to play its part in checking the other 
branches of government. We have seen already that the Supreme 
Council of the Union -controls both the main executive and 
legislative p:M&s. The Supreme Court, in its checking other 
departm;mts of government, has to confront the Supreme Council, 
if not i.rrm'rliately, eventually. The Supreme Council has the p::Mer 
to arrerrl the Constitution, thralgh saoowhat lengthy procedures, 
rut nevertheless it can insist on having amendments made (26). 
Despite the lOOI'al obligation on the Supreme Council not to harm 
the Supreme Court, and the negative political consequences which 
may result fran actions which are directed against the Supreme 
Court, the possibility of such actions cannot be ruled out. Am 
although it is difficult for the supreme Council to make 
decisions on important issues, the Council can amend the 
Constitution to limit the powers and effectiveness of the Supreme 
Court (27). 
'!he possibilities of the Supreme Council actioos to limit 
the pc:M&s of the SuprerOO Court include: 
a) '!he rem::Nal of 'certain conditions of appointment, such as 
the reooval of the life tenure of the judges. 
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b) The reroval of certain judges (28). 
c) '!he reduction of the jurisdiction of the Suprare Court, ' by 
raroving certain items fran the a:mpetence of Court. 
d) '!he use of the Supr~ Council's power to finance the Court 
as a pressure device on the Court. 
'lhe existence of these possibilities can have restricting effects 
on the Court's work when it considers issuing decisions which may 
trigger the anger am displeasure of the rrenbers of the Suprare 
Council. In a sense the Suprare Council is too powerful for the 
Court to confront in the present OCXlStitutional arrangenents in 
the United Arab Emirates Ccnstitution. Althoogh, for the Suprare 
Court to play its role to the full extent, the current 
CCIlStitutional arrangements will have to be cilangErl, the Suprare 
Court can still play a useful role in providing constructive 
interpretations of the Ccnstitutioo. 'lbere is a need for the 
positive am thoughtful interpretations by the Supreme Court to 
the Constitution. '!be involvanent of the Suprene Court in the 
developnent of Constitutional law is needed for the stable and 
constructive developnent of the Ccnsti tutional system. 'lhe need 
for the Coort's interpretations became apparent soon after it 
began ftmctianing (29 ) '!be need for the Court's insights and 
authori ty in the interpretatioo of the Calsti tution is still 
(X)l1tinuirY:J am is l::x::mXi to deve~ as its system, and the legal 
relations in it, be<:xJne rrore a:mplica.ted (30). 
Generally, the requiremants for the app::>intment to 
Constitutional Coorts, am the procedures for such appointJoonts, 
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depend to a large extent on the degree of adherence to the basic 
legal myth that judges do not make law (31). Where adherence to 
the tradi tional theory of the judicial process prevails, the 
procedures for appoinbnent to Coostitutional Courts tern to be 
un1ertaken by the executive, without recourse to consultation 
with the legislature; Canada arrl Irrlia are examples of such an 
attittrle (32). In countries where the nature of Constitutional 
Coorts is rerognised to include IOOre than the rrere mechanical 
application of existing law, the legislative authorities are 
given decisive roles in" the appointnent process; the U.S.A. and 
West Gennany are examples of this system (33). 
In the U.A.E., the procafure for the appointnent of members 
of the Supreme Coort proves adherence to the traditional view of 
the jOOicial process. '!be SUpreme Cbuncil and the President are 
empowerErl by the Constitution to appoint judges of the Supreme 
Coort (34). The Natialal Cameil is given no role in the 
process of appoint.Ioont to the SUpreme 0::xJrt. '1hl.s suggests a lack 
of appreciaticn of the possible effects and role of the Court 
(35). The traditional view of the judicial process is open to 
criticism, and has been shown to be misleading in its 
CCIlSideration of the technical, mechanical role of the judges of 
a rrerely discovering the law witlnlt participaticn in its shaping 
( 36). In the appoinbrent to the Suprenwa Ca.lrt of the U .A.E. , 
beclIiDJ in mW its political :i.np)~, attention should be 
paid to the political ~lErlge of the jooges, in addition to the 
ertrfilasis on their legal knowledge and technical experience (37). 
IJm1tin;J the attention paid to qualificaticns other than the 
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technical koowledge arrl experience neglects the need for judges 
to be sufficiently politically aware that oonfidence in them can 
be maintained. The consequence of this neglect has a negative 
effect on the operation of the Court, limiting its checking 
effect, and curtail~ its role in developing the oonstitutional 
law in the United Arab Finirates (38). 
Although, generally, the msnbers of the Supreme Court are 
appointed for life, there are exceptions to this rule which 
oversl'ladow life tenure am, in reality, empty the guarantee of 
judicial irrlepemence that life tenure carries with it. Article 
96 paragraph (2) of the O:>nstitutioo mentions aaong the causes to 
end the tenures of the judges of the Court, " ••• Expiration of 
term of contract for those who are appointed by fixed term 
contract or canpletion of tenn of secorrlment", Article 5 of the 
Supreme Court law (10/1973) gives as an exception to the 
requirements of appointment to the 0:Jurt the option of appointing 
saneooe fran " ••• aIOCRJ the citizens of the Arab CX>UIltries to the 
Cburt for a limited, renewable pericrl". In fact this exception 
has been, and still is, the general rule for the appointment to 
the Court since its establishment. It is obvious that those 
judges who are appointed to the Court for limited renewable 
pericrls will not be free fran pressure of wanting the renewal of 
their contracts, and the authorities which have the power to 
renew the jOOges' contracts are the same authorities which the 
j1.rlges are su~ to check and supervise. For the Court to be 
indepeOOent, this option of all<:lWinJ the appoinbrent of jooges 
Chapter 8 
- 226 -
for limitErl pericds of time has to be discontinuErl. The excuses 
gi veIl for making exceptions to the life tenure to the Suprene 
Court and for appointing citizens of other countries to the 
SUprare Cburt was that the UnitErl Arab Emirates was in its early 
stages of developnent arrl that this exception was to continue 
unt~l there were aITOI¥J the citizens of the country people well 
qualified to be appointErl to the Court. If this reason had roorit 
in 1973, it has surely now lost all justification (39). '!he way 
in which the Sup~ Court is arrl has been staffErl, since its 
establislm:mt explains .to a large extent why it has oot been 
effective in reviewin:J the legislative as well as executive acts 
and has not been useful to check their adherence to the 
Constitution. 
'lhe indeperrlence of the Suprare Court as an institution in 
relation to the other branches of governnent has to be closely 
reviewed and evaluated. 'lbe current arrangements by which the 
Supreme Court is included under the Ministry of Justice is 
ina:mpatible with its general and <XXlStitutional powers. 'Ihe 
Supreme Court has to be am:>ng the iIrlepen:ient govemoont branches 
which deal with other branches and depa.rtrle1ts on equal tenns. 
'Ihls Coort is meant to check the adherence to the Cbnstitution by 
the executive as well as the legislative branches. '!be CaJrt is, 
n:oreover, empowered to renjer <XXlStitutional interpretations 
which are binding on all concerned. In other words, the 
interpretatioos given by the Court to the Constitution have the 
same effect that the c:x;ClStitutional provisions have. 'Ihe Supre.ne 
Coort also is entrusted to umpire the federal system, which means 
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that it has to resolve problems between the emirates am the 
central gorvernment, as well as problems a.rrong the emirates. Tnis 
Court has to be irrleperrlent fran the Council of Ministers, yet in 
its current situation, deperrling for its b.rlget on the Council of 
Ministers and urrler the supervision of the Minister of Justice, 
it is restricted by this relatiooship. 
This same arrangement was originally made for the West 
Gennan Constituticnal Court rut, after strong pressure fran the 
Coort, it finally \t01 its irrleperx1ence fran the Federal Ministry 
of Justice, and other obj ecti ves, by 1 960 (40). 
'!he Supreme Coort in the United Arab Emirates, in order to 
be in a better position to carry out its respJClSibilities of 
judicial review arrl CXXlStitutianal interpretation, has to be 
distanced fron the Ministry of Justice and has to be provided 
with its own budget and insulated against any possible 
restriction from the executive as well as from legislative 
departnelts • 
'lhe fOl1Irlers of the United Arab Emirates Constitution clnse 
to rte1tioo the number of the members of the Supreme Ca.lrt in the 
oonstitutional text (41). 'lhis, by implicatioo, means that the 
legislature is excluded fran interference in this rratter except 
to add more details to the constitutional regulations. The 
constitutional delegation for a law to prescribe detailed 
regulatioo for the Supreme Coort did not include changir¥] the 
number of judges on the Court. All of this casts doubt on the 
oonstitutional legitimacy of the option of aw:>inting alternative 
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judges to the Supreme Court which is included in law (10/1973) 
(42) 
• The appointnwant of alternative judges to the Supreme Court 
means that even if there are members of the Court who have ~fe 
tenure (therefore with a sufficient degree of independence arrl 
insulatErl fron reprisals by the other branches of government) the 
a[)IX>intment of alternative jtrlges who are appointed for limited 
pericrls of tine am are subj ect to !'lOre pressure can have a 
negative effect on the work of the Court and can limit its 
irrlepenien.ce • 
'!he Supreme Crurt, - accx>rciIDJ to its statute, is organised 
into at least three chambers (43): one chamber for constitutional 
matters, one for criminal matters, arrl one or IOOre for other 
matters (44). 
'!he fonna.tien of the different chambers is the duty of the 
plenum of the Crurt (45). Decisioos en matters of Constitutional 
importance are handed by a five-member chamber (46). One 
alternate jujge can be a nenber of such a panel (47). '!he 
inclusion of alternate jujges in the work of the Supreme Court, 
am participa.ting in decisions on constitutional interpretations, 
judicial review am the different kinds of dis~tes between the 
federal government and the emirates could have significant 
~s. In SUprelOO Coorts to which jooge.s are appointed 
with life tenure, as in the U.8. Supreme Court, the judges form 
distinct groops, in matters of constitutional consequence, so 
that any change in the fonnation of the Court is bourrl to have 
sane effect on the decisiCllS taken by the Court (48). At present, 
and in the absenCe of life tenured appointee to the Court, the 
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significance of alternate judges is not highlighted. However, it 
is not only alternate judges who are vulnerable to pressure 
resulting fran the lack of security in their jobs; all the jooges 
of the Court share the saIOO lack of security. 'lbrough the passage 
of time, am with the awointment of life terrured judges to the 
Court, the negative effects of the existence of alternate judges 
coold beo::me apparent. 
']be CbIp!teoce of the &ipc 
'!be jurisdiction of the Suprem:! Court of the United Arab 
Emirates is fashioned alcng the sane lines as the jurisdiction of 
the Constitutiooal O::mt of West Gennany (49). '!be jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court is especially close to the original, 
unamerrled enumeratioo of powers of the West GentIan Constitutional 
Court, save, of CQlI'se, the matters which are non-existent in 
United Arab Emirates, such as party political matters (50). 
'!be Constitution gives the Suprem:! Court its major powers in 
its enumerations of jurisdiction in Article 99 am in other parts 
of the Constitution (51). '11le aain powers of the Court are its 
constitutional and federalism-based jurisdictions. The 
constitutional jurisdiction of the Court includes advisory 
opinions as well as reference to it in actual cases fran other 
coorts in the co.mtIy. Federalisn-based jurisdiction involves 
diSpltes between anirat~s arxl also between the emirates arrl the 
federal government. '!be federalisn-based jurisdiction involves 
issues of supremacy of the Federal Constitution and laws issued 
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by delegations from its prov;sl.' ons. Th 
... e federalism-based 
jurisdiction involves settling differences about laws and 
treaties between central and regional governments. 
'!be Supr~ Carrt has powers other than those which ooncern 
the constitutional review and supremacy and the federal system, 
but these powers do not concern us in this study (52) 
A: '!be Qmstitutialal Jurisdictim of the &lfa:aae <blrt 
'Ibis jurisdictioo inchrles both advisory opinions and 
concrete case/ controversy • 
1 ) Requests far Omstitutialal Int:erpmtaticn: 
(1dvisoIy ~iDims) (53) 
'Ihe original sty le of judicial review, which is attri1::uted 
to the American experience, limits the way in which the issues of 
canpatibility of legislative and judicial action with the 
Constitution can be brought, that is only thralgh a real case/ 
CXXlt.roversy. 'Ihe American experience of judicial review deperrls 
an the ootion that the proper role for the Courts is to decide 
cases, and thrOJgh this process they apply the CCIlstituticn as a 
higher law. Ccnstitutional questiCllS, according to the American 
experience, have to be ccrmected with a factual situaticn to 
warrant judicial decisioos. '!be Ca.lrt can then give its decision 
in full appreciation of the factual backgr()UI)j and the need for a 
resoluticn of the presentErl case ( 54). '!here are exceptions to 
the role of requiring concrete case/controversy in order to 
approach the supreme/COnstitutional Courts for decisions on 
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constitutional matters. These exceptions include Canada am the 
original West Genna.n system urrler the Constitutional Court Act of 
(1951) ( 55 ) '!be West Gennan -Consti tutiooal Court, as a result of 
the controversy arising fran the European Defence Camtunity case, 
has been deprived of the pcMer of rerrlering advisory opinions by 
the Court Refonn of 1956 (56). 
'!he pc:;Mer of rerrlering interpretative opinions by 
constitutional courts, by its nature, can be used for political 
reasons am can be employed by the political branches of the 
govermoent in applying pressures on other departments or for 
achievarent of certain desired errls. All of these possibilities 
can create problems for the courts or result in mistrust in their 
work, or, as has been the experience in west Gennany , depriving 
them of ~ of their pc:Mers. '!he Constitution of the United Arab 
Emirates gives the Supreme Court the ~ of rerrlering 
interpretation to the Constitution upon application fran certain 
auth:>rities. '!be right to apply for advisory opinions fran the 
Cb.1rt is given to all federal autOOri ties am the govermoents of 
the emirates. '!he federal authorities include: the President, the 
Cameil of Ministers, arrl the National Council. On the local 
level the goveI'IlllElts of the emirates, which are represented. in 
the rulers, have the right to apply for interpretation of the 
Cbnstitutian to the Suprete 0:>uIt. 
'l1le Cbnsti tuticn provide1 that the interpretations provided 
by the Court in its opinions upon the request for such 
interpretations are birrling on all, which makes its opinions 
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practically on equal terms with the provisions of the 
Cbnstitution. '!be only ways in which the opinion of the Court can 
be changed are either by constitutional amendment or by the 
Court • s CMIl change of decision in later opinions (57) . 
'!his jurisdiction of the Coort has proved to be a useful 
t ool for engaging the Court in clarifying ambiguities in the 
Constitution am in providing informative opinioo for the newly 
established federal authorities in their dealing with the written 
Constitution, especially in the early years of the Federatioo 
(58). 'lhls power can be ,utiiised by the <burt ani by the aut:h::>r-
ities awlying for the opinions to serve several ~. '!he 
Cc:AIrt can use this power to provide opinions suitable for the 
~ of the Constitution ani for the neej of the country at 
the tine when the opinion is given. The Coort can use this p:JWer 
to help the developrent of application of the Constitution to 
help strerqthen the federal autOOrities ani, at the same tine, 
protect the anirates fran any intrusions on their powers. Parties 
have the right to apply to the Cb.lIt to obtain an aut:h::>ritative 
opinion which clarifies the powers am limitations of each party, 
or else to prevent the occurrence of undesirable actions by other 
parties (59). '!be party applYID1 for an opinion fran the Cc:AIrt 
can use this way of obt:a.ini.rXJ infontation to stabilise their 
position and protect their actions against later attacks or 
allegatic.ns of illegitimacy. Hence this right of the authorities 
can be used to gain knowledge and to provide confinnation of 
their actions, and also as a protective device for future 
developnent. Because of their failure to agree to a Pennanent 
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Constitution the emirates have repeatedly opted to exterrl the 
duration of the Provisional Constitution (60) '!be repeated 
extension of duration of the Provisional Constitution means that, 
in practice, the Provisional Calsti tution is ftmctianing as a 
permanent one. '!be fact that this Provisional Constitution was 
originally drawn up to operate for only a limited period of time 
makes it by necessity unable to provide long tenn solutions for 
new problems as they arise. 'Ihis gives the Court opportunities to 
participate in adj usting its OpinialS to the developnent of the 
coontry. '!he actual use the Court makes of i ts ~ of reIrlering 
interpretations to the Constituticn depends to sane extent on the 
Court's urrlerstarrling of its OWOrtunity aM the importance of 
its opinions rut also to sane extent on its appreciaticn of the 
political risks involved if it clroses to rerrler opinions Wlfav-
ourable to the political branches of the federal or local 
govemment. '!be Court's role deperds also on the willingness of 
authorities wbohave the right to apply to the Court to have 
resort to the Court am their cooice of issues to present to the 
Court. 
2) ~ Applicatial of Reriew 
(AbiUact Iba Q:IIb:ol) (61) 
The Constitution and the law give the two levels of 
govemment the right to challeI¥Je the <X>IlSistency of the other 
level's laws within the agreed distribution of powers. This 
involves differences of opinions or doobts al::xJut the fonnal or 
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material compatibility of federal or regional law with the 
Constitution, or the canpatibility of regional laws with federal 
laws. 'Ihis process is initiated either by the authorities of the 
central government or by the emirates. No adversary proceedings 
are necessary. 'Ibis is similar to the abstract nonnal control 
power given to the Constitutional Court in West Gennany (62). 
'1hl.s item of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is meant to be 
a guarantee for the two levels of government to protect their 
spheres of power without having to wait for individuals or 
legal persons to bring cases to the Court to decide whether the 
off~ legislation slnlld be declared null. In this power of 
the Court there is another departure from the traditional 
judicial role of deciding cases or controversies - another 
manifestation by the Constitution of the special nature of the 
Court and its significance in the political system of the 
camtry. 'nle parties in these prooeecU ngs are ei ther central 
government autOOrities or goverments of the emirates. No private 
persoo is involved. '!be Court in these proceedings acts as an 
umpire on legislative matters between the two levels of 
goveInOeIlt. '!be institution which is put in this position of 
having to resolve differences on such important, political 
matters sb:Juld have, by its design arrl structure, assurances of 
independence and integrity in order to have the respect and 
oonfidence of the opposing parties. 
'nle Cl:Jurt's decisiCXlS in these proceedings are, as in other 
cases, bi.rrling (Xl all. Where the Court decides that the law urrler 
consideration is inconSistent with the Calstitution or federal 
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law, the Constitution instructs the concerned authority to "take 
the necessary measures to re.nove or rectify the constitutional 
inconsistency" (63). '!he Constitution opts for the instruction of 
active renovaJ. of laws deemed improper, rather than the effective 
removal of these laws by inapplicability. Anyway, the final 
result is the sama in this case because the decision of the Court 
is bi.nli.nj on all am the words of the Constitution require the 
quick rEmJVal of doaned laws. 
-
3) 'Dle Refen!llCe of cases fran ra.er CbJrts for 
QmstibIt1cma1 Reri.eIf (Qn:rete tb:Il CbltI:ol.) (64) 
'Ibis is the only way open for Wividuals and other private 
peI'SCIlS to challeI¥Je an \IDCXl11Sti tuticnal law. If, while hearing a 
case, a lower ccurt CXl11Siders unconstitutional any statute the 
validity of which is relevant to its decision, then it IIUlSt stay 
the proceedinJS and give the conoemed party a limited period to 
take his petiticn of unconstitutiooality to the Suprane Court 
(65). Q:nsideration of the unconstitutionality of laws by lower 
courts can be either by a challenge fran cne of the parties or by 
the <hlrt I S own ini tiati ve. If the lO'w'eI' court cxnsiders the 
challenge of unconstitutionality unfoonded., then it has to give 
the reason for its fiIrling in the decision (66). 'lllere is no spe-
cial remedy for the party whose challenge of unconstitutionality 
of laws has been refusErl. 'lbe only remedy for those parties wtt>se 
challenge an the constitutiooality of laws has been refused is 
the nonnal a~llate procedures (67) 
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If the consideration of the unconstitutionality of the law 
was by the lC7.rt'er coort' s own initiative, then it has to refer the 
concerne.:] prcwisions to the - Supreroo Court with details of the 
reasons for its decisions (68). 
Article 99 ( 6 ) of the Coostitutioo holds that the Supreme 
Court shall have jurisdiction in: 
"Examination of the constitutionality of laws, legislatioo 
arrl regulations in general, if such a request is referrOO to 
it by any Court in the country dur~ a perrling case before 
it ••• " 
All Courts in the country can bring questions of revie<.rf of the 
constitutionality of legislation to the Supreme Court. Both 
Federal c::nJrts am local Courts can bring constitutional review 
applications to the Supreme Courts. Primary, appellate, final 
and Sharia Courts can bring questions of review of 
consti tutionali ty to the Supreme Court. Questions of 
constitutionality of legislation can be referred to the 
CCXlStitutional chamber fron other chambers in the Supreme Court, 
especially after the enactment of the law of cassation (Law 
17/1978) (69). 
The laws that can be referred to the Supreme Court through 
this jurisdiction can be either federal or emirate laws, they 
include statutes, bye-laws, and any form of legislation and 
regulation (70). '!be CcXlstituticn gives the power of decidiD:J on 
the CXll'lStitutiooality of laws to the Supreme Court but this does 
not exclude the role of inferior courts in the process of 
reviewin:i the confonnity of laws with the Calstitution. Indeed, 
the role of inferior courts in the decision on the 
Olapter 8 
- 237 -
constitutiooality of laws is a vital one. Article 58 of the 
Supreme Court's statute (Law 10/1973) includes regulation of the 
procedure of referring questions ooncerning Constitutional review 
of legislation to the Supr~ Coort fron other Courts. '!his 
article gives the Court the right to initiate questions of 
Constitutionality, thereby referring than to the Supreme Court. 
'!he CaJrts in the country have the power to decide on the neri. ts 
of questions of constitutionality of legislation initiated by 
parties to cases before them. '!he inferior courts have the right 
to question the ccnfonnity of any law with the Constitution as 
long as the decision 00 this matter affects the ultimate decision 
of that CXAlrt 00 the case before it. To initiate prooeedings of 
reviewing the conformity of laws with the Constitution, the 
inferior courts have a wide discretion which means that they 
sl'nJld be willing to refer laws to the Supreme Ca.1rt an::'i, at the 
same time, they should be confident of the procedural and 
material ability of the Supreme Cc:urt to guard an::'i enforce the 
suprenacy of the CcIlstitutioo. Even when the question of the 
<XlnStituticrality of laws is presented by parties in cases before 
inferior courts, the discretion of these courts is still wide. 
The inferior courts have to decide on the matter of 
CXXlStituticrallty of laws. If a (X)JlStitutional question is raised 
by the parties, then, these ca:art:s either stay the proceedings 
before them arrl allow the party oonoerned to take his request to 
the Supreme Court or proceed with the decision on the case, 
having explained the reason for not granting the right to 
approach the SUpreme Coort. Paragraph (6) of Article 99 of the 
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Constitution allows the inferior courts to refer laws to the 
Suprerre Court even if they have only a slight doubt regarding 
their constitutionality am, at the saroo time, when the reference 
is requested by a party before them, there may be a strong 
possibility of contradiction of the questioned law with the 
Constitution rut the question will not be referred to the Suprene 
CbJrt if the opinion of the coort is wholly on the other side of 
the argunelt. 'llle absence of special procedures of appeal for 
parties whose applications for referral to the Suprene Court 
have been denied by lower Coorts strengthens the power of the 
inferior jtrlges on the referral of coostitutiooal objections to 
the Suprene <h1rt. OJrrently only ordinary appeals procedures 
are possible for those who have been denied referral to the 
Suprene Cburt for oonstitutional review. 'lbese procedures are not 
sufficient in all cases because there are special requiremmts 
for ordinary a~s which may be absent fran the case in which 
the ooostitutionality of laws was raised. '1berefore the ooncerned 
party may have 00 way to a~ against the refusal to grant him 
the right to approach the Supreme 0Jurt (71). 
The Supreme Court's jurisdiction to decide on the 
constitutionality of laws referred to it by inferior courts 
resulting from cases or controversies before them makes the 
Supreroo Call:t an important guarantor of calStitutional rights of 
individuals against violation by legislation. There is an 
inherent defect in the kirxl of procErlure cOOsen in the United 
Arab Emirates. '!be CCflStitutional COJrt receives an application 
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to review the canpatibility with the Constitution of a piece of 
legislation. TOO legislation is referred to wit:ha.lt ~ facts of 
the case, arrl the decision of the Court will be binding on all, 
not simply to the particular case in which the question of 
constitutionality arose. The emphasis of the Supreme Court 
becx:JIes ooncentrated not on the individual arrl the breach of his 
constitutional right but rather on the piece of legislation 
referred to. '!he separation of the constitutional questions fran 
the specific fact situation deprives the Suprema Court of the 
flexibility enjoyed by such courts as the Al'lE"ican Supreue Court. 
For, if the Suprem3 Court receives all of the case . (tx>th its 
facts and the questioo of constitutionality) it may axlSider it 
proper to postp::lle deciding the question of constitutionality or 
to interpret the Cbnstitution in a way to restore arrl protect the 
rights of the cooc:::ernel party am others in a similar situaticn 
to a greater extent (72). 'Ihe Supreme Court • s urrlerstanding of 
its primary duty regarciirq laws referred to it by lower courts, 
that is, of not havin:] to decide a particular case rut havir¥.J to 
give a fonnal declaratioo of the canpatibility of a law with the 
Calstituticn, cnUd have adverse effects on toose parties who 
willingly or WlWillingly caUSErl the statute to be referred to the 
Supreme O:mt. 
'n1e procedureS prescribed by the law for referrir¥.J laws for 
CXXlStitutional scrutiny by the SUpr€lOO Court may not be adequate 
to protect all constitutiooal rights that are violated by the 
legislature. The element of time may be a cause for the 
insufficiency of the procedure to protect irrli vidual rights by 
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referring laws to the Suprene Carrt, for example a person whose 
right to obtain a passport to travel has been violated by a law 
or administrative regulation. If he brings a case to ordinary 
court, the court either grants or refuses to grant him the right 
to approach the Suprene Carrt. If the lCMeI' court decides to 
allow the person to approach the Supreme Court, the court's 
protracted procedure takes a long time, after which the decision 
must still return to the lower court which decides the case 
accordingly. If the lower court decides not to grant the 
concerned person the right to take his case to the Supreme Ccurt, 
then this perscn has to appeal to the Appellate Ccurt which may 
or may not reverse the lower CXJUrt' s decision. '!ben the only 
rema.ini.DJ course for this perscn is by way of cassation to the 
Supreme Court. Each of these prooerlures nay result in a denial of 
a person' s fundamental rights. Even if the Supreme Court t s 
decision ultimately favours the person who initiated the 
prcx::aiures, it may be too late for him to benefit fran it. 
Arx>ther disadvantage resultirxJ fran the lengthy procedures 
arrl the special requirements in the coort I S statute is the high 
financial cost of bringing applications of constitutional review 
by individuals to the Supreme Court, which may result in 
discouraging people from requesting these procedures or 
~ them after they are permitted to awroach the Supraoo 
Court (73). 
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4) The R o1utim of Disprt:es Bel,:: I the IbtJer BDirates 
am Bet eeu '1bem and the Federal <b1emDent (74) 
General displtes can be presentErl to the Suprare CaJrt 
through this jurisdiction. '!he emirates and the federal 
govenment can bring these displtes to the CaJrt. These diSIXItes 
can be between the emirates and the fErleral government or between 
the emirates. '!he subjects of these displtes can vary widely. '!he 
diSIXIte presenterl to the Coort thrrugh this jurisdiction can be 
about territorial txJrder differences, financial ccmnitments, the 
application by the emirates of the fErleral laws, or mmy other 
subjects. '!be parties to these displtes are political txrlies, so 
dealing in a displte between them is politically sensitive. ~ 
to the positial of the Coort there are no appeals fron its 
decisions. '1bese facts place the Supreae Court in a positicn 
which is 00th pc::M&ful and ocWd be delicate. '!be position of 
the Calrt - to be able to decide diSIXItes between the emirates 
am the federal govemnent - demaOOs that the court is witlnrt: 
bias am thus deserving the trust and confidence of all parties. 
5) a:mstituticna1 QJest.ialS om ng to the <bJrt '1hI:t:u3h its 
Role as the CbJrt of Cassatial 
'!he SUpreae Court was given the role of a cassation court to 
hear final appeals on matters concerning errors of law by lower 
courts (75). Scme CXXlStitutional questicns may reach the Suprare 
Court on the basis of the error of application of laws or 
oonstituticnal provisions. 
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'lb! Role of the SUpcae Cburt in the Federal 1S1 anoe 
In the Unitoo Arab Emirates federalism has different 
neanings to different categories of people. To the people of the 
CQl!ltIy, the term itself has a k.inj of attractiveness am. holds 
pranise. 'nle principle of unity between the emirates am. the 
ending of a period during which the area was under British 
influence, prcm:::>ted a sense of national pride and nationalistic 
arotion. '!be irrleperrlence of the ca.mtry cane durID:j a perioo in 
which the total structure of the society and its economic, 
cultural, educational and other aspects were urrlergoing fast 
development. The development of education connected the 
inhabitants of the CXXlI1try with the people of the Arab world am. 
brought to the fore several historic facts, all of which 
strengthened the call for unity. The economic situation was 
changirq fast, oil !IXXleY was seen as a cause am. pranise of a 
better life. Unity between the emirates meant better services to 
the populatioo, especially to tlx>se in emirates unable to provide 
these services. To the rulers the federation meant security am. 
stability, and a source of financial support to the non-oil 
producers (76). 
Article 1 of the Constitution presented the CQl!ltry as a 
''Federation''. 'n1e preamble anphasised the desirability of unity, 
am the need to enhance the quality of life am. str~ the 
1::xxrls between the emirates. But what does ''Unity'' or ''Federatioo'' 
nean? There is no explanation of these tenns in the Calstitution 
other than the prescription for the division of powers between 
the emirates and the central government. 'llle distr1b.Iticn of 
Cllapter 8 
- 243 -
powers in the Constitution between the emirates am the central 
.gove.rrurent is set out in a series of fairly detailed lists of 
powers to the federal government, with the residuary given to the 
emirates. '!he kirrl of distrib.ltion of powers is closer to the 
system of West Gennany aM Canada than that of the O.S. which 
stresses the creating of a strOD3' central government (77). 
Owing to the immediate history of the emirates, their 
existing system of government, aM their tribal character, the 
emirates are likely to be strong aM reluctant to subnit totally 
to the authority of the federal government or help it to grCM arrl 
prosper (78). 
'!he Supreme Coort is the final reference to interpret the 
Constitution and is given the jurisdiction to decide on the 
allegations of unoonstitutionality of either federal or emirate 
laws if challenged either directly by the other level of 
government or indirectly by irrlividuals arrl parties to cases 
before inferior cn.t.rts. By their nature constitutional cases are, 
in a sense, political, especially if the dispute is between the 
two levels of government. The laws prarulgated by lx>th levels of 
government ooold affect varioos subjects arrl there are bourrl to 
be questions and disputes of whether or not each level of 
government did in fact adhere to the prO\Tince of power it is 
allowed by the CcIlSti tutioo. Not all of the areas of legislatioo. 
by the two levels of ~t will be clearly coherent with the 
oonstitutional distribution of power (79). The position of the 
Supreme Court as an umpire of the fErleral system, arrl the lack of 
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precise definition of the tenn "federal" or "federal govermnent" 
plt on the Coort the responsibility of affecting am rra.tntairrlng 
the federal balance in areas which are not regulated in detail. 
'1he judgement of the Court is not only to abide according to 
"positive" constitutional law rut also to include substantive 
judgeloont of creative quality. '!be SuprE:llOO Court cannot remain 
passive. Its decisions are bound to include more than just 
relOCNal of ambiguity fran constitutional provisions ( 80). '!be 
question which sln1ld be asked then is not whether the SuprE:llOO 
Court will make constitutional law rut rather according to what 
guidelines will arrl shalld it make such law? (81) 
In the area of constitutional distrirution of p:JWer between 
the two levels of government and in maintaining the federal 
system, there are several principles which should be considered 
by the Court in its decisions. 'lbese principles stem fran the 
constitutional text arrl history, fran the nature of the society 
an:i other relevant factors. Maintaining the federal system is the 
best way to ensure better protectioo for the irrli viduals. '!be 
federal system is better than small, ccmpletely indeperrient, 
emirates and, at the same tiae, it is better than one large 
unitary state. The origin of the federal system, the modern 
versicn of which is attriWted to the U.5. system of govemnent, 
was designed to afford the best protection for individuals by 
distributing the ~s of the govemnent aIIalg many institutions 
through separation of ~s and the federal system. '!be result 
is a system of many quarters of power, each sharing part of the 
power and all participating in guaranteeiD;1 protectioo of the 
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people through the system of checks arrl balances (82 ) In West 
Gennany the current federal system was organised to prevent the 
repetition of the Nazi experience arrl any other tyranny. Indeed 
in West Gennany new states were artificially created in order to 
divide the ~ am to assure protection of the irrli. viduals 
(83). '!be United Arab Emirates t federal system may help in the 
protection of individuals. For a very long time before the 
federation the rulers in the emirates used to enj oy ccmplete 
power over individuals and over domestic matters in their 
respective emirates. The federal system helped to break the 
canplete daninance of the rulers over irrli. viduals by di vidin3 
powers between the two levels of govenmmt. 'lbe creation of the 
federal system, in prcrlucing a new institutional infrastructure, 
offered the people a wider choice of employment a.rrl a better 
quality of services. wealth in the United Arab Emirates is 
associated with the goverrunent which distributes the benefits of 
oil to the peq>le throogh varioos different channels: employment, 
services, projects for OOild~ the infrastructure a.rrl other 
government schemes. All of the ~ties a.rrl choices are 
increased by the fe:ieral system which, ultimately, results in 
increasing the choices am benefits accruiD:J to the citizens. 'lbe 
protection of the irrli vidual am the prevention of tyranny are 
etrls associated with judicial review. 'lbe Supreme Court is a 
court empowered to practice judicial review of the 
constitutionality of laws, the ultimate pJrpOSe of which is to 
afford better protection for irrlividuals. 'lbe Supreme Court has 
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to support and maintain the federal system according to its 
original powers in the Constitution (84). In supporting the 
federal system am maintaining the fe1eral balance, the Suprene 
Ccmt: will be participating in protecting the irrlividual am 
serving the same errl that is linked with the judicial review 
(85) 
In order for the Supreme Cburt to suppJrt am maintain the 
federal system, attention must be paid to providing measurErl 
support for the central government, at least in the current 
period, and for the .,foreseeable future. However, current 
cira.uns~s surroorrling the fErleral system terrl to faVOJI' the 
emirates against central government, which results in weak 
central govenm:mt. '!be cootinued weakness of central government 
harnrers the develq:m:mt of the cruntry, particularly in that the 
central government is gi vert the duty to prCNide vital services. 
The weakness of central government leaves the whole federal 
system out of l::alance. 'lhls imh31ance not only prevents the full 
protectioo of the people, rut also denies them access to a better 
life with more choice (86). 
'!be weakness of the central government is the result of 
different factors, all of which play sate role in weakening its 
~s or preventing it fran the proper exercise of them. We 
shall discuss sate of these factors axx1 their effects. 
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1 ) 
'!be previous existence of the emir ates as independent 
entities 
'nle emirates were governErl by their rulers for a 10l'¥3' 
pericrl. Originally the rulers held all the IXJW& in their 
emirates, sane of which they relinquished to the British through 
treaties. Mainly, the rulers had the final say in all matters of 
government. '!be tribal nature of the people helped to direct 
power arxi loyalty to the perscn of the ruler arxi the ruling 
family. The later flow of oil and the increased financial 
strer¥]th of the rulers served to enhance their position over the 
people (87). '!be PJWeI's of the rulers were established for a very 
long time in their respective emirates. By comparison, the 
federal government is new. In the early stages of its life, 
therefore, the fErleral goverment needed support to establish its 
power an:] to be reco:JI1ised by the people arrl by the rulers. '!be 
transference of [x:PJl1ar loyalty fran the emirates to the federal 
governoent needed time to occur. 
2) '1be arraD;hjlE-=Uits in the Q:Ilstitutial favcurinq the Bldrates 
QJe to the nature of the process of devisin3 the current 
Calstitutioo, which was initiatErl, supervised arrl approved by the 
rulers, the ~ts in the Calstitution CXXlCelltrate power in 
the rulers arrl stress the rights of the emirates. 
The supreme body which has the principal executive and 
legislative powers is canpose1 of the rulers of the emirates. The 
emirates reserved large an::1 important areas of power (88). Urrler 
the original arrangements the emirates have the power over: 
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(i) Oil prcrluctioo and other minerals ~.....:l the. 
, C1lLl rr reverrue. 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
Cv) 
Olstans regulatioos am duty collection. 
Adj~ca1?-oo of ~tt~s not allocatErl to the fErleration 
(which ~s the ma]onty of civil am criminal tter 
arrl matters of ~lic laws which arise in the ~ates ~ • 
Raising annies am security forces which include all 
arrangements am different military forces. 
Police matters. 
ard several other:imp:>rtant areas of power, the use of all of 
these powers resulting in the existence of strong emirates and 
weak central government ... 
3) '!be f1rmv:1a1 
Canpared to the fe1eral government the emirates have the 
rooans and the capabilities to be irrlepexrlent in their financing. 
'!be central government, on the CXXltrary, has to deperrl on the 
cxntribJtioos fran the irrlividual emirates. '!here are no rreans to 
force the anirates to pay their respective shares. 'nle only neans 
of pressure (Xl the emirates is a roral CXle. '!be emirates pay 
their shares because of their felt nee:i to maintain the central 
govenwent. '!be payment of their shares by the emirates can be 
used as a means of pressure to achieve certain ems. 'n1e emirates 
can, and do sanetfmes, delay payment of their shares as a protest 
against the political decisions of central governrte1t (89). 
'!he Supreme 0:Jurt is a jOOicial body am its decisioos are 
relatively in1ttUne fran the pressures that face the political 
department of central goverrmwant • Its decisioos may, therefore, 
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support central government to an extent unavailable to the 
political departments. 
'!hese are only sane of the factors that contriOOte to 
weakening central government am thereby contriOOting to the 
imbalance of the federal system. 
It was clear that the arrangarents provided in the 
O:>nsti tution am the ~rs given to central government were not 
totally satisfactory am that is why the Constitution was 
labelled flprovisional" am given a duration of five years during 
which tirre a permanent coostitution of a llDre powerful tmicn was 
to be prepared arrl approved. '!be new Constituticn was not 
approved arrl, therefore, the arrangenents for the strc::n;er tmion 
were not achieved. '!he current coosti tution is a document which 
its autOOrs am framers wanted to be revised and ~oved to 
prcwide for a strCD3 central government (90). Were the Supreme 
0Jurt to interpret the Oxlsti tuticn in a manner favouring central 
government, it wwld not contradict the CalStitution. Rather it 
would achieve the results desired by tOOse who fraIOOd it. In 
ad1ition to liviBJ up to the desires of tOOse who foorrled the 
Constitution, the Supreme Court, in supporting central 
government, wc:uld be protecting the irrli vidual and maint:aini.r¥J 
the strength of the fErleral system. 
'1be SUpreme Chlrt can, thrc:ugh the interpretation of the 
<bnstituticn, achieve what the refoI'lOOrs of the Calstltutioo 
failed to achieve. '1llose wOO attanptErl to refonn the Constitutioo 
were confronted by political differences and pressures. The 
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Supr€!lOO Court can, through authoritative decisions, achieve the 
saIOO desire:i ends with fewer obstacles (91). 
There is a possibility that negative reactions and 
unwelcxming responses, or even objections, fron the emirates 
would follow a decision of the Court to support central 
gcwenurent. Such reactions COll.d be reduced or avoided by the 
Coort adopting the gradual approach am by persuasive argt1l1elts. 
In the U.S. am West Gennany, the COJrts were saootimes accused 
of being anti-dem:::x=ratic if they confronted the legislatures, am 
their acts were made veid. '!his objection cannot exist in the 
unite:i Arab Emirates because of the absence of daoocracy. What 
can be upheld is the accusaticn of politicising the jooiciary and 
the accu.satioo to the Coort of trespassing in the provinces of 
other departments of govenmmt. All of these obj ections can be 
answered lCXJically and cxcl.d be avoide:i by the Ccurt using a 
cautious approach. Judges must be assured of immunity from 
reprisals as a necessary protectloo for the Ccurt to carry its 
responsibilities am play its proper role in the developoont of 
the federal system of the Unita::1 Arab Emirates. '!be minimum role 
played by the Calrt must be to support the centre as a viable 
government. am so preserve a federal system rather than allowin:J 
local power to ra::1uoe the arrangenent effectively to a confederal 
one. 
'lbe Qsssatial Jud,sdictial alii its Effect <D the 0Jurt 
'!be year 1978 marked a major turn in the operatioo arrl 
jurisdiction of the SUpreme Court. 'lhls turning point was the 
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rrDVe of the Court fran being mainly a constitutional court to 
being a cx:mt of lOOre general cnnpetence. Law (17/1978) addErl to 
the Suprerte Court the cassation jurisdiction. 
Cassation is an appeal to a high court to review and 
diSCO\1er errors in the application of law by lower courts. 
Cassation originatErl in France after the revolution. It was a 
means by which a non-judicial organ, strictly connected to the 
legislative power, ensured that the courts applied only the 
letter of the law am did not interfere in the legislative sphere 
(92). '!be creatioo of ~ "Tribunal de Cassation" in 1790 was the 
result of the French Revolutionary distrust in the judiciary 
(93). Comparing the original institutions of cassation and 
jtrlicial review we can diSCXJVeI' prof01..1Irl theoretical differences. 
Cassation assumes the supratW3 will of the legislature, whilst 
judicial review requires the subj ection of ordinary laws to a 
supreme judicial body sufficiently inunune from political 
decisions. Cassation presupposes profound mistrust of the 
judiciary, whilst jtrlicial review presumes a great confidence in 
it. The development of cassation in France transformed the 
instituticn carrying it into a judicial 1:xrly and the "er:m- de 
Cassation" became the supreme court for the judicial 
interpretation of the law. This development of cassation 
effectively I'E!'OCM3d the o:ntradiction between it and judicial 
review. Hence, whilst judicial review is the institution for the 
control of ccnstitut.ionality, cassation is the institution for 
the control of legality (94). 
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The jurisdiction of cassation in its modern form and 
according to Article 4 of Law (17/1978) does not contradict 
judicial review. What cassation effectively does is considerably 
widen the field of jurisdiction of the Suprare Court by adding to 
its original oontrol of constitutionality the jurisdiction of 
oontrollin:J legality. Generally, in civil law countries where 
cassation has been receival, as in France, there are specialised 
higher ooorts. For example, in West Gern:any there are no fewer 
than six higher courts (95). In the United Arab Emirates there 
are no such speciali~ courts which means that the ultimate 
<::nJrt of a{:Peal for all cases is the Suprare CJurt. In COllLUl 
law c::nmtries where there is no such specialisation in Suprare 
Courts of Aweal, there are usually devices by which the Suprare 
Courts can choose cases or refuse to decide in others. For 
example, in t:b:! u.s. the Suprare Court has the discretion to 
refuse jurisdiction throogh certiorari (96). '!he Supreme CJurt of 
the United Arab Emirates lacks such a device so it has the duty 
to hear all cases brrught before it. '!be result of the inability 
of the Supreme Court to avoid jurisdictioo will inevitably lead 
to the Court being sul::nerged beneath a deluge of cassation cases, 
thus draining the Court of tine am energy which it was, by its 
original jurisdiction, supposed to give to interpreting and 
supervising the develq:ment of the Constitution. An ordinary 
civil law high court is unsuitable to be given, in addition to 
cassaticn jurisdiction, the power of a constitutional court, nor 
is a specially created oonstitutiCllal CXIUIt suitable to be given 
the general jurisdiction of cassation. 
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Beca~ of the special nature of the cassation jurisdiction, 
it needs technically-minded arrl experienced judges which makes it 
tmSUitable to be given to the Supreme Court in the United Arab 
Emirates. The Court I S state (Law 10/1973) expressed the desire to 
appoint local judges to the Supreme Court, the addition of 
cassation jurisdiction makes it difficult to do this. Because of 
the relatively recent developne.nt of the United Arab Emirates am 
the scarcity of experienced judges, the cassation jurisdiction 
makes it difficult, if not :imtxJssible, to fulfil the desire of 
the legislature to aw::>int local judges to the Court at the 
present tine or in the near future. 
The cassation jurisdiction was included urrler Paragraph (9) 
of Article 99 of the Calstitution which pennits the addition to 
the Court I s jurisdiction of other matters. But, to use this 
pennission to take up more than 90% of the Court I s time is 
incompatible with the constitutional purpos,e, although, 
literally, this can be justified. The incanpatihility of the 
addition of cassation to the Court is evident: 
') The Calstituticn has a relatively large part devoted to the 
SupreIOO Court. 'Ibis can be justified by the importance of 
the oonstitutional jurisdicticn of the Crurt rut is quite 
unjustified for a cx:w:t wlx>se occupation is to supervise the 
proper interpretation and application of ordinary laws. 
2) The aI=PJintment procedure and the tenure of the judges are 
especially formulated because of the IX>litical nature and 
CXXlStitutional i.tnport.anCe of the Crurt. '1be participation 
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of the Supreme Council and the President in the appoinbrent 
of the judges am President of the Supreme Court is not 
necessary for a Court which is mainly a court of cassation. 
The inclusion of the cassation jurisdiction was mainly 
because the Court was urrlerworked before 1978. '!he inclusion of 
cassation within the jurisdiction of the Court did not solve the 
problem of the Court but rather increased it. '!he real problem 
was that there were constitutional issues affecting the federal 
system, ani the constitution in general required decisions. 'lbe 
SUpreme Court, by the 3iPPlication of law (10/1973) especially 
conc:ern.:in3' staffing ani tenure, was unable to provide effective 
solutions for them. There was a lack of confidence in the Co..trt. 
'!here was also a lack of experience, ani all of these factors 
contributed to the ineffectiveness of the Court as a 
constitutional coort. These problems require special solutions. 
'!he approach usErl in the United Arab Einirates was to use the 
Court as a cassation court, which adversely affected the 
constitutional jurisdiction. 
'lbis approach did not address the real problem. It simply 
solved a superficial problem. It may have appeared desirable for 
the ailiinet or the Suprare <h1ncil to avoid this judicial body 
which deals with constitutional matters by occupying it with 
cassation cases. But, in reality, this rreans the increased 
ineffectiveness of this bcxly in CXXlStitutional cases which will 
leave a gap in the constitutional structure, the effect of which 
is to haIm the developnent of the country and to hamper the 
consti tutional system. 
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<lJaracteristics of Omstitutialal Review am Jnt:erpI:eta~ by 
the SUptaa::: CbJrt in the tllited Arab Bnirates. 
There are several characteristics of the met.hcrl chosen by 
the Consti tution and legislation for constitutional review am 
interpretation. These characteristics entail certain effects am 
result in advantages am disadvantages in the practice of the 
Supreme Court. 
1 ) 0!ntra.1ised Review -
The only institution empowered to provide binding 
constitutional interpretations am declare federal and local 
legislation unconstitutional is the Supreme Court (97). All other 
courts have to refer legislation to the Supreme Court for 
declaration on its compatibility with the Constitution. The 
choice of the centralised fonn of review is CUlliOll in countries 
with mainly civil law systems (98). 'nle rationale for adopting 
the centralised fonn of jtrlicial review is that it is coherent 
with the civil law systan. Firstly, civil law countries adhere to 
the supremacy of statutory law. Ju::licial review is recognised to 
have political character, therefore it is not the f\mctian of 
ordinary judges to engage in practising it. Ordinary judges 
should presune the validity of legislation am adhere to it in 
their decisions. Should any doubt arise in the validity or 
confonnity of legislation with the Coostitution, judges should 
stay their proceedings and refer the matter to a specialised 
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oourt enq:xJWerErl specifically by the Constitution to decide in the 
conformity of legislation with the Constitution. Special care is 
given to the appointnen.t of members of constitutional oourts 
because of their political significance. 
'1lle special political significance of the Suprane Court in 
the UnitErl Arab Emirates is enhance1 by the other areas of its 
cx:mpetence, such as providing constitutional interpretation on 
request. Whilst the final decisions arrl binding CXXlStitutional 
interpretations are the province of the Suprane Calrt, lower 
courts are not ccmpletely excludErl fran engaging in actual 
judicial review. IrrleErl, lower oourts play a vital role in 
bringing legislation for constitutional review to the Suprane 
Court. Lower courts, either fErleral or local, can, by their own 
initiative a:IXl accx:>rding to their own opinions, refer legislaticn 
affecting decisions on cases before them to the Suprane Coort if 
they consider, or even suspect, incompatibility of this 
legislation with the fErleral cccstitutian. If a party to a case 
before a lCMer court raises the questicn of uncoostitutiooality, 
the lower court has to decide whether there is merit in the 
attack or not. If it decides that it is not fourrled, the only 
requiranent for the court to refuse reference to the Suprane 
Court is to give reasoos (99). 'nlere are no special rE!ll'B:ties or 
appellate procedure for cccstituticnal issues raised by parties 
to cases in l<:"MeI' courts to review the decisions of refusal to 
refer them to the Supreme Crurt. The result is that the systen, 
which was designa:l by the Coostitution to be a centralised systen 
of review, is in practice distorted by Law (10/1973) into a 
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decentralised system. The practice of judicial review deperrls to 
a large extent on the will am enthusiasm of judges in lower 
courts to activate constitutional review and encourage its 
practice. 
2) (bspeci a1i sed 0Jurt. 
'!he Suprene Court, which is the Court ~ed to practice 
judicial review in the United Arab Emirates, is an unspecialised 
constitutional carrt, especially after the addition of cassation 
jurisdiction to its cbmpetence (100). Elsewhere, in other 
countries, the trend has been to give judicial review to a 
specialised court created for this jurisdiction or else the 
carrts, through their practice, becaning practically specialised 
constitutional coorts (101). Cbupled with the inability of the 
Suprene Court to refuse or avoid jurisdiction en cases brought to 
it, the lack of specialisation has an adverse effect on the 
consti tutional role of the Court. Constitutional courts need a 
wide range of political jtrlgemants am emphasis en the different 
effects of their decisions on present am future developoont of 
their respective societies, whereas general courts need aore 
technical Ie:JClI experience, with only a limitErl anphasis on the 
effects of their decisions (102) 
3) Reb:oactive Geoeral Bird .. "'} Effect of Deci si ems 
'!he decisions of the Suprene Court concernin:3 consti tution-
ality of laws are not cnly birrlin:] on the parties to the case in 
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which the decision was given, rut also on all others in similar 
situations in the future. The decisions of the Court are binding 
on all, am although the unconstitutional laws are not renoved 
fran the books, they are pronounced null and void for the future 
(103). '!be Constitution instructs the concerned government to 
rem:we the unconstitutional law as soon as possible (104). 
'!be express constitutional prcwisicos entp:)Wering the Supreme 
Crurt to pronounce legislatioo null arrl void towards all arrl for 
the future, have effectively saved the Ccurt fran the k.irrl of 
arguments which surroond the practice of judicial review in the 
U.S. arrl the allegations of judicial legislatioo which confronted 
the American Supreme Crurt for a lOO; ti.ne. What remains for the 
Supreme Crurt is the wise use of its given powers. '!be degree to 
which the Court uses its constitutional power, arrl the wide sweep 
of its general conclusions, can cause ccnfrootation with the 
legislatures am other ~litical depaIi:roonts of the country. '!be 
fact of uncx:mstitutionality of a law is a groorrl for absolute 
nullity arrl therefore ineffectiveness of that law even before the 
actual unconstitutionality has been declared. The 0Jurt discovers 
the nullity of the unconstitutional law (105). 
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'!he veto power possesse:l by the b«:> large emirates can play 
a vital role in the decision making of the Comeil. 
Relations between the b«:> large emirates are usually of 
suspicioo. am canpetition rather than of agreement. See John 
I>.Ike Anthaly pp1 04-112; am see Olapter Seven. 
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28. '!his can be achieved by several neans. One of these is 
the refusal to exterrl appointment of alternate judges for 
limited periods of tine, or the ccmplete adoption of the 
limited renewable pericrl of tenure for the judges of the 
Court. 
29. See Chipter Nine. 
30. See Olapter Ten. 
31 • See M::Whinney, op. ci t., p45. 
32. Ibid., p46. 
33. See KaImers, D. Ju::licial Politics in West Germany: A stOOy 
of the Federal Constitutional Ccurt Beverly Hills, 
California: Sage Publicatict'lS, 1976, p89. 
Acoord.ir¥J to Article 9 of the West German Basic Law half the 
nanbers of the Federal Cl:Institutional Court have to be 
elected by the Bundestag an:] half by the Burrlesrat. 
See Abraham, H. '!he Ju::licial process: An Intrcrluctory 
Analysis of the Ca1rts of the United states, England an:] 
France (5th ed.) Oxford! Oxford University Press, 1986, p24. 
According to Sectioo 2 of Article 11 of the U.5. 
Constitution 
1I'lbe President ••• shall naninate an:] .by a.rrl with the 
advice an:] consent of the Senate, shall appoint ••• 
judges of the Supreroo Court ••• " 
34. U.A.E. Prov. Const. Article 96. 
35. For similar reuarks on the Ruwai ti prOCErlure of appointment 
to the Oxlstituticnal Court see Al-Saleh, o. Ju::licial Review 
Before the O::nstiticnal Court of Kuwait (in Arabic) Kuwait: 
Faculty of Law, university of Kuwait, 1986, pp57-58. 
36. See discussion of this matter al:xJve in Chipter Three. 
37. '!he canpetence of the Supreme Court according to Article 99 
of the U.A.E. Prov. Coost. admits the resolution of disputes 
between political institutict'lS, interpretatioo of the 
Constitution arxi judicial review of legislation, all of 
which is by its nature politically sensitive. 
38. See for a canpa.rative analysis M::Whinney, ope cit., p45. 
39. '!be appointment of .local jujges for a life tenure can happen 
gradually, rut there are no signs that this will happen in 
the near future. '1bere are lccal judges who are qualified 
eno.J.gh to fill at least sore of the positions in the Court, 
if not all of them. 
Chapter 8 Footnotes 
- 262 -
40. See :Kat1rers, ope cit., p84. 
The justices of the Constitutional Court initiated a battle 
to rem:we the subordination they were effectively put urrler 
am to the Ministry of Justice by the 1951 Constitutional 
Court Act. '!he battle to win the Court's irrlepe:rrlence 
started in the very first rocm.ths of the Court's life. 'lbe 
justices issued a lengthy mamorarrlum addressed to the 
Presidents of the two legislative houses, the President, am 
the Chancellor. '!he Constitutional Court now has: 
1 • Budgetary autonany. 
2. Total control over all internal administrative matters. 
3. '!he Justices are acoorded a status in law corresporrling 
to that of the highest state officials. 
4. '!he President of the Court enjoys the fifth highest 
position in the Rep.lblic following the President, the 
Chancellor, the President of the Bun:iesrat, arrl the 
President of the Bundestag. 
'!he reasons for which the Justices of the West Gennan 
Constitutional Coort initiated the battle for iIXlependence 
are currently present in the case of the Supreme Coort of 
the U.A.E. Nothing short of the status wen by the West 
Gennan Court will ensure an effective functioning of the 
U .A.E. Supreme Coort. 
41 • The number of the Justices is set as ..... a President arrl a 
number of joo.ges not exceeding five in all ••• ". '!bat is, a 
President arrl a IIaXinrum of four nenbers. U.A.E. 
Constituticn Article 96. 
42. The number has been increased by acHiLg the opticn of 
appointing alternate judges by Article 3 of Law (10/1973). 
While nothing in .Article 96 of the Constitution suggests or 
allows such an increase in the membership of the Chlrt. 
43. Law (10/1973) Article 9. 
44. Ibid. 
45. Law (10/1973) Article 10. 
46. Law (10/1973) Article 9. 
47. Law (10/1973) Article 3, 
48. See~, ope cit., W 74- 82 • 
49. Ibid., p10i arrl Kamerce, ope cit., p106. 
Basic Law Articles 93 arrl 100. 
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Article 93 of the Basic law of West Germany urner the title 
''Federal Constitutiooal Court, Canpetency" includes the 
foilCMing: 
(1) The Federal Constitutional Coort shall decide: 
1- en the interpretation of this Basic law in the event of 
disp,ltes concern.inc3 the extent of the rights arrl duties 
of a highest federal organ or of other parties 
concerned wOO have been vested with rights of their 
own by this Basic Law or by rules of procedure of a 
highest federal organ; 
2- in case of differences of opinion or doubts on the 
fonnal arrl material OClllpatibility of federal law or 
rand Law with this Basic Law, or on the OClllpatibility 
of Iand Law with other law, at the request of the 
Federal Government, of a Land Government, or of one 
third of the Burrlestag nenber; 
3- in case of differences of opinion on the rights am 
duties of the Federaticn and the laerrler, particularly 
in the executicn of federal law by the laerrler and in 
the exercise of federal supervision; 
4- on other dist-'Otes involving p.lblic law between the 
Federation and the Laerrler, between different Laerrler 
or within a rand, unless recourse to another Court 
exists. 
Article 100 Provides under the title Canpatibility of 
statutory I.a.w with Basic I.a.w: 
1 - If a Coort oonsiders UIlCCtlSti tutiCXlal. a law the 
validity of which is relevant to its decision, the 
proceedings shall be stayed, am a decision shall be 
obtained from the Land Court competent for 
CXXlStitutional disputes if the Constitution of a Land 
is held to be violated, or from the Federal 
O:Ilstitutional Coort if this Basic I.a.w is held to be 
violated. This shall also apply if this Basic I.a.w is 
held to be violated by Land I.a.w or if a rand Law is 
held to be in£xJnpatible with a Federal Law. 
2- If, in the CXXJrse of litigation, doubt exists whether a 
rule of plblic international law in an integral part of 
federal ••• , the Coort shall obtain a decision fron the 
Federal O::xlstitutional Cburt. 
50. In the original jurisdiction of the O:Ilstitutional Court, it 
had the J:"CM& to provide advisory opinions en the meaning of 
constitutional provisicns, which is a part of the canpetenoe 
of the Supreme 0:Jurt of the U.A.E. '!be original jurisdiction 
of the O:Ilstitutional 0:Jurt did not inclu:ie hearing 
oonsti tutional oc:mplaints by individuals, which is not 
included in the J:"CM&s of the Suprane Court of the U .A.E. 
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51. Articles 123, 124 an1151 in addition to the main 
jurisdiction of the Court contained in Article 99. 
Article 99 states that the Supreme Court: " ••• shall have 
jurisdiction in the follCMing natters: 
1- Various diSp.1tes between member Emirates in the union, 
or between any one Einirate or more an1 the Union 
Government, whenever such di5p.ltes are suhnitted to the 
Court on the request of any of the interested parties. 
2- Examination of the constitutionality of Union Laws, if 
they are challenged by one or more of the Emirates on 
the grounds of violating the Constitution of the Union. 
Examination of the consti tutionali ty of 
legislations pranulgatErl by one of the Einirates, if 
they are challanged by one of the Union authorities on 
the grounds of. violation of the Constitution of the 
Union or of Unicn Laws. 
3- Examination of the constitutionality of laws, 
legislations and regulations in general, if such 
request is referred to it by arrf Calrt in the coontry 
during a pending case before it. The aforesaid Calrt 
shall be bound to accept the ruling of the Union 
Supreme Calrt rendered in this connection. 
4- Interpretation of the Provisions of the Constitution, 
when so requested by arrf Union autlx>rity or by the 
Government of any Emirate. /my such interpretation 
shall be biIrling 00 all. 
5- Trial of Ministers am Senior officials of the Union 
appointed by decree regarding their actions in carrying 
a.rt: their official duties on the demarrl of the ~
Cameil am in accordance with the relevant law." 
other matters includErl in this article are conflict of 
jurisdiction between fErleral arx1 local courts arx1 between 
the emirates. '!be Constituticn allowed addition of "other 
Jurisdiction" by the Constitution or by law to the Court. 
Law 10/1973 in Article 33 added the interpretaticn of 
treaties am international agreements to the Co.lrt. 
Law 17/1978 addErl the cassation jurisdicticn in all matters 
to the Supreme Calrt. 
Articles 123 am 124 of the Constitution give the Supreme 
Court the power of resolving disputes between the emirates 
am the federal governroont a.l:xJ.lt their rights to enter into 
treaties am international agreements, in case of abj ection 
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fran the other layers of government. 
Articl7 151 . gives the Supreme Coort jusrisdiction in 
resolvmg dl.5p.ltes about the supremacy of the FErleral 
Constitution aM FErleral laws. 
52. These powers incltrle subj ects incltrlErl in paragraphs (5) 
( 6 ), (7) aM (8) of Article 99 of ~ Constitution. ' 
53. U.A.E. Constitution Article 99 (4). law (10/1973), Article 
33(5) • 
54. See McWhinney, ope cit., p15. 
55. Ibid., p16. 
56. See Kamlerce, ope cit., p282. 
57. Accxm:ling to Article 65 of law (10/1973), if any of the 
chambers of the Supreme CoJrt decide to deviate fran a 
principle layErl down by the Supreme 0:::JUIt in an earlier 
case, this chamber has to refer the matter to the plenum of 
the Supreme CoJrt, which must then decide an the matter in 
the presence of all its rrenbers. 
'1b.e effect of this rule is to enhance the authority of and 
stabilise the pri.ociples established by, the Supreme Coo.rt. 
58. See Cllapter Nine. 
59. '!be history of the advisory opinien jurisdiction of the West 
Gennan Constutiooal CoJrt sb::M sane of the possibilities 
that exist for the use of this power. See Kamlers, P. (282 ) 
and McWhinney, ope cit., p17. 
60. '!be original pericrl of duratien providErl for in the 
Constitution expirErl an 1 Decanber 1976 (U.A.E. Prov. Const. 
Article 144 (1». Before the expiration of the initial 
pericrl of operatioo of the O:I:lstitution, a draft was 
preparErl for a Pennanent Constitution. IX1e to the failure of 
the emirates to agree en the new <llnstitutien, they opted to 
exterrl the duration of the Provisiooal Calstitutioo. 'Iba 
Provisional Coostitutian has been extended three times, the 
last of which was in 1986 am it will expire in 1991. '!be 
extensions of the Coostitutien are likely to <XJntinue. 
See Cllapter (7). 
61. U.A.E. O:l1stitution, Article 99 (2). Law (10/1973), Article 
33 (2) & (3). 
62. west Gennan Basic Law, Article 93 (1) am (2). See 
McWhinney, ope cit., p11; am Katmerce, ope cit., p106. 
63. U.A.E. <lx1Stitution, Article 101. 
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64. U.A.E. Constitution, Article 99 (3). Law (10/1973). Article 
33 (4). 
65. Law (10/1973), Article 58. 
66. Ibid. 
67. Ibid. 
68. Ibid. 
69. In the application for constitutional interpretation of law 
(14/year 9), appellants in the case before the Supreme Q)urt 
decidErl to apply for interpretation fran the coostitutional 
chamber for consideration of unconstitutionality. 
70. '!he language USErl in Article 99 (3) seems to be deliberately 
widened to incltrle yirtually any kiIrl of legislation. 
71. In sane constitutioos there are special procedures. to review 
the decisions of inferior oourts of refusing to allow 
reference of coostitutional questions to the CXXlSti tutional 
courts. An example of such procedures is Article 4 of the 
statute of the O::nstituticnal Coort of Kuwait which gives 
the party WOOse request to refer a constitutional review 
question is refused, the right to appeal to a specialised 
c:xmnittee of the Constitutional Coort through specialised 
procedures. 
See Al-Tabtabai, A. '1lle FErleral Systan in the United Arab 
Emirates cairo: Cairo New Press, 1978, p325; am Al-saleh, 
ope cit., p50. 
72. See cappelletti, ope cit., p79. For a canparative discussion 
of the inherent risks am defects in the (incidental) way of 
judicial review. 
73. AIocn:l the special requirements set by Law (10/1973) is the 
requirement of raising the constitutional question to the 
SupreJOO 0:Jurt through a qualified attorney (Article 52). 
'!his requirement, am the same original procedure, 
ocntrihlte to ren:lerin;J coosti tutiooal review procedures 
expensive. '!his may serve to deter individuals or other 
parties fran contestirv;J a case, or else to abarrloo their 
case if constitutional questioos ~ involvai. 
74. U.A.E. Coostitutioo Article 99 (1). Law (10/1973), Article 
33 (1). 
75. Law (17/1987). 
76. See Taryam, A. 'Ihe Establishrtelt of the United Arab Emirates 
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1 950-85 Lorrlon: Croan Helm, 1987, p207. 
77 • See Blair, P. Federalism a.rrl J\.rlicial Review in West Gernany 
Oxford: '!he Clarendon Press, 1981, p2 for canparison between 
West Gernany and U.S. Federations. 
78. See Al-Tabtabai, ope cit., p342ff; and Peck, M. '!he United 
Arab Emirates: A Venture into Unity Iorrlon: Croan Helm, 
1986, p132. 
79. See Catmerce Clauses cases of the U.S., which are discussed 
in Olapter Five. 
See cases about distriOOtion of pc:7Her on the federal level 
in West Gernany. Examples of these cases are: 
1. '!he Sooth West Case (Decisioos of the Constitutional 
Court 1, 14) (1951). 
2. '!he Boiler Joogenent (Decisioos of the Constitutional 
Court 11, 6) (1960). 
For rrore detail, see Blair, ope clt., pp50-65. 
80. An example of the requirement of p:>Siti ve j udgem:mt of the 
Court is the detennination of the limits of the powers of 
both levels of government in oonclusion of treaties, 
according to Article 124 of the Coostitution. 
81. '!he reality of the Cc:urt's ability to provide positive 
interpretations of the Qxlstitution is reinforcerl by giving 
the Court's decisions a binding effect on all people and 
institutions CXI"lCerIlOO by Article 101 of the Constitution. 
82. see E1azar, D. Exploring Federalism Tuscaloosa, Alabama: 
Oniversity of Alabama Press, 1987, p128. 
83. see Blair, ope cit., p3; and M=Whlnney, ope cit., p168. 
84. U.A.E. Prov. Const., Article 99. 
85. see Cappeletti, ope cit., p41; and~, ope cit., 
W168-184, for oanparative analysis of the value and 
importance of federalism in the \«)rk of cxnsti tutional 
CXJUIts. 
86. See '!he Preamble of the Coostitution, which annoonces: 
11 It is our desire ••• to establish a Union ••• to 
~te abetter, rrore emuriD;J stability and a higher 
international status ••• 11 • 
87. See Al-Tabtabai, ope cit., p364. 
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88. See Olapter Seven. 
89. '!he crisis of 1979 proved the effectiveness of the 
financial irrleperrlence of the emirates and the degree by 
which they can disrupt the operation of the federal 
government through this financial power. 
See Taryam, ope cit., p243. 
90. Article 144 of the U.A.E. Constitution limits the duration 
of the Constitution to 5 years. The preamble of the 
Constitution calls for a stronger Union to be inchrled, 
fQIl'(ej by the pennanent OJnstitution. 
91 • 'Ihe experience of the Supreme Court of the U. s. proves the 
availability of a wide range in which the constitutional 
courts can nove in developrent of constitutional law. 
See Tribe, H. CcnstitutiCllal. Choices Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1985--, pp5-8. 
92. See cappelletti, ope cit., p13; and vcn Mehren, A.T. & 
Gordly, J.R. '!be Civil law System: An Intrcrluction to the 
O:::mparative Sb.rly of law (2nd ed.) Little, Brown, 1977, 
p220. 
93. later the "Tribunal de Cassation" was called "eour de 
cassation" and changed fran being a political cxmnittee to 
being a judicial 00dy. Nonetheless, the special p:rrpose and 
theoretical basis for the cassation jurisdiction renained 
unchanged. 
See cappelletti, ope cit., p14; and vcn Mehren & Crordly, 
ope cit., pp220-228. 
94. See cappeletti, ope cit., p16. 
95. See Kamerce, ope cit., p49. The High Coorts of West Gennany 
are: 
1 • '!be Federal Cbnstitutional Court. 
2. '!be Federal Suprene Court. 
3. The Federal Administrative Court. 
4. '!be Federal Lab:Alr Court. 
5. '!be Federal Sooial Court_ 
6. '!be Federal Finance Colrt. 
96. See caweletti, ope cit., p6dec2; ~dedAbrahamby the'SuOPpr-:;tCourt·, pp181-187 About 90% of the cases l. rea~ it by the Certiorari. In this way a petitioner, 
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otherwise having no right to the Court, has the privilege to 
petition the Supreme Court to grant him a writ of Certiori. 
'!be Court has a wide range of discretionary powers either to 
grant or refuse to grant a writ of Certiori. Unless the 
Court detects an issue of substantial significance or 
controversy in the case, or happens to be specially 
interested in it, the application will be rejected. In this 
way the Supreme Court can avoid being flocrled by cases or 
controversies of minor interest of of no real general 
importance. '!be Supreme Court in the U .A.E. arrl generally 
Civil Law Courts of last resort, lack such devices by which 
they can avoid cases of no real or general interests. 'lbe 
result of the lack, or the m:inirral availability of 
discretion in Civil Law Courts of last resort is the 
creation of specialised oourts of last resort. '1llere are no 
such specialised courts in the U.A.E. 
97. Accxmting to the cxxnpetence of the Supreme Court unler 
Article 99 of the RA.E. Constitution am urrler Article 33 
of Law (1 0/1973) the birrling effect of the Court I S 
judgaoonts is accord~ to Article 101 of the Constitution 
am Article 67 of law (10/1973). 
98. See Cappeletti, ope cit., p51. 
99. Law (10/1973), Article 58. 
100. The addition of the Cassation Jurisdiction to the Supreme 
Court was according to Law (17/1978). 
101. For nore detail am special examples of this trerrl in 
Constitutional Court, see ~, ope cit., p272. 
102. Two of the nost praninent institutioos practising 
constitutional review, nanely the U.8. Supreme Court am the 
OxlstituticmJ. Camcil of France, do oot require judicial 
experience, or even official legal training, in their 
prospective nenbers. See lCWhinney, ope cit., p273; am 
Abraham, ope cit., pp52-64. 
103. U.A.E. coostitution Article 101. Law (10/1973), Article 67. 
104. Article 101. 
105. Al-Tabtaba.i, ope cit., T?326. For a similar analysis of the 
Kuwaiti system of judicl.al review, see Al-Saleh, ope cit., 
p34. For a uore general CXl'l'J[>3rative analysis, see 
eappeletti, ope cit., p88. 
'!be I):!cisims of the SupcGiE Cburt Delivered frail 1973 to 1978. 
The Constitution called for the enactment of a law to 
regulate details of structure am procedure for the Supr€lle Court 
(1 ) • law 10/1973 (the Supreme Court statute) was enacted in 1973 
arrl ~lished in August of the sane year (2). 
The first case to cate before the Court, was registered on 
24 October 1973, about b«> rocnths after establishment of the 
Court, and the decision was given en 29 November of the same year 
(3) The Court's b.lsiness dur~ the pericrl fran 1973 to 1978 
was daninated by applications for Cbnstitutional interpretation 
(4) Each application may contain rore than one request (5). 
The Court's decisions in these applications, therefore, may 
establish more than one principle. In its reply to the 
applications before it, the Court may need to establish 
principles which are not necessarily answers to the questions FUt 
before it (6). There was a need for authoritative 
interpretations fran the Calrt for several reasalS. The Court's 
interpretations were needed to remove ambiguities from the 
Constitutional text (7), and to settle differences between 
canpeting Federal Institutions (8). The Court's interpretations 
were, rroreover, needed to aid the new Federal Insti tutions to 
pass thrcugh the critical first f~ years of their fonnation. 
The Court's decisions during this period had a special 
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importance, namely by providing interpretation which supportErl 
the FErleral system and Institutions, thus producing a stabilising 
effect on the whole oountry and its chosen Constitutional struc-
ture. The new oountry, as organised by the FErleral Constitution, 
needed to be enlightenOO as to the proper fw1ctioning of the 
Constitution, and obj ections to this functioning needErl to be 
disarmed. All of these needs were satisfied by the Court's 
decisions. 
A. '!he Federal ~ of lUIers in the First '1'tIo 
AR?l i catials to the oourt. 
'!be distrihItion of legislative and executive pc:Mer between 
the centre and the constituent uni ts is one of the main 
characteristics of Federal systens (9 ). Federalism is one of the 
roc>st important features intraiuced to the Emirates by the new 
Cbnstitution (10). The idea and practice of FErleral Governm:mt 
was na1 to the area. '!he Calstitution distriOOted the legislative 
and executive pcYWers between the Emirates and the Federal 
Government (11). The language used, inevitably, led to 
interpretational differences of opinioo. 'lbe factors which led 
to the formation of the specifically Federal Government (in 
cx:ntrast with either the canplete political separation of the 
Emirates, or else a unitary Government) could, within the 
possible interpretations to the Constitutioo, ccntinue to exert 
their influence in the emergence of either a strong Federation, 
or else a restricted one. '!be strOrr:Jer Federation is preferre:1 by 
the newly organise1 Federal Autoorities, whilst the restricted 
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Federation is preferred by those Emirates which are still 
suspicious of the Federation and its authorities (12). There are 
sane provisions in the Constitution which can prcrluce either a 
strong, or a weak Federation, according to the interpretations 
given to them (13). By Constitutional design, the Supraoo Court 
is the arbiter in these matters, and the strength of the 
Federation will depend, to a great extent, on its vision and on 
the positic.n it is willing to take. 
In view of the a1::x::we, it is unsurprising to find the Court 
~ 
faced with questioos a1:nlt the distribution of powers in the 
first two applications sutmitted. The opinions of the Court in 
these two cases should be viewed in context and should be 
urrlerstocxi to IOOaIl oore than just providing answers to specific 
authorities' questions; rather these opinions are precedents in a 
subject which was still in the rrnUdi.ng process a..m the effects 
of the Court's opinions in these bNo cases have profound and 
loog-lastin;J effects. 
'1be First Applicatial: 'lhe Bllicp:atial Law Case 
(Applicatioo for Constitutional interpretation 1/1, 29 November 
1973). 15 Official Gazette (14). 
This application was addressed to the Court from the 
Ministry of the Interior. The Public Prosecutor urged rej ectic.n 
of the applicaticn because an irrlividual Minister does not have 
the capacity to subnit applications to the Court according to 
Article 99 (4) of the (blStitutlon, which states that only the 
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Federal authorities are capable of suhnitting applications of 
interpretation to the Court, and these authorities do not 
canprise individual ministers (acoording to Article 45 of the 
Constitution) (15). The newly created Court, eager to start its 
hlsiness and to present itself on the scene, rej ected the call of 
the Public Prosecutor arrl decided to proceed in the case. In the 
cnrt's opinion, the Ministers are collectively responsible for 
their works and ~licies (16). Deperrling mainly on the collective 
responsibility of Ministers in its argument, and on the k:na.m 
fact of the recent creatioo of the Federal ma.chinery and the lack 
of the proper procedures for representing the Council of 
Ministers ( 17), the Coort accepted the case against a strong 
objection fran the Public Prosecution. In this application there 
are several questions, arrl to each the Court supplied an answer, 
interpreting Ccnstitutional provisions and providing priorities 
am general principles. 
'Ihis case was effectively started because of problems in the 
applicatioo of a newly drafted Federal Law. The Ministry of the 
Interior is the authority responsible for the implementation of 
the Emigratioo and Residency Law (Law 6/1973). As a consequence 
of its being faced with several difficulties in the application 
of this law, the Ministry roved to br1D:1 this enquiry to the 
Court to help resolve the problems, and provide it with 
autixlritative opinions and guidance. The applicatioo subnittoo 
to the Supreme Court involved numerous questions concerning 
interpretation of several Constitutional provisions. 
'!his case represented the enthusiastic pursuit by a federal 
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ministry for IOOre pcMer. The constitution was in its early years 
and the limits of pc:Mer in the federal system created by it were 
still vague. The questions presented were grouped and phrased in 
a manner inviting an interpretation of the constitution which 
favoured the federal authorities. 
QJest.ials invol:ved in this case: 
'l11e Ministry of the Interior presented a list of questions 
in its application to the SUprE!lOO Court. 'lhis list inclooed: 
1 - Whether matters included in all criminal Federal Legislaticn 
are within the scope of Paragraph (6) of Article 99 of the 
Constitution? (18) And whether these crimes can be 
understood to violate the interests of the Federal 
Government. 
2 - Whether violatioo of criminal Federal Legislation, inclooing 
Criminal Provisions of Federal Emigration Law (19), are 
within the jurisdictioo of ~ Supreme Coort according to 
Paragraph (6) of Article 99 of the Constituticn. 
3 - What is the purpose behind separating legislation from 
execution of matters included in Article 121 of the 
Constitution? An::1 what is the plI'pose of giving legislation 
in these matters to the Federal Q:wernrIent yet execution to 
the Emirates? 
4 _ What is the purpose of giving the Federal Government 
, ,-~.--, Leg! lat' It? (20) legislative power in ''MaJor Pr~~(1.i. s 1.00 
5 _ What is the mea.niI¥.:J of "Major Procedural Legislation"? 
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6 - Does the Constitution authorise the Emirates to enact 
legislation which contradicts Federal legislation, in Major 
Procedural matters? 
7 - What is the effect of the exception contained in Article 149 
of the Constitution, an the awlication of Article 121? Ani 
what is the significance of the Federal supremacy of Article 
151 on these matters? (21) 
8 - Whether Federal Law regulating JOOicial relationships ana:g 
the Emirates (Law 11 /1973), which is requested by Article 
11(a) of the Constitution, is a "Major Procedural 
Legislation", and, accordingly, whether the Federal 
supremacy arrl the Federal occupation of the field prevents 
the Finirates fron interfering in these matters. 
9 - Whether Article 121 of the Constitution abolishes the 
oontents of Article 119 of the same Canstituticn. Possibly 
t:a=ause the matter which is the subject of Article 119 is 
inclOOed under Article 121. 
10 - Whether the requirement of regulation with "ut:roost ease" of 
Article 119, in regulation of Jtrlicial relatiooships aroc>ng 
the Emirates, has a binding effect over the Federal 
legislature. 
As a consequence of the U.A.E., at the tine of presentation 
of this awlication, having been in a transitional petiol, arrl 
because of the existence of a wide legislative vacuum, many 
important questions still awaited answers. It is obvious fron the 
questions in this case, that many Coostitutiooal provisioos are 
open to roore than one interpretatioo. 'Ihis case presents several 
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examples of the probability of the existence of different and 
variable meanings to the Constitutional provisions, namely: 
1 - What are ''Major Procejural I.egislations"? What is major and 
what is minor? Who sets the standard by which these 
legislations can be classified? It is obvious that the 
Constitutional provisions cannot provide much help in 
answering these questions. 
2 - What are the crimes that " directly affect the interests 
of the Union ••• " ? 
'1hese are only examples, certainly there exist a great many 
other provisions of the Constitution which give rise to several 
possibilities of interpretation and which can ~ to the Court 
for resolution and authoritative answers. It is obvious that 
there was nnre than one IOOtive for bringing this application. 
One purpose of the application was to gain an authoritative 
declaration tron the Ch.lrt in a matter which was still in diSp.1te 
as to whether it fell urrler Federal or IDeal Authority. '!he way 
in which the questions were organised and styled, are evidence qf 
this driving force behirrl the application. Another cause was the 
quest for guidance, especially as to whether the Judicial 
authority has canpetence in related matters. 
'!he Ministry of the Interior, by presenting this application 
wanted to achieve several results. '1he Ministry wanted j urisdic-
tion over all Federally criminalised acts, including tn::>se which 
result fron violatioo of Emigration laws, to be given to the 
Federal Judiciary. 'lbe Federal Judiciary, at the tine of the 
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enquiry, was canp:>sed of the Suprate Court alone. The Ministry 
wanted this jurisdiction to be given to the Supreme Court urrler 
Article 99 (6) as crimes against the interests of the Federation. 
'!be benefits of giving the jurisdiction to the Supreme Court were 
numerous. One benefit was that the Supreme Court is a Court of 
last instance, and there are no appeals from its decisions. 
Another benefit of giving the jurisdiction to the Supreme Court 
was that it is gecqrapucally better for the Ministry to bring 
cases to <:ne Coort situated in the same city as the headquarters 
of the Ministry itself, .rather than to argue the case in differ-
ent oourts dispersed throoghout the Emirates. A third benefit was 
that the legal rules am prcx:aiures which would be applied by the 
Supreme Court would be more consistent and simpler for the 
Ministry, than to involve local judiciaries with their variant 
details of regulations and procedures. These same benefits 
explain the reaSOOS for which the Ministry rocwed to invoke the 
Federal Supremacy of Article 151 an:l the Federal occupation of 
the field of Articles 121 an:l 149 of the Constituticn. 
P.d nc1pl es amouooed by the a:mt in this case. 
In this case the SuprE!flE cnurt was put in a positicn to test 
its vision of the Federal balance in the country. Was the Coo.rt 
aware of the aims of the Ministry which submitted the 
application? And was the Court prepared to submit to those 
dernaOOs? What role did the Coort choose for itself CCXlCerning 
the Federal distribution of power? Where was the Coo.rt prepared 
to draw the line between the F)ni.rates an::l the Federal Government 
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in matters which are not clearly stipulated in the Constitution? 
'Ihe answers to these questions would deperrl on the stance that 
the Court took in this case arrl on the decisions it produced. 
The decision of the Court contained several principles 
regarding interpretations of the Constituticnal provisions arrl 
policies. 
1 - '1lle Suprene Co.lrt has jurisdiction, according to Article 99 
( 6), only over crirres which represent direct intrusions on 
basic interests arrl fa.m:tatians of the Union. 
2 - Not all acts criminalised by Federal legislation are within 
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. For acts 
criminalised by Federal legislation to be within the 
jurisdiction of the Suprene Co.lrt, they have to be of such a 
nature as to represent intrusions on basic interests and 
fOOI'rlations of the Union. 
Whilst the Cb.lrt did not roontion those crines stenming fran 
violations of the Emigration Law in particular, the test 
armounced by the Court in this case excludes these crimes fran 
the jurisdiction of the Court. The motive behind the 
establisl:ment of such a test in this early case can be understood 
to be the desire of the Court not to be overburdened with a vast 
number of cases. 
3 - '!be distributioo of legislative and executive powers, which 
is included in Article 121 of the COOStltutioo, stems fran 
the Federal nature of the camtry. In the Federal system, 
which is adopted by the COOStitutioo, there is a central 
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government which has its sovereignty and international 
personality on one hand, and on the other, there are several 
Einirates, each with its own sovereignty and p::MerS, toth 
legislative and executive, by which it has the right to 
practise its p::Mers irrleperrlently. '!he Emirates have powers 
in areas which are not specifically given to the Federal 
gcNerIlIIeIlt. 
'!his principle partly serves the tm"POse of the Ministry 
because it announces clearly that areas of power, which are 
reserved for the Union; are forbidden to the Emirates. 'Ibis 
principle was nea:led by the Ministry to exch.rle the Emirates fran 
legislating in "Major Procedures" which is, by Article 121, 
reserved to the Union. 
4 - Major legislation in civil am criminal procedures is any 
legislation which deals with the general rules for 
adjtxlicatioo arx1 specific requirements in civil and criminal 
cases. '!be legislation lIBy deal with the bringing of cases 
before the Cburts, the organisatioo of levels of the Courts, 
organisation of clerks and ancillary personnel, procedures 
for handling decisions, organising appeals, execution of 
judgements and other related matters. Moreover these 
regulations cover collection of evidence and its 
presentaticn, interrogation, prosecutioo am execution of 
j 1.rlgements in criminal cases. 
rus principle further advanced the cause of the Ministry, 
t:halgh not in this particular case, because it interpreted the 
Federal Governments' power in the issuance of legislation 
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ooncerningmajor procedures in a fairly wide marmer. In this case 
the Ministry wanted to include specific legislation ( 22 ) Urrler 
the ''Major Procedural Legislaticn" of Article 121, rut the Court 
distinguished between the two. 'Ihe rotive of the Ministry was to 
exclude the Emirates fron interference in this matter. Whilst 
the Ministry's desire to include the specified law urrler ''Major 
Procedural Legislation" was not satisfied by the Courts' 
decision, the principle is a fairly wide one am opens the door 
for future Federal legislaticn in the subject, with the canbi.nerl 
benefit of excluding the Emirates from intervention in the 
matter. 
5 - '!be Emirates have the right to issue legislation lay~ down 
detailed procedures for the application of the general rules 
contained in the Federal Major procedural legislation. '!be 
Local legislation should observe the limits imposed by 
Articles 149 and 151. These limits are: (i) Federal 
occupatioo of the field of Articles 1 49 am 121 which means 
the Emirates are exclooed fron matters of Article 121 when, 
am to the extent that, the Federal Government occupies the 
field am (ii) the supremacy of Federal legislation, which 
means that Federal legislation prevails over Local 
legislatioo, if the Federal legislatioo is properly enacted 
in areas within the power of the Federal Government, 
according to the OxlStitution. 
'!he details of the principle in this case, had a negative 
effect on the aims of the Ministry, nanely its insistence of 
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mentioning Article 151 in addition to Articles 121 and 149, and 
the inclusion of a question concerning the authority of the 
Emirates in contradicting Federal legislation. Their aim was to 
obtain a declaration which excltrled IDeal legislation ccmpletely 
fron areas in which there are Federal regulations. 
6 - '!here are no contradictions between Articles 119 and 121 of 
the Constitutioo, therefore 1::x:>th are still applicable. Each 
.of these articles has its own specific meaning and specific 
area of application. 
'n1e aim of the ministry's enquiry in this matter was to 
obtain a declaratioo includ.iD:l matters of Article 119 in the 
general area of "Major Procedural Legislation" of Article 121, 
therefore excltrling the Emirates fran interference as far as 
there is Federal legislation in the matter. '!he Coort' s decision 
clearly rej ected the dema.Irls of the Ministry concerning this 
matter. 
7 - Article 11 9 of the Constitution ordered the issuance of 
Federal Law to regulate " ••• with utmost ease ••• " those 
matters pertaining to the execution of requests of 
commissions in judicial proceedings, the procedures of 
serving judicial documents and surrender of fugitives am::D:J 
member Emirates. All of these matters, in which the 
Emirates have judicial ~, are tb::>se matters left by the 
O:x1stitutioo for the Emirates. '!be Constitution required 
that Federal Law regulate these matters with "uboost ease", 
rut it did not provide any measure of guidelines for the 
ease requirEd, which puts this matter within the judgenent 
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of the legislature, within the supervision that is includOO 
in the Constitution. 
The supervisioo mentione1 by the judgemant is IroSt probably 
the supervision practised by the Court in its review of 
a:mpatibility of legislation with the Constitution. (23) 
other than these principles, the Supreme Court aIlIlOI.mOed its 
power regarding the Constitution am legislation. The Court 
rulOO that its pcMer in interpreting the Constitution was to 
renove ambiguities am clarify matters in the constitutional 
provisions which were tmclear, am to ha.Inxxrise the application 
of these provisions within the coontry. The power of the Court 
is to interpret CCtlStitutional provisions am does not include 
interpretation of legislative acts unless this is needed to 
detennine their cxmpatibility with the Constitution. 
The need for the guidance am principled interpretations by 
the Coo.rt is evident fran this case despite its annooncement that 
it only removes ambiguities fran constitutional provisions. The 
fact is that there are open-ended constitutional provisions 
requiring, not interpretation in the strict sense, rut joogement, 
am the Court is required to make this judgement. The provisions 
which were incltrled in this case, are examples of the need to 
inj ect more details and to use judgement in interpreting 
constitutiooal provisions. 
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'!he Secu~ Applicat:im: '!be Case of Scda1 Security Law 
(Application for constitutional interpretation 1/2, 14 April 
1974). Not t:lli>lishal in the Official Gazette (24) 
This case was brought to the Court by the Council of 
Ministers because of a dispJ.te it had with the National Council 
al:x:Jut the ~s of the latter with regard to the legislative 
process (25). 'lhe case involval a request to define the meanings 
of "legislation" and "executionll which are oontained in Articles 
120 am 121 of the Constitution. According to these definitions, 
the spheres of power of -the two levels of Goverrm:mt, as well as 
those within the Faleral Government w:u1.d be affected. 
'!be questioo of the powers of the Council of Ministers a.rrl 
the National <hmcil arose in the prooess of enactnent of the 
Social Security Law (26). When the bill of this law was 
presented to the National Council fran the Camcil of Ministers, 
the former suggested amendments to the bill. The bill was 
transferred to the Supreme Cameil to be discussed and considered 
for enactment. The Supreme Council approved the original 
oontents of the bill, wit:hcAIt the aaerlnents suggested by the 
National Cameil, and the President signed it to becx::ma law. '!be 
National Cameil objected to the enactnent of this law as being 
in violation of the procedures established by the 
Constitution (27). The National Camcil insisted that the bill 
was supposed to be re-subnittal to them, in the event of its 
ameu3ments not being acoeptal by the Supreme Cameil, so that the 
enactment procedure was as statal in the Constitution. 
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'!be P.drrip1es amnmced by the Qmt in this case: 
In this case definition was requested of the general tenns 
of "1 . lati 11 ~_A " 
eg:lS on CU&.l execution" within the context of Articles 
120 and 121. '!be Coort in this case established starrlards by 
which acts can be determined to be either legislati ve or 
executive. In future disputes, as to the nature of any act, 
whether it is legislative or executive, the Suprene Court is the 
cx:::mpetent authority to resolve the dispute, according to its 
original powers aIrl alc:n:J the lines of the general principles it 
announced in this case. It is the Suprene Court which has the 
canpetenoe to resolve disputes between, aIrl answer questions 
frCl(\, Federal and Iocal AutOOrities. It is the Suprene Court 
which sets the standard for classifying acts as either 
legislative or executive. It is the Supreme Court which is 
cx:::mpetent to resolve differences a1:xJut classification of acts as 
legislative or executive, if suhnitted to it, in the future, by 
the relevant authorities. '!be Court prCXlOUIlCErl several principles 
in its decisioo in this case: 
1 - 'nle rreaning of "legislatioo" in Articles 1 20 and 121 of the 
Constitutioo is the general rules regulating interactions 
arocng the subj ects of the law. 'Ihis legislatioo is issued 
by the canpetent Federal AutOOri ties in accordance with the 
procedures prescribed by the Cbnstitution. It takes the fonn 
of a statute, a decree which has the power of law, or a 
delegation by a law, and within the limits established by 
that law. All matters contained in Articles 120 and 121 
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should be regulated by such legislation, not by any inferior 
form of regulation which does not have the essential 
characteristics of legislation. '!he legislation has to be 
confinErl to the limits prescribed by the Constitution. It 
has to be general in nature, not directed to specified 
persons, and has to exclude unnecessary details, all of 
which shoold be left to the executive authority. 
2 - '!be meaning of "execution" in Articles 120 a.rrl 121 of the 
Constitution, is the administrative acts which are perfonood 
by the canpetent authorities. These acts are those which 
are required for operation of the legislation, a.rrl can take 
two fonus. '!hey can be in the foon of general executive 
ordinances, prescribing detailed rules for the application 
of the legislation, or in the foon of decisions concerning 
individual cases relating to matters necessary for the 
qJeration of the legislatioo, such as employment of people 
who will work on, and supervise the execution of, the 
legislation, or other kirrls of acts, the ~ of which is 
to simplify am renove obstacles fran the execution of the 
legislatioo.. '!he executive acts have to be perfonood without 
unnecessary delay, especially if the legislative provisions 
are not self-executing. 
3 _ Whilst the Emirates have executive power over matters 
CXXltained in Article 121, the Constitutioo made a special 
cxxrli tion for the delegation of this pcrwer • 'nley have, 
according to the CalStitution, to be witlnlt prejOOice to 
tIE provisi<XlS of Article 120. 'Ibis corrli ticn means that if 
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there is an eminent connection between matters of Articles 
120 and 121, so that the execution of both of these matters 
is inseparable, then the execution of both these matters has 
to be within the p::IWer of the Federal Government, in order 
not to prej udice the delegation of power in Article 120. 
1hl.s exception sl"xJuld be limited to the minimum possible 
extent, in order rot to hinder or ah.lse the distr:il:xltion of 
power in the Constitution. 
4 - '!be founders of the Consti tution interrled to support the 
Federation by providing the Federal Government with powers 
sufficient for it to achieve its goals, whilst protecting 
the independence of the Emirates. The distribution of 
legislative and executive powers between the Emirates and 
the Federal Govemnent stems fran the Federal nature of the 
Cbnstitutioo. 'lbe Constitutional limitations on the powers 
of the Federal and I£lcal Govenlnelts, have to be awlied 
logically arrl with a view to preserve the balance intended 
by fI'allm'S of the Constitution. 
'Ibe Council of Ministers presented this case to the Supreme 
Court, requesting a pronouncement on the division of powers 
wi thin the Federal Govemnent. 'lbe Cooncil wanted the Court to 
announce in its favour, limiting the authority given to the 
National Council. 'lbe Court's decisioo, however, favan-ed the 
National OJuncil by its insistence that, in the event of disap-
proval of the National Cooncil' s interventions, re-su1::mission of 
bills to the National Cooncil is part of the legislative prcx::ess. 
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AltOO.tgh this case was presented to the Ca.lrt. as a result of 
disagreem:mt between the Council of Ministers and the Federal 
National Council, the provisions invoked and the questions it 
presentErl, were equally imp:)rtant for the FErleral balance as it 
was for the canpetition for pa.tIe.r between the original parties to 
the dispute. 
'!be 0:Jurt I s interpretation of Articles 120 and 121 and its 
principles, are obviously benefiting a stronger Federation 
because of several attitudes am stances adoptErl by the Court: 
1 - '!he Ca.lrt invoked the preamble of the Constitution, and used 
it to achieve the interpretation which it gave to Articles 
120 and 121 in this case. '!his has resultErl in a favourable 
conclusion for the Federal Gc::J!.rerrlroot. This was an effort 
by the Court in the direction of strengthening the 
Federation. So, instead of engaging in a literal 
interpretation of the Articles requ.estErl, the Court mJved to 
use the preamble to support the FErleral Governnent. 
2 - The use of the preamble as a binding Constitutional 
ProV'isioo is significant in itself. '!be coosequence of the 
Court r s reference to the preamble is that, in the future if 
there is doobt about whether or not the Federal Gov'ernment 
has a certain pJWeI's in relation to the Elnirates, this doubt 
should to the extent possible I be resolved to strengthen the 
Federal Gov'enment, acoording to the attibrle and desire of 
the fraroors of the preamble. 
'll1e CaJrt r S interpretations of the Constitution have a 
bindirr:J effect (28), arrl can be used in the future by the 
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Federal Government or other interested parties, so its use 
of the preamble am the COnsequences of this use, all have 
i.np:>rtant significance for the future in the direction of 
supporting the Federal powers. The Court in this case 
rE!I'IXJ\Ted the possibility of the mare guiding effect of the 
preamble, and stressed its binding effect, with significant 
consequences for the powers and future of the Federal 
Government. 
3 - The combined effects of the Court's attitude, which was 
favoorable to the Federal Government, and of its use of the 
preamble as a binding part of the Constitution is an 
interpretation of the distrih.1tion of ~ which is clearly 
supportive of the Federal Goverrlne1t. The interpretation of 
the first paragraph of Article 121 (29) that was given by 
the Ca.lrt is clearly in favrur of the Federal Governm:mt. 
Although the 0Jurt restricted its interpretaticn of Article 
121 (first paragraph) with certain conditions, the fact 
remains that this interpretaticn is a significant step in 
favoor of the Federal Government. The principle of givin:J 
executive power to the Federal Government in matters covered 
by Article 121, if their execution is inseparable from 
matters of Article 120, has been established by the Court. 
'!he existence of the birrling cx:ntitions will be in the usual 
cases a relative fact which will need j udgaoonts concernirY;J 
the surrourrling circumstances to prove its existence or not. 
'!he effect of this is the possibility of increased powers 
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for the Federal ,... ....... ~----"""'v~ L U1J:ut • The Coort opened the door to 
The use of this opportunity the addition of new pcM'ers. 
however, will depend upon the Federal Government taking 
advantage of the Court's interpretation. 
'!be GeI:eral. Awr:aadl of the Supteie (bJIt 'l'c:Mu:Os the Federa1. 
System. 
'n1e Coort' s attitooe tCYards the Federal system during this 
pericrl was to emphasise its imtx>rtance to the Constitutial, and 
the priority of the interpretatioo which protects and strengthens 
this system. 'ltle preservation of the Federal system, besides the 
preservation of the irrlependenoe of the Emirates, requires the 
prarotion and support of the Central Governrtent and its powers. 
'nle Court was not willing to suhnit to all the desires of the 
Federal officials rut, nevertheless used its interpretations for 
the support of the Federal Government through a cautious 
attib.rle. 
B. '!he SupL 
0Juncil. 
(b]rt am the IWers of the Federal Natiooal 
Altlnlgh the Federal National Co.mcil has only a consultat-
ive role to play in the legislative process, it can play a useful 
role in checking the other Federal legislative authorities, by 
displting proj ected laws, aIOOIXling or canpletely rejecting them 
(30) Because of the possibilities for the Natictlal. Cooncil to 
participate, arrl the effects it can prcrluce, the cameil became 
involved in several di~tes alnlt the extent and effects of its 
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interventions in the legislative process. 
'!be Supreme Coort can, throogh its authoritative decisions, 
play the role of wnpire between the National Cameil and the 
Cbuncil of Ministers. It can provide opinions a.OOut its view of 
the balance in the legislative process. '1llese views can have 
important effects on future developments in the legislative 
process. 
'lbe occurrence of these applications in the early period of 
the Federation was evidence of the canpetition for power and 
attempts to gain authority by the different quarters of power in 
this transitional period. 
'Dle case of Sodal Security Law 
(Application for O:nstitutional Interpretation 1/2, 14 April 
1974) 
"Coocerning the effects of obj ections to, and amendnents to 
bills by the Natiooal Cameilll 
'Ibis case dE!l'lOlStrates the hesitation and unwillingness of 
the traditional absolute power oolders to subnit to the recently 
created Federal Institutions. Altlr.ugh the National Cooncil is 
CXJnpOSed of members cb::>sen by the Rulers themselves, the real 
effect of dissent by the Council is to delay the pranulgatioo of 
laws. '!be SUpreme OJuncil and its Olair:man (the President) rep-
resented in this case by the Q:mlcil of Ministers, insisted 00 an 
interpretation of the CbnStltuticn which would deprive the Nat-
icnal Council of the delaying effect of its dissent upcn bills. 
The Council of Ministers suanitted a draft of Social 
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Security Law to the National Camcil who am:md.ed the draft, am 
submitted it to the Supreme Council to be considered for 
pranulgation. 
'!be Supreroo Council apprO\Ted the original un-am:md.ed version 
of the draft and the President promulgated it as originally 
proposed by the Ca.mcil of Ministers. '1hl.s provoked a protest 
fran the National <h.mcil, which argued that the step taken by 
the Supreroo Camcil a.rrl its president, was unconstitutional, 
because it conflicted with Article 110 (3)a (31). '!be Council of 
Ministers argued that there was no breach of the Constitutioo by 
the actioo of the SupraIe Ca.mcil arrl the President. Article 110 
(3)a in fact states: 
"If the Union National Assembly inserts any amerrlIoont to the 
bill, arrl this ~t is not acceptable to the President 
of the Union or the Supreme Council, or if the Union 
National Assembly rejects the bill, the President of the 
Union or the Supreme Council may refer it back to the 
Natiooal Assembly" (Emphasis supplied). 
'!be National Camcil's opinion in the second sul::missicn to it 
has no biIx:lir¥J effect on the future of the bill. 'lbe National 
<hmcil's opinial is that the secorrl suhnissicn of the bill to it 
is not birrling on the President or the Supreme Camcil, because 
the bill can be promulgated without the amendments of the 
Natiooal Co.mcil, arrl despite its rejecticn of it. 
'nle camcil of Ministers, act.in:J as the representative of 
the Government, insisted that, whatever the opinion of the 
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~tional Cameil, the re-suhnission of the bill to that Ca.mcil 
was an option of the President am the Suprer!e Council. '!he bill 
could be pranulgatErl into law despite the opinion of the National 
Camcil am without re-sul:mission of the bill to that Council. 
'!he National Cbuncil arguErl that if the President or the Supreme 
Council wanted to override their opinions in proposed 
legislation, they had a oonstitutional obligation to re-subnit 
the bills to the Naticnal Cooncil. 
'lbe Cameil of Ministers after a pericd of dispute with the 
National Council, moved. to put an end to the argument by 
submitting the matter to the Supreme Court to obtain its 
decision, which would be binding on all, and would remove 
tensions between the two Camcils (32). 
Two questioos were subnittErl to the Supreme Court, namely: 
1 - A request for an interpretation of Article 110 (3 )a, am 
whether it was a:ntpUlsory for the President am the Suprene 
Cbmcll to re-subnit bills to the National Council, if they 
want to override its aIll:!Ildments am objections. 
2 _ A request for interpretation of Articles 120 and 121 am 
clarification of the meaning of "legislation" and 
"execution" in these Articles. 
'!be second request is discussed al:x:JVe in this chapter. 'lbe 
first part of this application is examina:1 here below. 
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':ft)e ~le AmrllJooed by the Qmt as to the First Request in 
this Applicatim. 
'!he question here is aOOut the option of the President am 
the Suprerce 0:Jurt to re-subnit the bills to the National Camcil. 
'!here are two distinct positions: one is that of the National 
Council, which is that this option is between accepting the 
amerdnents am opinions of the National Cooncil, in which case no 
re-sul:Inission is necessary; the secorrl possibility is that the 
President arrl the SuprE!lre Ca.mcil reject the opinions of the 
National Camcil, in which case re-subnission to the NatiCl:lal 
Cameil is necessary. The secoIXi opinion is that of the Cooncil 
of Ministers, insisting that this option is not tied to any 
oorrlition am that even if the President and the Supreme Council 
want to override the National Cb.mcil's opinicns, re-sutmission 
is optional, arrl al::aIrloning it does not affect the validity of 
the legislative procedures arrl does not affect the value of the 
resulting law. 
'!be Supreme Coort stressed that re-sutmission of bills to 
the National eamcil is an option, according to Article 110 (3)a. 
But if the President am the Supreme Cbuncil want to override 
amerdnents am objections to bills by the National Cbuncil, re-
subnissian recomes a necessary part of the legislative process 
and the promulgated law will not be valid without it. The 
consultative nature of the Naticnal ca.mcil does not affect the 
requirement of re-sutmission of bills to it in this case, because 
this re-subnission is required by the O:x1stitutioo. '!he President 
am the SUpreme ChunCil have to wait for the opinion of the 
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National Ca.mcil, am then it beca:oos the right of the President 
and the Supreme Council to promulgate the law despite the 
opinions of the National Cooncil. This opinion of the Suprare 
Court is, obviously, against the wish of the Council of 
Ministers, arrl roore importantly, contrary to the desires of the 
Suprare Cameil, am because of this it is a remarkable decision. 
'!he Suprare Coort prcrluced a decision limi ling the power of the 
Suprare Cameil, and the result is an effective role for the 
National Council in limiting the options of the Council of 
Ministers. '!be:inq:mtance of this decision is enhanced by its 
being the first case brought by the Council of Ministers, 
desiring a favoorable declaration frcm the Suprare Court in an 
issue which was in di~te between it and the National Cameil. 
'!he decision of the Calrt was against the wishes of the Cameil 
of Ministers, so it was a lesson to this Council and to the 
Supraoo Cooncil, that the Suprane Oxlrt was not a subsidiary of 
the Council of Ministers and sOOuld not be expectoo to sul:mit to 
its desires. Several consequences coold be expectoo frcm the 
position of the court in this case, including increased 
confidence in it frcm institutions and irrlividuals in their own 
disputes with the GovernmeIlt and an unwillingness of the Cameil 
of Ministers to sul:mit issues to the SUpraoo Court in future. 
'!he National Council emerged virrlicatoo arrl with its powers 
clarified, its future role in the legislative process was 
strengthened and prcm:>ted. To the entire Constitutional system of 
the E ... ~ ch was in the early stages of transition, the U.A •• , wu .... 
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decision was ranarkable. Here was an institution which had the 
co..n:age and the willingness to tell the Suprema Cooncil that, in 
the case of the Social Security Law, it was in breach of the 
Constitution, and that it should refrain fran doing such a thing 
in the future. A pronouncement like this was a new cx::currence in 
the tJ.A.E., and shoold be u.rrlerstood in its context of its t.i.Ire 
to be appreciated. The lOOS sage of the Ca.l.rt' s decision was that 
the Constitution would be applied even against the wishes of the 
Supreme Cruncil, and that Federal institutions had constitutional 
powers which they were - entitled to exercise. 'ltlere were new 
<:XDiitions which lTU.lSt be faced and that the rights of the Federal 
institution had real value which shoold be recognised. 
'lhe Case of Investaeut ani Deyel j "ElF iI Bank law 
(Application for Cbnstitutional Interpretation 2/4, 14 April 
1976) 38 Official Gazette. 
'!be Limits to the JDFw1ding Paler of the Natima1 Cbmcl1s to 
bills. 
'Ibis case was brought to the Suprene Coort by the National 
Council in the form of an application for interpretation of 
Article 89 of the Constitution. The National Council and the 
O::uncil of Ministers were involved in a dispute alxJut the extent 
of the rights of the National Council in amerrling bills which 
were sull:nitted to it fran the Camcil of Ministers, containing 
proj ected ametXhnents to applicable statutes. The cause of this 
dispute was that the Council of Ministers submitted to the 
Naticnal cameil a bill ccntaining proposed ameOOments to Law 
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(10/1974) the "law of Investment and Developrent Banks". Upon 
discussion of this bill in the National Council, it was fourrl 
that the Cameil of Ministers was proposing to change the name of 
the bank without any other changes in the law. '!be National 
Camcil decided to a&:I other ameOOments to the original bill, in 
addition to the proposed amendments from the Council of 
Ministers. The Council of Ministers obj ected to the position 
taken by the National Council on the grounds that the National 
Cameil, ac::::aJrding to Article 89, nrust limit its amerrlnents to 
the content of the bill suhnitted fran the Council of Ministers, 
and that its action in this case was a new bill and new 
anvandIrents, which was beyorrl the J:XJWeI"s delegated to it by the 
Constitution (33). '!be NatiCllaI Council subni tted an application 
to the Supreme Court for interpretation of Article 89 of the 
Constitution and clarification of the powers of the Council 
towards bills subnitted to it fron the Council of Ministers. 
'lb! Prirx:1ples Bstahl i shPrl by SUp:aa::: <bJrt in this Case. 
'n1e Cbuncil of Ministers subnitted a nenorandum concerning 
the power of the National Council regarding bills which are 
proposals to aroorrl existiI¥J laws. 'Ihls menorandum contained the 
opinicn of the scix>lar who was responsible for CXJDpleting the 
final draft of the Constituticn (34), arrl it stressed that bills 
seeking to aroorrl existing laws shoold be limited to the subject 
of the anexii.D] bill and shoold not touch the other contents of 
the original law unless this is necessary to the operation of 
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~ts supplied by the National Council to the proposed bill. 
The National Council argued that they could add, remove 
parts, or change parts of bills sutmitted to it by the Council of 
Ministers, whether they were new bills or merely bills proposing 
ameOOments to existing laws, am that the Constitution conta.ined 
nothing which restricted the pc7Ners of the National Council in 
the manner it chose to amend or change these bills. They arguoo 
that, even if bills oontaining ~ts to existing laws had a 
relationship to those laws, these bills were in a sense new laws 
on their own, an:] since the Cameil coold add to bills of new 
laws matters an:] provisions, the contents of which were related 
to the subject of the bills, this sane power should be urrlerstcxxl 
to inclooe the bills proposing ~ts to existing laws. 
'!he Supr~ Court decided that according to Article 89 of 
the Calstitution, the National Cameil had the power to add to, 
delete parts of, or arnerrl bills subnittErl to it fron the Council 
of Ministers. '111ese alterations shoold be related to the general 
subject that the bill was related to, an:] should concern the sane 
legal relatiooships which the bill dealt with. '!be Supreme Court 
added that if the bill was proposing to amend an existing law, 
the power of the National Cameil was limited to that bill, am 
did not exterrl to other parts of the original law which \1i1ere not 
inclooErl in the suhnitted bill, unless changes to those other 
provisioos was made necessary by the changes desired to be made 
by the National Council to the bill before it, am that those 
changes in the original law shoold be kept to the least possible 
extent. 
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The opinion of the Court in this case came according to the 
wishes of the Council of ~sters, and on the sane line as the 
opinion obtained by that Council fran its consultant, the person 
who was involved in drafting the final version of the current 
Constitution. 
There were critical ccmnents regarding the Court's decision 
in this case (35) and there were demarrls that the Suprere Court 
was 5UpIX)S€d to strengthen the powers of the National Camcil, 
arxi that it was supposed to back its demarrls for IOOre extensive 
powers and wider interpretations of its authority, on the groorrls 
that its pJWers were not final, and that the SUprere Cooncil and 
the President ccW.d override the opinions of the National Council 
if they did not agree with them (36). '!be Calrt' s opinion was 
right in the principle it established. '!he final victor in this 
case was the Constitution. '!be Court had proved that it was 
prepared to starrl with the Camcil of Ministers, and to satisfy 
its desires, if the Constitution so demaIrled. 
In the first case of disputes between the Council of 
Ministers and the National Council (37), the Court gave a 
decision for the latter, whilst in the present case the decision 
went against them. But in 1x>th cases, the Calrt' s opinion was 
cx:mpatible with the Constitutional Provisions, and did not exterrl 
them beyorrl reasooable limits, nor restrict them unjustifiably. 
If the eoostitution denied the National Council the power to 
intrcrluce new bills, then the SUprane Court was not willing to 
allCffl that cameil to achieve that power urrler the disguise of 
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making amerrlroonts to bills suhnittoo by the Cbuncil of Ministers. 
The integrity of the Court and confidence in its work is 
important. Even the Naticm.l Cooncil benefited indirectly fran 
the decision which appearoo, on the face of it, to be against 
their wishes. 'Ihls can be imaginoo by the increaSErl confidence 
and trust this decision brought to the Court, am that in the 
future, all CXXlcernoo will eventually benefit fron this. 
General Cblervatims AbJut the Effects of the CbIrt's Decl sial en 
the Belat:.imship Bet ee I the Rat:i.mal Cbmc:il am the Cbmc:il of 
Ministers. 
'!be SuprE!lOO Court in its decisions, managej to establish its 
irrlependenoe fron the Governnent, am to prove its intentions to 
defend and promote principled interpretations of the 
Canstituticn. 
'Ibe Ch.lrt defended the area of ~ given to the Natiooal 
Council and promoted its cause against the powerful Supreme 
Ccuncil, so the effects of opinions of the fonner were protected, 
despite their being, in nature, merely a o::nsultative b:xly. 
The Court, through its role as umpire between the two 
Ccuncils, playel a useful part in r~ tensions, an::1 solving 
disputes about the distribution of powers between these two 
Ccuncils. 
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c. The Constitutional Limitations on the Jurisdiction and 
During the early years of the Federation, the Supreme Calrt 
was faced with several issues regarding its own jurisdiction and 
the Hmi ts of the structure of the Federal Judiciary which are 
possible under the Constitution. The period in which these 
questions arose, was the pericrl in which the guidance and the 
authoritative declarations by the Court were rrost in need. 
These cases were the results of several factors. One of the 
main factors, which was true regarding other kirrls of issues, was 
the generalisation contained in the Constitution. The framers of 
the Constitution chose to deal with a wide range of subjects in 
general tenus, leaving the details to the legislature. In the 
early stages of the Federation, when the legislative vacuum was 
extensive, the executive authorities were faced with situations 
for which there was no legislative guidance, only general 
Constitutional Provisions. In response they resorted to the 
Suprare Court for rore detailed guidance in the application of 
the Constitution (38) The legislative authority faced sate 
difficulties in its effort to provide legislation for the 
application of the Canstitution. The Court's help and authority 
was therefore needed in this situation (39). 
There were unclear limits to the jurisdiction and function 
of the Court in its power of interpretation, whether it included 
the Constitution only or covered statutes and other legislatioo 
as well, which prompted the Court to clarify its power and 
(40) 
provide guidance for the future 
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'lhe Case of FlDigratial law 
(Application for Constitutional Interpretation 1/1, 24 November 
1973) 15 Official Gazette. 
'lhe lGiJer of the Sup£aae <bJrt in the :rnt.eqlmtatial of ordinary 
law. 
This case, which was the first case to come before the 
Ca.rrt, included several questions directed tCMards the Ca.rrt. 
These included enquirie~ which were mainly requests for 
interpretation of regular law (41). The Supreme Court answered 
the questions aboot the Constitution, rut refused to provide 
interpretations of statutory provisions. '!be Court took this 
opportuni ty to clarify its position on the proper areas of its 
interpretation power. 
'lhe Principle Established by the <bJrt in this Case. 
The role of the Supreme Court in interpreting the 
Ccnstitutional provisions was to reoove ambiguities fran 
these provisions, in order to clarify their meaning, arrl to 
provide ha.rm:>ny arrl oonsistency in their application. '!be 
interpretation of the Constitutional provisions did not 
exterrl to the interpretatiCll of statutory provisions, except 
in the case that an interpretation of a statute was needed 
for the determination of its compatibility with the 
Constitution. 
The significance of this principle for future cases was 
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obvious, it was a declaration by the Court that it would not be 
drawn into providing Statutory interpretations. The Court 
restricted its duty to interpret Statutory provisions to 
instances where the cx:mpatibility of the provisions with the 
Cansti tution was questioned before the Court, and then only to 
the extent necessary for it to make a decision in these matters. 
'lbe Court regarded its duty as ale which praooted the application 
of the Constitution and rem::wed doubts and ambiguities fran this 
application, and declared its supremacy against Statutes and 
other inferior fonns of law. 
'!be Case of Federal A(pe11ate 0Jurts 
(Application for Constitutiooal. Interpretation 1/4, 14 March 
1976) 37 Official Gazette. 
According to the original design of the Federal Lower 
Courts, they were given power to operate in a very limited 
territory and with limited canpetenae. '!be general territorial 
jurisdicticns ~e interrled to be mainly the pennanent Capital of 
the Union, which was supposed to be purpose-built in lands 
donated by Ahl-Dhabi and ~i on the border between them (42). 
'!he canpetenae of these Courts was designed to be all matters 
arising in the pennanent Capital of the Union, and "all Civil, 
Ccmnercial and Administrative di5pltes between the Union and 
irrlividuals" (4J). '!he pennanent Capital has rx>t been built, but 
has been a.baIrloned witOOut real prospect of it beiD:j built in the 
foreseeable future. The option given to the Emirates, to 
transfer their Judiciaries to the Federal Judicial System has 
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been used by the four Emirates, Abl-Dhabi, Sharjah, ,Ajman a.rrl 
Fuj airah (44). The territory in which the Federal Lower Coorts 
have general canpetence has been widened extensively. These facts 
arrl developnents have created certain problems for the Federal 
Authorities, because the original design of the Constitution for 
the Federal Judiciary was felt to be inadequate to deal with the 
eroorging situation. 
Originally the &ni.rates were presune:i to keep their Jtrlic-
iaries. '!be penna.nent Capital was supposed to be of limited size 
-
am therefore a few primary Federal Courts would be sufficient to 
deal with cases arising within its area. Appeals fron the Federal 
Primary Courts were interrled, or permitted, to be made to the 
Suprate Court. '!be design provided for the Federal Primary Courts 
was provisional arrl transitional in nature, which was the nature 
of the Constitutioo. This design was certainly insufficient for 
the developnent that followed a.rrl for the exterrled periods of 
operatioo that were repeatedly added to the Constitutioo. 
One of the areas which caused the present case to be brooght 
to the Supreme Court was that there was no clear pennission to 
establish Federal Appellate Courts, whereas permission to create 
Primary Courts was express ( 45) • '!be primary task of the Court 
here was not to remove ambiguity from the Constitution, but 
rather to provide an authoritative interpretation that was 
flexible arrl that overcame the deficiency of the Constitution in 
dealing with the developnent of the Federal Judiciary. 
This case was i.mp::)rtant for the role that could be played by 
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the Suprene Court in facing the devel<>pIe1t that was occurring in 
the country, arrl in providing a Constitutional interpretation 
which enabled the country to develop and deal with new facts in 
the changing circumstances at the tin'e. 
'nlere were two questions included in this case: 
1 - lX:les the Oxlstitution, acoording to Articles 95 arrl 103, 
allCM the establishment of Federal Courts of Appeal, which 
are Courts specialising as Appeal Courts, to hear appeals 
fron the Federal Primary Courts? Is the stipulation of the 
types of Federal Calrt which were included in Article 95 of 
the Constitution, meant to be comprehensive, preventing 
additional types of Court? Is it permissible, according to 
Article 95, to establish Federal ~llate Courts? (46) 
2 - What is the meaning of the word "final" in the second 
paragraph of Article 105? lX:les it allow any kirrl of appeal 
fron judgements of the Federal Courts in appeals fron IDeal 
Courts? 
Pd ry:i pl es Announced by the a:mt in this Case: 
As answers to the two points that the application to the 
Suprene Court required, the Court annc:m109d two principles: 
1 - '!bat the Constitution, acoordir¥:J to Articles 95 arrl 103, did 
not prohibit the establisbnent of Federal Appellate Courts. 
'n1is decisicn was based on several cx:nclusions. It was 
clear that Article 103 gave the legislature a wide discretion in 
organising the procedure and the judicial institution for 
appeals. This discretion included determination of the 
Cllapter9 
- 305 -
insti tution to which appeals from Primary Courts could be 
brought, because the Constitution did not specify the Supreme 
Court as the only Court to which appeals frcm Primary Courts 
could be taken. The language used by Article 103 gave the 
legislature the optioo of rnak.:ing appeals fran Federal Primary 
Courts to the Supreme Court. This necessarily meant that if the 
legislature decided not to take this option, an alternative was 
to establish Courts whose duty was hear appeals fran the Federal 
Primary Calrts. The absence of mention of Appellate Courts in 
Article 95 did not mean that their establishment was prohibited. 
'!be mention of Federal Courts in Article 95 is not meant to be 
conclusive, curl there was no evidence that the Constitution meant 
to prohibit establishnent of other Courts. The general rule was 
that means which were not clearly prohibited by the Constitution, 
curl which can serve p..trpOSes stated in the Constitution, were 
permitted by the Constitution to the legislature. 
In the decision of the Calrt, there were explanations as to 
the nature of appeals curl their benefits. The conclusioo of this 
was that these procedures would serve the purposes of the 
Constitution. The main points used by the Court to reach the 
cx:nclusion of the permission to establish Appellate Courts, were: 
(a) The mention in Article 103 of the possibility of appeals 
fraIl Primary Federal Courts, was optiooal. 
(b) '!be mention in Article 95 of kiIXis of Federal Court, was not 
meant to be conclusive. 
(c) '!bat, generally, means which can serve purposes stated in 
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the Constitution are allowed to be usErl by the legislature, 
unless specifically prohibited. 
2 - '!hat the meaning of the word "final" in Article 1 05 of the 
Constitution, was that these decisions exhausted all 
ordinary forms of appeal. This does not mean that the 
decision cannot be subjected to extraordinary ways of 
appeal, such as Cassation ani petition for re-<XlIlSideration. 
Therefore, it was permissible for the law to subj ect 
decisions of Local OJurts, to extraordinary fonns of appeal. 
Fran the decision of the 0Jurt in this case, it can be seen 
that the 0Jurt was not just involved in rennving ambiguities fran 
the Constitutional Provisions. The Court was involved in a 
judgement as to the permissible discretion allowed in the 
interpretation of the Constitutional Provisions. Was this 
interpretation supposed to be limited to the ideas at the t.inwa of 
the drafting of the Constitutioo, as in the case of the design of 
the Federal Jooiciary? Or was it to take a general ani wider 
discretion to other areas not clearly prohibited by the 
Constitution? '!be principle established by the CoJrt in this case 
of pennitting use of means which are not clearly prohibited was a 
useful one for the developnent of the Constitution. '!be question 
of whether certain means or ways are prohibited can be a questioo 
of judgement: that is relative. HcMever, if such a questioo is 
brought to the CaJrt, it is prepared, as in this case, to give 
its authoritative decision, and use its joogement in order to 
further the general aims established by the Constitution am as 
the Court umerstands them to be at the particular tine ani stage 
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when they cane before the Court. This decision is gc:x:rl evidence 
about the the ways that can be used by the Court, am the role 
that can be played by these decisions in promoting the 
flexibility of interpretation of the Constitution in dealing with 
the changing circumstances of the country. 
'!be Case of 'lrta.l of Senior Federal Officials 
(Application for Constitutional Interpretation 3/4, 18 November 
1976) 74 Official Gazette. 
According to Article 99 (5) of the Constitution, the Supreme 
Coort has j urisdictian in: 
" ••• trial of Ministers am Senior Officials of the Union 
appointed by decree regarc1in:J their actions in carrying out 
their official duties en the demarrl of the Supreme Court ••• " 
The Minister of Justice submitted an application enquiring 
whether this paragraph of Article 99 included all kinds of 
actions, or if it embraced only criminal actions. 
'!here were two opposing opinions. '!be first was that of the 
Ministry of Justice, which stressed that criminal actions alone 
were the subject of this paragraFb. '1l1ey argued that disciplinary 
actions were the jurisdicticn of the disciplinary council as far 
as senior Federal officials were calCerIled, but Ministers could 
not be subj ected to such procedures. 'lbe Ministry of Justice 
further argued that sttrly of canparative Coostitutions revealed 
that Ministers were usually not subjected to disciplinary 
procedures and that political responsibility was dealt with 
sufficiently elsewhere in the Ccnstitutien. This suggested that, 
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according to this paragraph, criminal actions were the only kirrl 
of actions which could fom the subject for trial of Ministers 
and senior Federal officials. 
The alternative view was represented by the Public 
Prosecution, which argued that the language used in the relevant 
paragraph was wide and general enough to include all actioos of 
Ministers and senior officials, either disciplinary or criminal. 
The Public Prosecution argued that there was no justification for 
restricting the meaning of the appropriate paragraph. 
The Court decided that: 
1 - Paragraph (5) of Article 99 of the Constitution was 
comprehensive of all types of act that are related to 
official duties, and that the jurisdiction in these cases 
was gi wo to the Suprene Coort, whether the people involved 
were Ministers or senior officials. 
2 - There was no basis on which the meaning of the word 
"actions" in the relevant provision could be understood to 
mean "crimes", because in another paragraph in the same 
Article the word "crimes" was being used, which was the use 
of this word in Paragraph ( 6 ) • If the drafters or the 
fowrlers wanted to limit the actions in Paragraph (5) to 
crime, they could have specified it, as happened in the 
following paragraph. The Constitution delegated the 
regulation of details of the trial of Ministers and senior 
officials (according to who was concerned) to the 
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legislature, to provide the types of actions, their 
penalties am their procedures that could be foll~ in 
these cases. Until there was legislation providing the 
intended details there was no basis for specifying and 
limiting a tenn in the Constitution, which was ooth general 
am cx:mprehensi ve. 
'!be Court I S decision in this case was significant. '!be 
reason for the importance of this decision was in the rules 
followed in interpreting the Constitutional Provisions. 'Ibe 
Court registered the idea of restricting the meaning of a 
Constitutional tenn which was, by its nature, a cx:mprehensive 
one. The Court announced that unless there was a clear 
indication that this general term was meant to be less 
o:mprehensive than originally stated, the Court would give the 
tenn the full meaning originally designed for it. 'Ibis ki.rrl of 
interpretation, especially in the context, for example of 
enwneration of the powers o·f the Federal Government and the 
auth:>rities of Federal officials, ca.tld be employed to support 
the Federal Goverrunent, as was the case here, because acoording 
to the interpretation given to the concerned provision, the 
result was support for a wider jurisdiction for the Supreme Court 
than the Ministry of Justice insisted. 
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General Cbeervatims abart: the Effects of the Decisioos of the 
St:q:a:aae cburt Rega:nij.BJ the Federal Jtdiciary. 
The Supreroo Court displ.q.yed, through its decisions in these 
cases, its flexibility in interpretation of the discretion of the 
establisbnent of Federal Courts and the jurisdiction provided for 
these Courts. The Court's interpretations in these cases allowed 
wide discretion for the legislature to create the kinds of Courts 
found to be necessary or useful for the performance and 
establisl"ment of justice, whether these Courts were Appellate 
Courts, or any other kiI)ds of Courts. Weed the language used 
by the Ca.Irt was general enoogh to permit other means which may 
serve the achieverents of the aims of the Federal Governnelt. 
The Court in these cases used interpretations which 
permitted the widening of competence given to it by the 
Constitution. The general provisions used in specifying areas of 
canpetence or in enuroorating spheres of power were to be given 
the full meaning, to be interpreted generally, a.rrl to deal with 
all a:n:::erned if they were general provisions. These provisions 
were not to be restricted unless it was so required by the 
Constituticn. 
'!hese rules of interpretaticn of the Constitution praooted 
increased ~s for the Federal Government. '!he was necessary 
because the Federal Government had limited a.rrl enumerated powers, 
whereas the Emirates had the residuary power (47) 
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fhmary 
An essential task for the Suprane Court during the perioo 
discussed in this chapter was the assurance of the continuation 
of the federal system arrl preservation of the balance created by 
the constitution. '!be 0JUrt fOUI'rl for the federal government in 
sane cases and for the Emirates in others. '!he court resisted 
demands from the federal executive to be provided with wide 
powers, whilst the interpretations provided by the court limited 
the powers of the emirates to ensure the progress and work of the 
federal system. The caJrt used its interpretation of calStitut-
ional provisions, its urrlerstarrling of the nature of the federal 
system arrl the aims provided in the preamble of the consti tutien 
to praoote the federal balance it viewed as proper and necessary. 
The federal institutions created by the constitution needed 
assurance, so the court provided opinions that helped the Federal 
National Council and the Federal judiciary to achieve the 
organisation and jurisdiction necessary for their developnent. 
Ckle of the IOOSt ranarkable achievements of the court in this 
perioo was its refusal to suhnit to the de.ma.rrls of the federal 
executive authority, representing the Supreme Council, for 
concentration of pc:7ft'& and for danination in the federal system. 
'!he balance created by the constitution and the federal system 
serves, ultimately, to limit the powers of the executive and the 
Supreme Council of the Union. '!be institution which could ensure 
application of these provisions and preservation of the balance 
of power was the SUpreme Court. The consistent interpretations by 
the Supreme Court were effective for the assurance of the 
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application of the constitution and were necessary for the 
continuation am effectiveness of the federal system. 
1. U.A.E. Prov. Const., Article 96. 
2. Al-Jaridah Al-Rasmyyah ('lbe Official Gazette), Aug. 1973. 
3. Application for Constitutional Interpretation 1 Year 1 29 
November 1973. ' 
4. '!here have, in total, been five different applications: 1/1, 
1/2, 1/4, 2/4 and 3/4. ('lbe first number is the number of 
the application, the secorrl number is the year since the 
Q)urt' s establishment, 1973 being Year 1). 
5. Application for Constitutional interpretation 1/1 contains 
roore than five requests. See the discussioo of the case 
below. 
6.. For example, the Q:)urt established that it can hear 
applications for Oxlstitutional interpretations fron 
irdividual ministers, in Case (1/1). 
7. See Case 1/1, below. 
8. As in applications 1 /2, 14 April 1974, and 2/4, 14 April 
1976. 
9. See watts, R.L. New Federatioos: Experiments in the Camon-
wealth Oxford: '!be Clarendcn Press, 1966, p164. 
10. See the definitioo cont:a.ine1 in Article 1 of the 
Constitution. See also the ~ established in the 
Preamble. 
11 • In Articles 120 arrl 121 of the Constituticn. 
12. See Taryam, A. '!be Establisment of the United Arab Emirates 
1950-85 Ialdon: Croan Helm, 1987, pp200-219. 
13. For evidence, see cases 1/1 and 1/2 below. 
14. Applicatioo for Coostitutional interpretatioo 1/1. '!his 
application was sul:mitted on 24 October 1973 and decided on 
29 No\1ember 1973. 
15. According to Article 45 of the Constitution, there are five 
Union authorities, these inclooe the Cooncil of Ministers. 
16. Article 64, for example, holds that: ..... Ministers shall be 
politically responsible collectively before the 
President ...... 
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17 • At p:-esent there is a special institution in the Ministry of 
Justice, which represents the Council of Ministers before 
the Courts. 
18. According to this paragraph, the Supreme Court has 
<XJnpetence regarding: " ••• crines directly affecting the 
interests of the Union ••• ". '!he paragraph gives sate 
examples of these criJOOs. 
19. Law 6/1973. 
20. U .A.E. Prov. Const. Article 121. 
21. U.A.E. Prov. Const. Article 149 contains: " ••• As an 
exception to the provisions of Article 121 of this 
Constitution, the Emirates may pranulgate legislation 
necessary for the regulation of the matters set out in the 
said Article, without violatioo of the Provisions of Article 
151 of this Calstitution •• 11 • 'Ibis Article makes the matters 
contained in Article 121 as concurrent jurisdiction. '!bese 
matters are within the the ~ of the Emirates to 
legislate in, until arrl to the extent to which there is a 
FErleral legislaticn in them. In other words, the Emirates 
can legislate in matters contained in Article 121 until 
there is FErleral occupation of the field in these matters. 
'!be FErleral Supremacy Principle is contained in Article 1 51 
of the Constitution. 
22. Unioo Law (11/1973) for the Regulation of judicial 
relationships aroong the Einirates. 
23. '!be Court did not explain the source of supervisioo in its 
decisicn. '!he matter of the degree of ease is largely a 
matter of policy am. is hard to be judicially detennined. 
24. Application for Coostitutional interpretation 1/2. 
25. 'Ibis case involved application to interpret Article 110 (3)a 
of the Calstitution. 
26. Law 13/1972. 
27. Acoording to Article 110 (3)a: " ••• If the Union National 
Assanbly inserts any amerrlnent to the bill and this 
amerrlnent is not acceptable to the President of the Union or 
the Supreme Colmcil, or if the Union National Assembly 
rejects the bill, the President or the Supreme Council nay 
refer it back. to the National Assembly. If the Union 
National Assembly intrcduces aroj amerrlnent on that occasion 
which is not acceptable to the President of the Unioo or the 
SUpreme Cooncil, or if the Unioo National Assembly decides 
to reject the bill, the President of the Unicn may 
pranulgate the Law after ratification by the SUpreme 
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Cameil ••• " 
28. According to Article 101 of the U.A.E. Prov. Const. 
29. Article 121 of the U.A.E. Prov. Const. starts with the 
follCMing paragraph: If ••• without prejudice to the provisions 
of the preceding Article, the Unicn shall have exclusive 
legislative jurisdicticn in the folla.dng matters ••• ". 
30. See Cllapter 7 for rrore details about the position of the 
National Council and the effect it can have on the 
legislation process. 
31. See Ibrahim, A. '!be Experience of the Federal National 
Cameil (in Arabic) Beirut: Al Safir, 1986, p115. 
32. Ibid., p116. 
33. See Al-Tabtabai, A. r '!be I.eqislative Authorities in the Arab 
Gulf states (in Arabic) Kuwait: Joornal of Gulf and Arab 
Peninsula studies Publicaticns, 1985, p264. 
34. This scholar is: Dr. Wahid Ra'fat. 
35. See, for example, Al-Tabtabai, '!be I.eqislative Autlx>rities 
ope cit., pp266-267. 
36. Wc. cit. 
37. Application for Constitutional interpretaticn 1/2. 
38. See, for example, '!he Case of the Trial of Senior Federal 
Officials, Case 3/4. 
39. See '!be Case of Federal Appellate Courts, Case 1/4. 
40. '!he case of Social Security Law, case 1/2. 
41. 'lbere were included in the application, requests to 
establish the limits of power of the authorities accx:>rding 
to the emigration law. 'lbe request was not fashiCl1ed as a 
Cbnstitutional question, though the intention of the 
applicant may have been to set the stan1aI:d for what the 
authorities coold, and could not do, as the Constitution 
prescribed their limits. For example, the case involved a 
question about the powers of the executive authority in 
deporting certain categories of inmigrants aCCOJ:ding to 
Article 42 of Law 6/1973. 
42. U.A.E. Prov. Const. Article 9. 
43. U.A.E. Prov. Const. Article 102. 
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44. 'Ihis option is accx:>rding to Article 105 of the Constitution 
which provides: " ••• All or part of the judicial authorities 
in accx:>rdance with the preceding Article maybe transferred 
by a Union law issued at the request of the Ehrlrate 
concerned, to the Primary Unioo Tribmals ••• ". 
45. U.A.E. Prov. Const. Article 95 which provides: " ••• '!he Unioo 
shall have a union Suprare Court and Union Primary Tribunals 
as explained hereinafter ••• 11 • 
46. Article 103 of the U.A.E. Prov. Const. includes: " ••• '!he law 
may stip.11ate that appeals against the joogements of these 
TriOOna.1s (Union Primary Trih.mals) shall be heard before 
one of the chambers of the Union Suprare Court ••• 11 • 
(emphasis supplied). 
47. U.A.E. Prov. Const. Articles 120, 121 and 122. 
CBAPDm 'I»f 
'mE nnmASm JU<LH( Qf THE &JPR&iE axRl' All) '!BE CJWLlHZS (R 
Sl1BS'.rANl'IVE .:JtDICIAL REVIBIf 
'1be decisims of the Suptaae O:mt since 1978 
Through the passage of tine, the Federation was able to 
prove its strength, arrl its ability to errlure became evident. '!he 
end of the first tenn of the Provisional Coostitution marked the 
end of the constitutional system as t:m'ely experimental. 'lbe 
extension of its operat-ion for a further period of five years 
demarrled that practical problems be addressed by the introduction 
of long term solutions, Tensions that occurred in the early 
stages of the Federation were absorbed by the federal goveI'IJlrent 
with success. The oil boan happened at a time favourable to the 
federal goverrment: 1973, 1974 arrl 1975 were years of extensive 
l:::uilding of the infrastructure arrl provision of major services 
(1 ). 'lbe federal institutions became roore stable arrl regarded as 
pennanent governmental institutions. As regard for the constitut-
ional system, arrl for the coontry, changed, legislation that had 
been delayed during the first period began to be prepared (2). 
'lbe period fran 1978 to the present day has characteristics 
that distinguish it fron the earlier pericrl. The first period 
was a period of establishment, of removal of doubts and 
ambigui ties. '!be secorrl period, being a period of exntinuity arrl 
of substantive constitutional challenges, has been different in 
several major respects. 
The first period was a period of establishment of the 
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country, a move from a country of separate and independent 
emirates to a federal system ccmposed of emirates carmitted to 
surrender parts of their indi viduali ty and sovereignty, to create 
a federal state which would provide them with unity and represent 
them on an international level. '!he rrove to abiding by a written 
constitution and surrerrlering parts of their sovereignty created 
problems which needed the special authority and strong voice of 
the Supreme Court to resolve, and to serve the purposes, 
established by the constitution, of praroting developnent of the 
federal system. 
In this secxxld pericrl, the federal state I1CJW established was 
reasonably stable. It had pasSErl the experimental stage. Iblbts 
about the viability of the federal system and its suitability for 
the emirates were fading. Fears of the emirates over their 
sovereignty were quelled. '!he need for the continuance of the 
federal system was obvious and the desire of the rulers to 
CXXltinue with it was proved through their stand in overccming the 
crisis surrounding the expiration of the original term of the 
constitution. 
What was I'OCISt needed I1CJW was further developnent of the 
federal system, which invol ved confronting several maj or 
practical constitutional problems. '!he U.A.E. has its unique 
characteristics, which mayor may not resemble those of other 
countries, which were bourrl to create challenges and problems for 
the constltutioo and the legislation which was being intrcrluced 
into the oountry. 
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The U.A.E. is an Arab country inhabited by Muslims. These 
two factors influence the constitution in particular ways. The 
country is a developing one, open to the world, and ca.rmot live 
in isolation; its systems are heavily affected by those of other 
countries. All of these created their own problems for the 
U.A.E., sane important aspects of which required solutions fran 
the Suprere Court. The Court's decisions in these matters ~e 
1:ourrl to be of great significance to the country. 
Legislation passed since the establisl'lrrent of the country 
has not always been obviously coherent with the constitution, 
giving rise to special problems and requiring special solutions. 
The Court was, and continues to be, the institution responsible 
for providing insights, rem::wing doubts and having the final say 
about ca:npatibility of these statutes and legislations with the 
constitution. 
The start of this pericrl was marked by the pranulgation of 
the cassation law, which transfotnai the Supreme Court fron a 
mainly constitutional Court to a Court of Last Resort in all 
matters. '!his change is significant. It has altered the position 
of the Suprere Court and resulted in adverse consequences for its 
constitutional jurisdiction (3 ). 
Because of the large number of cassation cases, we shall 
choose only sane of them which have constitutional significance 
as examples of the <::nlrt' s role in the constitutional order and 
developnent in the CCA.Ultry. All consti tutiooal cases will be 
reported and discussed, and the cases will be divided according 
to their subj ect matter. 
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ClJaract:eristics of Law 17/1978 (Law of Cassatial) 
This law was pranulgated aM signed by the President on 18 
December 1978, it was published on 30 December 1978 and, 
acoording to its provision, it began operation two IlOIlths later 
on 1 March 1979 (4 ) 
'nle petition of cassation is allowed to challenge a decisioo 
on the basis of error of Law, either material or procedural (5). 
Errors of fact cannot be a basis for a petition of cassation. 
The main purpose of cassation is to control and harmonise 
interpretation aM applicatien of Law. This Law made the Supreme 
Court the final appellate Court in all matters, other than 
constitutional matters, and other subjects which are included in 
the canpetence of the Supreme Ca.lrt by the consti tutien aM Law 
10/1973. Petitions of cassation can be brooght against decisions 
of federal appellate Calrts oo1y (6 ). 
The effect of the introduction of this Law has been, 
inevitably, to increase the voltme of cases before the Supreme 
Court and to change its emphasis from concentrating on 
oonstitutional and federalism cases aM other issues of political 
import.ance, into a CcA.1It of general ccmpetence. The oonsequence 
of the intrcrluctien of this Law was apparent in the practical 
errling of the applications for CXXlStitutiCllaI interpretaticn that 
distinguished the earlier period of the Court. A possible 
explanation of the errl of such applications to the Carrt is that 
it became a Court of general ccmpetence and, therefore, was not 
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worthy and capable of attracting the confidence that a 
specialised Court may attract. '!be new face of the Supreme Ca.lrt 
is different frOll that originally intrcrluced by the constitution, 
though no literal contradiction is available (7). 
'!'ne operation of the cassation Law necessitated a reform of 
the ca.nposition of the Supreme Court and the fonnation of its 
chambers. '!his introduced reform was necessary to aCCUllloJate the 
increased vol~ of cases before the Ca.lrt, due to the petitions 
of cassation. Law 14/1985 rem:::wed the limit on the runnber of 
alternate judges that can be appointed to the Ca.lrt. originally, 
Article 3 of Law 10/1973 prescribed that the rna.xi.mum number of 
alternate ju:iges that could be appointed to the Coort is three. 
'nle amerrled Article 3 provides that: " ••• a sufficient number of 
alternate judges can be appointed to the Court ••• ". 'Ibere is no 
limit to the number of alternate judges, which is a significant 
change to the membership of the Court (8). originally in Law 
10/1973 a maximum of ooe alternate judge could sit 00 any chamber 
of the Court (9). Law 14/1985 rem:JVed this restriction frOll rrost 
chambers. Only the Calstitutional Clamber 1s restricted to one 
alternate judge. Matters of the first seven items of Article 33 
can be decided by fi ve-iIellber chambers, of whan there could be 
two alternate judges. other matters could be decided by chambers 
of three j tXiges, two of whan could be al temate judges (10). 
By the nature of their positions, the alternate judges are 
prone to pressure. The appointment of alternate judges by 
decisions from the executive, without consultation with the 
National Cbuncil, am the nature of their terms of office being 
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fixed yet renewable, place them in a position whereby they are 
Wlprotected. fran arbitrary renova.l fran office. '!be matters with 
which the chambers in which these alternate judges sit are 
concerned. can be very important arrl politically sensitive, such 
as disputes between the emirates and the Union. In matters 
arising tm:ier the cassation Law, jurisdiction can be heard by 
panels on which the majority (two out of three) are alternate 
jooges. 
The importance of matters included in the jurisdiction of 
the Suprene CaJrt, either the original or the added. cassation 
jurisdictioo., cannot be overlooked.; arrl the new prescriptions for 
the imp:>sition am formation of chambers provided. for by Law 
14/1985 deprive the Supreme CaJrt of the special protections 
provided. by the constitution, makirx.J a substantial number of 
members of the Court vulnerable, which gravely affects the 
special nature am protection required. for the Supreme Coort. 
cases decided since :lntxtductial of the oassaticD jurisdicticn 
A. Cases involving federal c1istri.bIt.ia1 of pcMer 
(a) 'D1e Pisberies Case (11) 
(Application for constitutional interpretation 5/8, 8 Novanber 
1981) 100 Official Gazette. 
'nlis is the last of the a"W1ica:tions for interpretation that 
characterised. the first pericrl. It was requested. by the Camcil 
of Ministers on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture. 
'Ihl.s case involves the entry by one of the emirates into 
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agreement with a neighhJuring country to detennine rights to 
engage in fishing activities in adjacent sea areas. As an 
objection to this agreement, the Ministry of Agriculture noved to 
obtain a declaration fron the Supreroo Court that regulation of 
fisheries is the sole ~ of the federal goverrmmt, accordi.D:J 
to Article 121 of the constitution, and that the emirates do not 
have the right to enter into agreements wi th other countries 
about fisheries. Article 121 provides: 
wi thout prej udice to the provisions of the preceding 
article, the Union shall have exclusive legislative 
jurisdiction in the following matters: ••• protection of 
agricultural and animal wealth. 
Article 120, which precedes this article, prescribed matters 
on which: "the Union shall have exclusive legislative and 
executive jurisdiction", and aaong these matters is: "1 - Foreign 
Affairs". 
Article 123 provides: 
As an exception to Article 120 concerning exclusive 
jurisdictioo of the Union in matters of foreign policy and 
international relations, the nenber emirates of the Union 
may calClooe limited agreeaents of a local administrative 
nature with the neighbouring states or regions, save that 
such agreements are not inoonsistent with the interests of 
tb9 Unioo or with Unioo laws and provide:} that the Supreme 
Council is informed in advance ••• 
Article 149 provides: 
As an exception to the provisions of Article 121 of this 
constitution, the Emirates may promulgate legislations 
necessary for the regulation of the matters set out in the 
said Article witoout violation of the proviSions of Article 
151 of this CXlllStitution. 
Article 151 contains the supremacy clause, that the federal 
constituticn and legislaticn slxJuld prevail over local cnes. 
The dispute then involves entry into an international 
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agreerrent by an emirate, according to the exception provided by 
Article 123, fran the exclusive control of the federal governroont 
over foreign affairs according to Article 120 (1). The agreement 
entered by the emirate concerned, effectively involves regulation 
of fisheries, and this is an exception of the federal 
government's power of regulating animal wealth. The questions 
involved in this case are two: 
1 whether or not the regulation of fisheries is a part of the 
federal government's power of regulating and legislating in 
. 
matters ccncerning animal wealth; 
2 whether or not the emirates are excluded fran legislation in 
matters dedicated by Article 121 to the federal government's 
legislative power. 
Principles ~mopd by the CbJrt in this case 
The Supreme Court announced two main principles in this 
case: 
1 - 'nle first is that regulation of fisheries, restrictions and 
requirements of special pennits is within the legislative 
power of the federal government. The main basis for such a 
firrling is that fish are part of the animal wealth, the 
regulation of which is a part of the legislative power given 
to the federal government by Article 121 of the 
oonstitution. 
2 - The seaxrl is that originally the federal government has the 
power to regulate matters included in Article 121, but as an 
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exception to this rule, Article 149 gives the emirates the 
right to legislate in these matters until and to the extent 
of federal legislation. Foreign affairs are within the 
legislative curl executive federal power, but as an exception 
the emirates are allowed to conclude agreements of an 
administrative nature with nei~ing countries. 
'!be result of these two rules is that the emirates can enter 
into agreenents with neigh1x:m'ing countries to regulate fishing 
activities in the adjacent waters. '!he agreement entered into by 
the emirate concerned is-, as a consequence of the principles and 
findings of the Court in this case, oot inconsistent with the 
constitution. 
This case was not presented in the form of a direct 
challenge to an act taken by ooe of the emirates. It was brought 
in the fonn of an ~ and applicatioo for the interpretation 
of sane of the ronsti tutional provisions. '!be real cause of the 
rrove to bring this case was to challen:Je the cx:mpatibility of an 
agreenent made by one of the emirates with a neigbb:>Uring country 
with the provisions of the constitution. The reasons for 
avoiding the direct challenge, resorting instead to an 
applicatioo for advisory opinicn were political. Direct challenge 
by the Federal Cabinet to an acticn of cne of the emirates, 
necessarily headed by a nenber of the Federal Supra:ne Council, is 
sensitive and could result in negative oonsequences. Bringing an 
applicaticn for the interpretaticn of constitutional provisions 
is less sensitive than a direct challenge of unconstitutionality 
of an act of an emirate. 
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It is unclear fron the dOC\.lmaIlts available whether or not 
permission fron the Supreme Council was granted for the emirate 
cxncerned to enter into this agreenent (12). lJc::1Never, regardless 
of whether or not pennission was granted to the emirate, it would 
have been very difficult for the Supreme Council to agree on 
challenging this act by an anirate which is headed by a nenber of 
the Council. The matter of cha.ll~ng the cxnstitutionality of 
the entry of the anirate concerned into the agrearent was left to 
the Federal Cabinet to brirrg to the Supreme Coort. The Cabinet 
chose a way which saved it fron a direct coo.frontation with the 
emirate cxnoemed. 
The Supreme Court, as is evident fron its decision, was 
aware of the facts of the case. All the political factors 
affecting the matter involved in this case played some role 
favouring the anirate ccncerned. The Supreme C::urt had urxier its 
disposal means by which it could have redressed the balance, arrl 
defemed the interests of the federal goverment despite the 
negative effects of the political factors. Article 123 of the 
cxnstituticn required that an agreement which nay be entered into 
by one of the emirates should not be inconsistent with the 
interests of the federal government (13). 
The act of bringing this application, and therefore the 
challenge, is clear evidenoe of the disapproval of the federal 
autlx>rities with the contents of the agreement entered into by 
the emirat-e ccncerned. The anna.mcement by a federal authority, 
even in an indirect way, of its disapproval of an international 
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agreement, could have been used to ren:ler this agreem:mt void 
because of its contradiction with the interests of the Union. 
The Supreme Court could have stressed the condition of the 
oonsistency of international agreements of the emirates with the 
interests of the Union, an:l could have explained the ways by 
which any inconsistency of international agreements of the 
emirates with the interests of the Union could be disoovered. 
'!\le direct or irrlirect declaration of the Federal Cabinet could 
be used as evidence which may lead to the investigation of the 
oontents am circumstances of international agreements by the 
Suprare Court, to decide on their viability (14) 
Cb) Shah IbIh Case 
(Criminal cassation case 1 /8, 23 September 1985) 
'!his case involves the constitutionality of an executive act 
by the ruler of the Emirate of Fujairah. '!be executive order was 
carried out according to authorisation by the local law of 
criminal procedure, which neant that a decision had to be made on 
the ccnstltutionality of sane provisions of this local law, on 
the grounds of their incompatibility with the federal 
oonstitution, which rerrlers them invalid according to the federal 
supremacy of Article 151 of the constitution. 
'!he facts of the case involved two people who were convicted 
by the federal primary Court of Fujairah for as~ult, causing 
l:xxlily hann to a third perscn. '!he two ccnvicted people appealed 
to the federal appellate Court. While the case was pending 
awaiting appellate hearings, an amnesty order was issued for 
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these b,1o people. '!bey were released and the appellate oourt 
decided to dismiss the case on the grourrls of the amnesty issued 
by the ruler, by authorisation fron the local criminal procedures 
law. The appellate Court decided that, because of the order of 
amnesty, the criminal action was tenninated. 
'!he Public Prosecution Authority brought appeal of cassation 
to the Suprene Court. '!he appeal was based on two points of 
error of Law: 
1 - The first is that the decision of the Court of Appeals 
coofused two different kWs of amnesty. '!be first kirrl is 
amnesty fran the crime, which effectively renders lawful the 
acts on which conviction is based, with the result of 
re.novin;J all the effects of the convictioo. '!his kirrl of 
aI1U1eSty is authorised by Article 109 of the constitution, 
through the prarulgation of a special law (15). 'lbe secarl 
kind of amnesty is amnesty from sentence, which is 
authorised by the canstitutioo to be grantErl by a decree 
signed by the President follCMing rec:cmneroatioo of special 
committee created for this purpose (16). Amnesty from 
sentence does not r€llD\1e the criminal nature of the actions 
of the ccnvicted, am does not stop criminal action. '!be 
ultimate effect of amnesty from sentence is to stop 
application of sentence resulting from a final Court 
decision. 
2 - '!he second point of error of Law is that the decision was 
based on legal proc.risions which are no roore applicable. '!he 
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decision was based on Articles 186 and 1 87 of the local 
criminal procedures act, which give the ruler the right to 
grant amnesty to persons involved in criminal proceedings. 
According to Article 107 of the constitution, only the 
President can grant pardon fron sentence. General a.rralesty 
for crimes is allowed only by legislation, according to 
Article 1 09. By the application of the supremacy of the 
federal oonstitution and legislation over local legislation, 
the local articles allowing the ruler to grant a.rralesty are 
no mre applicable 117 ). 
'!be CbJrt' s decl sim in this case 
'!be Suprare Court accepted the points raised by the Public 
Prosecution and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal. 
'!be Cburt decided that, because the Court involved is a federal 
Court, it applies local legislatioo only as far as it does not 
conflict with the constitutioo or federal law. In this case, the 
constitution prevails on local legislaticn conflicting with its 
provisioos. 
'!be p::M&s gi veIl to the ruler of Fuj airah by the local crim-
inal procaiure Law are examples of the wide range of powers the 
rulers used to enjoy before the federaticn. 'Ibese rulers, as far 
as inteDlal matters in their emirates are ooncerned, were reluc-
tant to surrerrler power to the federal institutions. The ruler 
of Fujairah in this case acted in the way he had been accustaned 
to act. '!be new factor in this case, absent before the Union, is 
action of federal autOOri ties which were prepared to obj ect to an 
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order by a ruler in his emirate, deperrling on limitations imposed 
by the constitution for the benefit of the Union. 
Sane institutions, even after becaning federal institutions, 
were still treating the rulers as having unlimi ted pc:Mers in 
their emirates. '!be institutions, which used to be local am 
later transferred to federal control, needed time to get used to 
the new situation. '!be Court of Appeal which was involved in the 
case was transferred to the Unicn in 1978 (18). 
'!be SUprerre Court' s decision in this case is a significant 
precedent in balancing the federal system and enforcing the 
limits prescribed by the constitution on the powers of the 
emirates am their rulers. 
B. Cases imolviDj <XJIIPitibiUty with the ocostitutial of laws 
alleged to be in,.,et:lble with Islamic Sbari'a 
'!be exnstitution provides in Article 7 that: 
Islam is the official religion of the Union. '!be Islamic 
Shari I a shall be a rrain source of legislation in the Union. 
'!be clx>ice to refer to Shari' a as "a main source", is in 
contrast to reference to it as "the main source" (19). It is 
urrlerstood that the language used in Article 7 p,lts Shari' a 00 an 
equal basis with other sources o£ Law. The emphasis in this 
Article is on soorces of law, so it is meant principally for 
legislatures, to guide them in the prarulgatioo of laws. If no 
clear legislation is available, then the Coorts, while looking to 
other sources of Law, should bear this guidance in mind in 
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choosing rules that are not inccmpatible with Shari 'a (20). 
'lllis explanation is supported by the content in Article 8 of 
law 6/1978, which set up the Union Courts of First Instance aOO 
Appeal, am transferred to these Courts the jurisdiction of the 
local judicial bcrlies of four emirates (Al:ll-Dhahi, Sharjah, Ajrnan 
and Fuj airah). 'Ihl.s Article prO'l7ides: 
'!he Union Cc:Jurts shall apply the provisions of the Islamic 
Shari' a, Union laws, am other laws in force, just as they 
shall apply those rules of custom and general legal 
principles which do not conflict with the provisions of the 
Shari 'a. . 
In its reference to Union laws and other laws in force, this 
Article IXlts them on equal terms with the rules of Shari' a, rut 
in its reference to the remairrler of sources, the Article requi-
red that the rules taken fron those sources should be canpatible 
wi th Shari' a. 'nlese Courts, federal, primary aOO appeal, have the 
general cx:mpetence in their respective emirates, aOO the one in 
Abu-Dhabi has the canpetence prO'l7ided for the primary federal 
ccurt in the capital. So in civil and criminal matters, where 
federal legislation and local legislation apply in the 
territorial jurisdiction of the included emirates, there is 
generally no ccnfusicn a:oout the sources of law am the rules 
applicable, according to Law 6/1978 and according to the 
constitution (21). 
The Supreme Court's statute (Law 10/1973) provides in 
Article 75 that: 
'lbe SUprel'OO ChuIt shall apply the Islamic Shari 'a, Union 
laws and other laws in force in the member Emirates of the 
Union ccnfonning to the Islamic Shari 'a. Likewise it shall 
apply those rules of custan and those principles of natural 
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and comparative Law which do not conflict with the 
principles of that Shari'a. 
It should be notErl that in Article 8 of the Io.o1er Courts 
statute 6/1978, Union Laws and other applicable Laws are not 
expressly requirErl to conform to Shari'a, whereas in Article 75 
of the Supreme Court's Statute, express provision is included to 
require Union Laws and other applicable Laws to conform to the 
rules of Shari'a. It should be noticed, moreover, that the 
Supreme Court's Statute was not intended for general applicatioo 
regarding civil and criminal matters, rut to apply originally 
oo.ly to matters included in Article 99 of the constitution an:l 
Article 33 of Law 10/1973 (22). 
In 1978, and by Law 17/1978, cassation jurisdiction was 
gi ven to the Supreme Court. This Law prescribed rules and 
proc::edures for petitiCllS of cassation to the Supreme Court to 
oversee the applicatim by lower Q)urts of laws applicable in the 
cnmtry. Article 33 of Law 17/1978 (the cassation law) provides 
that: 
Law 10/1973 of the Federal Supreme Court should apply 
regarding matters not regulated in this Law. 
One of the matters not regulated in Law 17/1978 is the 
hierarchy aIXi applicability of the different salrces of rules, so 
Article 75 of Law 10/1973 applies for cassation cases. 
A strange situatioo is created by the rule just nentioned, 
in that the Federal rower Courts are boond by Article 8 of Law 
6/1978 regardin;J the priority am applicability of the different 
legal rules, whereas the Coort of Cassation (the Supreme Court), 
which is supposed to oversee the applicaticn by lower courts of 
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the existing laws, is governed by a different rule regarding the 
priority of sources of rules, which is Article 75 of Law 10/1973. 
'lhis resulted in making parts of Law 10/1973, which was passed to 
create arrl regulate a Court of special canpetence, applicable 
regarding commercial, civil and criminal matters. The 
significance of this result is that Article 75 insists on the 
cx:mpatibility with Shari' a of all legal provisions arrl rules to 
be applied by the Supreme Court, as a consequence of which 
several local and federal laws could now be challenged for 
incanpatihiUty with Shari 'a. 
'Ihis raises again the idea mentioned in Chapter Eight, that 
the SuprE!l're Court is not suitable to be given the jurisdicticn of 
cassation. '!he problem of the awlicability of the rules of 
Shari 'a is another problem created by Law 17/1978 (law of 
cassaticn) arrl it would have been better to establish a special 
coort of cassation with a clear stipllaticn for the awlicable 
laws than to create the current confusion for lower O:::A.lrts a.rrl 
for the SuprE!l're Court itself. 
Under the trend of the revival arrl reinstatenent of Shari 'a 
in the Islamic World (23) arrl because of the importanoe of Islam 
as one of the bases of society in the U.A.E. (24), the issue of 
the supremacy of Islamic Shari I a over other sources of Law was 
boUIx:i to cx:me before Lc::lwer Courts am eventually to the Suprene 
Court. 
'Iba importance of the matter of awlication of Shari' a is 
signified by the prohibition in Shari 'a of bank interest arx:i 
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usury (in Arabic - Riba), the application of which has great 
significance to the country's banking am a::mnercial operations. 
Another area of importance to the application of the rules of 
Shari 'a is in criminal matters, especially as related to drinking 
alcohol, am its prohibition am special penalties urrler Shari' a. 
Olses about the 1P'?1 i ty am amstituticmal.ity of bank interest 
(RllB) 
(a) '!be Janatta Bank Case 
(Applicatioo for constitutional interpretation 14/9, 28 June 
1981) 95 Official Gazette. 
In 1979 two new laws organising the federal judiciaries 
began operation sirultaneously (25), creating confusion about the 
prevalence of the salI'ces of law am of applicable legal rules 
governing the federal judiciary. An important part of the 
emerging oonfusioo conoerned the applicability of the interest 
rate on loans involvirxJ banks am ccmnercial transactions. A 
large number of cases came to the Courts in Abu-Dhabi regarding 
interest payments, am several decisions were taken by primary 
arrl appeal <hlrts in this emirate. '!be Janatta Bank case was the 
case in which the Constitutional 01amber of the Suprema Court 
sooght to use its auth:>rity to rerove the confusion by settlir¥J 
the matter and avoiding difficulties for the commercial 
operations am banking systems in the coontry. 
We shall examine the situation in Abu-Dhabi during the first 
two years of operatioo of laws regarding the federal judiciary. 
Abu Dhabi law of Civil Procedures (law 3/1970) allows, in 
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its Articles 61 and 62, the Civil Court to require the levying of 
interest upon a judgement sum until the full debt has been paid. 
In 1979 and 1980 sate Courts in Aal-Dhabi arguErl that Law 3/1970 
of Abu-Dhabi did not order or command the judge to include 
levying of interest but permitted such inclusion in civil 
decisions. Since Law 6/1978 made Shari I a the first source of law 
for federal Courts and it is obvioos that payment of interest is 
against Shari I a, these Courts refrained fran incluling payment of 
interest in their decision. They declared that fErleral Courts 
-were prohibited by statute fran inclu:Ung any interest payment in 
their decisions (26). 
'!he ~ion reached the Supreme Court, under its new role 
as a Court of cassation: the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court 
faced several petitions and appeals (27). The Civil Chamber of 
the Supreme Court was unable to act, because of its problem with 
Law 17/1978 (Law of cassation) and its reference to Article 75, 
which prohibited enforcement by the Supreme Court of any Law 
unless such a Law or instrument is canpatible with the rules of 
the Islamic Shari 'a. The Civil Olamber of the Supreme Court 
sooght the help of the Constitutional Cl'larnber, which is IOOre 
powerful arrl is anpowered to give constitutional interpretations 
which are binllng on all (28). 
'!he Civil Olarnber had before it the case of Janatta Bank v. 
Najib Transportation am Constructioo Canpany (29). In this case 
the Federal Appeal Court of Abu-Dhabi refused to order the 
payment of interest with its decision ordering the payment of the 
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original loan, arguing that payment of interest is against 
Shari 'a am that the Law prohibits any decision by federal courts 
that is in breach of Shari I a rules (30). 
The Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court submitted a 
oonstitutional question to the Constitutional Cllamber, asking for 
a declaration on the compatibility with the constitution of 
Articles 61 am 62 of Law 3/1970 of the Emirate of Aru-Dhabi, 
which permitted the order by civil Courts to levy interest. The 
urrlerly~ premise is that, if these articles are permitted am 
supported by the constitution, and that Article 7 of the 
CCt'lSti tutioo (of the Shari' a as a main source of Law) does not 
have the effect of over-ruling such articles, then there is no 
justification for lower federal courts avoi~ the enforcement 
of such articles. '!be ultimate effect of the 0Jurt' s decisioo in 
this case would not be confined to Aru-I:'babi, rut wcW.d have 
effect in other emirates which subscribed to the federal 
judiciary and, because of the constitutional authority, in the 
rest of the CX11Iltry. 
The questicn sul:Jni tted to the Suprere Coort: in this case was 
whether or not Articles 61 arrl 62 of the Civil Procedures Law of 
AtAl-Dhabi, which pennit the inclusion of interest payments in 
judicial decisioos, were canpatible with the CCt'lStitution in the 
light of its Article 7. 
Before discussing the principles established by the 0Jurt in 
this case, it is beneficial to consider the importance of the 
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subject matter in general. The case arose due to confusion 
resulting partly fron conflicting decisions by lower courts and 
partly because of the inability of the Cassation Chamber of the 
Supreme Court to offer help in avoiding these confusions. This 
environment of uncertainty created negative feelings in the 
ccmnercial banking sector and pranpted large rn.mtbers of debtors 
to default, signalling a crisis that required an authoritative 
voice to resolve. In order to protect CCItI'OOrcial banking and 
ccmnercial transactions in the area, reassurance was required. 
The confusion was triggered by new federal legislation, 
6/1978 and 17/1978. 'lhis latter gave cassation jurisdiction to 
the Supreme Court, which is governed by Law 10/1973 and its 
Article 75, which insists on conformity with Shari'a of all 
legislation to be applied by the Court. 
'!be sense of urgency about the need to brln:J an ern to the 
confusion can be appreciated fran the speed at which this case 
was decided. 'lbe case was brought on 24 May 1981 and decided on 
28 JW1e 1981. 'lbe case was important and the decision set a 
precedent used as a basis in subSequent decisions by federal 
oourts (31). 
'lbe SUpreme Court established three inqx>rtant principles in 
this case: 
1 - '!bat pranulgation of laws is the duty of the legislature and 
that Article 150 of the constitution directed the federal 
legislature to issue laws to replace legislation which 
existed before the federation, and to regulate matters in 
O1apter 10 
- 338 -
detail in accordance with the constitution's p..IrpOses ani 
orders (32); that Article 7 of the constitution is a 
direction frcm the constitution to the federal legislature 
to issue laws and regulations and to have the Islamic 
Shari 'a as a main source of such legislation. The speed and 
the fom of such federal legislation, especially regarding 
Islamic Shari'a rules, is a matter of policy which is not 
for the judiciary to decide. 
2 - 'lbat the Laws, regulations, orders ani other measures in 
force at the time when the constitution commenced its 
operation are save:3 frcm application of Article 151 (federal 
supremacy clause) because of the protection extended to than 
by Article 148 ( 33) • 
rrhe Calrt argued that it was obvious fron Article 148 
and the following articles, that the framers of the 
constitution differentiated between two categories of 
legislaticn. In tm first category is legislation in force 
at the time of CCII1in;J into force of the oonstitution. 'Ihls 
category is granted extension of authority ani cxntinuatioo 
of application by Article 148. 
In the second category is all legislation issued 
subsequent to the cx.ming into force of the constitution. 
'Ihls category is regulated by Articles 149 ani 150 (34). 
The hierarchy of this second category is established by 
Article 151 (federal supremacy clause). This second 
category is subj ect to review by the Supreme ChJ.rt to ensure 
observation of the order established by Article 151. 
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Accordingly, all measures of legislation preceding the 
caning to force of the consti tution remain in force and 
acquire authority fran the provisions of the constitution so 
far as they remain \ll'laIreOOe:1 or abolished expressly. '!here 
is no excuse for any authority in the ca.mtry to refrain 
fran observing legislation preceding the operation of the 
constitution, as they starrl, urrler the cover that sate of 
these laws do not conform with the provisions of the 
constitution. The reason for the continuation of the 
operation of such legislation is that the constitution 
expressly ordered their observation and saved them from 
application of Article 151. Irxieed, the Ca.Irt argued, any 
abarrlonment of the applicatioo of these maasure would arocmlt 
to abandonment of consti tutional orders prohibited by 
Article 145. 
Because of the foregoing, the Ca.Irt argued, Articles 61 
and 62 of the Civil Procedure Cede of Al:u-Dhabi are parts of 
a law which came into force before commencement of the 
operation of the constitution, therefore, these two articles 
are oonsidere:1 to be oonstitutional according to Article 148 
of the coostitution. Not.hirr:} in Articles 8 of Law 6/1978 or 
75 of Law 10/1973 (which oroere:1 federal <X>UIts to apply the 
Islamic Shari'a), affects or removes the constitutional 
authority exterrled to the two articles of the Al:u-Dhabi Law 
by the constitutioo. 
3 - '!bat the prrpose of the language used in Article 62 of Abu-
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Dhabi's civil procedure ccxie is to establish the maxi.rnum 
allowable rates of interest. Nothing in this or Article 61 
authorises the judges to refrain fron enforcing the interest 
rate agreed by parties or abarrlon the payment of interest in 
their judgement. '!'he tmPOSe of establishing maxi.rnum rates 
of interest is the protection of debtors fron exploitation. 
'Iberefore, if the parties ex.ceerled in their agreements the 
prescribed limits, it becnoes the duty of the judges to 
decrease the rate of interest to CCXlfoon to the rraximum 
limit prescribed by- the cx:rle. 
Evalnatim of the prlnciples established by the Qm:t in this 
CBSe 
Evaluation will be confined to the first two principles, due 
to their significance to the purposes of this study. 
1 - That issuing federal Laws to replace local legislation 
(especially legislation inconsistent with the constitution), 
and the direction of Article 7 to make Shari I a a main source 
of Law, are matters of policy not for the Courts to 
question. 
If the tirnID3', form and details of new federal legislation 
orderal by Article 150 of the constitution are mainly matters of 
policy for the legislature to decide, there is a duty on the 
supreme Court to review canplianoe of the legislature with the 
orders and provisions of the coostituticn. Any urdue delay in 
issuing federal legislation required by the coostituticn cx:cl.d 
result in effects contrary to those sanctioned by the 
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oonstitution. The detennination of the existence of undue delay 
is a matter of judgement but it carmot be left entirely to the 
legislature without any checking an::1 supervision fran the Supreme 
Court, which has the power of judicial review of 
oonstitutionality. Altlnlgh the legislature has wide discretion 
for clxx:>sing the timiD:J of the passing of legislation requested 
by the constitution, the power of review given to the Supreme 
Court can be invoked to remedy obviously unj ust or negative 
effects resulting fran any · clearly unnecessary delay in issuing 
federal laws. Moreover, if the details of issuing federal 
legislation are largely a matter of policy, leaving local 
legislation in contradiction to the provisions of the 
constitution, is not a matter of policy left to the discretion of 
the legislature. Depriving such legislation of effect is a matter 
of principle governed directly by the constitution, particularly 
by Article 151, am is subject to review am enforcement by the 
Supreme <burt' s decisions in accordance with Article 99 of the 
constitution am Article 33 of Law 10/1973. 
2 - '!bat all local legislation in force before the caning into 
force of the constitutioo is saved by Article 148 of the 
constitution fran being subjected to the order of Article 
151 am, therefore, not subj ect to review by the Supreme 
Court. 
This principle is based on an interpretation of some 
constitutional provisions, which is not obviously sanctiooed by 
the language used in these prov1sioos, especially Article 148. 
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'!be interpretation provided by the Court is not canpatible with 
the literal meanings of these provisions, nor with the federal 
system created by the oonstitution. Such interpretations were 
not essential for arrival at the conclusion that the Court 
reached. 
It is essential to rerranber that the constitution is the 
supreme Law of the larrl. 'Ihls constitution prevails not only 
over local legislation, rut also over the constitutions of the 
member emirates. Any legislation of the member emirates is 
~ to be sanctioned by the local constituticn, whether this 
is written or custarary. To argue that the federal constitution 
prevails over local ccostitutions rut not over sane inferior 
legislation is not reasonable, an:l is contrary to Article 151 of 
the federal constituticn. 
The constitution which created the federal system and 
distributed powers between the federal government and the 
emirates has the position of bein;J the supreme law of the lan:l. 
After the constitution cane into force, all legislation in the 
country has been required to observe the constitution-i.mp:>sed 
limitations. It is against this premise for the Suprene Court to 
deduce, as the Court did in this case, fran an article of this 
constitution, a rule not clearly stated nor strongly ~lied by 
its language that it sanctioos breach by any kirrl of legislation 
of its rules am limitations. 
Article 148 can be urrlerst:cx:rl to have a meaning similar to 
that of Article 149. According to Article 1 49 the emirates have 
the power to legislate in matters incllrled in Article 121 until 
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the federal government uses its right to legislate. in these 
matters, and to the extent that local legislation does not 
contradict federal legislation in these matters. In other words, 
the emirates have the right to legislate in these matters until 
am to the extent of federal occupation of the field. Likewise, 
Article 148 could be understood to have similar meaning. 
According to this uOOerstanding, local legislation existing in 
the emirates prior to the caning into force of the constituticn 
remains valid to the extent that it does not conflict with the 
provisions of the constitution or federal law. 
Nothing in Article 151 or in any other provision of the 
CXXlStitution necessarily or expressly irrlicates that legislation 
existing before the caning into force of the CXXlStitution is to 
be excluded from the federal supremacy rule of Article 151. 
Irrlee:i, fron the language used in Article 150, that the federal 
authorities shall issue legislation as soon as possible to 
replace existio:; local legislation, especially those conflicting 
with the federal constitution, this constitutional sanction oould 
be understood to have the same meaning as the sancticn in Article 
101, for the concerned authorities, upon a decision by the 
Supreme Court of the i.ru:xxnpatibility with the constltuticn of 
their legislation, that they: 
shall be obliged to hasten to take the necessary measures to 
rem:>ve or rectify the constitutional inconsistency. 
'lhls canoot be UIrlerstood to mean that, until inoonsistency 
with the constitution is rectified, such legislation should 
remain valid. In the same light, it is not a cxnvincing argument 
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that provisions of emirate legislation operating before the 
CX>IlStitution caroo into force should be held valid until arnerrled 
or a.l:x>lished. 
The Supreme Court, in its decision in this case, used a 
measure of self restraint, and the judgement was neither 
beneficial nor detr:ineltal to the CXXlStitution. The argtU'llel1ts 
used by the Court in this case give the emirates a wide 
discretion, removing from federal supremacy some local 
legislation that had been subject to federal rules. '!be result 
of arguments used by the Court in this decision are to the 
disadvantage of the federal government. The federal system 
requires suJ:m:ission by member emirates of parts of their powers 
to the central goverment. Canpatibility of local laws with the 
federal constitution is required by the nature of the federal 
system am by express provisioos of the federal constitution. 
The principle announced by the <DJ.It in this decision contradicts 
the federal system and the requirements of the federal 
constitutioo. 
(b) '!be BaJ:ldt. Bank 0Ise 
(Civil cassation case 17/5, 6 Septanber 1983) 
'!his case was ~ the cases brought to the federal courts 
of AOO-Dhabi in the envirormmt of uncertainty of the legality of 
bank interest payments created by Laws 6 and 17 of 1978. BarOO.a 
Bank. brought the case to recover the principa.l debt and interest 
accruiIY:j fran the deferrlant, AOO-Dhabi Electronics Canpany. The 
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Court of first instance ordere1 payment of the principal debt but 
refused to include an order of payment of the interest accruing. 
'!be Ccurt argue1 that, because it is ordere1 to apply Shari'a, 
arrl interest payment is prohibite1 according to Shari 'a, it could 
not order such payment. 
The Bank appealed, and the appellate Court reversed the 
decision of the l.or.r.>er Court arrl ordere1 payment of the principal 
arrl the interest. The defendant in these proceedings brought a 
challenge of cassation to the Supraoo Court, requesting reversal 
of the appeal Court's decision, on the grourrl of error of Iaw in 
its enforcement of the interest clause in the original agreem:mt. 
'!be Cassatial Decisicn 
'!be SUpraoo Court upheld the appeal Court decisicn and citErl 
the constitutional decision in the Janatta Bank case 
(oonstitutional interpretation 14/9). '!his autlx:>ri ty of the 
Janatta Bank case shows the importance of that decisicn for later 
cases. 
cn .... na] Cases about the awucatiat of 9Jarl'a 
'!be CXXlfusion creatErl by the enactments of Iaws 6/1978 and 
17/1978 of the federal judiciary involved uncertainty and 
questioning of sane local criminal laws as to their ocmpatihility 
with Article 7 of the constitution and their application by 
federal Courts urrler the new Court legislation. '1lle majority of 
the cases involved the applicability of the special penalty 
prescrilJej by Shari' a for the drinking of alcoOOl by Muslims, and 
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whether this penalty should be applied in conjunction with, or as 
a replacement to, the punishments prescribed by local 
legislation. The causes of the confusicn in this matter are the 
same that resulted in confusion a1:xJut interest payzrents, rut the 
consequences are less significant (35) 
Ca) 'l1le case of the CDIpltihility with the (xmst.:U:utim of the 
OD:1eSS in a PJbllc place mrler Abl-umn. 
Law 8/1976 
(Application for constitutiooal interpretation 1/8, 8 November 
1981) 100 Official Gazette. 
A Illmlber of cases for constitutional interpretation were 
joined with this case to be prCNided with one decision, due to 
the similarity of their requests (36). 'Ihese cases were referred 
by the Abl-Dhabi Appeal Court for decisions on the canpatihility 
with the constitution of the penalties imposed by the Abl-Dhabi 
Alooholic Drinks Law (Law 8/1976). '!he Court of Appeal invoked 
Article 7 of the constitution, which makes Shari I a a main source 
of law, Federal Law 6/1978 of the federal judiciary, the 
-application of which leads to application of the penalties 
imposed by the Abu-Dhabi Alcoholic Drinks Law (37), and Law 
17/1978 of cassaticn, which refers to Article 75 of Law 10/1973 
of the Supreme Court, in which application of Shari' a is 
stressed. 
The Court of Appeal argued that there appeared to be a 
oonflict between the application of Article 75 of Law 10/1973, 
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which makes the penalty for drunkenness and consumption of 
alcohol by a Muslim to be flogging as an Islamic Hadd, am the 
application of Law 8/1978 of Abu-Dhabi, which provides for 
another penalty (38). The Court of Appeal argued in its 
application that the problem is created by the inclusion of a 
penalty other than that prescribed by Shari I a, which is a breach 
of the rules of Shari 'a arromting to a breach of the constitution 
in its sanction that Shari'a be made a main source of 
legislation. 
PO nciples est;abl1 shed by the decl Si 00 of <bJrt in this case 
'l1le Court used several principles in order to reach its 
final result, sane of which were already established, others of 
which were new. '!be principles used in this case were as follows. 
1 - '!hat Article 7 of the constitution cannot be used as a basis 
for the scrutiny of legislation with the constitution 
because of non-compliance with Shari I a. The purpose of 
Article 7 is to provide guidance for legislators in the 
legislative process; compliance with this guidance is a 
matter of policy not for the Courts to question. 
2 - 'l1lat the proper basis for constitutiCXlal scrutiny is Article 
75 of Law 10/1973, which provides that the Court in its 
disposal of matters in its original jurisdiction, provided 
by Article 33 of its statutes including constitutional 
scrutiny of legislation, has to disregard any measures 
incx:rnpatible with Shari la. As a result of this, the Court 
argued that, to decide on the constitutionality of 
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punishments included in Law 8/1976 of Abl-Dhabi, · it needed 
to decide on the canpatibility of the punishments included 
in Article 17 of that Law with the rules of Shari' a (39). 
If these rules were fourrl to be canpatible with Shari' a, 
then they wc:uld be <XXlStitutlonal, an1 vice-versa. 
3 - '!bat the pmishment prescribed in Article 17 of Abu-Dhabi 
Law 8/1976 is for a special crime of drunkenness in a public 
place or pJblic road, whether such a person is a Muslim 
subject to the Islamic punishment of Hadd or a non-Muslim. 
'!his is a special criJoo described by its defined corrlition; 
for such a crime a special discretionary punishment is 
allowed by Shari' a, which cnlld be regulated by legislation. 
'Ibere is nothing to prohibit the applicatien of the Hacki 
punishment for Muslims in addition to the punishment 
provide:! by Article 17. 'lberefore, Article 17 of Abl-Dhabi 
Law 8/1976 is not against Shari'a and, consequently, it is 
oonstitutiooal. 
BInlluat.ial of the a:m:t' s dec1 Si on 
'!be principle, reiterated by the Court here, of considering 
cx:mpliance with Article 7 a matter of policy not to be questioned 
by the Courts, has been evaluated above ( 40) • Evaluatien here 
will be confined to the principle aIl1'rAlIlCed by the Court that 
Article 75 of its statute is the basis en which oanpatibility 
with Shari I a is essential to decide that a provision of law is 
canpatihle with the ccnstitution. Central to this principle is 
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the Court I s argument that Article 75 governs the original 
jurisdiction of the Court containOO in Article 33 of its statute, 
including constitutional scrutiny of legislation. 
Article 75 provides: 
The Supreme Court shall apply the rules of the Islamic 
Shari I a, Union Laws am other laws in force in the member 
Emirates of the Union confonning to the Islamic Shari 'a, as 
well as those rules of custom and those principles of 
natural am canparative law which do not conflict with the 
principles of that Shari'a. 
'Ibis article is not meant to be a canprehensive catalogue of 
all the sources of regulatioos that can be applied by the Ca.Irt 
in all the matters in its original jurisdicticn. '!here is one 
essential source anitted fron Article 75, am this source is the 
constitution itself. 'Ibis anission makes the idea that Article 75 
is a canprehensive catalogue of applicable sources of regulation 
for the Court unfoorrled, am is certainly a wrong idea. An 
explanation of the anissioo of the coostitution fron Article 75 
is that it is implied that the Court will apply the 
constitutional provisioos directly in cases of oonstitutional 
interpretatioo and scrutiny. Article 75 is, accx:>rclinj to this 
understanding, to apply to the other items in the original 
jurisdictioo of the Court • 
.AccoI'di.r¥3 to the afore-nenticned idea, the Coort was wrcn;J 
to base its oonstitutional scrutiny in this case 00 Article 75. 
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(b) Case ~ the CDlStitut:iooality of the punisboent far 
drunkermess ocntained in law 8/1976 of Abl-lllabi. 
(Application for constitutional interpretation 4/9, 25 November 
1983) 135 Official Gazette. 
Several cases were joinoo with this case to be provided with 
one decision, due to the similarities of their requests (41). 
Basically, the causes and requests in this and the cases joined 
with it are the same that were in case no. 1, year 8 discussed 
above. This case concerned the compatibility with the 
consti tution of the punishment of drunkenness contained in 
Article 17 of Law 8/1976 of Abu-Dhabi, because of the provision 
of a pmishment other than requiroo by Shari' a. 
'!be priIclpl.es establ1 staJ by the <h1rt 
'!he Court based its decision on two min principles. 
1 - That, although it may appear from Article 7 of the 
constituticn that Shari la is to be on equal terms with other 
sources of Law because it is referred to as "a main source" 
instead of "tre na.in 5alI'ce" of Law, the doubt has been 
renoved by Article 75 in which the legislature has explained 
the intention from Article 7 of the constitution that 
Sharila is to have a paramount position that makes it 
prevail c:ner other sources of Law. 
2 _ That applying the punishment required by Sharila to the 
consumption of alcohol by a Muslim, therefore, is made 
obligatory by Article 7 of the constitution, acoording to 
its added explanation by Article 75 of the statute of the 
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Suprema Court. At the sane tine, the rules of Shari I a pennit 
the imposition of discretionary punishments over special 
k.irrls of cr~. '!his discretion can be regulated by the 
legislature. 
'!he crimes mentioned in Article 17 of Law 6/1976 of 
Ab.l-Dhabi are rrore than just consumption of alcohol, am 
inch.rle acts ocmnitted by Muslims as well as ncn-r-bslims. 
The Co..lrt arrived at the sane conclusion at which it arrived 
in the previous case, that there is no conflict between Shari' a 
and the punishment rules of Law 6/1976 of AOO-Dhabi, therefore 
the Ab.l-Dha.bi law is not unconstitutional. 
Evaluatiat of the dad si at 
As a start, the case here did not warrant a special 
decision, because the case discussed above (case No. 1, Year 8) 
included a similar request. It was acceptable for the Court of 
Appeal to refer the case because of the enviromnent of confusion 
created by the federal jooiciary statutes (6/1978 and 17/1978), 
since at the tine of the referral (5 April 1 981) the decision in 
the case having the same questioo (No. 1, Year 8) was urrlecided, 
rut at the tine of deciding this case (No. 4, Year 9), which was 
25 December 1 983, the other case had already been decided 
(decisioo in Case No. 1, Year 8 was on 8 November 1981), it was 
sufficient for the Court to refer to the earlier decision. 
In evaluating the principles used in the decision, we shall 
deal with those unique to this case. 
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1 - '!hat the legislature in Article 75 of raw 10/1973 provided 
explanation about the meaning of Article 7 of the 
constitution, the result of which is for Shari' a to be the 
main source of raw. 
'!he decision here confuses h«> different providers of 
binding rules of Law: the first is the constitutional 
framers who have a paramount and supreme position; the 
secx:>rrl is the regular legislature, who are subordinate to 
the first. '!be regular legislature has the right am power 
to legislate in the~ fields am to the extent provided by the 
constitution. The provisions of the constitution bind the 
legislature, but the legislature does not have such a 
binding effect on the constitutional framers or 
constitutional provisions. '!be Court argued in this case 
that the legislature in Article 75 of Law 10/1973, 
effectively transformed the place of Shari'a among the 
sarrces of raw fran being "a main source" into "the main 
sarroe" of raw. 'lbeir argunent is unacceptable because of 
the inherent hierarchy of the h«> sources of rules, the 
constitution am the regular raw (42). 
2 - '!hat the use of Article 7 of the constitution as a provis-
ion enforceable by the Court contradicts a principle estab-
lished earlier by the Court that Article 7 is rreant as a 
guidance to the legislature & that canpliance with it is not 
(43) for the Court to question • In order for the Court to 
change this principle, a special procedure has to be foll-
owed, which has clearly not been followed in this case (44) 
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(c) Case concerning the cxnpatibility with the constitution 
of Article 58 of the AbJ.-lIlabi Cdminal 0Jde. 
(Application for constitutional interpretation 1/14, 19 April 
1987) Not tm>lished in the Official Gazette. 
This case involve1 a person who was prosecuted and brought 
to the Court of first instance of AOO-Dhabi on the grourrls of 
breach:in;J public morals, as defined by Article 58 of the AOO-
Dhabi Criminal Code. The COurt of first instance decided to 
sul::mit an application of constitutional interpretation to the 
Supreme Court, inquiring about the compatibility with the 
constitution of Article 58 (45). '!he referring Coort argued that 
the article in question did not define precisely the acts which 
represent a breach of public morals, which gives rise to a 
possibility of incanpatihility of this article with the constit-
utional principle established by Article 27 of the constitution 
that "All cri.nes and pm1shn'ents shall be defined by Law ••• ". 
Princi pl es estahl 1 shed by the om:t' 8 dec1 8 100 
The Court, in sustaining the compatibility with the 
constitution of Article 58 of the AOO-Dhabi Penal O::xie, deperrled 
on t\r«) p:>ints. 
1 - That it is apparent from Article 58 that there is no 
ambiguity in the acts subject to it. 'Ihese are all acts 
that represent breach of public norality. 'Iherefore, there 
is no conflict between this Article and Article 27 of the 
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constitution in its principle that pmishn¥:mts and crimes 
shall be defined by Law. 
2 - That the absence of precise definitions of the acts 
representing breach of {Xlblic norality does not deprive this 
Article from compatibility with the constitution. The 
absence of precise definition of the acts covered by Article 
58 is a sign of flexibility in order to suit the custcms and 
culture in its development and changing considerations. 
Ba.sic guidance to the definition of public norality should 
be sought in the Islamic Shari 'a, which is the official 
religion of the state and the religion of the inhabitants of 
the cnmtry. 
It is apparent fran this case, as well as fran others, that 
the Court in its relations with other authorities practises self 
restraint and avoids firrling legislaticn \IDCOtlStitutional. 
Geoeral CIlservatials 
'!be i.mp:>rtance of the Supreme Court for the federal system 
and the constitutional system in general cant.inue;:l to gather rrore 
evidence in this period. The prpmulgation of the federal 
judiciary Laws (Law 6/1978 and Law 17/1978) brought new 
confusions and challenges to the Supreme Court. 
It is evident that the Supreme Court, because of its 
origina.l design and because of its statute (Law 10/1973), is oot 
suitable as a Court of cassation. Article 75 of the Court's 
statute, which is unique in insisting on the prevalence of 
Shari'a over other sources of Law, created a crisis in the 
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camtry, especially since Article 7 of the constitution arrl law 
6/1978 of lower federal Courts do not have the same degree of 
insistence on prevalence of the rules of Shari' a. 
In order for the Court to avoid the creatioo of further 
confusion, especially for the financial sector, it resorted to 
interpretations to the constitutioo which are in sate cases not 
oanpatihle with the federal system. 'n1e large number of cases 
caning to the Court increased its responsibility, especially due 
to the binding power of its constitutional decisions. The 
interpretations provided by the Court, either in the cases of 
bank interest payments or consumption of alcob::>l were, in my 
view, insufficient am not well founded. '!be main cause of the 
problem is Article 75 of law 10/1973 arrl the Court failed to CCIlE 
up with an interpretation to this article that rem:::wes the cause 
of the canfusioo. 
As a soluticn to the problem the follC7tliing arguroont could 
serve the purpose of rEmJ\Ting the restrictions imposed by Article 
75 of Law 10/1973. It is worth remambering the original ~ 
of Article 75, which is to govern the items of the Supreme 
Court's canpetenoe other than the CCflStitutional interpretat-
ions. A main reason for this urrlerst:aI:rlir¥J is the absence of 
mentioo of the oonstitutioo itself in Article 75 (46). 
It is also worth renenbering the original purp:lSe of the 
special aR;leal of cassatioo. '!be purpose of cassation is to 
oontrol legality, that is to supervise adherence by the Q:urts to 
the rules prescribed by Law (47) '!be result is that in its 
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constitutional review the Supr€!'le Court has to resort directly to 
the provisions of the constitution witlo.It regard to Article 75 
of its statute, because this is implied in the statute itself. 
In its review of cassation cases, the Supr€!'le Court has to resort 
to Law 6/1978 for reviewing adherence by the Courts to the 
hierarchy of sources of Law provided by the legislature. 
By using this argument the Supreme Court can avoid the 
contradictions it faces as a result of legislation providing it 
with jurisdiction incanpatible with its original purpose. Giving 
the Supreme Court the Cassation jurisdiction not only had a 
negative effect on the Supr€!'le Coo.rt as a specialised court, rut 
also confused the lower courts am caused a large number of cases 
to come to the Supreme Court for which contradicting and 
unfOUIrled decisions were gi van. 
'!he Supreme Coo.rt was interrled by the Constitution to be a 
primarily constituticnal court. Preservaticn of its original 
nature, UIrlerstarrling the importance of its constitutional juris-
diction and solution to the confusion created by the law of 
Cassation make it necessary to transfer cassation from the 
jurisdiction of the SuprE!!lOO Coo.rt to a special court sui table for 
this plI"pOS8. 
At present the argument provided in this part as a 
suggestion for rE3lIkJ\TiD;J the confusicn about the application of 
the rules of Shari I a can serve as a way in which the Coo.rt coold 
avoid the continuation of interpretations that are contrary to 
the design am objectives of the Constitutuion. 
1 '!he quantity of oil prcrluCErl in the U.A.E. went up fron 51.1 
million metric tons in 1971 to 81.8 million metric tons in 
1975. 'lhe incx:IIe fron- exportation of oil rose fron 431 
million dollars in 1971 to 6500 million dollars in 1975. 
See Al-Farra, M. "The Geography of Oil in the U.A.E." in: 
'lhe Arab League, Institute of Arab Research, 'lhe U.A.E.: A 
General Survey Cairo: 1978, pp.452 and · 471. 
2 The tNOrk started in preparing maj or legislations such as 
Criminal Law , Civil Law and other Laws concerning c:x:mnercial 
activities. '!he long tenn projects involved in preparing 
these Laws represent evidence of the confidence emerging as 
to the durability of the federation and the confidence that 
the constitutiCX1al system in existence is to remain for a 
l~ t:ine to cane. The main Laws which were pranulgated in 
the 1980s: 
- Catm3rcial Aqency Law, Law 18/1981 
- Law of Civil Transactia:ls (Civil Code), Law 51/1985 
- Law of Islamic Banks, Financial Institutions and 
investment canpanies, Law 6/1985 
- Criminal Law, Law 6/1986 
3 See cmpter Eight. 
4 'lhis Law was ~lished in the Official Gazette, issue No. 64 
of 30 December 1978. 
5 Law 17/1978 Article 4 
6 Law 17/1978 Articles 1 & 4 
7 See discussion en the effects of the cassation jurisdiction 
00 the Supreme Ca.lrt in Chapter Eight. 
8 '!he principle of app:>intiD:J alternate judges to the Ca.lrt is 
deserving of criticism because the matter of membership of 
the Ca.lrt is establishe:i by Article 96 of the constitution, 
which entails that any further prescription for the 
ne:nbership of the Ca.lrt by legislation should be of adding 
details to the c::xnstituticral prescription not of a canplete 
transformation of the Court. Even if these jtrlges are 
called altematejudges, they mainly have the same powers of 
the full members of the Court,withscma exceptions. '!he 
only main difference between these members and full members 
of the Court, acoording to the original constitutional 
design, is the security of office which exists for the full 
members and does not exist for the alternate judges. See 
Olapter Eight for further discussion of the matter. 
9 Article 3 
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10 Article 9 of Law 10/1973 as am:m:ied by Law 14/1985 
11 'Ibis application was suhnitted to the <hlrt on 5 August 
1980. 'Ib.e law of cassation (17/1978) cane into effect early 
in 1979, so the virtual en:i of applications frOll government 
authorities constitutional interpretation ooincided with the 
intrcrluction to the caJrt of the new jusrisdiction. 
12 Article 123 of the constitution requires the pennission of 
the Supreme Council for any agreement to be nade by a member 
emirate with neighbouring cnmtries. 
13 Article 123 provides that international agreements by .member 
emirates with neighbouring cnmtries are pennitted if they 
are of administrative nature arrl llsave that such agreements 
are not inconsistent with the interests of the Union". 
1 4 Acxx>rding to Article 1 23 of the constitution. 
15 Article 109 of the constitution provides: 
there shall be no general amnesty for a crime or for 
specified crimes except by Law. '!be pranulgation of the 
law of amnesty shall consider such crines being deem:rl 
never to have been committed, and shall remit the 
execution of the sentence or the remaining part of it. 
16 Article 107 of the constitution provides: 
'!be President of the Unioo may grant pardon frOll the 
executioo of any sentence pasSErl by a Union j udiciature 
before it is carried out or while it is being serverl, 
or he may camnlte such sentences, on the basis of the 
reccmnendation of the Union Minister of Justice, after 
obtairl.ir¥J the approval of a cx:mnittee fonned urrler the 
Olainnanship of the Minister. 
17 Acxx>rd.ID;J to Article 151 of the Calstitution. 
18 E¥ Federal Law 6/1978 
19 'nle original El3YPtian constitution of 1971 arrl the Kuwaiti 
constitution provide in Article 2 of each that Shari' a is a 
main soorce of law. '!be current aroendErl Egyptian 
constitution arrl the coostitutian of Oatar provide that 
Shari 'a is the main source of law. 
20 See Al-Jamal, Y, '!he Calstitutiooal System in Kuwait Kuwait: 
(in Arabic) Kuwait University Press, 1970, p.469. In case 
for interpretatioo J 4, year 9, the Supreme <hlrt stated that 
the content of Article 7 that Shari' a is a main soorce of 
law is a guidance to the legislature arrl is a matter of 
policy not for the Cburt to questioo. See reporting arrl 
discussicn of the case infra. 
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21 Article 1 of Law 6/1978 prO'lides that the Primary Courts in 
the Emirates of Ahl-Dhabi, Sharjah, Ajrnan an::l Fujairah 
should beccJIe Federal Primary Courts 00 the start of caning 
to force of this law and that appellate carrts in these . 
emirates should beccJIe Federal ~llate Courts. 
Article 2 provides that the jurisdictions of the local 
courts that are subj ect to Article 1 should be transfonned 
to the federal courts. 
Article 3 prO'lides that the Federal Primary Court in the 
capital of the Unioo shall have jurisdiction in the adminis-
trative disputes between the Union an::l irrlividuals, while 
civil an::l ocmnercial disputes between the Unioo an::l 
individuals shall be heard by the federal primary courts 
according to the place of residency of the deferrlant. 
Notice the reference in this article to "the capital of the 
Union", not the pennanent capital in Article 102 of the 
constitution an::l the difference in the jurisdictioo between 
the Court of Article 3 of Law 6/1978 an::l the Court of 
Article 102 of the eonstituticn. 
22 'nlese matters include: disputes between the emirates an::l 
between them an::l the Union; interpretaticn of the -provisions 
of the constitution by application or as a result of 
challenge of UIlCCIlStitutiooality of legislation; trial of 
senior federal officials regarding actions in carrying out 
their official duties; crines directly affecting the inter-
ests of the Union; resolution of ccnflict of jurisdictioo 
between federal judiciary an::l local judiciaries arrl inter-
pretatien of treaties an::l international agreements. (Article 
99 of the CXXlStitution an::l Article 33 of Law 10/1973) 
23 See Ballantyne, W.M. !.s:Jal Develor;:ment in Arabia: A Selec-
tion of Articles arrl 1d:lresses en the Arabian Gulf. LcnJon: 
Graharn arrl Trotman Ltd. 1980, pp. 109-120. 
24 See Heard-Bey, F. From Trucial States to United Arab 
Ehrl.rates: A Society in Transitioo. Iarlon: Ialgrran, 1982, 
pp.126-163. 
25 'Ibis year was the first to witness the operation of both 
laws 6/1978 aIrl 17/1978, the fooner became effective on 15 
June 1978 aIrl the latter en 30 February 1979. 
26 Article 61 of Law 3/1970 of Ahl-Dhabi Civil Procedure Law 
penults the Courts to specify the o::mnencanent aIrl eming 
points of the interest they include in their decisions. 
Article 62 specifies the max:irmJm enforceable limits for 
interest rates in c:xmnercial aIrl ncn-ccmnercial 
transactions. For example, in civil a~ case No 5, 1979, 
the Court refused to include interest payment with its 
decision. 
27 Civil cassation cases 5, 6 aIrl 40/2. 
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28 According to Article 101 of the constitution. 
29 Civil cassation case 40/2. 
30 Depending on Article 8 of Law 6/1978 (the Law establishing 
federal primary arrl appeal courts). 
31 See the next case below. 
32 Article 150 of the constituticn provides: 
'!he Union authorities shall strive to issue the laws 
referred to in this constitution as quickly as possible 
so as to replace the existing legislations am systems, 
particularly those which areoot consistent with the 
provisions of the constitution. 
33 Article 151 of the constitutions provides: 
'n1e prOV'isions~ of this constitution shall prevail over 
the constitutions of the member Emirates of the Union 
am the Union Laws which are issuErl in accordance with 
the provisions of this constituticn shall have priority 
over the legislations, regulations am decisions issued 
by the authorities of the Emirates. In case of 
oonflict, that part of the inferior legislaticn which 
is inconsistent with the superior legislaticn shall be 
rendered null am void to the extent that renr::wes the 
inconsistency. In case of di~te, the matter shall be 
referred to the Union Supreme Court for decision. 
Article 148 provides: 
All matters established by laws, regulations, decrees, 
orders am decisions in the various member Emirates of 
the Union in effect upon the a:ming into force of this 
constitution, shall continue to be awlicable unless 
aroeIXled or replaced in accordance with the provisions 
of this constituticn. 
34 Article 149 is the occupatioo of the field clause which 
allows the emirates to legislate in matters incltrled in 
Article 121 \mtil am to the extent of federal legislation 
occupying the field. Article 1 50 orders the federal 
authorities to issue legislatioo referrerl to in the 
constitution as quickly as possible. 
35 Because the proolE!l1 regarcli.Dg the bank interest payments 
involved disrupting the ~cial sector of the country. 
36 '!he cases which were joi.nerl with this case are awlications 
for interpretations nos. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 for year 8, am 1, 2, 
3, for year 9. 
37 In Article 17 
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36 A 'basic cause of this is the granting by Law 17/1978 of 
cassation jurisdiction to the Supreme Co.lrt. This Co.lrt is 
not suitable to operate as a cassation court, a main reason 
for this conclusion being the .problem created here am in 
other cases by having a cassation court governed by a 
statute not ccmpatible with the statute governing the lower 
courts. See Article 8 of Law 6/1978 am Article 75 of Law 
10/1973, which is referred to by Law 17/1978 (statute of 
cassation). See other a.I'g\.1Itelt in Chapter Eight. 
39 Article 17 of the AOO-Dhabi Law 6/1976 provides: 
Any person caught in a {Xlblic place or {Xlblic road in a 
state of apparent drunkermess, should be punished by 
imprisonment for a pericxl not less than two nnnths am 
not II¥Jre than one year, in adlltion to a fine of not 
less than five hundred Dirharns am not II¥Jre than two 
thousand Dirhams. If such a person ccmnitted a breach 
of public safety or public morals, the punishment 
should be imprisonment for a period not less than six 
II¥Jnths and not rore than two years, in addi ticn to a 
fine of not less than CX'le thousand Dirhams am not rore 
than five thousand Dirhams, without prejOOice to any 
other punishment provided by the penal code or any 
other law. 
40 See Case of Janatta Bank (constitutional case no. 14, Year 9) 
discussed alx>ve in this chapter. 
41 '!he cases which were joined with this case are cases of 
constitutional interpretation nos. 5 to 13 am 15 to 23, 
Year 9. In later cases, this case am case no. 1, Year 8, 
were used as booing preoerlents. These cases are nos. 1, 
Year 10 and 14, Year 10, to which decisicns in other cases 
in the sane year were referred. 
42 See the argument provided before that Article 75 is not 
rooant to govern the constitutional interpretation or general 
matters. 
43 See constitutional cases nos. 1 4, Year 9, am 1, Year 8, 
discussed earlier. 
44 Article 65 of the statute of the Supreme Co.lrt (Law 10/1973) 
provides for the establishrrent of a special ccmnittee, the 
duty of which is to consider cases referred fron the 
Clambers of the Supreme Court who decided to a.barrlon or 
aIOOIrl principles established earlier. 
45 Article 58 of the At:u-Illabi Criminal Ccrle provides in 
paragraph 4 that: 
Any person who cx:mnits an act representing a breach of 
{Xlblic IOOrals shall be (Xmishe.d by imprisorunent for a 
pericxl not less than three ItDlths arrl not rore than two 
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years and by a fine of an am:>unt not less than five 
thousand Dirhams and not more than twenty thousand 
Dirhams, or by one of these ~shments. 
46 See arguroont to this ~ above in this chapter. 
47 See Cappelletti, M. Jooicial Review in the Contemporary 
World Irrlianapolis, Irrliana.: '!he Bobbs Merrill Co., 1971, 
pp12-16. 
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l)rring the past few decades the United Arab Emirates has 
experience:i, and continues to experience, rapid developnent and 
accelerating change. This develq:ment, facilitatErl by wealth 
acquired fron oil, has resulted in the transfonnation of the 
Emirates into a wider and roore open society , receptive to new 
experiences, and responsive to institutions in other parts of the 
world. The transformation underway is happening through the 
interaction between local culture and institutions with those 
brought in from elsewhere in the world. Experience has 
deronstrated to the Ehlirates that the demands of a growing, IOOre 
Erlucated and open society need the kiOO of political and social 
unity engerrlered by the federal system and the rrodernisation of a 
tradi tional way of goveI'lllleIlt. 
FErleralism is in its nature a system of two co-ordinatErl 
units of goverrunent, each with its respective sphere of power, 
delimitErl by a written c::alStitutioo which seeks to ensure neither 
that central power grows to such an extent that the identity of 
the local units as distinct governments is threatened, nor that 
the separate areas of power at the local level emasculate the 
central authority and put in jeopardy the whole federal 
enterprise. Experience has shown that constitutional courts, as 
1IXI.eperrlent umpires of the fErleral system, have a crucial role to 
play in preserving the fErleral balance. '!be courts can protect 
. 
each sphere of governmant fron the creeping encroachment on its 
powers by the other and yet are flexible and sensitive enough to 
adapt the federal arrangements to changing circumstances. 
Ultimately, where the political differences between the units are 
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irreooncilable, the oourts provide authoritative decisions on the 
interpretation of the constitution. It is this role which the 
Supreme Court of the U.A.E. is inevitably called on to perform. 
Deeper an:! wider turlerstarrling of the place of the Supreme Court 
in the constitutional arrl federal system of the U.A.E. is neErled. 
Equiwing the Supreme Court to carry out its important duties is 
essential for the success not only of the Coo.rt itself, rut also 
the perfonnance of the constitutional arrl federal systems of the 
cnmtry. Support of the written Constitution am improvement in 
its awlication, protectioo of rights of governments am people, 
soluticns to constitutional problems, all of these call for the 
strengthening am supporting of the role of the Supreme Court. 
'!be experience of other systems, particularly the U.5. am 
West Gennany, shows that judges in constitutional courts have a 
particularly wide judicial discretioo. 'lbe understa..rrling of this 
phenomenon has developed in the U.5. by reference to cases 
involvlig irrli vidual rights, rut the lessoos which are leamed by 
a study of such cases are equally applicable to questions of 
federalism. In the U.5. the Supreme Court had to claim for itself 
the final power of interpreting the Coostitutioo because there 
was no explicit provision in the Constitution. No similar 
difficulty arises for the Supreme Court of the U.A.E. because of 
its express authority to interpret the Ccnstltutioo. 'ftle issue 
is not whether the Court shall do so, rut heM it shall do so. 
O:>nstitutions do not only establish rights am duties of 
government, they also establish the basic am fundaIoontal rights 
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of people. Constitutional Ccmts in their interpretation of 
constitutional charters am in their settlaoont of constitutional 
canplaints, have sane effect on the rights and duties established 
by constitutions. 'Itlese facts increase awareness arrl intensify 
attention given to constitutional Courts. By increased attention, 
fuller understanding and clearer analysis and arguments 
concerning the work of constitutional courts, there is more 
chance of improvement am developnent. 
As in the other countries studied I the SUprene Court in the 
U.A.E. plays an irn{x>rtant role in the CCXlStitutional order arrl 
the federal system. 'llle imp:)rtance of constitutional interpret-
ation by the SUprene Court has been enhanced by the successive 
extensions in duration of the Provisional Constitution. '!his has 
subjected the interpretative provisions of the Court to a longer 
period of use I am therefore in the context of a rcore advanced 
political and legislative environment, than intended by its 
framers, calling for involvement by the Supreme Court in 
interpretations for newly emerging needs curl inquiries. 
'!be original ca:rrpetence of the SUpreme Court of the U.A.E. 
suggests that it can play a role similar to that of the U.s. 
Supreme Coort curl the West Gennan Constitutional Court. '!here 
are, hc:Mever, several factors which restrict the effectiveness of 
the U.A.E. SUpreme Coort as a CCXlStitutional court. 
canpa.red to the U.S. curl West Gennan oourts, the U.A.E. 
Supreme Court has some major differences. These differences 
concern the specialisation of the court; the conditions of 
appointment of its justices, their tenure ani protection; curl the 
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institutional irrleperrlence of the court. 
Whilst the U.S. and West German courts are specialised 
courts, de facto or de jure, the U.A.E. Supreme Court is a court 
of general jurisdiction. This fact, in ad:lition to the legal 
system in which it operates as a civil law system, makes the 
court ineffective as a oonstitutional court. '!be Supreme Court is 
currently over-rurdened with cassation cases, am is effectively 
denied the resources and the confidence needed for it to becane 
an effective constitutional court. 
Whilst the U.S. and West Gennan courts are provided with 
institutional irrleperrlence and are placed in praninent positions 
in relation to other branches of their respective goverrurents, 
the U.A.E. Supreme Court lacks the necessary irrlependence. '!be 
U.A.E. Supreme Court is linked to, am subject to the influence 
of, the Ministry of Justice in administrative matters, financial 
needs am choice of members. 
lm:lngst the roost important differences between the U.A.E. 
Supreme Court am those of the U.S. ani West Germany, is the 
procedure for the appointmant of justices. '!be U.S. ani West 
Gennan procedures are designed to give the full legislatures am 
the member states of the federal systems major roles in the 
appointment of justices. This system is designed on an 
urrlerstan:ling of the roles that a coostitutional court can play 
in the developrent ani shaping of its country's constitution ani 
federal system. The U.A.E. Supreme Court, l'lchIever, is staffed 
according to procedures that show a lack of appreciation of the 
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real effect that a court can have. 
Whilst the U.S. am West Gennan constitutional justices are 
provided with protections am guarantees to operate without fea.r 
of reprisals by their political branches, the U.A.E. justices 
lack such protections. 'lbere are many defects in the legislative 
enactments dealing with the membership of the Supreme Court. '!be 
Suprare Court I S statute allows the appointment of foreign judges 
for limited terms of office, as an exception to the corrlitions of 
appointing nationals of the country with life tenure. This 
exception has been and remains the general rule for appointment 
to the Supreme Court. No U.A.E. national has been appointed to 
the c::curt, nor has there been anyone appointed with life tenure. 
'!he consequence of this is that the original procedures designed 
to protect the judges and provide them with the necessary 
oonfidence are not utilised, with consequential reduction in the 
effectiveness of the court. The Supreme Court's statute, as 
ameOOed provides for an option of appointing to the court an 
unlimited number of alternate judges. 'Ibis adds to the already 
damaging regulations dealing with the membership of the court. 
'!he U.S. Supreme Court and the Coostitutional Court of West 
Genrany have maj or roles to play in the developrent of their 
respective constitutional systems, in part due to the large 
number of constitutional cases they receive. '!be U.A.E. SUprare 
Calrt, by way of contrast, receives few constitutional cases. 
'Ihls is due to its relatively recent establishrrent and also to 
the system in which it operates. '!be effect is that the Supreme 
Court is unable to play a full role in the developnent of the 
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constitutional system. The passage of time and the further 
develOIJ'OOl'lt of the U.A.E. arrl its constitutional system may allow 
the Supreme Court greater opportunity to practise its 
constitutional role. 
In addition to these differences which limit the 
effectiveness of the Supreme Ca.n:t, there are differences which 
are supposed to allow the court greater freedan and give it nore 
opportunity to be an effective c:onstitutional court. In c:xJUlltries 
such as the U.S., where there is no clear sanction given for 
constitutional review by the supreme court, doubts are expressed 
and controversy flares up about the legitimacy of such review. 
'!here is no doubt about the right of the U.A.E. Supreme Coort to 
provide final and birrling coostitutional interpretations because 
of the clear sanction for such interpretation by the 
constitutional text. 
In dem::x:::ratic countries, such as the U.S. am West Genrany, 
the choices employed by c:onstitutiCllal courts in their review of 
legislation are often criticised on the grounds that they 
contradict majority rule and that they are umarocratic. In the 
U.A.E., the political system is not delocratic, and such displtes 
are therefore inapplicable. 
The finality of constitutional review is a threat to 
p:>litical power within the U.A.E. and to the in:lividual emirates. 
'lhls threat to traditional and political power makes the influ-
ence of the political organs 00 the Supreme CbJrt such a serious 
obstacle to its fulfilling its full CXXlStitutiooal potential. 
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'!be Supr~ Court has playe1 an important role in the early 
years of the establishment of the fe1eration and the operation of 
the written Constitution to support the federal system, and 
solve1 disputes about the rights of different authorities. All of 
these have helpErl the fe1eral system to continue am pass throogh 
the critical first few years. But in order for the fe1eration to 
continue into the future, am to prosper for the good of the 
Emirates am their people, more still is neede1 fran the Court. 
'!be Supr~ Court has played an important role to suPFOrt the 
application of the constitution without negative implications for 
individuals am ccmnercial activities, especially in the" field of 
application of Sharia. For the Supresre Court to continue and to 
improve the manner in which it plays its constitutional role, 
improvesrents are neede1 in its <XlllfX1Sitioo arrl regulation. 
Recognition has to be given to the imp.)rtant role that can 
be played by the Court for the develquent and maintenance of the 
constitutional system of the camtry, and to the need for greater 
confidence in its irrlependence, in order to encourage resort to 
it by governroont authorities, courts and irrlividuals. Distancing 
the process of appointinJ members of the Court fran the c:anplete 
domination by the executive authority, granting the Court 
institutional independence from the Ministry of Justice and 
preservation of the number of judges established by the 
Constitution and their life tenure are imp.)rtant for supportiI¥] 
the irrlependence of the Court. '!be Court was interrle1 by the 
f~s of the Constitution to be mainly a O::Dstitutional Q:Jurt. 
If preserving the Constitutional nature of the Court is 
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desirable, cassation jurisdiction must be noved to another Court. 
In discharging its role of constitutional interpretation a 
court will find itself embroiled in questions of political 
controversy to which the Constitution provides no clear answers. 
'!he caJrt's judgement will, inevitably, favour one side over the 
other. In order to convince the losing party that the court has 
not made a political choice, it is necessary that the court in 
its judgement strives for jooicial coherence, justifying its 
decisions by reference to the values, as well as the express 
words, of the Constitution; keeping in mind its own 
prOl'lO.mcements on other constitutional issues; and being aware 
that, if it is to survive over a long time, a constitution must 
be adapted to the changing circumstances of its state and of the 
~ld. 8anetimes, the best a court can do is to show that its 
decision is a defensible interpretation rather than demonstrate 
that it is the only CX)l'lCeivable one. '!his is the general lesson 
of canparative constitutional law. A canparison between the U.S. 
and West German Supreme Courts shows that the language and 
structure of a o:nstitution is significant to the ootccmes of 
particular cases: there is no single rocrlel of federalism. An 
examination of the cx:mnerce clause jurisprudence of the u.S. 
Supreme Court shows just how important a court's contrirution to 
the developnent of a particular national version of federalism 
can be. 'lhe judgements of the Supreme Court prevented the States 
fran arrogating local interests over the needs of the national 
market and then created the legislative opportunity for Congress 
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to take the integration of the national economy further as 
changErl eotrlitions denarrlErl further govenunental action. 
It is against this baGkground that the constitutional 
position am jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the U.A.E. 
must be considerErl. It is not suggestErl that the precise details 
of the U.S. or West Gennan systems shalld be decisive for the 
U.A.E., but that it slnlld be recognisErl what the Supreme Court 
in any federal system must do. Although the Court is given a 
major place in the U.A.E. system, there is evidence that the 
proper nature of constitutional interpretation is not fully 
appreciated within the U.A.E., perhaps even by the judges 
themselves. When exercising its julicial discretion on federalism 
questions, the Court should be aware of certain features of the 
Constitution. Although it emphasises the importance of the 
federal enterprise in the Preamble, the actual structure of 
government gives great weight to the interests of the irrlividual 
emirates by reason of the direct participatlcn in sane organs of 
government arrl their ability to exercise powerful influence over 
others. '!be dangers to the federal system appear to cane rrore 
fran local government than fran the national government. In these 
ciretmlStances, there is a sped a1 respoosibility en the Court to 
act as a camterweight to tendencies which, if taken to extremes, 
co..lld destroy the federal system. The study of the practice of 
the Court shows that it has sometimes been aware of this 
ooligation, arrl its urrlerstarrling of its role should develop as 
it deals with more cases. Equally, the cases show some 
incx:nsistency arrl weakness of reaSCXl.irxJ which urrlermines the 
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coherence of its jurisprudence, an important matter if its 
judgements command less than enthusiastic acceptance by the 
political organs of gOV'ernroont. '!be Supreme Court has not been 
assisted in fulfilling its constituticoal role by sane of the 
changes made to its jurisdiction, particularly the addition of 
cassation functions. 
Constitutional Courts are not without discretion in their 
interpretations of constitutions, am the Supreme Court of the 
U.A.E. is no exception. Recognition of the real potential, nature 
and functions of these Courts is better than denying the 
realities about these characteristics. 

We, the Rulers of the Emirates of Ab..l Dhabi, D.lba.i, Sharjah, 
Ajma.n, Utm AI Q;lwain and Fuj airah (2): 
Whereas it is our desire and the desire of the people of our 
Emirates to establish a Union between these Emirates, to praoote 
a better life, roore errluring stability and a higher international 
status for the Emirates and their people; 
Desiring to create closer links between the Arab Emirates in 
the fonn of an indepeIrlent, sovereign, federal state, capable of 
protecting its existence and the existence of its nsnbers, in 00-
operation with the sister Arab states and with all other frierrlly 
states which are nsnbers of the United Nations Organisation and 
of the family of nations in general, on a ba.sis of mutual respect 
and reciprocal interests-and benefits; 
Desiring also to lay the foundation for federal rule in the 
caning years on a sound basis, correstarling to the realities and 
the capacities of the Emirates at the present ti.ne, enabling the 
Union, so far as possible, freely to achieve its goals, 
sustaining the identity of its members providing that this is not 
inconsistent with those goals and preparing the people of the 
Union at the same time for a dignified and free constitutional 
life, and progressing by steps towards a canprehensi ve, repre-
sentative, demx:xatic regime in an Islamic and Arab society free 
fran fear and anxiety; 
And whereas the realisation of the foregoing was our dearest 
desire, towards which we have bent our strongest resolution, 
bein:J desirous of advancing our oountry and our people to the 
status of qualifying them to take appropriate place among 
civilised states and na.tions; 
For all these reasons and until the preparation of the 
permanent Constitution for the Union may be completed, we 
proclaim before the Supreme and Qnnipotent Creator, and before 
all the peoples, our agreement to this provisional Calstitutian, 
to which our signa.tures were apperrled, which shall be implemented 
during the transitiooal pericrl indicated in it; 
May Allah, our Protector am Deferrler, grant us success. 
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PART am 
'!BE tmCIf, rrs Ft:H:WHfl'AL <IKS'l'I'ruI!Bl AfI) AIMS 
Article 1 
The United Arab Emirates is an independent, sovereign, 
federal state am is referred to hereafter in this Constitution 
as the Union. The Union shall consist of the following 
Emirates:-
Are Illabi - nIDal. - Sharjah - Ajrnan - Urm Al Qiwain -
Fujairah - Ras Al Khaimah. (3) 
Any other independent Arab country may join the Union, 
provided that the Suprene Council agrees unani.toously to this. 
Article 2 
'!he Union shall exercise sovereignty in rratters assigned to 
it in accordance with this Constitution over all tern tory am 
territorial waters lying within the international bcA.lrrlaries of 
the nanber Emirates. 
Article 3 
'!be member Emirates shall exercise sovereignty over their 
own territories and territorial waters in all rratters which are 
not within the jurisdiction of the Union as assigned in this 
Consti tution. 
Article 4 
The Union rray not cede its SO\Tereignty or relinquish any 
part of its territories or waters. 
Article 5 
The Union shall have a Flag, an Emblem and a National 
Anthem. '!he Flag and the ~lem shall be prescribed by Law. 
Each Emirate shall retain its own flag for use within its 
territories. 
Article 6 
The Unioo is a part of the Great Arab Natioo, to which it is 
bound by the ties of religion, language, history and common 
destiny. 
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'!he people of the Union are one people, am one part of the 
Arab Nation. 
Article 7 
Islam is the official religion of the Union. The Islamic 
Shari fah shall be a main source of legislation in the Union. The 
official language of the Union is Arabic. 
Article 8 
'!be citizens of the Union shall have a single natiCl'lality 
which shall be prescribed by law. When abroad, they shall enj ay 
the protection of the Union Government in accordance with 
accepted intemational principles. 
No citizen of the Union may be deprived of his natiCl'lality 
nor may his nationality be witlrlrawn save in exceptional circum-
stances which shall be defined by law. 
Article 9 
1 • The Capital of the Union shall be established in an area 
allotted to the Union by the Emirates of Ab..l Dhabi and I:Xlbai 
on the borders between them and it shall be given the name 
"Al r<arama". 
2. '!here shall be allocated in the Union bOOget for the first 
year the annmt necessary to rover the expenses of technical 
studies and planning for the construction of the Capital. 
However, calStruction work shall begin as soon as possible 
and shall be a::mpleted in not nore than seven years frail the 
date of entry into force of this constitution. 
3. Until the construction of the Union Capital is a::mplete, Ab..l 
Dhabi shall be the provisional headquarters of the Union. 
Article 10 
The aims of the Union shall be the maintenance of its indep-
endence and sovereignty, the safeguard of its security and 
stability, the defence against any aggression upon its existence 
or the existence of its member states, the protection of the 
rights and liabilities of the people of the Union, the 
achievement of close co-operation between the Emirates for their 
cxmn::n benefit in realising these aims am in praroting their 
prosperity and prcgress in all fields, the provision of a better 
life for all citizens together with respect by each Emirate for 
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the irrlependence and sovereignty of the other Emirates in their 
internal affairs within the franework of this Constitutioo. 
Article 11 
1. '!be Emirates of the Union shall fonn an econanic and custans 
entity. Union Laws shall regulate the progressive stages 
appropriate to the achievement of this entity. 
2. The free movement of all capital and goods between the 
Emirates of the Union is guaranteed and may not be 
restricted except by a Union Law. 
3. All taxes, fees, duties and tolls imposed on the 1l'Ovem:mt of 
goods from one member Emirate to the other shall be 
al:x>lished • 
Article 12 
'!be foreign policy of the Union shall be directed towards 
support for Arab and Islamic causes and interests and tcMa.rds the 
consolidation of the 1::xxlds of frierrlship and co-operation with 
all nations and peoples on the basis of the principles of the 
Olarter of the United Nations and ideal international standards. 
PART 'DD 
Article 13 
'!he Unioo and the member Emirates shall co-operate, within 
the limits of their jurisdiction and abilities, in executing the 
provisions of this Part. 
Article 14 
Fquality, social justice, ensuring safety and security and 
equality of opportunity for all citizens shall be the pillars of 
the Society. O:>-operation and mutual mercy shall be a finn lxn1 
between them. 
Article 15 
The family is the basis of society. It is founded on 
morality, religion, ethics and patriotism. The law shall 
guarantee its existence, safeguard and protect it from 
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corruption. 
Article 16 
Scx::iety shall be responsible for protecting childhood am 
motherhocrl am shall protect minors am others unable to look 
after themselves for any reason, such as illness or incapacity or 
old age or force:i unemployment. It shall be responsible for 
assisting them am enabling them to help themselves for their or.m 
benefit am that of the ccmmmi ty. 
Such matters shall be regulated by welfare and social 
security legislations. 
Article 17 
Etlucation shall be a fun:3amental factor for the progress of 
society. It shall be ccmpulsory in its primary stage am free of 
charge at all stages, within the Union. '!be law shall prescribe 
the necessary plans for the propagation am spread of education 
at varioos levels am for the eradication of illiteracy. 
Article 18 
Private schools may be established by individuals and 
organisations in accordance with the provisions of the law, 
provided that such scOOols shall be subject to the supervision of 
the canpetent plblic autOOrities am to their directives. 
Article 19 
Medical care and means of prevention and treatment of 
diseases am epidemics shall be ensured by the ccmmmi ty for all 
citizens. 
'!be ccmmmi ty shall pratDte the establishnent of plblic am 
private hospitals, dispensaries am cure-houses. 
Article 20 
Scx::iety shall esteem ~k as a corner-stone of its develop-
rrent. It shall endeavoor to ensure that employment is available 
for citizens am to train them so that they are prepared for it. 
It shall furnish the appropriate facilities for that by providing 
legislations protecting the rights of the employees and the 
interests of the employers in the light of developing 
international la1:x:Iur legislations. 
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Article 21 
Private property shall be protected. Conditions relating 
thereto shall be laid down by Law. No one shall be deprived of 
his private property except in circumstances dictated by the 
public benefit in acoordance with the prov'isions of the Law arrl 
on payment of a just canpensatian. 
Article 22 
Public property shall be inviolable. The protection of 
plblic property shall be the duty of every citizen. '!be Law 
shall define the cases in which penalties shall be imposed for 
the CXlI1travention of that duty. 
Article 23 
'lhe natural resources arrl wealth in each Emirate - shall be 
considered to be the public property of that Emirate. Society 
shall be responsible for the protection arrl proper exploi tatioo 
of such natural resources and wealth for the benefit of the 
national eCXll1CJI1Y. 
Article 24 
'!be basis of the national eamany shall be social justice. 
It is fourrled on sincere co-operatioo between plblic am private 
activities. Its aim shall be the achievement of economic 
developnent, increase of productivity, raising the standards of 
living am the achievement of prosperity for citizens, all within 
the limits of Law. 
'!he Union shall encourage co-operation am savings. 
Article 25 
All persons are equal before the law, without distinctioo 
between citizens of the Union in regard to race, nationality, 
religious belief or social status. 
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Al;t.icle 26 
Personal liberty is guaranteed to all citizens. No person 
may be arrested, searched, detained or imprisoned except in 
accordance with the provision of law. 
No person shall be subjected to torture or to degrading 
treatment. 
Article 27 
Crimes arrl ~shments shall be defined by the law. No 
penalty shall be imposed for any act of carmission or anission 
cx:mnitted before the relevant law has been pranulgated. 
Article 28 
Penalty is personal. An accused shall be presumed irmocent 
until proved guilty in a legal arrl fair trial. 'lbe accused shall 
have the right to app::>int the perscn wb;) is capable to coOOuct 
his defence durinj the trial. '!be law shall prescribe the cases 
in which the presence of a coonsel for defence shall be assigned. 
Physical arrl rroral abuse of an accused perscn is prohibited. 
Article 29 
Freedan of novement arrl residence shall be guaranteed to 
citizens within the limits of law. 
Article 30 
Freedan of opinion arrl expressing it verbally, in writing or 
by other means of expression shall be guaranteed within the 
limits of law. 
Article 31 
Freedan of camnmication by post, telegraph or other means 
of camnmication am the secrecy thereof shall be guaranteed in 
accordance with law. 
Article 32 
Freedan to exercise religious worship shall be guaranteed in 
accordance with established custans, provided that it does not 
conflict with (Xlblic policy or violate plblic IOOrals. 
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Article 33 
Freedan of assembly and -establishing associations shall be 
guaranteed within the limits of law. 
Article 34 
Every citizen shall be free to choose his occupation, trade 
or profession within the limits of law. Due consideration being 
given to regulations organising saoo of such professions an:1 
trades. No person may be subjected to forced la.b::lur except in 
exceptional circumstances provided for by the law an:1 in return 
for cx:mpensation. 
No person may be enslaved. 
Article 35 
Public office shall be open to all citizens on a basis of 
equality of opp:>rtunity in acoordance with the provisions of law. 
Public office shall be a national service entrusted to those who 
hold it. The IXJblic servant shall aim, in the executioo of his 
duties, at the IXJblic interest alcne. 
Article 36 
Habitations shall be inviolable. '1hey may not be entered 
without the pennissicn of their inhabitants except in accordance 
with the provisions of the law an:1 in the circumstances laid down 
therein. 
Article 37 
Citizens may not be dep:>rted or banished fran the Union. 
Article 38 
Extradition of citizens and of Political refugees is 
prohibited. 
Article 39 
General confiscation of property shall be prohibited. 
Ccxlfiscation of an individual's p:>Ssessions as a penalty may not 
be inflicted except by a ca.ut j oogeoent in the circumstances 
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specified by law. 
Article 40 
Foreigners shall enjoy, within the Union, the rights arrl 
free:ian stipulated in international charters which are in force 
or in treaties am agreements to which the Union is party. They 
shall be subject to the correspcniing obligations. 
Article 41 
Every person shall have the right to suh:nit ccmplaints to 
the canpetent authorities, including the judicial authorities, 
concerning the ahl.se or infringaIeIlt of the rights arrl freedan 
stipulated in this Part. 
Article 42 
Paynent of taxes arrl public charges detennined by law is a 
duty of every citizen. 
Article 43 
Defence of the Union is a sacred duty of every citizen arrl 
military service is an honour for citizens which shall be 
regulated by law. 
Article 44 
Respect of the Constitution, laws and orders issued by 
public authorities in execution thereof, observance of public 
order and respect of public morality are duties incumbent upon 
all inhabitants of the Union. 
Article 45 
The Union authorities shall consist of:-
1. The SUpreme Camc!l of the Union. 
2. The President of the Union am his Dep.lty. 
3. The O::mlcil of Ministers of the Union. 
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4. '!he National Assembly of the Union. 
5. '!be Judiciary of the Union. 
Article 46 
The Supreme Council of the Union shall be the highest 
authority in the Union. It shall consist of the Rulers of all 
the Emirates canposing the Union, or of those who dep.ltise for 
the Rulers in their Emirates in the event of their absence or if 
they have been excused fran atterrling. 
Fach Fru..rate shall have a single vote in the deliberations 
of the Colmcil. 
Article 47 
The Supreme Council of the Union shall exercise the 
follCMing matters:-
1 • Fonrulation of general policy in all matters invested in the 
Union by this Ccnstitution am consideration of all matters 
which leads to the achieverent of the goals of the Union and 
the ocmnon interest of the nanber Emirates. 
2. Sanction of various Union laws before their pranulgation, 
incluling the Laws of the Annual General Budget am the 
Final Accolmts. 
3. sanction of decrees relating to matters which by virtue of 
the provisions of this Constitution are subject to the 
ratification or agreement of the Supreme Council. Such 
sanction shall take place before the pranulgation of these 
decrees by the President of the Union. 
4. Ratification of treaties and international agreertents. Such 
ratification shall be accanplished by decree. 
S. Approval of the appointnent of the Olainnan of the Camcil 
of Ministers of the Unioo., acceptance of his resignation and 
his rem::wal fran office u(.XD a proposal fran the President 
of the Union. 
6. Approval of the appointment of the President and Jooges of 
the Supreme Court of the Union, acceptance of their 
resignations and their dismissal in the circumstances 
stipulated by this Constitution. Such acts shall be 
acccmplished by decrees. 
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7. Suprene Control over the affairs of the Union in general. 
8. Any other relevant matters stipllated in this Constitution 
or in the Union laws. 
Article 48 
1 • '!he Suprene Council shall lay d~ its own bye-laws which 
shall include its procedure for the corrluct of rusiness arrl 
the procedure for voting on its decisions. The 
deliberations of the Council shall be secret. 
2. '!he Suprene Council shall establish a general Secretariat 
which shall consist of an adequate number of officials to 
assist it in the execution of its duties. 
Article 49 
Decisions of the Supreme Council on substantive matters 
shall be by a majority of five of its members provided that this 
majority includes the votes of the Emirates of Ab.! Dhabi ani 
OJbai. '!be minority shall be bound by the view of the said 
majority. 
But, decisions of the Cameil on procedural matters shall be 
by a majority vote. SUch matters shall be defined in the bye-
laws of the Cameil. 
Article 50 
Sessions of the SUprane Council shall be held in the Unien 
capital. Sessions may be held in any other place agreed. upon 
beforeha.rrl. 
Article 51 
'!be SUpreIOO Camcil of the Unien shall elect fran arocng its 
members a President am a Vice President of the Unien. The Vice 
President of the Union shall exercise all the powers of the 
President in the event of his absence for any reason. 
Article 52 
"!be term of office of the President arrl the Vice President 
shall be five Gregorian years. '!bey are eligible for re-election 
to the same offices. 
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. Fach of them shall, on assuming office, take the following 
oath before the Supreme Council: 
"I swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful to the 
United Arab Emirates; that I will respect its Constitution 
and its laws; that I will protect the interests of the 
people of the Union; that I will discharge my duties 
faithfully and loyally and that I will safeguard the 
irrleperrlence of the Union and its territorial integrity." 
Article 53 
Upon vacancy of the office of the President or his Deputy 
for death or resignatioo, or because either one of them ceases to 
be Ruler in his Emirate for any reason, the Supreme Council shall 
be called into session within one nonth of that date to elect a 
successor to the vacant office for the period stipulated in 
Article 52 of this Constitutioo. 
In the event that the two offices of the President of the 
Supreme Council and his Deputy bec:x::Ioo vacant simultaneously, the 
Council shall be iItm:rli.ately called into session by anyone of 
its members or by the 01ai.nnan of the Council of Ministers of the 
Union, to elect a new President and Vice President to fill the 
two vacant offices. 
Article 54 
The President of the Union shall assume the following 
powers:-
1 • Presiding the SUpreme Council and directing its discussions. 
2. calling the Supreme Council into session, and terminating 
its sessions acoording to the rules of procedure upon which 
the Cameil shall decide in its bye-laws. It is obligatory 
for him to convene the Council for sessions, whenever one of 
its members so requested. 
3. calling the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers 
into joint session whenever necessity demarrls. 
4. Signin:1 Unicn laws, decrees and decisicns which the Supreme 
Council has sanctione:i and pramllgating them. 
5. ~intiD3 the Prime Minister, accepting his resignation and 
relieving him of office with the oonsent of the Supreme 
Council. He shall also appoint the Deputy PriIre Minister 
and the Ministers and shall receive their resignations and 
relieve them of office in accordance with a proposal fron 
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the Prime Minister of the Union. 
6. Appointing the diplanatic representatives of the Union to 
foreign states and other senior Union of£icials both civil 
and military (with the exception of the President and Judges 
of the Supreme Court of the Union) and accepting their 
resignations and dismissing them with the ccnsent of the 
Council of Ministers of the Union. Such appointments, 
acceptance of resignations and dismissals shall be 
accanplished by decrees and in accordance with Union laws. 
7. Signing of letters of credence of diplanatic representatives 
of the Union to foreign states and organisations and 
accepting the credentials of diplomatic and consular 
representatives of foreign states to the Union and receiving 
their letters of credence. He shall similarly sign 
docuroonts of appointment and credence of representatives. 
8. Supervising the implementation of Union laws, decrees and 
decisions through the Council of Ministers of the Union and 
the cx:xnpetent Ministers. 
9. Representing the Union internally, vis-a-vis other states 
and in all international relations. 
1 o. Exercising the right of pardon and ccmnutation of sentences 
and approving capital sentences according to the provisions 
of this Constitution and Union laws. 
11. Conferring decorations and medals of honour, both civil and 
military, in accordance with the laws relating to such 
decorations and medal s. 
12. ArrI other ~ vested in him by the Suprane Council or 
vested in him in conformity with this Cbnstitution or Union 
laws. 
Article 55 
'!he Cooncil of Ministers of the Unioo shall consist of the 
Prime Minister, his Dep.lty and a number of Ministers. 
Article 56 
Ministers shall be chosen fran a.rrong citizens of the Unioo 
known for their cx:mpetence and experience. 
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Article 51 
The Prime Minister, his Deputy and the Ministers shall, 
before assuming the responsibilities of their office, take the 
following oath before the President of the Union:-
"I swear by Almighty God that I will be loyal to the United 
Arab Emirates; that I will respect its Constitution and 
laws; that I will discharge my duties faithfully; that I 
will ccmpletely observe the interests of the people of the 
Union and that I will ccmpletely safeguard the existence of 
the Union and its territorial integrity." 
Article 58 
'nle law shall define the Jurisdiction of the Ministers and 
the powers of each Minister: 'nle first Council of Ministers of 
the Union shall be <Xllp:>sErl of the following Ministers:-
1 • Foreign Affairs 
2. Interior 
3. Defence 
4. Finance, Econcmy and Industry 
5. Justice 
6. El:lucatioo 
7. Public Health 
8. Public Works and Agriculture 
9. camnm.ications, Post, Telegraph and Telephones 
10. labour and Social Affairs 
11 • InfontBtion 
12. Planning. 
Article 59 
'!be Prime Minister shall preside over the meetings of the 
Council of Ministers. He shall call it into sessioo, direct its 
debates, follow up the activities of Ministers and shall 
supervise the co-ordination of work between the various 
Ministries am in all executive organs of the Union. 
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rrt:e ~~ Pr~ Minister shall exercise all the powers of 
the PrJ.IDa Minister m the event of his absence for any reason. 
Article 60 
The Council of Ministers, in its capacity as the executive 
authority of the Union, arrl urrler the supre.ue control of the 
President of the Union and the Supreme Council, shall be 
responsible for dealiIxJ with all darestic arrl foreign affairs 
which are within the ca:npetence of the Union according to this 
Constitution arrl Union laws. 
'!he Council of Ministers shall, in particular, assume the 
following powers:-
1 • Following up the implementation of the general policy of the 
Union Government, l::x:>th danestic arrl foreign. 
2. Initiating drafts of Federal laws arrl sul:mitting them to the 
Union National Council before they are raised to the 
President of the Union for presentation to the Supreme 
Council for sanction. 
3. Drawing up the annual general J:u:iget of the Union, arrl the 
final accounts. 
4. Preparing drafts of decrees am various decisic.ns. 
5. Issuing regulations necessary for the implementation of 
Union laws without anex:ling or susperxling such regulatic.ns 
or making any exerrptien fron their executien. Issuing also 
policy regulatic.ns relating to the organisation of public 
services and administrations, within the limits of this 
Constitution arrl Union laws. A special provision of the law 
or the Cbuncil of Ministers, may charge the CXJnpetent Union 
Minister of any other administrative authority to pranulgate 
sate of such regulations. 
6. Supervising the implementation of Union laws, decrees, 
decisions arrl regulations by all the concerned authorities 
in the Unien or in the Emirates. 
7. Supervising the executien of joogeoents remered by Unien 
law courts an:] the implementation of internaticcal treaties 
an:l agreements CXXlcluded by the Union. 
8. ~intnent arrl dismissal of Unien employees in accordance 
with the provisic.ns of the law, provided that their appoint-
ment arrl dismissal do not require the issue of a decree. 
9. OXltrolling the carluct of work in departments arrl public 
services of the Union arrl the cx::n:fuct arrl discipline of 
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Union employees in general. 
10. Any other authority vested. in it by law or by the Supreme 
Council within the limits of this Constitution. 
Article 61 
Deliberations of the Council of Ministers shall be secret. 
Its resolutions shall be passed by a majority of its members. In 
the event that voting is evenly divided., the side on which the 
PriIre Minister has vote1 shall prevail. '!be minority shall abide 
by the opinion of the majority. 
Article 62 
While in office, the Prirce Minister, his Deputy or any Unioo 
Minister, may not praatise any professional, commercial or 
financial occupation or enter into any ccmnercial transactions 
with the Government of the Union or the Governments of the 
Emirates, or canbine with their office the membership of the 
board of directors of any financial or cxmnercial canpany. 
Furthernnre, they may not canbine with their office rrore 
than one official post in any of the Emirates and shall 
relinquish all other local official posts, if any. 
Article 63 
'!he members of the Cameil of Ministers shall aim to serve 
in their corrluct the interests of the Union, the prarotioo of 
plblic welfare and totally renounce personal benefits. '!bey nust 
not exploit their official capacities for their own interests or 
that of any person relate1 to them. 
Article 64 
'1he Prime Minister and the Ministers shall be politically 
responsible collectively before the President of the Unioo and 
the Suprane Cameil of the Union for the executioo of the general 
policy of the Union both daoostic and foreign. Fach of them 
shall be personally responsible to the President of the Unicn and 
the Supreroo Cameil for the activities of his Ministry or office. 
The resignation of the Prime Minister, his removal from 
office, his death, or the vacating of his office for any reason 
whatsoever shall involve the resignaticn of the whole Cabinet. 
'!he President of the Union may require the Ministers to remain in 
office temporarily, to carry out ittna3iate administratioo, 1.mtil 
such time as a new Cabinet is fonood. 
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Article 65 
At the begirming of every financial year, the Council of 
Ministers shall subnit to the President of the Union for present-
ation to the Supreme Council, a detailed statement of internal 
achieverents, on the Union's relations with other states am 
international organisations, together with the reccrrmerrlations of 
the Cabinet on the best and nnst practical means of strengthening 
the fO\lI'rlations of the Union, consolidating its security and 
stability, achieving its goals and progress in all fields. 
Article 66 
1 • '!he Camcil of Ministers shall draw up its CMI1 bye-laws 
incltrling its rules of procedure. 
2. '!be Council of Ministers shall establish a general Secret-
ariat provided with a number of employees to assist it in 
the carluct of its business. 
Article 67 
'!be Law shall prescribe the salaries of the Prime Minister, 
his Deputy and the other Ministers. 
<:mP.lm IV - 'DIE NATICIfAL A$BMBLY CF 'DIE tmCB 
5ectial 1 - General P.rovisials 
Article 68 
'!be Naticnal Assembly of the Unien shall be ~sed of 
forty (4) members. seats shall be distributed to member Emirates 
as follCMS:-
Ah.l Dhabi 8 seats 
Dubai 8 seats 
Sharjah 6 seats 
Rag Al Khaimah 6 seats 
Ajrnan 4 seats 
Utm Al <.)lwain 4 seats 
Fujairah 4 seats 
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Article 69 
Each Emirate shall be·free to determine the method of 
selection of the citizens representing it in the Union National 
Assembly. 
Article 70 
A member of the Union National Assembly must satisfy the 
following oorrlitions:-
1. t.tlst be a citizen of one of the Emirates of the union, a.rrl 
perm:mently resident in the Emirate he represents in the 
Assembly. 
2. l-tlst be not less than twenty-five Gregorian years of age at 
the ti.roo of his selection 
3. r-tlst enjoy civil status, good cx:xxluct, repltation a.rrl not 
previously convicted of a dishonourable offence unless he 
has been rehabilitatErl in accordance with the law. 
4. loUst have adequate knowledge of reading a.rrl writing. 
Article 71 
Membership of the Union National Assembly shall be 
incompatible with any public office in the Union, in~luding 
Ministerial portfolios. 
Article 12 
'!be term of membership in the Union Natialal Assembly shall 
be two Gregorian years ccrrmencin;J fran the date of its first 
sitting. When this period expires, the Assembly shall be 
canpletely renewed for the time ranainin;J until the em of the 
transitional pericrl as laid down in Article 144 of this Constit-
ution. 
Any member who has canpleted his term may be re-elected. 
Article 73 
Before assuming his duties in the Assembly or its 
O:mnittees, a member of the Union National Assembly shall take 
the following oath before the Assembly in plb~ic session:-
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"I swear. by Almighty Gcx1 that I will be loyal to the United 
Arab flnirates; that I will respect the Constitution am the 
laws of the Union arrl that I will discharge my duties in 
the Assembly arrl its Camrl.ttees honestly arrl truthfully." 
Article 74 
If, for any reason, a seat of any member of the Assembly 
beccmes vacant before the end of the tenn of his rrenbership, a 
replacement shall be selected within two IOClnths of the date on 
which the vacancy is announced by the Assembly, unless the 
vacancy occurs during the three months preceding the end of the 
tenn of the Assembly. 
'!be new member shall canplete the tenn of nenbership of his 
predecessor. 
Article 75 
Sessions of the Union National Assembly shall be held in the 
Union capital. Exceptionally, sessions may be held in any other 
place within the Union on the basis of a decision taken by a 
majority vote of the nenbers arrl with the approval of the Council 
of Ministers. 
Article 76 
'!he Assembly shall decide upcll the validity of the marrlate 
of its members. It shall also decide upon disqualifying nenbers, 
if they lose one of the required corrlitions, by a majority of all 
its members am on the proposal of five anong them. '!he Assembly 
shall be ~tent to accept resignaticn fran membership. 'lhe 
resignaticn shall be coosidered as final fran the date of its 
acceptance by the Assembly. 
Article TT 
A member of the National Assembly of the Union shall 
represent the whole people of the Union and not merely the 
Emirate which he represents in the Assembly. 
Sect:i.cn 2 - OCganisatial of 1b:'k in the Mserpbly 
Article 78 
'!be Assembly shall hold an annual ordinary session lasting 
not less than six months, commencing on the third week of 
Nc::wember each year. It may be called into extraordinary session 
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whenever the need arises. The Assembly may not consider at an 
extraordinary session any matter other than those for which it 
has been called into session. 
N<;>twithstanding the preceding paragraph, the President of 
the Union shall SUIIIOOn the Union National Assembly to convene its 
first ordinary session within a pericd not exceeding sixty days 
fran the entry into force of this Constitution. '!his session 
shall em at the tirce ap{x)inted by the Supreme Council by decree. 
Article 79 
'!he Assembly shall be S\.mIOCt'led into session, am its session 
shall be terminated by decree issued by the President of the 
Union with the consent of the O:mlcil of Ministers of the Union. 
kny !reeting held by the Council witlx>ut a formal SUltIOOns, or in a 
place other than that legally assigned for its rreeting in accord-
ance with this Constitution, shall be invalid am shall have no 
effect. 
Nevertheless, if the Assembly is not called to hold its 
meeting for its annual ordinary session before the third week of 
November, the Assembly shall be ipso facto in session on the 
twenty first of the said lOOt1th. 
Article 80 
'!he President of the union shall inaugurate the ordinary 
annual session of the Assembly whereupon he shall deliver a 
speech reviewing the situation of the country am the important 
events am affairs which happened during the year am outlining 
the projects arrl refonns the union GovernnEnt plans to urrlertake 
during the new session. '!be President of the union may depute 
his Vice President or the Prime Minister to open the sessioo or 
to dell ver the speech. 
'!he Natiooal Assembly shall select, fran am::ng its nanbers, 
a camdttee to draft the reply to the ~ Speech, emtx:rlying 
the Assembly's ohserVations am wishes, am shall sutmit the 
reply after approval by the Assembly to the President of the 
union for sul::mission to the Supreme Cooncil. 
Article 81 
Members of the Assembly shall not be censured for any 
opinions or views expressed in the course of carrying out their 
duties within the Assembly or its Ccmnittees. 
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Article 82 
Except in o:ses of "flagrante delicto", no penal proceedings 
may be taken agamst any member while the Assembly is in session wi~.t ~ authorisation of the Assembly. The Assembly nrust ~ 
not~f1ed ~f such proceedings are taken while it is not in 
session. 
Article 83 
'!be President of the Assembly arrl its other members shall be 
entitle:l, fran the date of taking the oath before the Assembly, 
to a remuneration which shall be determined by law, and to 
travelling expenses fron their place of residence to the place in 
which the Assembly is meeting. 
Article 84 
'!be Assembly shall have a Bureau consisting of a President, 
a First and Second Vice President and two controllers. The 
Assembly shall select than all fron anrng its menbers. 
The term of office of the President and the two Vice 
Presidents shall expire when the term of the Assembly expires or 
when it is dissolved in accordance with the provisions of the 
secorrl paragraph of Article 88. 
The term of office of the oontrollers shall expire with the 
choice of new ccntrollers at the opening of the next ordinary 
annual session. If any post in the Bureau becanes vacant, the 
Assembly shall elect wOO shall fill it for the renaining pericd. 
Article 85 
'!be Assembly shall have a Secretary-General who shall be 
assiste:l by a number of staff who shall be directly respc::nsible 
to the Assembly. '!be Assembly's stan::li.ng orders shall lay down 
their cx:nlltions of service arrl their powers. 
The Assembly shall lay dCMn its stan:1ing orders, issued by 
decree pranulgated by the President of the Union with the Consent 
of the Cameil of Ministers. 
The standing orders shall define the p:Mers of the President 
of the Assembly, his two Vice Presidents and the Ccntrollers arrl 
shall define generally all matters pertaining to the Assembly, 
its cxmnittees, its members, its Secretariat, its employees, its 
rules arrl procedures of discussion arrl voting in the Assembly arrl 
the Committees and other matters within the limits of the 
provisioos of this OJnstitutim. 
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Article 86 
Sessions of the Assembly shall be ~lic. Secret sessions 
may be held at the request of a representative of the Government, 
the President of the Assembly or one third of its members. 
Article 87 
Deliberations of the Assembly shall not be valid unless a 
majority of its members at least are present. Resolutions shall 
be taken by an absolute majority of the votes of members present, 
except in cases where a special majority has been prescribed. If 
votes are equally divided, the side which the President of the 
session supports shall prevail. 
Article 88 
Meetings of the Assembly may be adjourned by a decree 
pranulgated by the President of the Union with the approval of 
the Cameil of Ministers of the Union for a pericrl not exceeding 
one IIalth, provided that such adjOl.1rI1neIlt is not repeated in one 
session except with the approval of the Assembly am for once 
only. '!be pericrl of adjourrm:mt shall not be deemad part of the 
tenn of the ordinary session. 
'!be Assembly may also be dissolved by a decree prCJtU.llgated 
by the President of the Union with the approval of the Suprene 
Cameil of the Union, provided that the decree of dissolution 
includes a summons to the new Assembly to come into session 
within sixty days of the date of the decree of dissolution. The 
Assembly may not be dissolved again for the same reason. 
Sectial 3 - R:M!I'S of the Naticnal :& 7.1y 
Article 89 
In so far as this does not conflict with the provisions of 
Article 110, Unioo Bills, including financial bills, shall be 
subnitted to the National Assembly of the Union before their 
su1::mi.ssioo to the President of the Union for presentation to the 
Supreme Council for ratification. '1be National Assembly shall 
discuss these bills arrl may pass them, anend or reject them. 
Article 90 
'!he Assembly shall examine during its ordinary session the 
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Annual General Budget draft law of the Union and the draft law of 
the final .accn.mts, in accordance with the provisions in Cllapter 
Eight of this Constitution. 
Article 91 
The Government shall inform the Union Assembly of 
international treaties and agreements concluded with other states 
and the various international organisations, together with 
appropriate explanations. 
Article 92 
The Union National Assembly may discuss any general subject 
pertaining to the affairs of the Union unless the Council of 
Ministers informs the Union National Assembly that such 
discussion is contrary to the highest interests of the Union. 
The Pr:i.Ire Minister or the Minister ccncerned shall atterrl the 
debates. The Union National Assembly may express its recxmteIXl-
ations and may define the subjects for debate. If the Council of 
Ministers does not approve of these rec.cJ'l'lIel'rltions, it shall 
notify the Union National Assembly of its reasons. 
Article 93 
The Government of the Union shall be represented at sessions 
of the Union National Assembly by the Prime Minister or his 
deputy or one member of the Unial Cabinet at least. 'nle Pr:i.Ire 
Minister or his deputy or the cx:mpetent Minister, shall answer 
questions put to them by any nanber of the Assembly requestiD;J 
explanation of any matters within their jurisdiction, in 
oonformity with the procedures prescribed in the standing orders 
of the Assembly. 
Article 94 
Justice is the basis of rule. In performing their duties, 
judges shall be independent and shall not be subject to any 
authority rut the law and their own conscience. 
Article 95 
The Unioo. shall have a Union Suprene Ccmt and Union Primary 
Tril::mlals as explained hereafter. 
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Article 96 
'Ihe Union Supreme Court shall consist of a President arrl a 
number of judges, not exceeding five in all, who shall be 
app:>intea. by decree, issued by the President of the Union after 
approval by the Supreme Council. 'lbe law shall prescribe the 
number of the chambers in the Court, their order arrl prcx=edures, 
corxli tions of service arrl retirement for its n:e:nbers arrl the 
precorrlitions arrl qualifications required of them. 
Article 97 
'Ihe President arrl the J\rlges of the Union Supreme Court 
shall not be rercoved while they administer justice. '!heir tenure 
of office shall not be terminated except for one of the followirg 
reasons:-
1. Death. 
2. Resignation. 
3. Expiration of term of contract for those who are appointed 
by fixed term contract or canpletion of term of seo:::n:3ment. 
4. Reaching retiremant age. 
5. Pennanent incapacity to carry the rurdens of their duties by 
reason of ill health. 
6. Disciplinary discharge on the basis of the reasons and 
proceedings stitW-ated in the law. 
7. Appoint:rrw:mt to other offices, with their consent. 
Article 98 
'!be President arrl the Judges of the Union Supreme Court 
shall, before holding office, swear on oath before the President 
of the Union am in the presence of the Union Minister of Justice 
that they will render justice without fear or favour arrl that 
they will be loyal to the Constitution arrl the laws of the Union. 
Article 99 
The Union Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction in the 
following matters:-
1. Various dis~tes between member Emirates in the Union, or 
between any one Emirate or nore arrl the Union GJvernnent, 
whenever such di~tes are sul::mitted to the Court on the 
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request of any of the interested parties. 
2. Examination of the constitutionality of Union laws, if they 
are challenged by one or nnre of the Emirates on the grourrls 
of violating the Constitution of the Union. 
Examination of the a::>nstitutionality of legislations pram.ll.-
gated by one of the Emirates, if they are challenged by one 
of the Union authorities on the grourrls of violation of the 
Constitution of the Union or of Union laws. 
3. Examination of the constitutionality of laws, legislations 
arrl regulations in general, if such request is referred to 
it .by any Cal.rt in the country during a perrling case before 
it. 'n1e aforesaid Court shall be bourrl to accept the ruling 
of the Union Supreme Cal.rt rendered in this connectioo. 
4. Interpretation of the provisions of the Calstitution, when 
50 requested by any., Union authority or by the Government of 
any Emirate. Any such interpretation shall be considered 
birrling on all. 
5. Trial of Ministers and senior officials of the Union 
appointed by decree regarding their actions in carrying out 
their official duties on the demand of the Supreme Cameil 
arrl in aca::>rdanoe with the relevant law. 
6. Crines directly affecting the interests of the Union, such 
as criIoos relating to its internal or external security, 
forgery of the official records or seals of any of the Union 
authorities arrl counterfeiting of currency. 
7. Conflict of jurisdiction between the Union judicial 
authorities and the local judicial authorities in the 
Emirates. 
8. Conflict of jurisdiction between the judicial authority in 
ale Emirate am the judicial authority in another Emirate. 
'!be rules relating thereof shall be regulated by a Union 
raw. 
9. Any other jurisdiction sti[:cl.ated in this Constitution, or 
which may be assigned to it by a Union law. 
Artic1e100 
The Union Supreme Court shall hold its sittings in the 
capital of the Union • . It may, exceptionally, assemble when 
necessary in the capital of any ale of the Emirates. 
Apperrlix A 
- 400 -
Article 101 
'!he judgements of the Union SuprenE Court shall be final and 
binding upon all. . 
If the Court, in ruling on the constitutionality of laws, 
legislations and regulations, decides that a Union legislation is 
inconsistent with the Union Constitution, or that local 
legislations or regulations under consideration contain 
provisions which are inconsistent with the Union Calstitution or 
with a Union law, the authority concerned in the Union or in the 
Emirate, accordingly, shall be obliged to hasten to take the 
necessary measures to remove or rectify the constitutional 
inconsistency • 
Article 102 
'!he Union shall have one or IOOre Union Primary Tribmals 
which shall sit in the pennanent capital of the union or in the 
capitals of some of the Emirates, in order to exercise the 
judicial powers within the sphere of their jurisdiction in the 
following cases:-
1 • Civil, ccmnercial and administrative di~tes between the 
Union and individuals whether the Union is plaintiff or 
deferrlant. 
2. crimes committed within the boundaries of the permanent 
capital of the Union, with the exception of such matters as 
are reserved for the Union Supreme Court urrler Article 99 of 
this Calstitution. 
3. Persalal status cases, civil and ccmnercial cases and other 
cases between iI:rli viduals which shall arise in the pennanent 
capital of the Union. 
Article 103 
'!he law shall regulate all matters cormected with the Unien 
Primary Tribunals in respect of their organisation, fonnatien, 
chambers, local jurisdiction, procedures to be followerl before 
them, the oath to be sworn by their judges, c:xxrlitions of service 
relating to them and the ways of appeal against their judgemants. 
'!he law may stipulate that appeals against the judgemants of 
these Tribunals shall be heard before one of the chambers of the 
Union SUpreme Court, in the cases and according to the procedures 
prescribed therein. 
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Article 104 
'!be local judicial authorities in each Emirate shall have 
jurisdiction in all judicial matters not assigned to the Union 
judicature in accordance with this Constitution. 
Article 105 
All or part of the jurisdiction assigned to the local 
judicial authorities in accordance with the preceding Article may 
be transferred by a Union law issued at the request of the 
Emirate concerned, to the Primary Union Tribunals. 
Circumstances in which appeals against judgements by the 
local judicial authorities in penal, civil, CCIl1'!ercial and other 
litigations may be referred to the Union Trib.mals, shall be 
defined by a Union law provided that its decision in such appeals 
shall be final. 
Article 106 
The Union shall have a Public Prosecutor who shall be 
appointed by a Union decree issued with the approval of the 
Council of Ministers, assisted by a mmIber of members of the 
Public Prosecutor's office. 
The law shall regulate matters relating to the members of 
the Union Public Prosecutor's Office with respect to their method 
of appoint::ne1t, ranks, praoc>ticn, retirement and the qualific-
ations required of them. 
Besides, the Union Law of criminal Procedure and trials 
shall regulate the f:XJWEll" of this lxrly and its procedures and the 
competence of its assistants from the police and the public 
security officers. 
Article 107 
The President of the Union may grant pardon from the 
execution of any sentence passed by a Union judicature before it 
is carried out or while it is being served or he may o:mnute such 
sentence, on the basis of the recommendation of the Union 
Minister of Justice, after obtaining the approval of a ccmni ttee 
fonned urrler the chairmanship of the Minister and cccsisting of 
six members selected by the Unicn Council of Ministers for a tenn 
of three years which may be renewed. The members of the 
committee shall be chosen from citizens of good repute and 
capability. 
Membership of the ccmnittee shall be gratis. Its deliber-
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ations shall be secret. Its decisions shall be issued by a 
majority vote. 
Article 108 
No sentence of death imposed finally by a Union judicial 
authority shall be carried out l.ll1til the President of the Union 
has confinned the sentence. He may substitute it by an attenuate 
sentence in accordance with the procedure stipulated in the 
preceding Article. 
Article 109 
There shall be no general amnesty for a crime or for 
specified crimes except by law. 
'lbe pranulgation of the law of amnesty shall consider such 
crimes being deE!l"OOrl non avenu, and shall rani t the execution of 
the sentence or the remaining part of it. 
PART FIVE 
t:I([(B ~ 1H> II«1<Fl3S 1H> 'mE AIJ.lB::RITIES BAVlH'i 
.nJnSDICl.'ICfi 'IBi!idSlN 
Article 110 
1. Union laws shall be promulgated in accordance with the 
provisions of this Article and other appropriate provisions 
of the Coostituticn. 
2. A draft law shall bec::xma a law after the adoption of the 
following procedure:-
(a) '!be Cameil of Ministers shall prepare a bill and sul:mit it 
to the Union National Assembly. 
(b) The Council of Ministers shall submit the bill to the 
President of the Union for his approval and presentation to 
the Suprane Council for ratification. 
(c) 'lbe President of the Union shall sign the bill after ratif-
ication by the Suprsne Council and shall pranulgate it. 
3. (a) If the Unicn National Assembly inserts any amendment to 
the bill and this amendment is not acceptable to the 
President of the Union or the Supreme Cameil or if the 
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Union National Assembly rejects the bill, the President of 
the Union or the Supreroo Cbuncil may refer it back to the 
National Assembly. If the Union National Assembly 
introduces any amendment on that occasion which is not 
acceptable to the President of the Union or the Supreme 
Council, or if the Union National Assembly decides to reject 
the bill, the President of the Union may pranulgate the law 
after ratification by the Supreroo Council. 
Cb) 'TIle term ''bill'' in this clause shall rrean the draft 
which is sul:mi tted to the President of the Union by the 
Council of Ministers including the amemments, if any, made 
to it by the Union National Assembly. 
4. Notwithstarrling the foregoing, if the situation requires the 
pranulgation of Union laws when the National Assembly is not 
in session, the Council of Ministers of the Union may issue 
than through the Supreroo Council am. the President of the 
Union, provided that the Union Assembly is notified at its 
next meeting. 
Article 111 
Laws shall be pJblished in the Official Gazette of the Union 
within a maximum of two weeks fran the date of their signature 
am. pranulgation by the President of the Union after the Supreme 
Council has ratified than. Such laws shall bec:c:ma in force one 
nonth after the date of their publication in the said Gazette, 
unless another date is specified in the said law. 
Article 112 
No laws may be applied except on what occurs as fran the 
date they bec:::cIoo in force and no retroactive effect shall result 
in such laws. '!he law may, however, stipilate the contrary in 
matters other than criminal, if necessity so requires. 
CBAP.tm n - !AIlS Tsg dO) Br iH1U5ISS 
Article 113 
Should necessity arise for urgent pranulgation of Union laws 
between sessions of the Supreme Council, the President of the 
Union together with the Council of Ministers may pranulgate the 
necessary laws in the form of decrees which shall have the force 
of law, provided that they are not inoonsistent with the Constit-
ution. 
Such decree-laws must be referred to the Suprene Council 
within a week at the maxi.rnum for assent or rejection. If they 
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are approved, they shall have the force of law and the Union 
National Assembly shall be notified at its next rooeting. 
~er, if the Supreme Council does not approve them, they 
shall cease to have the force of law unless that it has decided 
to sanction their effectiveness during the preceding period, or 
to settle in scma other way the effects arising therefran. 
Article 114 
No decree may be issued unless the Cameil of Ministers has 
confirmed it and the President of the Union or the Supreme 
Cameil, acoording to their powers, has ratified it. Decrees 
shall be ~lished in the Official Gazette after signature by the 
President of the Onion. 
Article 115 
While the Suprene Council is out of session am if necessity 
arises, it may authorise the President of the Union and the 
Cotmcil of Ministers collectively to pranulgate decrees whose 
ratification is within the pc:MeI' of the Supreme Council, provided 
that such authority shall not include ratification of inter-
national agreements and treaties or declarati.on or rescission of 
martial law or declaration of a defensive war or appointrrent of 
the President or Judges of the Unic:n Suprene Court. 
PARI' SIX 
Article 116 
'!he Emirates shall exercise all powers not assigned to the 
Union by this Constitution. '!he Emirates shall all participate 
in the establishment of the Onion and shall benefit fran its 
existence, services and protectioo. 
Article 117 
'!he exercise of rule in each Emirate shall aim in particular 
at the maintenance of security am order within its territories, 
the provision of ~lic utilities for its inhabitants am the 
raising of social am ecxn:mi.c starrlards. 
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Article 118 
The member Emirates of the Union shall all work for the c0-
ordination of their legislations in various fields with - the 
intention of unifying such legislations as far as pJSsible. 
~ or more Emirates may, after obtaining the approval of 
the Suprane Council, agglcroorate in a political or administrative 
unit, or unify all or part of their public services or establish 
a single or joint administration to run any such service. 
Article 119 
Union law shall regulate with utroost ease matters pertaining 
to the execution of judgements, requests for commissions of 
rogation, serving legal documents am surremer of fugitives 
between member Emirates of the Union. 
PART SE.V.m' 
DIS'DWI1l'I(Jf CF UliISLATIVE, EXID11'IVE AR> ~ 
.JlIUSDICl"I(R) BB'DIEI!N 'mE (I(lQi AR> 'mE PXIlWlES 
Article 120 
'!be Union shall have exclusive legislative am executive 
jurisdiction in the following affairs:-
1. Foreign affairs. 
2. Defence am the Union Armed Forces. 
3. Protection of the Union's security against internal or 
extemal threat. 
4. Matters pertaining to security, order and rule in the 
permanent capital of the Union. 
5. Matters relating to Union officials am Unioo judiciary. 
6. Union finance am Union taxes, duties an:1 fees. 
7. Union plblic loans. 
8. Postal, telegrafil" teleplxxle am wireless services. 
9. Q:>nstruction, maintenance am improvement of Union roads 
which the Suprane Camcil has determined to be trunk roads. 
'!he organisation of traffic on such roads. 
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1 o. Air Traffic Control and the issue of licences to aircraft 
and pilots. 
11 • Frlucation. 
12. Public health and medical services. 
1 3. Currency board and ooinage. 
1 4. r.Easures, starrlards and weights. 
15. Electricity services. 
16. Union nationality, passports, residence and inmigration. 
17. Union properties and all matters relating thereto. 
18. Census affairs and statistics relevant to Union purposes. 
19. Unioo Information. 
Article 121 
Wi thout prej udice to the provisions of the preceding 
Article, the Union shall have exclusive legislative jurisdiction 
in the following matters:-
:r..abaJr relations and social security; real estate and exprop-
riation in the public interest; extradition of criminals, banks; 
insurance of all kinds; protectioo of agricultural and animal 
wealth; major legislations relating to penal law, civil and 
cx:mnercial transactions and canpany law, procedures before the 
civil and criminal courts; protection of cultural, technical and 
industrial property and copyright; printing and publishing; 
import of arms and anmuni tion except for use by the aImad forces 
or the security forces belangin:J to any Emirate; other aviation 
affairs which are not within the executive jurisdiction of the 
Union, delimitation of territorial waters and regulation of 
navigatioo on the high seas. 
Article 122 
The Emirates shall have jurisdiction in all matters not 
assigned to the exclusive jurisdicticn of the Unicn in accordance 
with the provisions of the two precPd i ng Articles. 
Article 123 
As an exception to paragraph 1 of Article 120 concerning the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Union in matters of foreign policy 
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and international relations, the nenber Emirates of the Union may 
conclude lirnitai agreements of a local and administrative nature 
with the neighbouring states or regions, save that such 
agreeroonts are not inconsistent with the interests of the Union 
or with Union laws and provided that the Supreme Council of the 
Union is informed in advance. If the Council objects to the 
conclusion of such agreements, it shall be obligatory to suspend 
the matter until the Union Court has ruled on that objection as 
early as possible. 
The Emirates may retain their nenbership in the OPEX:! organ-
isation and the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting 
Coontries or may join them. 
Article 124 
Before the conclusion of any treaty or international agree-
ment which may affect the status of any of the Emirates, the 
competent Union authorities shall consult that Emirate in 
advance. In the event of a dispute, the matter shall be 
subnitted to the Union Supreme Court for ruling. 
Article 125 
The Governments of the Emirates shall undertake the 
appropriate measures to implerrent the laws prcmulgated by the 
Unioo and the treaties and international agreeuents concluded by 
the Unioo, including the prcmulgation of the local laws, regul-
ations, decisions and orders necessary for such implementation. 
The Union authorities shall supervise the inq:>lementation by 
Emirates I Governments of the Union laws, decisions, treaties, 
agreem:mts and Unioo judgenents. The canpetent administrative 
and judicial authorities in the Emirates shc:W.d forward to the 
Union authorities all possible assistance in this connection. 
The general revenues of the Union shall consist of the 
incane fran the following resoorces:-
1. Taxes, fees and duties imposed urrler a Union law in matters 
within the legislative and executive jurisdiction of the 
Unioo. 
2. Fees and rates received by the Unicn in return for services 
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provided. 
3. O:>ntribution made by member Emirates of the Union in the 
Annual Budget of the Union in accordance with the article 
herein cx::ming after. 
4. Union ir1caIe fron its own properties. 
Article 127 
The member Emirates of the Union shall contribute a 
specified proportion of their annual revenues to o::::Ner the annual 
general b..rlget expenditure of the Union, in the manner and on the 
scale to be prescribed in the arlget Law. 
Article 128 
'!he law shall prescribe the metixrl of preparing the general 
b..rlget of the Union and the final accounts. '!he law shall also 
define the beginning of the financial year. 
Article 129 
'Ihe draft annual budget of the Union, canpn.smg estimates 
of revenues and expenditure, shall be referred to the Union 
National Assembly at least two m::nths before the beginning of the 
financial year, for discussion and submission of comments 
thereon, before the draft budget is sul::mitted to the Suprene 
Council of the Union, together with those CCJtmal1ts, for assent. 
Article 130 
'!be annual general hJdget shall be issued by a law. In all 
cases, where the budget law has not been pranu1.gated before the 
beginning of the financial year, temporary monthly fun:1s may be 
made by Union decree on the basis of one twelfth of the funds of 
the previous financial year. Revenues shall be oollected and 
expenditure dishlrsed in accordance with the laws in force at the 
end of the preceding financial year. 
Article 131 
All experrli.ture not provided for in the b..rlget, all expend-
iture in excess of the budget estimates and all transfers of sums 
fron one part to another of the Budget IIUlSt be o::::Nered by a law. 
Notwi thstarrling the foregoing, in cases of extreme urgency, 
such experrli. ture or transfer may be arranged by decree-law in 
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conformity with the provisions of Article 113 of this 
Consti tution. 
Article 132 
'!be Union shall allocate in its annual blrlget a sum fron its 
revenue to be experrled on b.rilding and construction proj ects, 
internal security and social affairs according to the urgent 
needs of ~ of the Emirates. 
'!be execution of these projects and the disbursement thereon 
shall be drawn fron these furrls, accanplished by neans of and 
under the supervision of the CCl'Ip:!tent Union bodies with the 
agreerrent of authorities of the Emirates concerned. 
'!he Union may establish a special furrl for this ~. 
Article 133 
No Union tax may be :imposed, aIOOIrled or al:olished except by 
virtue of law. No person may be exanpted fran payment of such 
taxes except in the cases specified by law. 
Union taxes, duties am fees may not be levied on any perscn 
except within the limits of the law and in accordance with its 
provisions • 
Article 134 
No {Xlblic loan may be cx:ntracted except by a Union law. No 
cxmnitment invol vir¥] the payrrent of sums fron Union Exchequer in 
a future year or years may be concluded except by means of a 
Unicn law • 
.Article 135 
'!be final accounts of the financial administration of the 
Unicn for the oanpleted financial year shall be referred to the 
Unioo Natiooal Assembly within the four rronths following the em 
of the said year, for its cooments thereon, before their 
suhnissioo to the Supreme Cameil for approval, in the light of 
the Auditor-General' s report. 
Article 136 
An indeperrlent Unioo department headed by an Alrlitor-General 
who shall be appointed by decree, shall be established to audit 
the accc:mlts of the Union and its organs and agencies, and to 
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audit any other accounts assigned to the said department for that 
plUl;X)Se in accordance with the law. 
'!he law shall regulate this department arrl shall define ' its 
jurisdiction and the oanpetence of those 'WOrking therein, arrl the 
guarantees to be given to it, its head an::l the employees 'WOrking 
in it in order that they may carry out their duties in the Itk)st 
efficient manner. 
PART NINE 
Article 137 
Every attack upon any member Emirate of the Union shall be 
considered an attack upon all the Emirates arrl upon the existence 
of the Union itself, which all Union arrl local forces will c0-
operate to repel by all rooans possible. 
Article 138 
Only (5) the Union shall have anny, navy arrl air forces with 
unified training am o:mnarrl. '!he CaImaIXler in Orief of these 
forces am the Orief of the General Staff shall be appointed an::l 
dismissed by means of a Union decree. 
'Ibe Union may have a Unicn Security Forces. 
'lhe Union Camcil of Ministers shall be responsible directly 
to the ,President of the Union am the Supreme Cooncil of the 
Unicn for the affairs of all these forces. 
Article 139 
'!he law shall regulate rnili tary service, general or partial 
mobilisation, the rights and duties of members of the Armed 
Forces, their disciplinary prOCErlures am similarly the special 
regulations of the Unioo Security Forces. 
Article 140 
'!he declaration of defensive war shall be declared by a 
Union decree issued by the President of the Union after its 
approval by the supreme Council. Offensive war shall be 
prohibited in accordance with the provisions of international 
charters. 
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Article 141 
A Supreme Defence Council shall be set up under the 
chainnanship of the President of the Union. Anong its members 
shall be the Vice President of the Union, the Chainnan of the 
Council of Ministers of the Union, the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, Defence, Finance, Interior, the Camlarrler in Crief arrl 
the Crief of the General Staff. It shall advise arrl offer views 
on all matters pertaining to defence, maintenance of the peace 
arrl security of the Union, fonning of the anred forces, their 
equipnent arrl developrent and the detennination of their posts 
am camps. 
'!be Council may invite any military adviser or expert or 
other persons it wishes to atterrl its meetings but they shall 
have no decisive say in its deliberations. All matters 
pertaining to this Council shall be regulated by means of a law. 
Article 142 (6) 
'!he member Emirates shall have the right to set up local 
security forces ready and equipped to join the defensive 
machinery of the Union to defend, if need arises, the Union 
against any external aggression. 
Article 143 
Any Emirate shall have the right to request the assistance 
of the Annerl Forces or the Security Forces of the Unien in order 
to maintain security am order within its territories whenever it 
is exposed to danger. Such a request shall be submitted 
inlnajiately to the Supreme Council of the Union for decision. 
'!he Supreme Council may call upcn the aid of the local anned 
forces belonging to any Emirate for this p.1I'pOSe provided that 
the Emirate requesting assistance arrl the Emirate to whan the 
forces belCllg agree. 
'!he President of the Union and the Council of Ministers of 
the Union collectively, may, if the Supreme Council is not in 
session, take any imnediate measure which cann::>t be delayed arrl 
considered necessary and may call the Supreme Council into 
i.lrIrediate session. 
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Article 144 
1. Subject to the provisioos of the follo.ring paragraphs, the 
provisions of this Constitution shall apply for a 
transitional period of five Gregorian years beginning fran 
the date of its entry into force in accordance with 
provisions of Article 152 (7). 
2. a) If the Supreme Council considers that the topmost 
interests of the Union require the amendment of this 
Constitution, it shall submit a draft constitutional 
aroorrlI:oont to the Union National Assembly. 
Cb) '!he procedure for approving the constitutional aroorrlI:oont 
shall be the same as the prOCErlure for approving laws. 
Cc) '!he approval of the Union National Assembly for a draft 
constitutional aroorrlI:oont shall require the agreeroont of two-
thirds of the votes of members present. 
The President of the Unioo shall sign the oonstitutional 
aroorrlI:oont in the name of the SUpreme Council and as its 
representative and shall pranulgate the aroorrlI:oont. 
3. D.Jring the transitional period, the Supreme Council shall 
adopt the necessary measures to prepare a draft permanent 
Constitution to take the place of this temporary 
constitution. It shall submit the draft permanent 
Constitution to the Union National Assembly for debate 
before pranulgating it. 
4. '!he SUpreme Council shall call the Union National Assembly 
into extraordinary session at a time not more than six 
rocnths before the em of the period of validi ty of this 
temporary Constitution. '!he pennanent O::x1stitution shall be 
presented at this session. It shall be promulgated 
according to the procedure laid down in paragraph 2 of this 
Article. 
Article 145 
Urrler no circumstances, may any of the provisions of this 
Consti tution be susperrled, except when Martial law is in force 
and within the limits specified by this law. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, sessions of the National 
Assembly of the Union may not be susperrled during that period nor 
may the inmunity of its members be violated. 
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Article 146 
In case of necessity defined by law I Martial law shall be 
declared by a decree pramilgated with the approval of the Supreme 
Council en the basis of a proposal made by the President of the 
Union with the oonsent of the Council of Ministers of the Union. 
Such decree shall be notified to the Union National Assembly at 
its next meeting. 
Martial law shall be similarly lifted by decree issued with 
the approval of the Supreme Council when the need, for which it 
was imposed, no longer exists. 
Article 147 
Nothing in the applicatien of this Constitution shall affect 
treaties or agreements concluded by member Emirates with states 
or international organisations unless such treaties or agreenents 
are amended or abrogated by agreement between the parties 
concerned. 
Article 148 
All matters established by laws, regulations, decrees, 
orders and decisions in the various member Emirates of the Union 
in effect upon the caning into force of this Constitution, shall 
continue to be applicable unless amended or replaced in 
accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. 
Similarly, the measures and organisations existing in the 
member Emirates shall continue to be effective until the 
promulgation of laws amending them in accordance with the 
provisions of the Constitution. 
Artic1e149 
As an exception to the prCNisions of Article 121 of this 
Constitution, the Emirates may pramilgate legislations necessary 
for the regulaticn of the matters set out in the said Article 
wi thout violation of the provisions of Article 1 51 of this 
Constitutioo • 
.Article 150 
The Union authorities shall strive to issue the laws 
referred to in this Constitution as quickly as IX>Ssible so as to 
replace the existing legislations and systems, particularly those 
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which are not consistent with the provisions of the Constituti on. 
Article 151 
!he provisions of this Constitution shall prevail over the 
Constitutions of the manber Einirates of the Union and the Union 
laws which are issued in accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution shall have priority over the legislations, 
regulations and decisions issued by the authorities of the 
Emirates. 
In case of conflict, that part of the inferior legislation 
which is inoonsistent with the superior legislation shall be 
rendered null and void to the extent that rE!lIOVes the inoonsist-
ency. In case of disp.1te, the matter shall be referred to the 
Union Suprema Court for its ruling. 
Article 152 
'!he Constitution shall take effect fran the date to be fixed 
in a declaration to be issued by the Rulers signatories to this 
Constitution. 
Signed in Dubai on this day the 18th of July, 1971, 
corresporxling to this day the 25th of the rocnth of Jamad Awwal 
1391. 
(Signatures of the Rulers of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, 
Ajrnan, Urm Al Q:lwain, Fuj airah). ( 8 ) 
'Ibis constitution is based, to a large extent, on the IOCdel 
set by the Egyptian Constitution. A principal reason for. the 
heavy influence of the Egyptian Constitution is the general 
place which the Egyptian legal system occupies as a IOCdel 
for other Arab CCJUIltries. 
A second reason for the Egyptian influence was the 
participation of a mnnber of Egyptian legal advisers am 
scholars in the process of drafting the U.A.E. Constitution. 
or. Wahid Ra' fat, the Egyptian scholar, was the main drafter 
of the final version of this constitution. 
'111e U.A.E. Constitution is also affected by British 
influences in sane of its major characteristics. '111e federal 
system adopted by this constitution is a system favoured by 
the British for adoption by their former colonies and 
protectorates. 
2 Ras Al Khaimah joined the Union on the 1 Oth of February, 
1972. 
3 'llle original signatories of the Constitution did not include 
Ras Al Khaimah. which adhered to the Union on 10 February, 
1972. A new paragraph was added by a Declaration of 
Constitutional Amendment No. 1 (1972) which reads as 
follows:-
"In the event of the acceptance of a new nenber joining 
the Union, the Supreme Council of the Union shall 
determine the number of seats which will be allocated 
to that member in the National Assembly of the Union, 
being in addition to the number stitulated in Article 
68 of this O:nstitutioo." 
4 Decision of the Supreme Cooncil of the Union No. 3, 1972. 
5 Added by Cbnstitutiooal AmeOOment No. 1 (1976). 
6 ~letErl by Constitutional AmeOOment No. 1 (1976). 
7 '!his paragraph has been amen:led three consecutive times, the 
last of which was in 1981. '!be effect of the last amerrlrcent 
is to make the term of this O:nstitution expire on 1 st of 
December 1991. 
8 Ras Al I<haimah joined the Onion on the 10th February, 1972. 
APPIHlIX B 
t:tmB LAW tuEm 10 FeR 'mE YEAR 1973 
~]lI; 'mE tmQf SOPI.(I§IE CDm' 
mICB LAW ~ 10 FeR "mE YEAR 1913 REGmDn«; '!BE tmaI SJJ£ll(li.;ME 
cnm (1 )(2) 
Article 1 
A Suprerce Coort shall be established in the Uni ted Arab 
Emirates, this Coort shall be called "'!he Union Supreme Court". 
Reference will be made to it in this law as "'llle Supreme Court It • 
This Court shall be the supreme ju:licial authority in the 
Union. 
Article 2 
'!he seat of the Supreme Coort shall be in the capital of the 
Union. '!be Court can hold its sessions in any of the capitals of 
the Emirates whenever appropriate. 
Article 3 (3) 
'!he Suprerce Court shall be CUiiPOSed of a President arrl four 
judges. A sufficient number of alternate judges can be appointed 
to the Court. No IOOre than one alternate judge can sit in the 
Constitutional Olamber. Regulations concerning the judges of the 
Suprerre Court shall be applied to the alternate judges with the 
exception of the matters specifically regulated for the alternate 
judges. 
Article .. 
To be appointed to the Supreme Court a person has to satisfy 
the following requir~ts:-
1. To be a citizen of the United Arab Emirates and of a 
oamplete civil capacity. 
2. To be at least thirty five years of age. 
3. To hold a degree in the Islamic Shari la arrl Law fran an 
accredited University or a higher educational institution. 
4. To have canpleted a pericd of work of at least fifteen years 
in judicial or legal employnent in a Ccurt or an equivalent 
employment in the ~lic prosecution, or legal consulting 
departments of the goveIllIle11t; engagem:mt in the represent-
ation of the governm:m.t before the Ccurts; teaching of Law 
or Islamic Shari la in an accredited University or higher 
educational institution; practice in the legal profession as 
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.an attorney; or in any other employrrent which is equivalent 
to the judicial employrrent. 
Article 5 
As an exception from the requirement of item 1 of the 
preceding Article, citizens of Arab countries can be appointed to 
the Court, provided that they fulfil the other requira:rents. 
Appointments of such individuals should be by way of 
secon:m:mt fron their governroonts or by contracts of employrrent 
for limited and renewable pericrls. 
All rules of this Law shall be applied to judges on secorrl-
ment or aptX>inted by contract. 
Article 6 
'!be period specified in item 4 of Article 4 shall be reducErl 
to half its length, and the age requirelOOl1t contained in the 
second item of Article 4 shall be reduced to thirty years, for 
citizens of the Union who fulfil the other requirements for 
appointment. 
'!he application of the preceding paragraph shall ccntinue in 
the first seven years following the caning into force of this 
Law. 
Article 7 
App:>intment of the President and judges of the Supraoo Court 
shall be by decree, issued by the President of the Union after 
approval by the Council of Ministers and ratification by the 
Supraoo Council of the Union. '!be seniority of the judges shall 
be based on the date of the decree of appointment and in acoord-
ance with the order in that decree. 
Article 8 
'!be President of the Court and its judges shall, before 
asstmdng their respoosibilities, take the following oath before 
the President of the Union and in the presence of the Minister of 
Justice:-
"I swear by Almighty God that I will decide in accordance 
with justice, withalt fear or prejudice, and that I will be 
faithful to the Constitution of the United Arab Emirates and 
its Laws." 
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Article 9 (4) 
'!he Supreme Court shall have one Clamber for Constitutional 
matters and other Clambers for consideration of other matters 
included in this Law, Union Law Number 17 for the year 1 978, or 
any other Law. The Chambers shall be presided over by the 
President of the Court or the m::>St senior judge. No alternate 
judge shall be allowed to preside over any Clamber. 
Decisions in matters included in the first seven items of 
Article 33 of this Law shall be passed by a five-rrsnber Chamber 
with a maximum of two alternate judges. Decisions in other 
matters shall be passed by a three-member Chamber. In both 
cases, decisions shall be taken by majority. However, decisions 
of death sentence shall not be issued except by unanimous 
decision. 
Article 10 
'!he Supreme Court shall have a plenum of all its judges 
presided over by its President or acting president. The plenum 
shall have jurisdiction in organising Chambers, distriootion of 
workloads between them, detennining the number, dates and ti.rres 
of sessions for each Cllamber, in acHitian to all matters relating 
to the organisation of the O::lurt, its internal matters and all 
other matters provided by Law. 
Article 11 (5) 
The plenum of the Court shall hold a meeting at the 
beginn.i.r¥3' of every year, on the SUlIl'lOllS of the President of the 
Court or its acting president. Additional meetings may be 
arranged whenever such are felt necessary. 
The Public Prosecution shall be called to the meetings am 
its representative given the right to raise his opinion in 
matters relating to its duties. 
For the plenum's meetings to be quorate, at least three of 
its original judges, including the President of the Court or its 
acting president, have to be present. Decisions of the plenum 
shall be taken by absolute majority of the present rrenbers. In 
case of a split vote, the side of the President shall prevail. 
'!he proceedi ngs of the plenum I s meetings shall be rerorded am 
signed by the president of each meeting. 
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Article 12 
The Court shall have an annual judicial recess starting fron 
the beginning of July and errling at the em of August. . 'lbe 
recess shall be oonsidered ordinary holiday for those who are not 
assigned work during it. 
The plenum of the Court shall organise holidays of judges 
and the work of the Court during the annual judicial recess. 
Judges shall not be given their annual holidays in pericrls other 
than the annual judicial recess, unless such are necessary and 
only within the p:>ssible limits allowed by the Court's work. 
Pennission for such holidays shall be given by the President 
of the Court, and for a maximum of fifteen days. 
Article 13 
'lbe Supreme Court shall have a technical office ccmposed of 
a president and a sufficient number of members chosen from 
members of the judiciary, public prosecution, ccnsultation and 
legislation authorities, or others who are employed in perfonning 
works equivalent to the judicial employment. 
In case of necessity, p:>sts may be filled by way of seoorrl-
ment fron local judicial autOOrities or fron lawyers iron Arab 
countries who aCXIUire sufficient experience and ability. 
The attachm:mt of the members of the technical office shall 
be by way of secorrlment or temporary employment aca:>rding to a 
decision fron the Minister of Justice, after suggestion fron the 
President of the Ca.lrt and awroval of the autOOrity fron which 
the nenber is seoorrled or given temporary leave. 
A sufficient number of staff shall be attached to the 
technical office. 
Article 14 
'!be technical office shall urrlertake the perfonnance of the 
following matters:-
1 • 'lbe expedi tion of legal rules established by the Supreme 
Coort in its decisions, categorisation and organisation of 
such rules to simplify future reference to them. 
2. supervision of copying, printing and publishing of the 
Court's decisions. 
3. Preparation of research required by the President or any of 
the O1ambers of the Coort. 
Appen:lix B 
- 421 -
4. Supervision of the Court's schedules and registration of 
cases, petitions arrl applications in these schedules. 
5. other matters referred to it by the President of the Court. 
Article 15 
'lhe Supreme Court shall have a secretariat of clerks, and 
another of sunm::>ns servers, headed by a senior clerk and a senior 
s1.lJIlIOrlS server respectively, arrl assisted by a sufficient number 
of staff. 
'!be clerks and SUIIIIDIlS servers shall take an oath before 
assuming their duties, before a Chamber of the Court, to 
discharge their duties honestly and faithfully. '!he oath shall 
be reoorded and kept in a special record. A copy shall be filed 
in the employee's file. 
In matters not regulated by the preceding paragr.aphs., the 
Union Law of Civil Service shall apply in relation to these 
employees. 
Article 16 
'lbe President of the Court shall have the right to supervise 
its judges and business, and the right to caution regarding 
occurrences incanpatlble with the duties and requirements of 
office. 
Article 17 
The President of the Court has the disciplinary power 
over civil servants and employees of the Ccmt, that is given to 
the Minister and Under-Secretary by the Union Law of Civil 
Service. 
Article 18 
'!he tenure of office of the President and the judges of the 
Supreme Court shall not be terminated except for one of the 
following reasans:-
1. Death. 
2. Resignaticn. 
3. Expiraticn of tenn of c:xxltract for those wOO are appointed 
by fixed tenn c:xxltract or canpleticn of tenn of sec::x:xrlment. 
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4. Reaching retirement age. 
5. Pennanent incapacity to carry the b.rrden of their duties by 
reason of ill health. 
6. Disciplinary discharge on the basis of the reasons and 
proceedings stipulated in the Law. 
7. Appointment to other offices, with their consent. 
Article 19 
The retirement age for the President and judges of the 
Supreme Ccurt shall be sixty five years. If such age is reached 
within the pericrl fran the first day of Q:tober to the last day 
of June, the member shall continue to hold office until the 
latter date. 
Whenever considered awropriate, extension of service of 
members of the Ccurt nay be decided for a pericrl or periods not 
exceeding three years, provided that each pericrl shall not be 
less than one j trlicial year. Extension of service shall be by 
the 5aIre means of a~intment. 
Article 33 
'!be Supreme Ccurt shall have exclusive jurisdiction in the 
follCMing natters:-
1. Varioos diSpltes between nenber Emirates in the Union, or 
between any one or IlDre Emirates and the Union Govenunent, 
wh~ such diSpltes are subnitted to the Ca.lrt at the 
request of any of the interested parties. 
2. Examination of the constitutionality of Union Laws, if they 
are challenged by one or nDre of the Emirates on the grourrls 
of violating the Ccnstitutioo of the Union. 
3. Examination of the constitutionality o£ legislations 
prarulgated by one of the Emirates, if they are challenged 
by one of the Union authorities on the grcmrls of violation 
of the Q)nstitutioo of the Onion or of Union Laws. 
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4. Examination of the constitutionality of laws, legislations 
and regulations in general, if such request is referred to 
it by any Court in the oountry during a case pending before 
it. 
5. Interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, when 
so requested by any Union authority or by the Governnent of 
any Emirate. 
6. Interpretation of treaties or international agreements, when 
so requested by any Union authority, by any of the member 
Emirates, or if such interpretation is the subject of a 
dispute pending before any Court. 
7. Trial of Ministers and senior officials of the Union 
appointed by decree, regarding their actions in carrying out 
their official duties on the demarrl of the Supreme Council 
and in accordance with the relevant law. 
8. Crimes directly affecting the interests of the Union, such 
as crimes relatin:J to its internal or external security, 
forgery of the official records or seals of any of the Union 
authorities and counterfeiting of currency. 
9. Conflict of jurisdiction between the Union judicial 
authorities and the judicial authorities of the Emirates. 
10. Conflict of jurisdiction between a judicial entity in an 
Emirate and a judicial entity in another Emirate, or anong 
judicial entities in a single Emirate. 
11. Any other jurisdiction stip.ll.ated in the Constitution or any 
Union taw. 
(This Part includes establishment of the Public Prosecution 
Authority and its general regulations.) 
PART FIVE mE HO"" ikBS &liCRE mE SlJPR&IE CD:Rl' 
Article 51 
Until legislations regulating civil and criminal procedures 
are p:iSsed, rules included in this Part and general adjudicative 
rules shall be applied in relation to procee1 i ngs before the 
Supreme Court. 
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Article 52 
Except in criminal actions, petitions to the Court shall be 
brought by means of a nerorarrlum. This meroc>randum must include, 
in addition to names of the parties, their capacities and 
addresses, inforna.tion about the subject of the petition arrl the 
constitutional or legislative provisions relating to the 
application of interpretation or the dispute besides 
clarification of the suggested contradiction or vagueness in such 
provisions, together with all elements of the case arrl d0C\ID\8nts 
necessary. The rnerrnrarrlum shall be signed by the petitioner. 
In the case of petitions brought by federal or local 
authorities, signature shall be by their legal agents. If 
petitions are brought by irrlividuals, signature shall be by an 
attorney accepted to appear before the Supreme Court. 
'!be petitioner shall ffle with the original copy, additional 
copies of the Ill€I'OClrarrlum arrl documents, of a number suff icient 
for the other parties am the nanbers of the Court. 
Criminal actions shall be brought by the Prosecutor General 
by way of Sl.lIIIOC.Cing the accused to appear before the Court. '!be 
sununons shall indicate the alleged offence and the legal 
provisions stip.1lating the penalties, in regard to felonies a 
list of the available evidence shall be served with the SUIIlOOIlS. 
'lbe s\.IIIl"OClt'lS shall be served to the receiver in person or to 
his danicile in accordance with the manner sti{Xllated in Article 
54. 
SUmrons shall be served to prisoners in the presence of the 
governors of the prisons or their dep.lties. 
SUmrons for members of the anned forces or the police shall 
be served in the presence of their superiors or through the 
authority entrusted with receiving such SU1'l1OCKlS. 
Article 53 
'!he clerk 'secretariat of the Court shall record petitions in 
the same day of receipt of their rnerrnrama. Such recording shall 
be in a special record arrl in the same subsequent order of their 
receipt. Record of petitions shall be transferred to the 
President of the Court to detennine a session for consideration 
of each, then he shall pass the record with a note for each 
petitioo containing the date, number arrl session in which each 
petition shall be considered. 
'!be clerk secretariat shall expediently notify the concerned 
parties. '!be case shall be considered starting fran the date of 
its recording. Notification shall be carried out by the 
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secretariat of summoners. Help may be sought from persons 
designated for such purpose by the Minister of Justice. Notific-
action shall include, in addition to the special infornation 
regardin:3' the date am time of service of such notice, the ·naIre 
arrl occupation of its server am the name arrl capacity of its 
receiver. 
No notice shall be served before sunrise or after sunset, or 
in holiday or festivity days, except on occasions of urgency 
provided that this is ordererl by the President of the CaJrt arrl 
that he signs the original copy of the notice. 
If the person serving notice encamters resistance or major 
difficulties, he shall suspend his procedures and refer the 
matter to the President of the CaJrt for his orders about the 
following actions. 
'!he server shall return the original copy of the notice to 
the clerk secretariat of the Court with the impression of what 
has occurred. 
Article 54 
'!be perscn whose interests have been affected by a crime has 
the right to act as a plaintiff requesting redress of his civil 
rights before the criminal 01amber of the Ccurt considering the 
action, unless the case centains an issue on which decision has 
been reserved. 
'Ihe civil action can be considered started by serving a 
llBlK)I"andum containing requests to the Public Prosecutioo in order 
to proceed with the criminal actien. Claim of civil rights can 
be initiated in the session of the CaJrt considering the criminal 
action, if the accused is present, otherwise the case shall be 
adjourned until the accused has been infonned of the claims of 
the plaintiff, provided that the criminal action is not canpleted 
and ready for decision. 
'!be plaintiff can include in his action a perscn responsible 
for the civil rights of the accused, and this person can 
intervene in the action of the case en his own initiative at any 
stage. 
Article 55 
Witlx:ut prejudice to the preceding Article, the party banned 
by a crime has the right to refer to the Civil Coo.rt which has 
jurisdiction, to request indemnity fran hann suffered because of 
the crime. 
Whenever such a route has been cOOsen, the plaintiff cannot 
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refer his claim to the Criminal Chamber. If the civil action has 
been started while the criminal action is still pending before 
the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, the Civil Court shall 
susperrl its prcceedings until the criminal action is decided. 
Article 56 
'!he criminal action shall be considered extinguished by the 
death of the accused. 
Article 57 
Testi.roc>ny of witnesses of legal age shall be heard after 
taking oath to testify according to the truth. Any witness who 
refuses to appear before the Court despite notification, or 
refuses to testify withoot justifiable cause, shall be liable to 
a penalty of a maximum of ale huIrlred Oirhams. 
If a witness refuses for the sec:orrl time to appear before 
the Court despite notification he shall be liable to a penalty of 
a maximum of two huIrlred Oirhams. '!he Court can at this time 
order the police to canpel him to appear if his appearance is 
considered necessary. 
In all cases the Court can relieve witnesses of penalties if 
they appear arrl offer acceptable excuses. 
Article 58 
Applications for constitutional review that are raised 
before the Cants in the course of their consideration of cases 
pendi.D:J before them, shall be referred to the Supreme Court by a 
decision of the concerned court containing the grounds for 
referral. 'llle application shall be signed by the President of 
the Circuit cxncerna::l am shall cx:ntain the provisions subject to 
the revie';l requested. '!his shall apply if referral is by the 
initiative of the Court cxncerna::l. 
If the referral to the Supreme Court has been caused by a 
plea fran a party to the case am accepted by the Court, the 
Court shall specify a time limit within which the interested 
party can refer his request for revie';l to the Supreme Court. If 
such a limit elapses without proof of referral of the matter to 
the Supreme Court, the person shall be considered to have abarxi-
oned his plea. 
In the case of refusal by the Court to accept the petition 
to refer a question of constitutional review to the Supreme 
Court, the decision of refusal shall be grotIIXled. '!he concernerl 
shall have the right to appeal the decision with the remainder of 
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the Court I s decision to the Court which has jurisdiction, 
provided that the decision is appealable. 
'!he Court before which the original case is pending shall 
suspend its proceedings until the Supreme Court issues its 
decision in the constitutional application. '!he decision of 
suspension shall be issued with the decision of referral 
roontioned in the first paragraph of this Article or after the 
actual referral to the Supreme Court mentioned in the second 
paragraph. 
Article 59 
Applications for the interpretation of treaties which are 
raised before the Courts in the caIrse of their consideration of 
cases before them, shall be referred to the SUpreme Court by a 
decision of the concerned Court according to the procedures 
contained in the first paragraph of the preceding Article, that 
is in the case in which referral has been started by the Court IS 
CMIl decision or by a serious petition fran one of the parties. 
'!he rule contained in the last paragraph of the preceding 
Article shall apply in this case. 
Article 60 
In the cases of conflict of jurisdiction between two or nnre 
judicial authorities, that are mentiOOErl in items 9 and 10 of 
Article 33, in case none of these authorities relinquish 
consideration of the case, or if all of these authorities 
relinquish the case, or if conflicting decisions have been 
issued, the application to detennine the canpetent Court may be 
brought by way of a I'Ie'IOrarrlum fran a party to the case or fran 
the Prosecutor General. 
'!be IOElIlOrandun shall be accanpanied by copies of roemorarrla 
of ccnflicting cases or of the ccnflicting decisions. 
As a consequence of filing the roontioned mem::lrandurn with the 
clerk secretariat of the Supreme Court, cases which are in 
cooflict shall be suspended until the canpetent Court has been 
detennined. '!be coocerned Cllamber of the Suprene Court may order 
the suspension of the enforcement of all the conflicting 
decisions until the applicable decision has been detennined. '!be 
President of the Supreme Court may order suspension of the 
enforcement of the conflicting decisions until the matter is 
considered by one of the <llambers of the Court. 
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Article 61 
'!be clerk secretariat of the Court shall sul:mit the case to 
the President of the Court to detennine the C1amber which shall 
consider the case. 
Except in criminal matters, the President of the Court shall 
naninate a member of the Clamber assigned the case, to prepare it 
for hearings. 
The clerk secretariat shall notify the parties and the 
public prosecuticn about the sessions of preparaticn of the case, 
in order to atterrl before the judge responsible for such prepar-
ation. 'file judge resp:>nsible for peparing the case may request 
the fulfil.nent of certain duties an:l procedures fran the public 
prosecution in order to o:::rnplete preparation of the case. 
Article 62 
After canpletion of the preparation of the case, the judge 
responsible shall file a report listing the facts and legal 
issues raised by the case without including his own opinion 
regarding than. 
'!he clerk secretariat shall sul:mit the report mentioned to 
the President of the Chamber concerned, to detennine the session 
in which the case shall be considered. '!he clerk secretariat 
shall inform those concerned about the date of the session in 
which the case will be considered. After that, it bea:lres their 
responsibility to follow the proceedings of the case. 
'!he judge who prepared the case shall be the reporter of the 
case, while others may be assigned this job by the President of 
the Chamber. 
Article 63 
'Ihe jtrlge who prepared the case shall read his report in the 
sessicn. Decisions shall be passe1 after hearing the requests of 
the public prosecuticn, without argument of the case unless the 
Court decides to seek clarificaticn fran parties in person or 
fran their legal representatives. 
No decision shall be passed in criminal cases without 
hearing defence of the accused. 
Article 64 
In cases other than tlx>se specified in this Law, it shall 
not be a consequence of bringing" of a case to susperrl enforc::arent 
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of a decision or judge:rrent which is subject to the case. 
Article 65 
A Carmittee shall be established in the Supreme Court of the 
President or his deputy and the four rrost senior of its judges, 
provided that the number of alternate judges does not exceed two. 
If any of the Olarnbers of the Court decides, in the course 
of considering a case or petition, to depart fron a principle 
previously established by the Court, except in oonstitutional 
matters, or in the existence of conflicting principles previously 
established by the Court, the Clamber shall refer the matter to 
this Carmittee for decision. 
Article 66 
All civil, administrative and judicial authorities in the 
Union and in the nenber Emirates shall provide the Court with the 
information and doctnrents it requests. 
'l1le Court shall have the authority to issue any order to 
ensure the presence of any perscn or subnission of any dOCl.1lOOIlt 
it considers to be necessary to the determination of cases, 
requests or petitions before it. 
All the mentioned authorities shall errleavour, within their 
respective powers, to fulfil any order issued to them by the 
Court in order to help in performance of its duties. 
PART SIX 
Article 67 
Decisiccs of the Supreme Court shall be final and birxling on 
all. No appeal of any kirrl nay be heard regarding such decisions 
except in decisions issued in absentia in criminal matters, in 
which case special ki.rrls of appeals included in taws of criminal 
Procedures shall be applied. 
Article 68 
'!be basis for the determination of values of cases, the 
charges payable and ways of appeal against such, shall be estalr 
lished by decree. Petitions and applications of the Union 
authorities or authorities of the member Emirates shall be 
exempted fran payrrent of charges. 
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Article 69 
Expenses of cases shall be determined by the Court if 
possible, otherwise such determination shall be by the President 
of the Chamber which issued the decision, by means of an 
unappealable order on a mem::>randum presentErl by the beneficiary. 
Article 70 
The President of the Chlrt, or his designate, shall decide 
in applications of postponement of paynents of charges, bails or 
relief therefrom. Such decisions shall be issuErl after review of 
documents and hearing from the applicants in case such heariD:J is 
considerErl appropriate. 
As a consequence of applications for relief from paynents of 
charges, dates of cases shall be susperrled. 
Article 71 
The decision shall be issuErl and enforced in the name of the 
President of the Union. 
Article 72 
Until FErleral Chlrts of First Instance are establishErl, the 
Supraoo Court shall have ccmpetence to decide in civil, administ-
rative and ccmnercial disputes between the Union and individuals, 
whether. the Union is a plaintif£ or deferrlant. 
Decisions in these cases shall be passed by a panel of the 
Calrt CXl[ifX>Sed of three jOOges. 
Article 73 
The CO'fIY of the decisiCl1S which is to bea::ne the basis for 
enforcement, shall be stamped by the seal of the Court and signed 
by the designated employee of the clerk secretariat, after 
entering the follCMing phrase in writing on the ropy:-
"All Ministers, heads of government establishments and 
departments and all oanpetent authorities of the Union or 
Member Emirates, shall endeavour without undue delay to 
execute this decision and perform its orders. The 
ProsecUtor General, his representatives and other officials 
mentiot19d, shall help enforce application of this decision, 
even if they are requirErl to use force in such application." 
Apperrli.x B 
- 431 -
Article 74 
All decisions of the Supreme Coort in constitutional cases, 
applications for constitutional interpretation, am for inter-
pretations of treaties am international agreements, shall be 
made public without cost in the Official Gazette. 
Article 75 
'!be Supreme Coort shall apply the Islamic Shari' a, Union 
Laws aIXi other Laws in force in the rrember Emirates of the Union 
confonning to the Islamic Shari' a. Likewise, it shall apply 
those rules of custan am those principles of natural law am 
canparative law which do not conflict with the principles of that 
Shari'a. 
Article 76 
All local authorities in the member Emirates of the Unicn 
shall transfer, without cost or request, all cases available with 
them, which cane within the ccmpetence of the Supreme Court in 
accordance with this Law. 
'lbe clerk secretariat of the Supreme Court shall urrlertake 
performance of procedures required by this Law am carry notif-
ication for the parties about sessions designated for their 
cases. 
'!be two preceding paragraphs shall not apply regarding cases 
in which decisiCllS have already been issued or tlx>se in which 
arguments have been canpleted am are held awaiting decisions. 
Article 77 
'!he Minister of Justice shall issue the necessary orders to 
implement this Law. Ministers shall within their respective 
pc:MeI"s implement the rules of this Law. 
Article 78 
'lhis Law shall be published in the Official Gazette am 
applied after two roonths of its date of publicaticn. 
1 Published in the Official Gazette issue 12, August 1973. 
2 As anended by Union Law 14/1985, pJblished 29.12.85 
3 Amerrled by Union Law 14/1985 
4 Arlended by Union Law 14/1985 
5 Amerrled by Union Law 14/1985 
6 Generally, hearin]s in trial of judges and their impeach-
IOOI1t, and decisions are passed by an impeachment council 
canposed of the President and the two r:rost senior of its 
judges or by the plenum of the Court in other cases. 
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Naticmality IBte of 
~t 
Egyptian 31 05 1973 
Egyptian 31 05 1973 
Egyptian 31 05 1 973 
Egyptian 31 05 1973 
Egyptian 31 05 1973 
Atrlul-Majid Al-Garaybeh Jordanian 30 07 1973 
AhzIej Sultan 
M::>haIrmrl Al-Mulhem 
Syrian 
Syrian 
Mustafa Al-Khalid (Alt) Syrian 
M::>hanmed Al--Qldi 
Mohamned Al-Bagdadi 
othman othman 
Amin Mazyad 
salah Al-Shash (Pres) 
O:u"wish Atrlul-Maj id 
Qna.r Awad 
Syrian 
Syrian 
Syrian 
Egyptian 
SUdanese 
M::>h 'd Al~izani (Alt) 'l\misian 
r-bh 'd Al-Baj ouri (Pres ) Egyptian 
Fahmi Al-Khayyat (Alt) Egyptian 
Al-Husni Al-Kanani Eyyptian 
11 08 1975 
26 08 1976 
22 09 1978 
24 09 1978 
07 041979 
10 09 1980 
21 12 1980 
03 02 1981 
27 01 1983 
01 09 1983 
03 02 1988 
17 02 1988 
03 03 1989 
03 03 1989 
IBte of 
Release 
16 04 1975 
03 05 1976 
26 09 1973 
01 06 1976 
01 01 1980 
29 07 1977 
25 08 1980 
25 09 1987 
14 05 1987 
09 09 1987 
01 01 1984 
21 09 1987 
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